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INTRODUCTION

In the eighth and the ninth chapters of his treatise "On the Three Primary
Hypostases" (V 1 [10]), Plotinus compiles the doxography of ancient philosophers
with regard to their attitudes towards the transcendent One. After remarking that
those who sided with Pythagoras and Pherecydes knew most about the One (9,27-

30), 1 he concludes his doxographical presentation:
But some of them worked out the idea fully in their own writings
( €~Et.py6:crmn:o €v o:\rtou;; o:\J't@v A.6you;;), others did not do so in written
works but in unwritten group discussions, or left it altogether alone (9,3032, tr. A. H. Armstrong).2
Plotinus is here making a distinction between those of the ancients who
have given a full written account of the doctrine of the One and those who have not
done so. The latter group is further subdivided into those who mentioned the
subject in umecorded seminar and those who have not mentioned it at all. Who
would Plotinus think belong to the first group? He indeed states that Plato's own
writings ('tole; o:u'tou "tou lIAa'tWV<><; ypaµµo:crtv) can be the evidence for the
ancient origin of his view of three hypostases (8, 13-14 ). Then, did Plato "fully work
out" the idea of the transcendent One in his dialogues? Plotinus assesses that his
doctrine of three hypostases is not explicitly (µil O:vo:nEn'to:µE:vwc;) stated in Plato's
writings (8,11-12). In fact, the modification µil aVO:TIETI'to:µE:vwc; would not go with
the verb €~Epya~Ecr0o:t. We know, as a historical fact, that Plato deals with the
transcendent Good in the metaphor of the sun in the Republic. But even if the
metaphor of the sun, in the Plotinian fashion, is taken closely with the deduction
from the first hypothesis in the so-called second part of the Pannenides and with
Diotima's talk about the Idea of the Beauty in the Symposium, we will be reluctant
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to admit that Plato did work out ( E~Epy6:~Ecr0at) the transcendent One or Good in
his own dialogues. We are left totally perplexed about which philosophers Plotinus
may categorize into the first group.
In spite of our perplexity, the above cited passage really adumbrates the
basic attitude of Plotinus towards his doctrine of the One; he assumes, as his own
philosophical task, to give a fully elaborate account of the highest principle in his
treatises.3 In order to work out

(€~Epy6:~Ecr0at)

his doctrine of the One in his

written works, Plotinus is forced to go through all the problems concerning the
nature and the activity of the One with indomitable philosophical spirit. He, against
Aristotle, posits the One beyond the self-thinking Intellect. Then, the question
naturally arises whether the One has intellection or not. If it does not, how can
intellection be justifiably denied to it? If the One has some hyper-noetic activity,
what may it be called? In which respect does it differ from intellection? These are
the basic problems, regarding the One's knowledge, which Plotinus must
unavoidably encounter in his endeavor to "work out" his doctrine of the One fully.4
Several critics have already undertaken the study of Plotinus' doctrine of
the One's knowledge. Rist's study in his book published in 19675 is the first major
effort to treat the issue. But he almost exclusively focuses upon the chronological
development of terminology that Plotinus employs in describing the One's hypernoetic activity. Deck's study in his book published in the same year6 is simply
intended to remark that super-knowledge is not absent from the One. Being quite
brief, it cannot be regarded as a full study of the issue. Finally, Bussanich
undertakes more extensive study of the problem in his recent book and article. 7 He
pays enough attention to the context in which a given crucial term occurs to
delineate the exact difference between the One and Intellect. Bussanich succeeds in
clarifying how Plotinus carefully calibrates his positive statements about the One's
inner life. But he does not fully analyze Plotinus' arguments for the absence of
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intellection from the One, so that his study does not sufficiently point out how the
positive and the negative descriptions of the One's knowledge are consistent with
one another within the comprehensive doctrine of the One. The problem, whether
the One has intellection or not, has grave significance since the answer to it
determines the basic character of the philosophy of Plotinus. Plotinus hence
devotes one treatise V 6 [24] and five chapters (chs. 37-41) of another treatise VI 7
[38] to the elaborate consideration of this problem. For the full study of the
doctrine of the One's knowledge, we cannot avoid carefully considering Plotinus'
arguments for the absence of intellection from the One.
In this dissertation, we shall analyze not only the affirmations about the
One's knowledge but the arguments for the absence of intellection and intellectual
consciousness from the One. With this analysis, we shall further inquire into the
following problems. First, is there any chronological development in Plotinus'
affirmations about the One's knowledge? Does he try to distinguish, by employing
technical terms and qualifications, the unique activity of the One from the cognitive
activities of Intellect and the soul? Second, what ontological status of the One
might serve as the ground for its cognitive activity? How is that ontological status
related to other doctrines of Plotinus? Third, how is the denial of intellection to the
One rooted in the fundamental thesis of Plotinus' philosophy, the absolute unity of
the One? Is there any chronological development in his arguments for this denial?
Fourth, how does Plotinus attempt to undermine the probable distortion of his own
doctrine, that is, the jump from the negation of intellection to the One to the
ascription of some pejorative terms to it? Does any affirmation about the One's
hyper-noetic activity satisfactorily dismiss this kind of misconstruction? Fifth, how
can the negation of intellection and the ascription of the hyper-noetic knowledge to
the One be coherent with each other? Again, how is the negation of intellection
coherent with the ontological status of the One which serves as the foundation for
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the affirmations about its hyper-noetic knowledge? Finally, how does the
chronological change, if any, in Plotinus' terminology describing the One's
knowledge influence the mode of coherence between the negation of intellection
and the ascription of the hyper-noetic knowledge to the One? For our inquiry to be
the full study of the One's knowledge, we must consider all these problems from
diverse angles.
What method should we take in order to work out the aforementioned
problems? It is clear that we must read Plotinus' texts very carefully from two
viewpoints, chronological and systematic. We can read the relevant passages from
the Enneads in the chronological order, referring to Porphyry's chronological list of
Plotinus' treatises (Vita Plotini, chs. 4-6), which the majority of scholars regard as
correct.8 But it does not suffice to read the key texts from the chronological point of
view alone. Since Plotinus' treatises are composed during his last seventeen years,
they show no substantial development in his system. His system seems to have
already emerged before he began his writing, so that he, in each treatise, seem to
presuppose the already emerged system. As Armstrong remarks, the treatises of the

· Enneads give us "an extremely unsystematic presentation of a systematic
philosophy."9 Hence we always need to bear the entire system of Plotinus'
philosophy in mind. Concretely speaking, for our issue, the consideration from the
systematic viewpoint reveals not only the theses which are consistently maintained
regarding the One's knowledge throughout all the periods of his writing but their
systematic relation to other theses constituting the doctrine of the One. From two
viewpoints, furthermore, we can even see the chronological development to the
extent that Plotinus has systematized his doctrine of the One.
Another point to be noticed in interpreting Plotinus' texts is that the real
object of our inquiry is his formal doctrine of the One's knowledge. The treatise VI
8 [39] comprises extremely positive and revealing descriptions of the One's inner
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activity. But, since Plotinus' descriptions in this treatise, as he himself mentions,
somewhat diverge from his formal doctrine, we must treat them with sufficient
circumspection and sensitivity. Our modus interpretandi of VI 8 [39] will be carefully
worked out in Chapter VI of Part 11.10
In order to undertake the full study of the One's knowledge, we cannot
avoid inquiring into the nature of intellection. Needless to say, the denial of
intellection to the One will be unfounded unless the nature of intellection is
sufficiently explored. Intellection represents the cognitive relation between thinking
subject and object thought. Plotinus' theory of the triple identity of Intellect,
intellection, and the intelligible objects is indebted, on the one hand, to Aristotle's
theory of divine intellection, but his doctrine of Intellect as a whole can be seen, on
the other hand, as the solution to the serious problem left in Plato's philosophy, how
it is possible to systematize harmoniously the cognitive relation between intellect
and the Forms, so that it does not infringe the Forms' immutability and complete
intelligibility, and the role of the Idea of the Good as the cause not only of intellect's
knowing and the Forms' being known but of the Forms' substantiality. In Plotinus'
philosophy, therefore, the nature of intellection is considered from diverse angles,
that is, the immutability and the complete intelligibility of the Forms, the
incorrigibility of Intellect, the possibility of true self-knowledge, and the relation of
Intellect to the One. Hence we may consider Plato' and Aristotle's theories of
intellection as the philosophical and historical background of Plotinus' doctrine of
Intellect. Through our consideration of Plotinus' view of intellection, moreover, the
reason why the One must be internally active will be revealed; the conception of the
One as essentially active directly leads to an affirmation about its knowledge. In
other words, the very reason why the One must possess some kind of knowledge will
be understood from the systematic point of view. The clarification of this reason
certainly indicates that Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge does not occupy a
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peripheral position in his philosophy, but is closely related to his doctrine of
Intellect.11 Before inquiring into the One's knowledge in Part II, we must thus
make a necessary detour, the exploration of Plato's, Aristotle's, and Plotinus'
doctrines of intellection in Part I.
What contribution should our inquiry make to philosophy in general? Our
inquiry would suggest what a theistic philosophical system should be, more
specifically, that any theistic philosophy must satisfactorily ground its philosophical
theology on its metaphysics. Take, for example, Aristotle's theology. Aristotle
indeed sufficiently grounds the existence and the substantiality of the unmoved
mover on his metaphysics. But the mystical self-contemplation of God and several
perfections attributed to him do not seem to be well founded on Aristotle's own
speculative philosophy.12 In turn, Plotinus' accounts of the inner life and activity of
the One, as our inquiry will show, are firmly based on the ontological status of the
One, which coheres with other theses in his metaphysics. Plotinus gives us a lesson
regarding how a description of divine inner life can be metaphysically founded, for
the inquiry into the structure of the great philosophical system unmistakably serves
as a necessary training towards the establishing of one's own philosophical position.

7
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lWe take 't<XirrT\V ••• 'tftV ct>vatv in 9,30 as the One. See M. Atkinson,
Plotinus: Ennead V. 1, a Commentary with Translation (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1983), p. 210.
2Tue basic text used in this dissertation is H-S2, the OCT edition of the
Enneads, Plotini Opera ediderunt P. Henry and H. -R. Schwyzer, 3 vols. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1964-1982) with later corrections, H. -R. Schwyzer,
"Corrigenda ad Plotini Textum," Museum Helveticum 44 (1987):191-210. All the
translations of the passages from the Enneads, unless mentioned otherwise, are
mine. Making a proper notice, we may sometimes diverge from the reading of the
basic text.
The referent of O:ypcXct>otc;; O'\JVouaiac;; in 9, 31-32 is disputed. Armstrong
supposes the reference to Plotinus' master Ammonius (Plotinus, a Text with an
English Translation, 7 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19661988; London: William Heinemann, 1966-1988), 5:45, note 3), whereas Atkinson
takes the reference to the unwritten doctrines of Plato (op. cit., p. 211).
3Plotinus usually calls his treatise a A.6y0<; (II 3 [52],1,4; III 1 [3],10,1; IV 4
[28],23,48).
4Jn this dissertation, we will use the locution "the One's knowledge" in a
rather extended sense; "the One's knowledge" means its cognitive activity or state in
general. The locution hence also covers a sort of consciousness to be attributed to
the One.

SJ. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1967), pp. 38-52.
6J. N. Deck, Nature, Contemplation, and the One: A Study in the Philosophy
of Plotinus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), pp. 17-21.
7J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, a
Commentary on Selected Texts, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988); idem, "Plotinus on the
Inner Life of the One," Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):163-189.
BA few doubts remain regarding the chronological position of III 9 [13],
which is in fact a collection of brief notes. As we shall see in Chapter IV of Part II,
the uncertainty of the chronological locus of III 9 [13] is not a serious difficulty in
our inquiry.
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9A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, l:viii.

lONeedless to say, the problem remains regarding the authenticity of
Plotinus' writings. The passage in II 3 [52],12,12-32 has been suspected to be
spurious. Since this passage has nothing to do with our present issue, the problem is
virtually cleared.
llAs we shall notice later, Plotinus formally gives a positive account of the
One's knowledge in only nine lines (V 4 [7],2,15-19; VI 7 [38],39,1-4). This fact
would be prone to make us neglect considering the exact position of the doctrine of
the One's knowledge in his entire system of philosophy.

12Tuis point is readily seen from the fact that many contemporary critics
(Burnet, Gohlke, Jaeger, Murrey, Nygren, Regis, Robin, and Ross), except for
Mansion and van Ivanka, suppose that some un-Aristotelian elements are mixed
into Aristotle's accounts of divine inner life. Of course, the incompleteness noticed
in Aristotle's accounts would be considerably due to the compositional causes of the
Metaphysics.

VOLUME I: PLATO, ARISTOTI.E, AND PLOTINUS ON INIBUECTION:

TIIE PIDLOSOPIDCAL AND IDSTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PLOTINUS'
DOCIRINE OF TIIE ONE'S KNOWLEDGE

INTRODUCTION

In terms of the long history of Greek philosophy, Plotinus' doctrine of the
One is placed in the general current of a quest of the apxn of all things, which
precisely goes back to Thales or Anaximander. His doctrine of the One's knowledge
answers the question of what kind of inner activity the apxn of all things has. In the
philosophical background of the doctrine, moreover, there is a problem concerning
the nature of intellectual knowledge or the cognitive relation between thinking
subject and object thought. Needless to say, Plotinus' denial of intellectual
knowledge to the One, which represents the negative aspect of his doctrine of the
One's knowledge, first becomes intelligible when the nature of intellectual
knowledge is fully clarified. Furthermore, Plotinus' affirmation about the One's
knowledge specifies its internal activity, which, as we shall see later, is called for by
his view of the relation between thinking subject and object thought, namely the
intellect-intelligible identity. Therefore the consideration of his notion of
intellectual knowledge and its historical sources constitutes a necessary prelude to
our inquiry into his doctrine of the One's knowledge.
In the first chapter, we shall discover the crucial problem in Plato's
conception of intellection. On the one hand, he claims the necessity of that which
transcends being for intellection directed to being to occur. On the other, he does
not give a definite account of the relation between intellect and the Form, which is
fully consistent with his theory of Forms.
9
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In the second chapter, we shall investigate the basic traits of Aristotle's
notion of intellection as the identification of the knowing subject and the object
known.
In the third chapter, we purport to inquire into Plotinus' philosophical
enterprise. First, Plotinus' doctrine of the intellect-intelligible unity, with a
complete mastery of the philosophical advantages of Aristotle's view, can
satisfactorily answer the problem left unanswered in Plato's dialogues; his doctrine
not only insures the infallibility of Intellect but also goes well with the fundamental
theses of Plato's theory of Forms. Second, Plotinus attempts to synthesize the
intellect-intelligible identity with the role of the hyper-ontic Good as the cause of
the Forms' substantiality, the role which the Platonic Form of the Good is assigned
in addition to its role as the cause of the Forms' intelligibility. In Plotinus' own
philosophy, this synthesis is achieved by means of the systematization of the
doctrines of the intellect-intelligible identity and of Intellect's relation to the One.
When the intellect-intelligible identity is fully unfolded to complete the notion of
self-intellection, the intelligible objects or Forms are to be regarded as themselves
being active, thinking, and living. If so, the One, as the cause of their substantiality,
must be active in itself. The One's knowledge is nothing less than the cognitive
specification of its inner activity. In short, the problem of the One's knowledge
unavoidably arises from the systematization of the doctrines of the intellectintelligible unity and of Intellect's relation to the One. The philosophical and
historical background of these well systematized doctrines of Plotinus, of course, will
be revealed by our inquiry in the first and the second chapters.

CHAP'IERI
INIEI.J.ECTION IN PI.A.TO

Introduction

What we shall explore in the following is not the full delineation of Plato's
doctrine, of vo\Jc; and v6ncru;, based on the exhaustive reading of his dialogues, but
the clarification of the prominent features in his doctrine; (i) his position that the
account for VOflcru; which properly concerns oucricx must call for something beyond
oucricx, namely the Idea of the Good and (ii) his endeavor to reconcile his
conception of VOflcru; with the immutability of the Form that is the fundamental
thesis of his theory of Forms. For this purpose we shall focus on the following
passages; (i) the allegory of the sun (Rep. 508a-509b ), (ii) the allegory of the divided
line (Rep. 509c-511e), and (iii) the problem concerning being (Soph. 245e-249d).
Someone might consider our exploration to be an effort to get the systematic picture
of Plato's doctrine from these two dialogues and thereby accuse us of overlooking
the chronological development of the theory of Forms in those dialogues. For
certain, the theory of Forms has developed in such a way that the intercommunication among the Forms is first fully explicated in the Sophist. As we shall see later,
however, the fundamental position of the theory of Forms that is represented by the
unchangeability of Forms is neither abandoned nor transformed in such dialogues
like the Parmenides and the Sophist, but is persistently and consistently maintained.
Our inquiry does not attempt at obtaining the full systematic picture of Plato's
doctrine of VOflcru;, but at thinking with Plato how he has to treat vou<;; and voricru;
for the immutability of Forms to be defended and the oucricx-y€vEcru; distinction to
remain a viable insight.
11
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1. Intellection in the Allegocy of the Sun (Republic 508a-509b)

Before going into details about the education requisite for the philosopherkings in the Republic, Plato mentions the supreme necessity for them to know the
essential nature of the good (505a2-b2, 506a4-7). The Platonic Socrates, however, is
afraid of telling an opinion without knowledge (506c2-3) and tries to avoid giving an
account of the good itself. Instead of clarifying "what the good itself is" (506d8-e 1),
he intends to meet the request of Adeimantus and Glaucon by offering "the interest
and child of the good itself' (507a3). "To pay the interest" means to present, without
directly arguing about the good itself, three allegories about it, the allegories of the
sun, of the divided line, and of the cave.1 In spite of the fact that the metaphors of
the sun and of the divided line are not devoted to the explication of the nature of

v&r,au;;, 2 we can see in them how v&r,au;; is related to oucri.o:.
Why is the sun introduced into the account for the Form of the Good? It is
first introduced with the remark that the presence of a third thing or light is
necessary for sight to occur (507dll-e2); and light comes from the sun (508a4-8).
The relationship between sight and the sun is explicated as follows:
(1) The sense of sight and the power of being visible are linked together by the

sun (507e6-508a2).
(2) Sight itself is not the sun (508all).
(3) The eye is not the sun. But it gets the power of seeing as a sort of
overflow from the sun's treasury (508all-b7).
(4) The sun itself is not sight (508b9).
(5) The sun is the cause (ah:ux;)3 of sight (508b9-10).
(6) The sun is seen (6pCi"rm) by sight itself (508b10).
There are a couple of points to be noticed. First, the complete disjunction
of the sun and sight is stressed by (2) and (4). The sun is then regarded as the cause
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of sight in (5). Hence (2), (4), and (5) seem to imply the separateness of the cause
from its effect, which is also one of the most prominent ontological principles shared
by the Neoplatonists.4 The transcendence of the Good over oucricx (509b9-10) must
be seen primarily in terms of the cause-effect separateness implied here. Second,
the status of the sun as the cause of sight is properly explained by (3). But we must
notice that the sun is not the cause solely of sight. Sunlight "makes our sight see in
the finest way and the seen things seen" (508a5-6),5 and "the sun provides the seen
things with the power of being seen" (509b2-3). In a word, the sun is causally related
not only to sight but also to the visible objects (508cl-2). Hence it is also
responsible for the visibility of those objects. In this sense, the sun or light can be
said to be "honorable yoke" (508a1)6 uniting the sense of sight and the power of
being seen. Third, we are told that sunlight as the cause of sight makes our sight see
in the finest way (0-n KcXAAtcn:a) and the seen things seen (508a5-6). By "the finest
way" Plato would mean the mode in which the things are clearly ( cra~) seen and
in which the pure vision (Ka0apex o"'tc;) is present in the eyes (508dl-2). The
fineness is found in the clarity of sight which is due to the sun. The sun is thus said
to be "an offspring of the Good" (508b12-13) whose value is "more precious

(i:tµurt€p4>)" (508al). Therefore it must be seen that the sun joins the eyes and the
visible objects so as to cause the eyes to see clearly and the objects to be clearly
seen. The sun is surely responsible for the best condition for sight. Finally, although
the sun is compared to the "yoke" (508al) that unites the sense of sight and the
power of being seen, it is seen (opfrtal, 508b 10) by sight itself. In other words, the
sun is placed on the side of the object seen.
Plato attempts to give an account of the relationship among the Form of the
Good, intellect, and the intelligible objects on the strict analogy of the
aforementioned relationship among the sun, the eye, and the visible objects
(508b13-c2). Strictly speaking, the eye (oµµa) would correspond to intellect (vo\X;;)
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and sight (o\jJu;;) to intellection (vm,ou;;).7 Let us enumerate what Plato says about
the relationship among the Idea of the Good, intellect, and the intelligible objects:
(1) The Form of the Good provides the things known with truth (6:Ai}0Eux) and
gives the power (Bvvcxµu;;) to the knower (508el-3).8
(2) The Form of the Good is the cause of knowledge ( €ntcn:flµTl)9 and of
truth-as-the-known (508e3-4 ).10
(3) As light and sight are not the sun itself but sunlike, knowledge and truth
are not the Good itself but like it (aycx0o€1.Bfy;) (508e6-509a4).
Although the word vOr,au;; does not occur in the description of the
intelligible realm, we may certainly take intellection as the actual exercise of
intellect,11 which is caused by the Form of the Good.
Plato's characterization of intellection in the metaphor of the sun can be
summarized as follows. First, intellection is directed to the Form; it is thought, but
not seen (voE1a0cxt µ€v, 6p<ia0cxt B' ou, 507b10). From such a status of the Form,
intellection, first of all, is seen as a purely intellectual activity making no use of
information supplied by the senses.12In other words, intellection does not concern
the sensible entities as its objects. From this, moreover, we can understand that
intellection has the highest degree of clarity just as sight is said to be clear and pure
by virtue of the sun (508dl-2). On the one hand, the Form intuitively known is
clearer

(acx~€aTEpov)

than the object discursively known (511c4-6). On the other,

when the soul fixes herself on the transient, sensible thing mixed with darkness (To
T4> OKOTq> KEKpaµ€vov), she opines and is dimmed

(oo~a~El TE

KCXt aµf3A.uwTTEl)

(508d6-9).13 Second, the object of intellection is the Form that is expressed as "that
which is (o €cn:tv)" (507b7) or "that which is illumined by truth and that which is (ou
KCXTcxAaµnEt 6:Ai}0EUX TE Kat TO ov)" (508d4-5). In the Phaedo, we read that the

o€cn:tv (75dl-2). The expression cxuTo o€aTtv is
interchangeable with ouai.cx and TO ov (78dl-5). Also in the Republic, Plato refers to
Form is by us put the seal cxuTo
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the Form using the word ovaia. 14 Hence the object of intellection is nothing other
than ovakx. From our present passage, however, it is not clear whether vo\K; is
categorized as ovaia or not.15 Third, no causal role in the occurrence of intellection
is assigned to the Form. As already seen, the Idea of the Good, but not the Form in
general, is the cause of knowledge. But this does not mean that the content of
intellection is not determined by the Form to which that intellection is directed.
When Plato defines the Good as the cause of knowledge, he does not mean that the
content of knowledge is determined by the Good, but that the Good unites the
knower and the known and thereby is responsible for the occurrence of intellection.
The truth as the known is situated in the Form, but not in the Idea of the Good.
Fourth, whether intellection can have the Form of the Good as its object, in other
words, whether the Idea of the Good can be known by intellection, is not clear
enough from the present passage. We must avoid, at least, concluding the
knowability of the Good from the visibility of the sun (508b9-10) to which it is
compared. As to the relationship between the Good and intellection, we can say
nothing more than that the former is the cause of the latter and that the latter
resembles the former.16 Finally, intellection is characterized as the ouvaµu;; (508c2)
of knowing. By ouvaµu;; Plato seems to mean that "by which (ale;;) we are capable of
what we are capable, and also everything is capable of whatever it is capable"
(477cl-2). As the causal dative ale;; indicates, actual agency is involved in Plato's
notion of ouvaµu;;. Hence Adam would be right in noting that since the power to
exercise the faculty of knowledge is "hardly different ... from the actual exercise of
Reason," "Plato's 't'TlV ouvaµtv, in fact, is nearly equivalent to Aristotle's 't'T,v
€v€pyEtav."17 In addition, intellection is the very power of knowing oval.a. As
Adam notes, "the faculty of vouc; is suddenly actualized into voriau;; by being turned
upon its proper object."18 In other words, intellection occurs when intellect and its
proper object are related to one another by their being respectively given the
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powers of knowing and of being known, so that it represents the actualized
conjugation between intellect and the Form by virtue of the Good. Then, how
should we understand this relation? Does the Form stand outside intellect? Or, as
Aristotle and Plotinus entertain, is the intelligible object identical with intellect
when the latter thinks the former? Since Plato, in the metaphor of the sun, intends
to show the value

(µn~6VW<;

'tlµrrr€ov, 509d4-5) of the Good in terms of its causal

function to unite intellect and its object, the separation between them prior to the
occurrence of intellection appears to be tacitly presupposed. From the present
passage alone, however, we cannot decide whether intellect thinks the object outside
itself or not, in other words, whether intellection is a sort of extroverted activity like
sight or not.
Through the above consideration, the connection between VOflO't<;; and
oucria becomes clear; oucria is the proper object of VOflO't<;;, and VOflO't<;;, precisely as
the o\Jvcxµu;; of knowing, is caused by the Form of the Good, which is beyond oucria
and itself not oucria (509b8-10).19 Whether that which is beyond oucria can be the
object of intellection is not sufficiently settled in the present passage. Moreover,
intellection which is the actual exercise of intellect, if Aristotelian terminology were
invoked, could be characterized as an €v€pyEta. In fact, Plotinus, following this
line, defines intellection as pure €v€pyEta. In order to explore other prominent
features in Plato's notion of intellection, let us move to the metaphor of the divided
line.

17

2. Intellection in the Allegocy of the Divided Line (Republic 509c-51 le)

Cornford analyzes several senses of v6nau; used in the sixth and the
seventh books of the Republic.W It means:
(1) the cognition of any objects or truths in the intelligible realm,
(2) the intuitive act of apprehending an Idea or a prior truth implicit in
conclusion, and
(3) the state of mind of one who sees with perfect clearness a completed
structure of truth illuminated by the unquestionable principle.
Some of these prominent features can be seen also in the section usually
called "the allegory of the divided line." Intellection is correlative to the upper
division of the intelligible realm (511d6-8). It is intuitive in that the soul inquires
into that realm by using no sensible images (510b7-8, 51 lcl). The clarity of
intellection mentioned in the metaphor of the sun is here reiterated {51 le3-4) and
linked with the clarity of the objects it apprehends.21
Our aim is not to examine Cornford's view critically. Before considering
several problems in our scope focused upon the relationship between vo\J<;;; and
oval.ex, we need to see what Plato intends to do in the present passage. Socrates,
recognizing a lot of things left unexplained in the metaphor of the sun (509c7),
proceeds to expound the metaphor of the divided line.22 He, first of all, reiterates
the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible realms (509dl-4) which has
already been made in 507b9-10. After going through two subdivisions of the visible
world (509el-510a10), Socrates begins to explain how the intelligible realm should
be bifurcated (510b2-9). But Glaucon cannot understand Socrates' explanation
{510b10), so that Socrates is compelled to account for the dividing of the intelligible
realm again at full length (510cl-511c2). Hence the substantial portion of the
metaphor is devoted to the dividing of the intelligible realm, of the objective side of
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the line, rather than the demarcating of v6nau; from ouivoLCX, on the cognitional
side of the line. Nevertheless, since cognitive powers are distinguished from one
another in terms of their correlative objects (477c9-d2), the distinction between
v6f1<7tA; and ouivota must be based upon the division of the intelligible realm.
Moreover, we must here keep in mind that "the dividing of the intelligible realm," as
we shall see, does not necessarily mean the hypostatizing of "intermediates" whose
ontological status is distinct from the Forms.
The first problem relevant to our inquiry concerns the referent of ouGicx
that vo\X; apprehends. More specifically, does intellect properly apprehend not only
the Forms, either adjectival (e.g., the Beautiful itself, 507b5) or substantival (e.g.,
Couch and Table, 596b3-4), but also the mathematical objects (e.g., the Square itself
and the Diagonal itself, 510d7-8) to which ouivota is related? The question is
answered by clarifying the ontological status of those mathematical objects. The
problem concerning their ontological status arises, precisely because they, though
seen by ouivota (511al), are nowhere described as otavorrc<X, while vo11i:6v is
exactly correlative to vo\X; or VOllO'IA;. Nevertheless, ever since Aristotle,23 many
doxographers and commentators have regarded the mathematical objects as the
distinct link between the Forms and the sensibles. This line is followed by Adam.24
His view seems to be based on his own observation that Plato speaks of a
multiplicity of mathematical units in 526a2-4, the multiplicity alien to the unity of
the Idea.25 To this observation, in fact, the plural aui:a i:a foa in the recollection
argument of the Phaedo (74cl) runs counter.26 More importantly, a careful reader
of Plato would easily acknowledge that he, in the Seventh Letter, 27 exemplifies 8 of)
YVWO''tOV 'tE

Kat c:xA119@<; EO''ttV OV (342b 1) by aui:Cx;; 6 KUKAO<,; ( c2-3 ). We are here

told that vouc;; is most akin to the Circle itself (dl-3) and that the Circle itself is
apprehended by vo\X; and, after their cognitive contact, engenders its concept in the
soul (i:a vEvotlµ.Eva, 343a2). May we conclude from these points that in their
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ontological status the mathematical objects are regarded as separate Forms also in
the allegory of the divided line? Ross, against Adam, tries to show that "the objects
of B1'lvot.a are not the 'intermediates' but are simply the mathematical Ideas."28 His
claim is based on three points. First, the mathematical objects are in 510d7-8
qualified by oo'.n:6, which is the hall-mark of a separate Form.29 Second, whereas
Plato describes the subsections of the lower section of the line by reference to their
own nature, he divides the subsections of the intelligible by distinguishing them as
two classes of objects respectively corresponding to two different mental states,

without referring to their own nature.'30 Finally, there is a textual evidence supporting
the possibility of mathematical objects being apprehended by v6ncnc;:
... you do not regard them (sc. those who behold with Bt6:vmcx) as
possessing intellect about those (mathematical) objects, although the
objects, when connected with the principle, are intelligible ( vo\Jv ouK
taxEtv nEpl cxfrra ooKo\Jcri crm, Kcxii:m voni:@v ovi:wv µEi:a apxl1c;) (51 ldl1).31
Here it is explicitly stated that the mathematical objects can be voni:6: when
a certain condition holds.3 2 What does this condition µEi:a apxl1c; indicate?
According to Ross, the passage in question implies that "the whole world of Ideas is
capable of being illuminated by the Idea of good, and studied by the method of
dialectic."33 First of all, we must keep in mind that µEi:a apxl1c; indicates En' apxi\v
to\Jcrcxv (511a5) or En' apxi\v avEA.06vi:Ec; (c8-dl).34 The ascent to the first
principle constitutes the part of dialectical process:
Well, then, go on to understand that by the other segment of the intelligible
I mean that which argument itself grasps (ani:Ei:m) with the power of
dialectic ... in order to reach what is free from hypothesis in the beginning
of the whole (Ent i:i\v i:o\J ncxvi:Oc; apxi\v). When it grasped (a~6:µEvoc;)
this, argument now depends on that which depends on the beginning and in
such fashion goes back down again to an end; making no use of anything
sensed in any way, but using fo{ms themselves, going through forms to
forms, it ends in forms too (511b3-c2, tr. A. Bloom).
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Now the meaning of µFta apxfl<; is clear; it refers to the ascent to and the
contact with the Form of the Good. Since the Good is said to be free from
hypothesis (510b7, 511b6), the phrase implies making no use of hypothesis, the use
of which might inevitably entail vo\Jv ouK '(axnv.35 In conclusion, the mathematical
objects can be apprehended by intellection, when we inquire into them without
recourse to their sensible images and the hypotheses about them. In other words,
the ouai.o: as the proper object of v611au; embraces not only the Ideas already
mentioned in the dialogue but the mathematical ldeas.36 It is not intermediates but
mathematical Ideas that are known by intellection when they are connected with the
first principle.
The above consideration leads us to the assurance that intellection is
directed solely to ouai.o: or an Idea. In the simile of the divided line, we encounter
another prominent characterization of intellection as one of "states arising in the
soul (na9ilµm:a E:v "CTI ljJuxn yiyv6µEva)" (511d7-8).37 Unfortunately the Republic
affords us no more information about this characterization, so that we need to turn
to the kinship argument in the Phaedo, where the word n6:911µa is used for
describing the soul's cognitive contact with the Form. After recalling the soul's
distraction and confusion by transient things which she apprehends through senseperception (79c2-8),38 Socrates describes her liberation from wandering by virtue of
her contact with immutable reality:
Whereas whenever it (sc. the soul) studies by itself, it departs yonder
towards that which is pure and always existent and immortal and unvarying,
and in virtue of its kinship with it, enters always into its company (aEt µEl:'
EKEivou 1:€ yiyvE"tat), whenever it has come to be alone itself, and
whenever it may do so; then it has ceased from its wandering and, when it is
about those objects, it is always constant and unvarying, because of its
contact (€~mnoµ€V'f1) with things of a similar kind; and this condition ("to
n6:911µa) of it is called "wisdom (~p6V'f1atc;)," is it not? (79dl-7, tr. D.
Gallop).
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Here we do not need to trouble ourselves about Plato's use of ~p6vriau;
instead of vCn,au;. Also in the above passage it is repeated that the use of senses
hinders the soul from the contemplation of the immutable Ideas; she must be alone
by herself (a\rtf\ Ka0' ooJ'tflV, dl, 4). Again, what is called ~p6vriau; is nothing but
the soul's contact with unvarying reality ('tow\n:wv E:cJ>cxm:oµE:vri, d6), just as
dialectic in the Republic is distinguished from mathematical sciences with regard to
the soul's contact with the first principle (a"'aµEVO<; cx\rtf\<;, 51 lb7). The above
passage mentions two other aspects of intellection as the state arising in the soul.
First, the soul becomes free from her wandering (nE:ncxv'tai ... 'tOU 1tA6:vov, 79d4-5)
in her envisagement of the Forms. When the soul is concerned with transient things,
on the contrary, she herself wanders (Kal av'tf\ 'JtAavCi'tat, 79c7). A similar idea is
reiterated in the fifth book of the Republic; since the phenomena are ambiguous
(E:mx~'tEpil;,Etv),

we cannot form any stable (nayiw<;)39 conception of them

(479c3-5). So the many beliefs of the sensible many ('ta 'tWV noU@v noUO:
v6µtµa), insofar as they are about the ambiguous, transient phenomena, roll around
(KVAlVOE'i'tat) between not-being and pure being (d3-5). Intellection is thus
conceived to be the fixed apprehension of the Forms which are always the same as
themselves and free from any ambiguity whatsoever. Second, the n6:0l1J.LCX called
~p6vriau;

is such a mental state that is always constant and unvarying around the

immutable Ideas (Kal nEpl EKE'iva 6:El Ka'ta 'tav'ta wam'.J'twc; EXEl, 79d5). The soul,
in her contact with the always self-identical Forms, no longer wanders. Thus the
above passage from the Phaedo reveals fixedness and immutability as the essential
characters of the n6:9l1J.LCX in the soul that she attains in her contact with the Forms.
In this state, she is no longer perplexed and confused by the transiency of the
phenomena.
The aforementioned passage from the Phaedo suggests that we may take
the characterization of intellection as the n6:9l1J.LCX with the soul's cognitive contact
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with the Forms also in the simile of the divided line; intellection is the na0ry..ux that
arises in the soul during her contact with the Forms. Since Plato often expresses this
as a vision of the Form, an ocular image, the above consideration suggests that a
tactile image, which marks intimacy between apprehending subject and object
apprehended, may be more appropriate to intellection. In fact, the verb

€cj><lni:Ea0at, in the above mentioned passage from the Phaedo, represents the soul's
kinship to the Ideas (79d3). On the soul's cognitive contact with the Ideas,
moreover, what is not said in the Phaedo is said in the Republic. In the latter, it is

cx\rcCx; o A.6ycx; that grasps (am:Ei:at) the higher division of the intelligible realm
(511b3-4).40 As already mentioned,41 A.6ycx; is the instrument whereby vouc;; works.
Cross points out that the emphasis here lies on hard argument rather than
immediate knowledge or knowledge by acquaintance.42 In the metaphor of the
divided line, therefore, intellection is more specifically regarded as the na0ry..ux
arising in the soul when she grasps the Forms by means of the A.6ycx; of dialectic.43
Through our reading of the metaphor of the divided line, several new
aspects of vOr,au;; have been revealed. First, not only the moral and aesthetic Forms
but the mathematical Forms are known by VOflau;;. 44 Second, intellection is
characterized as the na0ry..ux that arises in the soul through her cognitive contact
with the Forms by means of the A.6ycx; of dialectic. Moreover, this characterization
involves the tactile metaphor of intellection, which expresses the intimacy of the
soul's apprehension of the Forms to which she is said to have affinity in the Phaedo.
Nevertheless, the crucial point of the relationship between intellect and the Form is
not fully clear in the present passage. Does intellection occur when the soul acts on
the Form? Or, does it occur when she is acted on by it? Although the word na8fl1-Lcx
exactly means "state" or "experience" in Rep. 511d7, it is the antonym to noiflJ-LCX or

€pyov and usually connotes passivity.45 But we may not jump rashly from this
connotation to the conclusion that intellection is the state in the soul acted on by the
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Form. In this conception of intellection, needless to say, inheres such a difficulty
that we are forced to implant some agency in the Form. Plato, however, nowhere
speaks of the Idea's possessing agency.46 Now we must turn to another dialogue, the
Sophist.
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3. Intellection in the Problem of Being (Sophist 245e-249d)

The problem of the characterization of vCn,au;; as a m10yVJ.CX is, in fact,
inseparable from the problem of Plato's frequent description of the Form as 'to
VOfl'tOV.

What does this description mean? Is the Form related to intellect in such

a manner that the former is acted on by the latter? Or, as the ocular metaphor of
vision of the Form insinuates, is intellect acted on by the Form? Gottfried Martin
tackles this problem in his work on Plato's theory of Forms.47 Martin contrasts two
opposing views, the conception of intellection as pure reception that takes seriously
the ocular metaphorization of the vision of the Form and the idealistic
interpretation that appeals to the spontaneity of intellect. But his criticism is
exclusively focused on the extreme form of the latter, Natorp's position. Natorp
maintains that the A.6ym as thought-setting activity ground the truth of ov'ta.
Martin points out that Natorp's view is based on Phd. 99e and criticizes him for
illegitimately bringing the modern hypothetical interpretation of science into Plato's
quest for the cause by the method of hypothesis.48 After criticizing Natorp, Martin
turns to the passage from the Sophist, where "the friends of Forms" are forced to
accept that reality includes some movement (248d-249c), but he can find no
satisfactory answer. Again, he tries to find a solution in Rep. 597b-c, but is
perplexed by such uniqueness of the passage that the Idea is described as if it were
created by god. Eventually, Martin concludes his discussion by simply remarking,
without any textual support, that A.6y0<;; for Plato is active as well as passive.
Needless to say, Martin's tentative conclusion is not satisfactory enough, because it
does not fully clarify the relationship between intellect and Form. Is there no
solution to our present problem? Is there no clue in the passage of the Sophist
referred to by Martin? Let us carefully read that passage again.
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The argument in the Sophist first confronts the aporia of non-being (238d 12); without presupposing non-being, the actual occurrence of falsehood cannot be
explained (237a3-4) and thereby the definition of a sophist as an illusion-maker
becomes unfounded. The Eleatic Stranger then remarks that we are confused about
being as well as about non-being (243c2-5) and directs the dialogue to the problem
of being. As soon as the criticism of dualistic philosophers of nature and of
Parmenides the monist (243c-245e) is concluded, we are entangled in "something
like a battle of gods and giants between them over their quarrel about reality"
(246a4-5), the dispute between materialists and idealists. Whereas the materialists
believe that tangible body is the sole reality (246b 1), the idealists hold that the
incorporeal Forms are real:
Yes, and accordingly their adversaries (sc. idealists) are very wary in
defending their position somewhere in the heights of the unseen
maintaining with all their force that true reality ("rf\v aAfl0tvf\v ovcri.o:v)
consists in certain intelligible and bodiless Forms (VOfl'tcX CX't'ta Kat acrwµa'ta
E'lOfl). In the clash of argument they shatter and pulverize those bodies
which their opponent wield, and what those others allege to be true reality
they call, not real being, but a sort of moving process of becoming ( yE:vEcrtv
... $EpoµEVflV 'tlVa) (246b6-c2, tr. F. M. Cornford).
Here two points about the fundamental position of the idealists are to be
kept in mind. First, ovcri.o: is strictly distinguished from yE:vEcru;;.49 Second, the
Forms identified as ovcri.o: are the kinds of things known by intellect (VOfl'tcX CX't'ta,
b7). After criticizing the materialists (246e-247d), the Stranger tries to express a
mark (op<><;, 247e3, 248c4) of being in order to induce them to accept that even a
small portion of reality is incorporeal. The proposed mark is "anything that is so
constituted as to possess any sort of power either to affect anything else or to be
affected ('to Kat 6nmavouv KEK'tflµEVOV ovvaµtv Eh' El<; 'tO TtOlElV E'tEpov O'tlOUV
rtE$uKc'><; Eh' El<; 'tO na0E'iv)" (247d8-el).50 Let us call this mark "the ovvaµu;;
criterion of being" for convenience. The Stranger then begins to examine whether

26

the idealists may also accept this criterion of being. Unless they admit it, it will be
impossible for them to defeat the materialists in their battle about reality.51
The idealists who are now denominated "the friends of Forms (-ro\x; -r@v
ElOOJV ~\Aouc:;)" (248a4),52 however, are forced to make desperate efforts to defend
their own position by adamantly refusing to apply the ovvcxµu; criterion of being to
true being. The Stranger and Theaetetus as a spokesman of the idealists reconfirm
the fundamental position of the idealists, namely the distinction between oucrlo: and
yE:vEcru; (248a7-9), and then proceed to consider their view of cognitive contact
with each of being and becoming:
And you say that we have intercourse (KotVWV€lV) with Becoming by means
of the body through sense (Bl' cxlcr0iicrEW<;), whereas we have intercourse
with Real being by means of the soul through reflection (oul: A.oytcrµou).
And Real being, you say, is always in the same unchanging state (6:€l Kcx-ra
-rcxma ciJcrcxV"tW<; EXElV), whereas Becoming is variable (248a10-13, tr. F. M.
Cornford).
As Cornford points out,53 Plato uses the verb KotVWV€lV which is neutral
enough to cover all forms of cognition; the use of the verb here has no bearing on its
use later to describe the "intercommunication" of Forms. The idea of two
contrasted kinds of cognition, matching the oucrlo:-yE:vEcru; distinction, is not newly
introduced here. Already in the kinship argument of the Phaedo, we are told that
the soul considers transient objects by means of the body or sense (oul: -rou crwµcx-roc;

... Bl' cxlcr0iicrEW<;, 79c5), whereas she investigates constant Forms by herself alone
(cxU"ttl KCX0' CXU"ttlV, 79dl, 4). This idea is also found in the dialogue after the

Sophist; in the Timaeus, oucrlo: and yE:vEcru; are contrasted with one another just as
"CO ... VOllO'El µE-rCx A.6you TtEptA11Tt"tOV and "CO ... OO(TI µE"t' cxlcr9iicrEW<; 6:A6you
oo(cxcr-r6v are (28al-3). Another point to be noticed is the use of the word
A.oytcrµOc; for describing the soul's cognitive contact with the Forms. This use has a
precedent in Phd. 79a3, where the Forms are said to be apprehended by the
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reasoning of thought (i:&J i:Tl<;; ouxvoiac; Aoyta~). Furthermore, the immutability of
Forms is also here emphatically asserted with the very reminiscence of Phd. 79d5
and 80b2-3.54 Upon the idealists' position thus being more fully unfolded, the
Eleatic Stranger, taking cognitive intercourse with becoming and being in terms of
the ovvaµu; criterion of being, asks "the friends of Forms" whether they accept this
criterion:
But now what are we to take you as meaning by this expression 'intercourse
(KotVWVEtV)' which you apply to both [sc. becoming and being]. Don't you
mean what we described a moment ago? ... The experiencing an effect or
the production of one, arising, as the result of some power (na0Tl}J.CX il
noiTl}J.CX EK ouvaµEW<; i:tv<><;), from things that encounter one another
(248b2-6, tr. F. M. Cornford).
Seeing Theaetetus' inability to answer satisfactorily this query on behalf of
"the friends of Forms" (248b6-7), the Stranger pronounces their supposed reply:
Well, to that they reply that a power of acting and being acted upon belongs
to Becoming, but a power which is neither of these powers ( i:ovi:wv
oooEi:E:pou i:f}v ovvaµtv) is compatible with Real being (248c7-9, tr. F. M.
Cornford, adapted by A. Sumi).55
"The friends of Forms" admit the ovvaµu; criterion of being as applying
only to becoming,56 but not to true being. But the Stranger points out that the
relationship of ytyvwaKElV and ytyvwaKEa0m is found between the soul and true
being (248cll-d2) and further that this relationship exactly embodies that of activity
and passivity (248d4-7). The knowability of the Forms, as already seen, belongs to
the fundamental position of the idealists (VOT)i:a chi:a, 246b7). But they also here
refuse to view the soul's cognitive contact with true being in terms of the activepassive relationship:
If knowing is to be acting on something, it follows that what is known must
be acted upon by it; and so, on this showing, Reality when it is known by the
act of knowledge must, in so far as it is known, be moved (KtVEta0m) owing
to being so acted upon; and that, we say, cannot happen to the motionless
(i:o TipEµotlv) (248d10-e4, tr. F. M. Cornford, adapted by A. Sumi).
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To regard the relationship of knowing and being known in terms of that of
acting and being acted on is incompatible with the immutability of true being known
by the soul. As already seen, the immutability of true being constitutes the
fundamental position of the idealists (248a12). Hence they defend their own camp
by firmly refusing to view knowing in terms of activity and passivity. But we must
not jump rashly from this refusal to the conclusion of our problem. There seem to
remain at least two problems for further consideration. First, who are "the friends
of Forms"? If they are not Plato himself, the present passage has no bearing on our
present problem which has been raised in our discussion of the metaphor of the
divided line in the Republic, and so the problem is left unanswered. Second, when
"the friends of Forms" are identified as Plato himself, may we draw a conclusion
directly from the above considered passage? Is the ignored possibility that the soul
is acted upon by the Form compatible with the constancy of real being? Or, if the
soul's knowing of the Form is totally divorced from activity and passivity, what kind
of cognitive contact must be appropriately conceived between them?
The theory of "the friends of Forms" in discussion, as many critics observe,57
seems to represent Plato's own theory in the middle dialogues. Cornford defends
this view as follows.58 First, true being is spoken as separate (xwpic;, 248a7) from
becoming. Also in the Pannenides, the theory of Forms that young Socrates presents
stresses the separateness of the Form from its participant thing (130b2, 3, cl, dl)
and from its immanent character (Tl<; tiµElc;; 0µ01.6-nrr:0<; €xoµEv) (130b4).59 Still in
the Timaeus, we are told that being and becoming must be distinguished from one
another (olCXtpE"r:€ov, 27d5). The separateness of Forms from phenomena is thus
persistent as the core of the theory of Forms through the middle and the late
dialogues; it can be said to be the core of the theory precisely because the
immutability of the Forms can be insured only insofar as they are sharply
distinguished from transient phenomena.60 Second, "the friends of Forms" speak of
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two contrasted kinds of cognition, intercourse with becoming through sense and that
with real being through reflection. As already seen, this contrast, with the
distinction between two realms of objects, is persistent through the middle and the
late dialogues.61 Finally, "the friends of Forms" emphasize immutability as the mark
of real being and variability as the mark of becoming. The unchangeableness of the
Forms is asserted in the middle dialogues, especially in the Phaedo, with full
emphasis. This thesis is also never absent from the late dialogues; we are told in
Tim. 28c5-29a8 that the Demiurge's formation of the good universe must rely on his

contemplation of the eternal, immutable paradigm. Thus seen, the position of "the
friends of Forms" turns out exactly to represent the fundamental theses of the theory
of Forms which persist through the dialogues before and after the Sophist. Besides
these remarks by Cornford, the proposed identification is supported by the fact that
"the friends of Forms" succeed in defending, at least eristically, their own position by
adamantly refusing to think of cognitive intercourse with true being in terms of
activity and passivity. The Form, which is said to be -ro iipEµouv (248e4), is never
acted on in being known. The denial of passivity to the Form is explicitly stated not
only in one of the middle dialogues (Symp. 211b4-5 µr)OE: n:O:crxEtV µr)O€v)62 but also
in the Seventh Letter written in the last period of Plato's life (342c3 oooE:v n:O:crxEt).
The immutability of Forms, which is the very kernel of Plato's theory of Forms, is
here, however only eristically, successfully defended by the desperate efforts of the
idealists.63
"The friends of Forms" being identified as Plato himself in the middle
dialogues, especially in the Phaedo, the Republic, and the Symposium, we can
conclude that Plato himself refuses to think of cognitive intercourse with true being
in terms of activity and passivity. Traditionally, however, the present course of
argument has been variously interpreted. As Cornford points out,64 the possibility is
ignored that knowing is an affection of the soul, acted on by the Form. From this
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some critics infer that this ignored possibility is Plato's own doctrine.65 Overlooking
the point that the refusal to envisage cognitive intercourse with the Form in terms of
activity and passivity safeguards the impassability of the Form as stated in Symp.
21lb4-5 with emphasis, other critics still believe that it can be accepted for Plato
himself to regard knowing as a form of acting and being known as a form of being
acted on.66 In the following argument (248e6-249b4), the idealists admit that i:o
ncxvtEA@c;;

ov (248e7-249al) must include some movement.

Does this force the

idealists or Plato to consider cognitive contact with the Form in terms of activity and
passivity? We need to go ahead to read the rest of the dialogue.
After "the friends of Forms" has defended the immutability of Forms by
insisting that the Form as i:o iipEµovv does not undergo any change in being known
(248d10-e4), the argument takes a different turn. Now the Stranger speaks out what
he thinks about the idealists' position:
But tell me, in heaven's name: are we really to be so easily convinced that
movement, life, soul, understanding have no place in that which is
completely real (i:Gi ncxvtEA@c;; ovtl) -- that it has neither life nor thought,
but stands immovable in solemn aloofness (crEµVOV KCXl aytov), dovoid of
intelligence (vo\Jv ouK €xov)? (248e6-249a2, tr. F. M. Cornford, adapted by
A. Sumi).67
How does the refusal to introduce activity and passivity into the realm of
oucrio: entail the absence of intellect from the realm of i:o ncxvtEA@<; ov? Is i:o
ncxvtEAw<; ov identical with oucrtcx entertained by the idealists? The Stranger's
response, prima facie, can be said to be a sort of OTlJ..l.Eyopio: or clap-trap. But to
answer the Stranger's question affirmatively, supposes Theaetetus, would force us to
accept a terrible doctrine (249a3). Now the dialogue abruptly moves from the
examination of the idealists to the argument for the reality of movement. In the
argument that aims at recognizing soul, intelligence and life in complete being
(249a4-b2), movement comes to be placed within complete being: "In that case we
must admit that what moves and movement are real things" (249b2-3, tr. F. M.
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Cornford, adapted by A. Sumi). Then the Stranger criticizes the Eleatic and the
Heraclitean positions separately (249b5-c9) and concludes the argument:
On these grounds, then, it seems that only one course is open to the
philosopher who values knowledge and the rest [sc. ~p6vriau; and vovc;]
above all else. He must refuse to accept from the champions either of the
One or of the many Forms the doctrine that all Reality (i:o ncxv) is
motionless; and he must tum a deaf ear to the other party who represent
Reality (i:o ov) as everywhere moved. Like a child begging for 'both,' he
must declare that Reality or the sum of things (i:o ov 'tE Kat i:o ncxv) is both
at once--all that is unmovable and all that is in movement (249c10-d4, tr. F.
M. Cornford, adapted by A. Sumi).
The dialogue hereafter remarks the distinctness of being from both
movement and rest and moves to the argument about intercommunication among
Forms.
What has been established in the above mentioned course of the dialogue,
as Cornford notes,68 is that we ought not any longer to speak as if the Form were
the whole of reality and that the idealists are required to admit spiritual motion into

i:o navi:EA.@c; ov. But the introduction of spiritual motion into that which is
completely real, of course, does not lead to the representation of the Form as some
moving and thinking entity.69 Again, it does not mean that the Form may be moved
in being known.70 This introduction is never inconsistent with the idealists' refusal
to consider the soul's cognitive intercourse with the Forms in terms of activity and
passivity.71 The idealists would not be reluctant to accept spiritual motion in i:o

navi:EA.@c; ov.72 They, being different from the Eleatic philosophers who deny any
movement whatsoever, 73 have only to reject such movement that might compromise
the immutability and immobility of Forms.74
Before concluding our inquiry into the Sophist, we need to ascertain Plato's
own position in the above considered passage. First of all, it is certain that "the
friends of Forms" represent Plato's theory in his middle dialogues, inter alia, the
Phaedo, the Republic, and the Symposium. The Stranger's claim that i:o navi:EA.@c;
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ov must include spiritual and noetic movement does not oppose the theory of
Forms, unless that movement is conceived to infringe the unchangeability of Forms.
To be sure, his claim prepares for the argument regarding intercommunication
among the Forms by stressing the reality of movement. Nevertheless, the Stranger's
reaction to the idealists seems to reflect Plato's self-examination of his theory in his
middle dialogues. Plato here examines such tendencies of his ovcri.cx-y€vEcru;;
distinction that often represents the vorrr6v-6pat6v distinction alone and so is
prone to leave the ontological status of cognitive subject, soul and intellect,
unexplained.75 If that distinction is confined solely to the distinction of cognitive
objects, the idealists who hold it cannot put up a good fight against the materialists.
Insofar as the reformed materialists have been forced to admit the absurdity of
regarding invisible virtues as either having no place among real things or being all
corporeal (247b7-c2), the idealists are not allowed to exclude soul and intellect from
the realm either of ovcri.cx or of y€vEcru;;. Soul and intellect must have their place
among either ovcrla'. or y€vEcru;;. But to categorize them into y€vEcru;; is
inconsistent with their own theory of two kinds of cognition (248al0-11). Hence
they must by all means be placed among the realm of ovcrla'.. Here Plato exactly
comes to be confronted with the problem how we can integrate immobile Forms,
soul, and intellect into the unified whole. It is Plato's own awareness of this
problem that we can ascertain in the Stranger's reaction to the idealists. Although
this problem is left unanswered,76 the thesis that the whole world of real being must
include spiritual and noetic movement, unless that movement infringes the Forms'
immutability, seems to belong to Plato's own position.
In conclusion, we may read passivity neither into the characterization of
intellection as na011JJ.CX EV i:n

IJ1uxn yiyv6µEVCX in Rep. 51 ld7-8 nor into the frequent
characterization of the Form as i:o VOfl'tOV. Although we are in the metaphor of the
sun told that the Idea of the Good provides the soul with the power of knowing and
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the Form with the power of being known, we may not take these powers as the
powers, of acting and of being acted on, that are suggested in the Sophist as the
criterion of being.n When the soul knows the Form, she neither acts on it nor is
acted on by it. We may not understand the soul's apprehension of the Form in
terms of the sharp bifurcation of subject and object. We are told that the soul, in
contemplating alone by herself, is always with the Form (aEl µE-r' EKEivov 'tE

ytyvE'tCXl, Phd. 79d3) and in contact with it (i:moirtwv €4>cxn-roµ€\ll1, d6). Their
cognitive intercourse is of immediacy, intimacy, and some loose unity rather than of
subject-object oppositeness and sharp duality. To this extent, intellection cannot be
appropriately compared to sight which presupposes the sharp distinction between
eye and visible object. We must notice that the reason why intellection is compared
to sight in the metaphor of the sun is to stress the value and diginity of the Form of
the Good that is responsible for intellection by showing the analogy between the
intelligible realm and the visible in which the sun or light conjoins the eye and the
object seen. Strictly speaking, the analogy here shown is not of the emergent
process of sight to that of intellection but of the relationship among eyes, visible
object and the sun to that among intellect, the Form and the Idea of the Good. The
theme in the metaphor of the sun is not intellect's apprehension of the Form, but
the value of the Idea of the Good responsible for that apprehension. In the Sophist,
then, we can see another characterization of intellection. Intellection is here
explicitly associated with movement. But intellection as movement does not occur
by itself. As without any immobile entity there is no intelligence (249b8-10),
intellection is the movement that is always directed towards the immobile Forms.
Or we can render it as such movement that involves the €pwc;; to aspire the
immutability and immobility of the Form which the soul lacks in herself. In
addition, this movement is supposed to be free from activity and passivity, because
both the Form's being moved by the soul and the soul's being moved by the Form
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would necessarily infringe the fundamental thesis in the theory of Forms, namely the
Forms' immutability.78 But there remains a problem. If we are not allowed to think
of cognitive intercourse between the soul and the Form in terms of activity and
passivity, what kind of cognitive relationship can we conceive between them? It can
be seen from the above mentioned passage from the Phaedo (79d3) that this
relationship is essentially of intimacy and affinity, but not of sharp oppositeness of
subject and object. Plato simply indicates that intellection involves neither acting
nor being acted on in order to defend the unchangeability of Forms and leaves
intellect's relatedness to the Forms not fully clarified.
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4. Conclusion

Let us summarize our inquiry into the relationship of vffilau; to oval.a and
other key notions in Plato's philosophy.
1. On the one hand, vffilau; is always vffilau; of oval.a which is the Form and

thereby must presuppose oval.a for its occurrence. On the other, insofar
as the Form is not a vCn,µcx, it does not depend on vffilau; for its
existence. Hence oval.a is ontologically and gnoseologically prior to

VOf\au; in that the latter is dependent on the former for its occurrence.
2. Although the content of vffilau; is determined by the Form which VOf\au;
concerns, Plato does not ascribe a causal role to the Form. The Form of
the Good that is not oval.a but beyond oval.a is regarded as the cause of
intellect's knowing and of the Form's being known. Hence the cause of

vffilau; itself lies beyond oval.a.
3. Nffilau; properly concerns oval.a. The Idea of the Good is beyond ovai.a.
Plato does not explicitly answer whether the Idea of the Good can be
apprehended by v6Ttau; or not. 79
4. Although VOT\au; is the ouvaµu; of knowing oval.a (Rep. 508e2), it is that
ouvaµu; which is neither of acting on oval.a nor of being acted on by
oval.a (i:ofrrwv oooEi:€pov i:i)v ouvaµtv, Soph. 248c9).
5. Without KiVTtau;, on the one hand, we cannot possess voDc; (Soph. 249b5-6).
Without stability, on the other, voDc;; is eliminated from the realm of true
being (249b8-10). Whereas v6Ttau; is characterized as a sort of KlVf\atc;,
it is precisely that KiVTtatc; which is always directed towards the immobile
Form. The Form, on the contrary, can exist and subsist apart from any
spiritual and noetic movement. Thus the ontological priority of oval.a to

voDc;; or VOf\atc;; is also here obvious. Again, the Form is not moved by
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voV<; in being known, though v6rpu; is considered to be the upward

KiV'flO'u; towards the Form.
6. Needless to say, Plato has not entertained Aristotle's terminus technicus
E:v€pyE:ux. He does not define vCn,au; as the E:v€pyE:ux of voV<;.80
Nonetheless, such commentators like Adam and Apelt are not reluctant
to characterize v&r,au; as the E:v€pyE:ux.81
What is worthy of special mention in Plato's view of v&r,au; is that that
which is not OUCJ'lcx but beyond ouaia, rather than ouaia, itself is regarded as the
cause of v&r,au;. The Form of the Good is indispensable for the account for voriau;
to occur. Moreover, the cognitive relation of voV<; to oval.ex is not fully explained. It
has only been suggested that this relation must not be seen in terms of activity and
passivity. Then, how does voV<; apprehend OUCJ'lcx and that which is beyond oual.cx?
What kind of spiritual movement may we think between vouc; and oval.ex? If the
Form of the Good can be somehow apprehended, how does that privileged
apprehension differ from voriau; proper? Plato has left these crucial questions
unanswered. They are exactly what Plotinus tries to solve in his doctrines of the

voV<;-vorii=ov identity and of the relationship of Intellect to the One.
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N01ES

lWe may not confine the referent of "the interest of the good" solely to the
metaphor of the sun. In 517a8ff., Socrates connects the allegories of the sun and of
the divided line with that of the cave and then says:
"... then you will be in possession of what I surmise ( €A.nl.Oo<;) since that is
what you wish to be told" (517b5-6, tr. F. M. Cornford).
Adam remarks that the difference of tone produced by €A.nl.Oo<; (b6)
recalls 506e, where the child of the good is mentioned. See The Republic of Plato,
edited with Critical Notes, Commentary and Appendices by J. Adam, 2 vols., 2nd
ed., with an Introduction by D. A. Rees (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1963), 2:96. Jowett and Campbell also take b6 ETtEt0f\ ... aKounv as referring to
506d2-3 where Glaucon asks Socrates to go through the good. See Plato's Republic,
the Greek Text with Notes and Essays by B. Jowett and L. Campbell, 3 vols.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894; reprint ed., New York, London: Garland, 1987),
3:320. Hence it is seen that three allegories, supplementing one another, constitute
"the interest of the good."
2In the metaphor of the divided line, nevertheless, it is easily seen that the
passage primarily focuses on the distinction between voriat.c;; and ot.O:voux. Although
Socrates' remark on the inadequacy of the allegory of the sun (509c5-d6) indicates
that the passage about the divided line is continuous with that about the Form of the
Good (see W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951;
reprint ed. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976), p. 45), this continuity itself
does not explain how the allegory of the divided line is pointed to the account of the
Idea of the Good. The allegory begins with the distinction between the intelligible
and the visible realms (509dl-4), the distinction which has already been introduced
in the metaphor of the sun (508b12-c2; see also 507b9-10). The allegory of the
divided line is devoted to the consideration of the distinction of two realms ruled
(13aat.AEuElV, 509d2) respectively by the Form of the Good and the sun, without
referring to them. The allegory seems to complete the metaphor of the sun not only
by elaborating on the visible and the intelligible realms but, more importantly, by
defining the relationship between those realms in terms of paradeigmatism; unless
the realm which the sun as "the image (hK6va) of the Good" (509a9) governs is
regarded as the copy of the realm in which the Good dominates, the latter metaphor
is not adequate. In other words, the metaphor has connected the Good and the sun
by the archetype-image relationship without defining the sensible realm as the
shadow of the intelligible. For the simile of the divided line as containing the
"paradeigma" idioms with regard to the relationship between Forms and
phenomena, see N. Fujisawa, ""EXElV, ME'tEXEtv, and Idioms of 'Paradeigmatism'
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in Plato's Theory of Forms," Phronesis 19 (1974):42.
3See also 508a4 al"tuioao0a:t.
4Plotinus, VI 9 [9],6,54-55; Proclus, Elementatio Theologica, prop. 75.
5See also 507dll-e2. We here, following Adam (The Republic of Plato,
2:57), propose to retain the manuscript €v cx\rtolc; (d12), understanding <XlTt'OL<; as
"tO'lc; opwµEVOL<;. Although the inherence of color in the visible object is clear from
508c5, the fact that the colors themselves are treated as the objects of sight, without
alluding to the visible objects in which they inhere, shows that the distinction
between the color and the object in which it inheres is not essential to the theme in
the metaphor of the sun.
6Heidegger, referring to this phrase, expresses the shift of the locus of
truth in Plato's philosophy: "Die cU.t10Eto: kommt unter das Joch der IB€a" in Platons
Lehre von der Wahrheit, 3rd ed. (Bern, Munich: Francke Verlag, 1975), p. 136.
Friedlander, in his controversy with Heidegger, rightly proposes to alter "the IB€a" to
"the highest IB€a" and points out the illegitimacy of Heidegger's transforming the
yoke of conjunction to a yoke of subjection. See Platon, 3 vols., 3rd ed. (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter, 1964), 1:241-242. With Friedlander, we take the present
comparison as expressing conjunction.
7See J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, 2:60. We cannot agree at Adam's
equation of truth with light. Truth rather seems to correspond to "the power of
being seen" (507e6-508al), since the sun and light are not fully distinguished from
one another in the allegory.
8See also 517c4 aV"tft Kupicx cU.t10Eto:V Kal vo\Jv napaoxoµ€vri.
9Here E:mo"ttlµfl is equivalent to the exercise of intellect, v611ou; or
yv@au; (J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, 2:60). Compare 508e2 Kali:&>
ytyvwoKOV"tl "tftV ouvaµtv 6:nool.00v with 509a6-7 EntO"'ttlµflV ... napEXEl.
lOWe here read the codex A We; ytyvwoKoµ€VT1<;;, follow its punctuation,
and thereby do not adopt Adam's emendation We; ytyvwoKoµ€vriv.
Adam presents three reasons for his emendation (The Republic of Plato,
2:61). First, he attempts at showing that We; ytyvwoKtµ€vriv is in predicative
agreement with ali:icxv after OlCXVOOU by alluding to Pol. 258c6-7 naoac; i:ac;
E:moi:tlµac; We; ouoac; ooo E't'.011 ouxvo110f1vat. But, if this allusion is legitimate,
ouxvoou is related to two participles, ouoav and ytyvwoKoµ€vriv, and the former
participle sounds redundant. The reading based on the manuscript seems to be
certainly more straightforward; ouxvoou is related to ali:icxv ... ouoav and cU.119Eicxc;
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to cix;; ylyvwaKoµE:VT1<; alone. (Chambry wrongly takes cix;; ylyvwaKoµE:VT1<; also
with €nunfv.,Lfl<;: "dis-toi qu' elle est la cause de la science et de la verite, en tan
qu'elles sont connues.") Second, Adam claims that his emendation provides the
counterpart of the visibility of the sun mentioned in 508b9-10. Although we have
been told that the visible and the intelligible realms are strictly analogical to one
another (508bl2-c2), it seems rash to derive the knowability of the Form of the
Good from their mutual correspondence and the visibility of the sun which is the
offspring of the Good. Such a crucial problem like the knowability of the Form of
the Good must not be considered solely on the analogy of the visibility of its
offspring, but needs independent discussion. Moreover, Adam does not notice the
fact that the instrument of knowing the Good is not mentioned in the present
passage, whereas that of seeing the sun is mentioned in 508b 10. If he were to take
the present passage as the real counterpart of 508b9-10, he should subscribe to
Ficino's reading 01.CX voti ("per intellectum") for Ol<Xvooti. This would surely
undercut the first reason presented by Adam himself. Finally, Adam observes that
ylyvwaK0µ€11T1V µ€v balances ofrrw 0€. He explains the implication governed by
the binary particles as follows: "though apprehended by Knowledge, and therefore
in some sense subject thereto, the Idea of Good is (as being the cause of both) more
beautiful than Knowledge and Truth." The binary particles, µ€v and oE:, do not
always mean concession. It would be more natural to take the particles as
contrasting cxli:icxv ... €mcnfv.,Lfl<; ... Kcxl cXA.110Eicx<; (508e3-4) and aµ<f>oi:E:pwv ...
yvwaEW<; 'tE Kcxl cXA.110Eicx<; ( e4-5). Furthermore, we cannot see why it is consistent
with the status of the Good as the cause of knowledge to say that the Good
apprehended by knowledge is subject to it. Again, we cannot see whether the object
of knowledge is necessarily subject to knowledge or not.
In the appendix to his commentary on 508e3ff., Adam further argues
against cix;; ylyvwaKoµE:VT1<; (ibid., 2:83-84) and raises three objections. First, Adam
claims that the force of the particles µ€v and oE: is not clear enough in the Oxford
editors' explanation that "the idea of good 'is indeed (µE:v) the cause of knowledge
and truth, but (0€) it is other and fairer than they"' (B. Jowett and L. Campbell,
Plato's Republic, 3:306). But, since those particles are not necessarily taken as
marking concession, this objection is not well founded. Second, Adam maintains
that OlCXVOE'ia0m can hardly be used with a participle when it is unaccompanied with
clx;. Whereas this grammatical rule can apply to Theaet. 158b3-4 cix;; nEi:6µEVOl ...
OlCXVoWV't<Xl, Pol. 261all-b2 mxvi:cx<; OTIOO'O\J<;
CXpXOV't<X<; OlCXVOfl0WµEV €mi:a~€l
npoaXPwµE:vou<; runs against it. This objection thus turns out to be based on
Adam's own fabrication of the grammatical rule. Finally, Adam, criticizing the
Oxford editors' translation, regards as unnecessary the limitation that "the cause of
knowledge and of truth so far as the latter is known" (B. Jowett and L. Campbell,
Plato's Republic, 3:306). This passage, however, exactly reiterates 508el-2 i:o i:i)v
<XA.fl0ElCXV mxpE:xov i:ol<; ylyvwaKoµE:vou; and thereby is hardly meaningless.

av
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Against the limitation in discussion, Adam holds that "the Idea of the Good is the
cause of all Truth, known and unknown" (The Republic of Plato, 2:83). This view is
unconvincing. In the description of the sun, as already mentioned, the value is
recognized in the function of light that unites the eyes and the things as to make the
objects clearly seen. On the analogy of this value, if truth is not apprehended by
intellect, where can we find the value and honor of the Good? The value of the
Good must be found in its sustaining the relationship between intellect and the
Form by giving knowledge to the former and truth to the latter. Only insofar as
truth is apprehended by knowledge, hence, is the Idea of the Good worthy of being
called the cause of truth. To say that the Good is the cause of even truth unknown
would annihilate the very goodness of the Good.
To dismiss Adam's emendation, of course, does not imply the negation of
the intelligibility of the Idea of the Good. Even if his emendation is justified, we
cannot conclude the knowability of the Good directly from the emended text. The
problem of the intelligibility of the Good calls for serious argumentation for its
sufficient treatment.
llSee note 9.
12See L. C. H. Chen, "Acquiring Knowledge of the Ideas in the Phaedo,"
Rheinisches Museum far Philologi,e 133 (1990):53-54; J. H. Lesher, "The Meaning of
NOYL in the Posterior Analytics," Phronesis 18 (1973):50.
13Jn 478c10-15, we are told that yv@au;; surpasses oo~a in clarity
( crO'.~T\VEi.c;x) and that the latter is darker (crKO'twOEo-r:Epov) than the former.
14485b2,523a3,524el,525b5,c6.
15Schwyzer observes that Plato's vo\k; in the allegory of the sun is neither
reality nor substance, but process or attribute. See "'BewuBt' und 'UnbewuBt' bei
Plotin," in Les Sources de Plotin (Geneva, Vandoevres: Fondation Hardt, 1957), p.
346. Schwyzer's observation would be correct insofar as it concerns Republic VI;
intellection, as we shall see, is one of na9fu.uxi:a €v i:n ~uxn ytyvoµ€va (511d7-8).
In Phlb. 22c, however, Plato sharply distinguishes "the true, divine intellect" and "my
intellect." Hackforth takes the latter as the self-projection of the former and
comments onPhlb. 30c9-10: "It is qua projected that voD<; must be ouK CXVE\J ~uxTl<;
...." See Plato's Examination of Pleasure, translated, with an Introduction and
Commentary, by R. Hackforth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945), p.
57, note 10. The possibility of transcendent intellect existing apart from the soul is
nowhere denied by Plato himself.
16In Rep. 517cl, we are told that the Good is barely seen (µ6yu;; 6pacr9m).
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Because of the use of the somewhat metaphorical 6piia0at, we may not read the
.knowability of the Good by intellection from this passage. In the passage dealing
with the final task of guardians (540a7-9), on the other hand, the Good is said to be
seen (lOOvra<;;) by the beam of the soul (-rf\v -rll<;; lJluxll<;; cx\Jyhv). From this mystic
expression and the qualification µoytc;; in the former passage, it is seen that some
special effort is needed for the contemplation of the Good, an effort which is not
necessary for the contemplation of the Form in general. Moreover, the Good is
elsewhere described as if it can be known by intellection (nplv
au-ro 0 EO'TlV
aya0ov cx\J-rij vaftaEt Mlln, 532a7-bl). Hence it seems almost impossible to settle
the problem of the knowability of the Idea of the Good by intellection. For the
connection of this problem with the problem of the text emendation in 508e4, see
note 10.
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17J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, 2:60-61.
18J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, 2:60.
19We would like to read this passage literally. Adam tries to establish that
the Good is in a higher sense "the only true ouaia, for all oualcxt are only specific
determination of the Good" (The Republic of Plato, 2:62). By "specific
determination of the Good" he would mean the derivation of ouatcx from the Good
(509b7-8). On Adam's view, ouaic.x is to be taken equivocally, meaning derived and
underived ouaic.x. But such equivocation can nowhere be found in Plato's dialogues.
Adam's attempt at explaining the Good's being underived ouaic.x by cXpXtlV
avun60€'tOV in 510b7 (loc. cit.) is not convincing, because the unhypothetical first
principle identified there with the Good is primarily viewed as the ultimate goal
that, itself standing beyond all the hypotheses, guides the ascent from and beyond
them, and is not considered in terms of its relationship to ouaic.xt. The Good's being
<Xpxil does not necessarily allow itself to be ouaic.x in a certain sense.
2DF. M. Cornford, "Mathematics and Dialectic in the Republic VI-VII," in
Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1965), p. 76.

21 In the metaphor of the divided line, as to the objective side of the line,
degree of clarity (509d9, 511a7-8, c4-6) is interchangeable with degree of truth
(510a8-9, 511e2-3). As in the metaphor of the sun, the value associated with clarity
is also here obvious; the mathematical Forms, writes Plato, are "glorified and given
honor as being clear (We;; €vapy€at OEOo~aaµE:votc;; 1:€ Kat -rE-rtµTlJ..LEVotc;;)" (511a78) in comparison with their images. (Bloom mistranslates O€Oo~aaµ€vou;;: "they
are opined to be clear." For the apt reading, see J. Adam, The Republic of Plato,
2:69.)

42

22It is the likeness between the Good and the sun that Glaucon asks

Socrates to spell out (509c5-6). The likeness, however, is not mentioned in the
metaphor of the divided line, but is explicated in the allegory of the cave (515e6ff.).
But, since the metaphor of the cave and the passage dealing with the education of
the guardians presuppose the distinctions between the intelligible and the sensible
realms and between dialectic and mathematical science in the metaphor of the
divided line, Socrates, in the metaphor of the divided line, seems to take a detour in
order to meet Glaucon's request.
23Met. 987bl4-18. Other relevant passages from Aristotle are mentioned
in J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, 2:160.
24J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, 2:159-162.

25J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, 2:160. See also W. D. Ross, Plato's
Theory of Ideas, pp. 60-61.
26Ross (Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 60), Hackforth in Plato's Phaedo,
translated with an Introduction and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1955), p. 69, note 2, and Bluck in Plato's Phaedo, translated with
Introduction, Notes, and Appendices (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955), p.
67, note 3 regard avi:O: i:O: foa as the mathematical equals distinct from the Form of
the Equal. But it is obvious that the mathematical objects are not relevant to the
recollection argument. With Gallop in Plato's Phaedo, translated with Notes
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 123-124, we may see avi:O: i:O: '(aa as an
alternative designation of the Form of the Equal which is bipartite or multipartite.
Although this interpretation is not completely free from difficulty, it can avoid at
least entangling the context of the recollection argument by incorporating entities
distinct from the Form. Further, the unity of the Form is first established in Rep.
597cl-10, but is not seriously discussed in thePhaedo. Hence we do not need to be
so perplexed by the plural avi:O: i:O: foa.
27We do not touch upon the problem of the authenticity of this epistle.
Ross also refers to Epist. VII 342a7-c4 as a passage against the doctrine of
intermediates (Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 62).
'li!;W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 65. See also F. M. Cornford,
Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, p. 62: "I agree with critics who hold that nothing here
points to a class of mathematical numbers and figures intermediate between Ideas
and sensible things."

29W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 60.
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'30W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 63.
31'fhis passage is mentioned in W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 60.
32Adam takes the above mentioned passage to mean that the
mathematician does not exercise voV<;; on his subject, but has his subject which is
vQTTt6V as distinguished from 6pert6v and his hypothesis as an apxil (The Republic of
Plato, 2:72). This construction, however, overlooks the force of Kab;m that sharply
contrasts vovv OUK '(oXElV and vorrr:@v ovr:wv. To be worse, his interpretation
obscures this contrast by taking vorrr:6v to denote the division of the line
corresponding not only to v&,at.c:; but also to otftvma. Moreover, if we were to
follow Adam's construciton of µE'tcX apxfl<;, (i) vovv ouK '(ax€lv entailed by aKonEtv
... €~ \Jno9EO'€CIJV ( dl) should be synonymous with VOfl'tWV ovr:wv, and (ii) 'tO µt1
E:n' apxt1v 6:v€A.96vr:€<; (c8-d 1) should mean that the mathematician does not go up
to his hypothesis. From these consequences, the inadequacy of Adam's reading is
evident.
The passage in discussion is clearly Glaucon's restatement of Socrates'
account for the lower division of the intelligible realm: 'tOV'to 'toivuv VOfl'tOV µ€v
'tO EIBoc;; EAEyov, uno9€0'€0'l 0' 6:vayKa~oµEVflV lJluxt1v XPT1a9at nEpl 'tflV ~ll'tflO'lV
aV'tov, ouK E:n' apxt1v iovaav (51 la3-5). Here the binary particles µ€v and 0€
contrast VOfl'tOV and uno9E0'€0't ... 6:vayKa~oµEVflV ... XPT1a9at. Again, uno9€at<;
is here clearly distinguished from apxT,. The passage in question, in light of 51 la3-5,
does not allow Adam's reading. In addition, Martin's reference to 511a3 is
confusing as a textual evidence for Plato's description of the Form as VOfl'tOV. See
Platons Ideenlehre (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), p. 233.
33W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 64. See also ibid., pp. 64-65:
"When philosophy has done its work, the Ideas which hitherto were only OtaVOfl'tcx
have become VOfl'tCX by derivation from the unhypothetical first principle."
34See also 510b5-6 E:n' apxt1v nopE00µ€VT1; b6-7 E:n' apxt1v avun69€'tOV
... iovaa.
35Natorp captures this point: "... weil man nicht zum Prinzip zuriickgeht,
sondem bei (nicht ersten) Voraussetzungen stehen bleibt, hat man doch keine reine
Einsicht (vov<;) von ihnen." See Platas Ideenlehre: Eine Einfilhrung in den Idealismus
(Leipzig: Diirr, 1903; reprint ed., Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1961), p. 194. But the last
two words "von ihnen (sc. von Voraussetzungen)" are obviously misleading.
36'fhere still remain several problems.
First, whereas we are told in one place (510b5) that the soul makes her
way to the first principle, it is said elsewhere (511b4) that au'tO<; 6 A.6y0<; grasps the
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principle. Now v6T)cru; is one of the ncx0ilµ.oo:cx €v i;fi ~uxn ytyv6µe:vcx (511d7-8).
Then, how is v6T)cru; related to A6yoc;,? We agree with Adam who, following Krohn,
regards Aoyoc;, as "the instrument by which vo\X;; works" (The Republic of Plato,
2:70). In 534b4-6, Plato speaks of dialectic using the terms Aoyoc;, and vo\X;;:
"And, as for the man who is not able to do so [sc. to grasp the reason for
the being of each thing], to the extent he is not able to give an account
(A6yov) of a thing to himself and another, will you not deny that he has
intelligence (vovv) with respect to it?" (tr. A Bloom).
According to R. S. Bluck, "Logos and Form in Plato: A Reply to Professor
Cross," in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 41, Aoyoc;, here represents "an explanatory account of the
Form in question that should indicate its relation to other Forms." This view spells
out the nature of dialectic mentioned in 510b8-9 and 511b7-c2. Moreover, in Tim.
28al-2, the Form is described as '[0 ... of) voi)O'El µE'tCx Aoyou nEptAfln'tEOV. For
the close connection between Aoyoc;, and vo\X;; (or €mO"ti)µf1), see R. C. Cross,
"Logos and Forms in Plato," in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 22-25. We here do not go into detail
of the controversy between Cross and Bluck on the relationship between Aoycx;; and
Forms.
Second, according to Ross (Plato's Theory of Ideas, pp. 60-62), Rep.
526alff. and Phlb. 56d4-e3, making exactly the same point as one another, implicitly
bring out the distinction between the Ideas, the mathematical objects, and the
sensibles (see also R. Hackforth, Plato's Examination of Pleasure, p. 114; and J.
Adam, The Republic of Plato, 2:115). For these sections to give sufficient evidence
of Plato's formulation of the doctrine of intermediates, the distinctness of
mathematical objects from the Forms rather than from the sensibles must be found
in them. Ross maintains that units recognized by mathematicians exist in the plural
and are different form the Idea of Unity. As already mentioned in note 26,
however, the plural number does not always point to the distinctness from the Form.
Hence Ross does not succeed in showing that Plato had long been on the point of
formulating the doctrine of intermediates. (Incidentally, cxui;a nEV'tE Kcxl €ni;a in
Theaet. 196a2, though said to be free from practical mensuration, do not indicate
the Forms Five and Seven, but simply records printed in our mind compared to a
wax-tablet at a2-3.)
Third, Cornford maintains that the images of moral Ideas, different from
those of mathematical Ideas, are invisible. From this he concludes:
"Hence it is harder to see the difference between the justice of a particular
action or character and Justice itself than to distinguish Two apples from
number 2, also represented by other visible pairs. Accordingly,
mathematics serves as the easiest bridge from the sense world to the
intelligible, and should precede the study of moral Ideas" (Studies in

45

Plato's Metaphysics, p. 63).
This view, however, is not sufficiently grounded. On the metaphysical
distinction between the Form and its image, first of all, Cornford's comparison is not
appropriate. The distinction between the practically counted number two and the
Form Two, rather than that between two apples and the number two, must be
compared with the difference between the justice of a particular action or
disposition and Justice itself. From the invisibility of the images of moral Ideas, the
difficulty of seeing the distinction between those images and Ideas themselves does
not arise. The recollection argument in the Phaedo, in which the difference between
a Form and its immanent character is marked by the latter's deficiency (74d9-e4,
75al 1-b8), equally applies to the apprehension of Forms of quantitative relation and
of Forms of moral and aesthetic values (75c10-d3). What is crucial for recognizing
the difference between a certain Form and its image is not the visibility of the latter,
but the very inferiority of the latter to the former which has already been
apprehended. Moreover, even if Cornford's view is considered to be legitimate, the
ease in seeing the difference between the mathematical Form and its image does
not insure the ease in seeing mathematics as a bridge from the sensible world to the
intelligible. The role of mathematics that easily (p~ai:cinnic;, Rep. 525c5) turns the
soul around from becoming to true reality lies in its studying of numbers in order to
discriminate each of them, the numbers with which other numbers are mixed up
together (auyKe:xuµE:vcx, 524c7) and which are presented by the sense (524d9ff.). In
other words, the reason why mathematics is called the easy bridge from the sensible
realm to the intelligible is that the case of perceiving one and the same tiring as one,
or of such and such a number, and infinitely many at the same time (525a3-7) is so
probable that intellection is frequently aroused in order to discriminate those
opposites. Therefore the difference between moral Ideas and mathematical Ideas
with regard to visibility and invisibility of their images does not fully explain the
proposed order of education for the guardians. On the mutually opposite characters
to arouse intellection, Dancy writes: "... the distinction between the two realms [i.e.
the intelligible and the sensible] rests on the puzzles over provocative predicates."
See R. M. Dancy, "The One, the Many, and the Form: Philebus 15bl-8," Ancient
Philosophy 4 (1984):177.
Fourth, Ross infers the structure of the world of Forms from the
difference of movement of voriau; from that of ot.eXvota:
"... it seems not unlikely that Plato thought of these two ways of dividing
the ideal world as actually producing the same division, between
mathematical Ideas as coming low in the hierarchy and ethical Ideas as
coming high. For ethical Ideas are much more closely and obviously
connected with the Idea of good than mathematical Ideas are" (Plato's
Theory of Ideas, p. 64 (Italics mine.)).
First of all, we must keep in mind that Plato's talk of the procedure of
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dialectic (510b6-9, 511b7-c2) presupposes the hierarchical structure of the world of
Forms. But the difference in the direction of the movement of thought does not
always point to the hierarchy of the Forms. Ross observes that we must resign our
attempt to connect the mathematical Forms with the Idea of the Good when we
start with them (Zoe. cit.). This view seems to imply that dialectic cannot treat those
Forms unless we start with the moral Forms, ascend to the Form of the Good, and
finally descend to the mathematical Forms, in other words, that intellection of moral
Ideas must precede that of mathematical Ideas. This implication is no doubt
untenable. It is not dialecticians or philosophers but mathematicians or scientists
that "have no intellect about the mathematical objects" (Slldl-2). (Notice ale;
(511c6) related to 't:WV 't:EXV@v KM.ovµ€vwv (511c6).) Plato nowhere suggests that
dialectic must begin with a certain moral Idea. Moreover, it is nowhere said that
ethical Forms are more closely connected with the Idea of the Good than
mathematical Ideas are. (We cannot see what Ross exactly means by "more closely
and obviously connected with the Idea of good." According to Soph. 252el-2, the
Forms are simply either connected or unconnected with one another. If
mathematical Forms are less obviously connected with the Good than ethical Forms
are, insofar as the Good is responsible for the clarity of intellection, such absurd
consequence will follow that intellection of the former is somewhat dimmer than
that of the latter.) In a word, it seems that the metaphor of the divided line does not
provide us with sufficient clues to the structure of the world of Forms.
Finally, we must notice that it is in mathematical sciences ('t@v 't:Exv@v
KM.ovµ€vwv, ale; ... , 511c6) that the inquirers have no intelligence about
mathematical objects, though they, when connected with the first principle, are
V011'ta (dl-2). This certainly implies such continuity from mathematical sciences to
dialectic that mathematicians, when they arrive at the final stage of the educational
program for guardians, can come to acquire intuitive knowledge of the Forms. If
dialectic does not reveal true being to those who have mastered mathematical
sciences, in other words, if the intelligibility of mathematical Forms is not insured
for them, they leave their hypotheses unexplained and so cannot see reality fully
awake, but simply dream about it (533b8-cl). This means that, insofar as they are
ignorant of the first principle of their inquiry, their consistent deductive system
cannot constitute science (c3-6). (Also in 476c2-8, we read that the person who does
not hold the existence of the Beautiful itself besides many beautiful things is in a
dreaming state.) Natorp contrasts Plato's method of dialectic that secures science
by virtue of the contact with the principle or the Form with nominalistic approach to
science (Platos ldeenlehre, p. 216). If mathematical objects are not Forms but simply
intermediates distinct from them, it will be impossible to secure mathematical
sciences by dialectic.
37Cornford takes naOfy.J.m:a applied to intellection as vo\Jv EXElV in light
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of 51ldl vouv '(aXElV (Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, p. 76).
38Tue section n<lAm €A.€yoµEv recalls Socrates' earlier criticism of senses
in 65a-b.
39'fhis word with negation is employed for expressing the instability of the
continuous flux of phenomena in Tim. 49d2. See also Theaet. 157a3-4.
40Marten sees cxm:Ea0m in 511b4 in terms of the affinity between the soul
and the Form. See Platons Theorie der /dee (Freiburg, Munich: Karl Alber, 1975), p.
22.
41See note 36.
42R. C. Cross, Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, p. 24.
43Cornford (Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, pp. 72, 76) considers
intellection in terms of the method of analysis and takes the metaphor of cxlJlcxa0m
(51lb7) to mean the intuitive apprehension of a prior truth implicit in a conclusion
in the soul's upward movement of thought from geometrical analysis. But, since
Cornford's discussion is not based on sufficient textual evidence from Plato's own
work, we feel somewhat reluctant to follow his view.

44If the problem "what can be apprehended by intellection" is legitimately
replaced by or reduced to the problem "what can be posited as the Idea," then our
present inquiry will be first complete when the latter question is sufficiently
answered. We here do not go into the details of this problem, but tentatively rely on
Plato's almost exhaustive list of the Forms in Epist. VII 342d3-8:
"The same doctrine holds good in regard to shapes and surfaces, both
straight and curved, in regard to the good and the beautiful and the just, in
regard to all bodies artificial and natural, in regard to fire and water and
the like, and in regard to every animal, and in regard to every character in
the souls, and in respect to all states active and passive" (tr. L. A. Post,
adapted by A. Sumi).
In spite of the young Socrates' hesitance to accept the Forms of Man, Fire,
and Water inPann. 130cl-4, Plato, at least in his late dialogues, seems to feel
comfortable to posit the so-called substantival or substantial Forms. Also inPhlb.
15a4-7, the monads of ox and man are mentioned on the same footing as those of
the good and the beautiful. See also Fujisawa's comment on the Timaeus' doctrine
of the images of the Forms coming into the Receptacle: "It is important to notice ...
that the so-called qualitative or adjectival Forms ... and their images are on the
same footing as the substantial or substantival ones ... " (Phronesis 19 (1974):54,
note 64). Even in the middle dialogues, the substantial Forms are not dormant. In
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Rep. 596a-597c, for example, Plato endeavors to establish the unity or numerical
singularity of the Idea by referring to the Forms of artificial objects, couch and chair.
In Phd. 75c10-d3, we read that we have innate knowledge of everything marked by
a\rco o €cn:L But we, with Hackforth (Plato's Phaedo, p. 71, note 3), would like to
leave the question open, whether or not we may infer from this passage that Plato
had already entertained the view of Rep. 596a, the view that an Idea corresponds to
every group of things we choose to make.

45See Rep. 437b4; Phdr. 271b2; Soph. 248b5, d5; Leges 859e4-5, 894c5-6;
Epist. VII 342d7-8.
46fo the hypothesis argument of the Phaedo, the Form plays the part as the
cause of a thing's becoming (ytyv6µEvov, 101c3; yEv€a9m, c5), say, beautiful (see
R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo, p. 144). In spite of Plato's use of such military
metaphor like K<rrEXElV (104dl, 6, 105d3), we do not understand the Form-cause
theory such that the Form acts on a participant in itself. Hackforth (Plato's Phaedo,
p. 145) correctly regards the absence of efficient cause from the Form as the
problem in the acquisition of characters rather than in the possession of them. Of
course, the fact that the Form plays no part as moving cause in the participational
situation does not necessarily mean that it does not act on the soul in the occurrence
of intellection.
47Tue following sketch of his discussion is based on G. Martin, Platons
Ideenlehre (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), pp. 233-239.
48Natorp tries to see the support for his idealistic interpretation of the
theory of Forms in the explanation of the "second voyage" (Phd. 99c9-dl) as follows:
"Denn in den Denksetzungen (A.6ym) ist, nach dem (99E) bestimmt ausgesprochen
Grundsatz der Idealismus, die Wahrheit <lessen, was ist (der ovi:o:) ... allein zu
ersehen." See P. Natorp, Platas Ideenlehre, p. 133. There arise two problems on this
presentation. First, Martin quotes this passage in order to clarify Natorp's position
in which intellection is considered to be purely active. But we must notice that
Natorp does not subscribe to the passive knowability of the Form. The Platonic
Form which he regards as a law or method, but not as a thing, is also itself active:
"... denn es ist allgemein das Gesetz, welches in der Erkenntnis und fur
sie den Gegenstand schafft. Das ist der letzte Sinn der 'Idee' ... " (Platas
Ideenlehre, p. 29).
"... Platos Ideen von Anfang an bis zuletzt, und wenn je, dann im
Phaedrus, Methoden besagen und nicht Dinge; Denkeinheiten, reine
Setzungen des Denkens und nicht aussere, wenn auch iibersinnliche
'Gegenstande'" (ibid., pp. 74-75).
"Was ist also ... die 'Idee'? ... Nein, sondern schlechthin aktiv,
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dynamisch, funktional, Funktion auch der Gegenstands-setzung, auf der
alle irgendwelche Gegenstandsdarstellung erst beruhmt .. ."(ibid., p. 471).
In Natorp's view of the Form as a law or method, as shown above, the
Form is not passively known by intellect, but actively and spontaneously constitutes
scientific objects. Martin's reference to Natorp's position therefore seems to be
somewhat out of focus. Second, Natorp's reading of Phd. 99e must be examined.
His idealistic exegesis, needless to say, is based on his construction of El<; "to\X;;
X6youc; as "in den Denksetzungen." But it is unnatural to read the spontaneity of
the knowing subject into this passage, because it is simply the method of searching
for the cause that is here elucidated. Moreover, Natorp takes "tcX oV"tcx in 99d5 and
e6 as scientific objects. It is at least certain that the word here does not refer
exclusively to the Forms (see R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo, p. 136; D. Gallop, Plato's
Phaedo, p. 177), though to specify the exact referent of that word is not always easy.
49"fhis distinction becomes prominent after the middle dialogues (Rep.
525b5-6, c4-6, 526e6-7, 534a2-3; Tim. 29c2; Phlb. 54a5). Before these dialogues, the
contrast between immutable Forms and transient objects inPhd. 79c2-d7 and 80bl-5
is not described as that between oval.ex and y€vEatc;;. Again, despite the fact that the
Form of the Beautiful is in Symp. 211al said to be aEl
Kcxl OU"t€ ytyv6µEvov
OU"tE anoUuµEVOV, oval.ex and y€v€atc;; are themselves not contrasted with one
another.
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many critics point out, Plato himself is not committed to this mark
(F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1935; reprint ed., Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), pp. 238-239; A. E. Taylor,
Plato: The Man and His Work (London: Methuen, 1926; reprint ed., Cleveland:
Meridan Books, 1956), pp. 384-385; The Sophist & the Statesman, Translation and
Introduction by A. E. Taylor, ed. P. Klibansky and E. Anscombe (London: Thomas
Nelson, 1961), pp. 48-49; A. Dies, La Definition de l'Etre et la Nature des ldees dans
le Sophiste de Platon (Paris: J. Vrin, 1932), pp. 29-35; The Sophistes and Politicus of
Plato, a Revised Text and English Notes by L. Campbell (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1867; reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1973), p. 124; Platonis Sophista recensuit
prolegomenis et commentariis instruxit Otto Apelt (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1897;
reprint ed., New York: Garland Publishing, 1979), p. 149; P. Natorp, Platas
ldeenlehre, p. 289; G. Martin, Platons Ideenlehre, p. 203).
Sayre, against many commentators, maintains that this characterization of
being is Plato's own (Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Solved (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1983), pp. 226-227). He presents three points for his observation.
First, "the friends of Forms" are in 248d-e forced to admit that the Forms are acted
on in being known. Second, this characterization nicely fits the ontology of
becoming in the Theaetetus. Finally, the El eatic Stranger in the Sophist proceeds to
examine the ouvcxµtc;; (251e8, 252d2,passim) of Forms to combine with one
50As
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another. These three considerations, however, do not seem to support satisfactorily
Sayre's view. The first point is based on Sayre's misconstruction of 248d-e. As we
shall see later, "the friends of Forms" in 248c8-9 clearly deny the compatibility of
active and passive powers with true being. They are nowhere compelled to accept
that the Ideas are acted on in being known. The second point will turn out to have
very little force as soon as we see that the doctrine of flux in the Theaetetus is not
Plato's own. This doctrine, allowing the transition of perceptual qualities
themselves, eliminates the possibility of identifying any kind of perception ( 182d 1e6), and therefore no intelligible assertion about sensible phenomena is possible
(183a4-b5). In Plato's own theory of phenomenal flux, on the contrary, some degree
of certainty in the description of phenomena is insured by the retention or
reiteration of self-identical images of the Forms in the sensible realm (Tim. 29cl-2,
50b5-6). The upshot of such world-picture as presented by the flux theory in the
Theaetetus is nothing else than the misology that Plato most resents (Phd. 89dlff.).
The final point discloses Sayre's confusion about the meaning of ouvcxµu;. The
meaning of the ouvcxµu; of Forms to combine with each other is entirely distinct
from that of the ouvcxµu; employed for the characterization of being; the former
simply means "capacity" or "possibility" and lacks the implication of "power" or
"force."
51Taylor writes: "The point is simply that the 'materialists' who use the
notion of a 'force' has already surrendered his materialism" (Plato: The Man and His
Work, p. 385; see also H. -E. Pester, Platons Bewegte Usia (Wiesbaden: Otto
Harrassowitz, 1971), p. 14). Notice that the criterion is brought by the Stranger, but
not by Theaetetus who is the spokesman of the idealists. If it were brought out by
the idealists and not entertained by themselves, their argument against the
materialists would be simply ad hominem.
52Tue problem concerning the exact referent of "the friends of Forms," of
course, is raised here. We have already pointed out that their fundamental position,
namely the distinction between ouaicx and YEVEau;, is purely Platonic (see note 49).
But the problem is also inseparable from another problem, whether the
immutability of the Ideas is denied in the Sophist or not. Hence we shall await the
identification of "the friends of Forms" until their position is fully examined and its
consequence is revealed.
53F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 239, note 1.
54See F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 244, note 1; H. -E.
Pester, Platons Bewegte Usia, p. 42. Dies spells out the implication of 248a10-ll as
follows:
"La negation de la realite du mouvement est impliquee dans cette these
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[sc. 248a10-11]; car il n'y a mobilite que dans la y€vEcrtc; et de cette
mobilite on ne peut conclure a une existence reele du mouvement,
puisque cette mobilite n'est attribut que d'une pseudo-realite" (A. Dies,
La Definition de l'Etre et la Nature des Idees, p. 42).
This observation seems to be misleading. Indeed mobility is attributed to
the realm of becoming alone. As we shall see, however, the idealists in 248c7-9 try
to exclude "movedness" from the realm of Forms by insisting upon the
incompatibility of powers of acting and of being acted upon with true being, but
never hold that "movement" is present solely in the realm of becoming. They do not
refuse to introduce to 'to ncxV'tEA@c;;
(248e7-249al) some kind of movement that
may not compromise the immutability of the Forms. The above cited observation
no doubt compels Dies to identify 'to ncxV'tEA@c;;
as the sensible world by
divorcing it from oucricx and 'to
(op. cit., pp. 65-88). Dies' interpretation of 'to
ncxV'tEA@c;;
will be examined later.
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ov
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55Campbell suggests that 'tftV ouvcxµtv in line 9 is used in a slightly
different sense from ouv6:µEwc; in line 8 and akin to the common one of "nature,"
"import," and "meaning" (The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, pp. 127-128). This
reading indeed has merit in avoiding the redundancy which is felt when the word is
taken in the same sense in both places. On this reading, however, the reason is not
explained why Plato repeats the same word with a different sense that is very likely
to cause some confusion. Moreover, to say that the "meaning" or "word" of the
powers of acting and of being acted upon is inapplicable to true being, seen with the
binary particles µ€v and 0€ (lines 7-8), is not well balanced with YEVEO'El ...
µE'tEO''tl 'tOU n6:crXElV KCXt notElV ouvaµE<i.>c; (lines 7-8), and also sounds incurably
redundant. Another reading is suggested by Pester: " ... zu der Usia passe die
Dynamis keines dieser beiden" (Platons Bewegte Usia, p. 17). Here OOOE'tEpou in
line 9 is read as an explicative genitive, and 'tftV OUVCXµtv is taken as a "power"
distinct from the powers of acting and of being acted on. This construction would
imply that the idealists, though refusing to apply the ouvcxµu; criterion of being to
the realm of oucricx, do not deny the compatibility with that realm of such ouvcxµu; as
free from activity and passivity. This implication perhaps points to the soul's power
of knowing the Forms rather than to the Forms' capacity to combine with one
another, since the presence of movement in 'to ncxvi:EA.@<;;
soon comes to be
stressed in 248e6ff. Thus construed, i:oui:wv oooEi:€pou i:f\v ouvcxµtv, indicating
"the power that is neither the power of acting nor that of being acted on," is felt free
from redundancy.
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56Several commentators observe the exact agreement of this section with
the analysis of sensation in the Theaetetus (F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of
Knowledge, p. 245; W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 111; L. Campbell, The
Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, p. 127). But our dialogue does not seem to be well
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connected with the flux theory of perception in the Theaetetus. In the Theaetetus, on
the one hand, a perception and a perceived object are said to be twins from the
intercourse and friction of the powers of acting and of being acted on (156a7-b2). In
the Sophist, on the other, KOlVWVElV or cognitive contact presupposes the subject
and the object that encounter one another ('t@v npOc; <XAA~cx O'\JVtOVLWV, 248b5-6).
Here the sensible objects are not regarded as the offsprings of the powers. Pester
also presents two reasons for rejecting the analysis of perception in the Theaetetus
with the present passage (Platons Bewegte Usia, p. 135, note 15). First, Plato stands
apart from the flux doctrine of perception (see also note 50). Second, the active and
the passive powers, in the Theaetetus, are mentioned solely in the realm of
perception. The second reason, however, does not seem to be convincing enough,
because the idealists, also in the present passage, restrict the ouvcxµu;; criterion of
being to the realm of becoming alone. (Behind the presentation of the second
reason is Pester's view of the applicability of the ouvcxµu;; criterion to the realm of
true being (op. cit., p. 169), the view supported by his demarcation of the immobile
Form and the VOT)JJ.CX moved by and in the soul (pp. 133, 139).
57F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 243; W. D. Ross, Plato's
Theory of Ideas, p. 107; P. Seligman, Being and Non-Being: An Introduction to Plato's
Sophist (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 34; Plato's Sophist, a Commentary
by R. S. Bluck, ed. G. C. Neal (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975), p.
94. For the list of various views and their supporters, see W. D. Ross, op. cit., pp.
105-106 and G. Martin, Platons Ideenlehre, p. 153. Pester, in spite of his closely
tracing the conformity of the doctrine of "the friends of Forms" to the ontological
and epistemological theories in the Phaedo and the Republic (Platons Bewegte Usia,
pp. 42-45), identifies them as representing stubborn dogmatism that turns a deaf ear
to the differentiating of the notion of movement (p. 62).
58F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 243-244.
59Cornford correctly observes that the Form's separateness mentioned in
the Pannenides originates in the Phaedo (Plato and Pannenides (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1937), pp. 74-80; see also his Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 7-8).
60From this separateness, several critics otherwise identify "the friends of
Forms." Taylor regards them as Italian Pythagoreans (Plato: The Man and His
Work, pp. 385-386; Plato, The Sophist & the Statesman, pp. 43-45) and Natorp as
Plato's students who might distort the methodic meaning of the Form by separating
it from phenomena (Platos Ideenlehre, pp. 292-293). Taylor tries to defend his view
by pointing out the absence from the Sophist of the doctrine of the thing's
participation in the Form that breaks down the absolute severance between true
being and becoming. But this defense is not plausible enough, since the doctrine of
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participation and the causal doctrine of Form contribute nothing to the course of
argument moving towards the necessity of including movement in complete being.
Again, Natorp seems to miss the point that Plato has to postulate the Form's
separateness from becoming to insure the farmer's immutability. His claim of the
Form's immanence without distinguishing the transcendent Form and its immanent
character is simply forced by his thesis of the Form as a rule or method.
61Taylor observes that sensation, absolutely severed from reflection, has
no cognitive value in the doctrine of "the friends of Forms," in other words, that the
theory of recollection in the middle dialogues, according to which sensation calls
into our minds the apprehension of the Forms, is absent from their doctrine (Plato:
The Man and His Work, p. 385; The Sophist & the Statesman, p. 42). But this
observation also does not sufficiently support his identification of "the friends of
Forms" as Italian Pythagoreans (see note 60), because the theory of recollection has
no force in the course of the present argument. We must remember that the theory
of recollection in the Phaedo purports to establish the existence of the Forms and
the pre-existence of the soul, whereas the existence of the Forms is maintained from
the outset (246b6-c2) and the immortality of the soul is not discussed at all in the
Sophist. Moreover, the word A.oytcrµ6<; is in Phdr. 249b7-cl associated with a
generalizing process involved in recollection from a plurality of perceptions to a
unity. The word in Soph. 248all has no bearing on recollection.
62Apelt correctly takes the idealists' refusal with Symp. 21 lb4-5 (Platonis
Sophista, pp. 151-152). We cannot see why many contemporary critics, in showing
the debt of "the friends of Forms" to the theory of Forms in the middle dialogues,
usually ignore this important section.
63Tue fundamental hypothesis of the theory of Forms is that "there is a
beautiful alone by itself (n KcxAov afrro Ka9' airro), and a good, and a great, and so
on with the rest of them" (Phd. 100b5-7). As EKEtva 'ta noA.u9puAf11:a in b4-5 refers
back to the Forms mentioned in the recollection argument and the kinship
argument, the locution 'tl KcxAov au"to Ka9' au1:6 quite certainly implies the
unchangeability of that hypothetical entity (see 78dl-7). Hence the immutability of
the Forms can be said to constitute the aforementioned fundamental hypothesis of
the theory of Forms. Even in the Pannenides, Parmenides accepts this hypothesis
after his relentless elenchus of Socrates:
"But on the other hand, ... if, in view of all these, difficulties and others
like them, a man refuses to admit that Forms of thing exist or to
distinguish a definite Form in every case, he will have nothing on which to
fix his thought, so long as he will not allow that each thing has a character
which is always the same ('ti}V afrri}v aEl ELVat); and in so doing he will
completely destroy the significance of all discourse" (135b5-c2, tr. F. M.
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Cornford).
The denial of the existence of the always constant Forms entails the
destruction of the possibility, not only of philosophy, but of all discourse, and finally
leads to the misology Plato most resents (see note 50). Hence Cornford is right in
pointing out that it is "the fundamental thesis of Plato's theory" that Parmenides
here accepts (Plato and Pannenides, p. 100). To be sure, the Forms' immutability
has never been abandoned up to the Seventh Letter (342c2-4).
Also in the transition from the first question to the second about the
unvarying monads in Phlb. 15b 1-4, we can see that to conceive such monads like
man, ox, the beautiful, and the good exactly means to posit them as "always one and
the same and subject neither to generation nor to destruction" (b2-4). By "the
second question" is here meant Eha n@c; ... µio:v i:afrr11v (b2-4). On this matter we
disagree with Hackforth who maintains that only two questions are raised in Phlb.
15bl-8 (Plato's Examination of Pleasure, p. 20, note 1). In order to defend his
construction that the second question occupies all of b2-8, Hackforth reads in b4,
oµci.x; ElVat 13EJ3at6i:ai:a a ( = np@i:ov) µ€v i:aui:11v and considers µEi:Cx OE 1:0\J"l:' in
b4-5 not to belong to the series np@i:ov µE:v ... Eha ... , but to answer the second
npwi:ov µEV in b4. Other commentators propose replacing oµw<; with OAW<; (Dies)
or with OV"l:W<; (Susemihl). Moreover, Natorp transposes all of oµci.x; ... i:aui:11v
after xwplc; in b7 (Platas Ideenlehre, p. 314, note 1). Thus the crux of the problem of
the number of questions raised inPhlb. 15bl-8 lies in how to construct oµci.x; Eivat
J)EJ3at6i:ai:a µio:v i:avi:11v in b4, if possible, without calling for any emendation. If
the preceding context is seriously considered, it will be noticed that oµci.x; in b4 is
never out of place. In 15al-7 we read that one must be concerned with dispute in
contemplating divisions of such monads like man, ox, the beautiful, and the good,
whereas he has no need to thrash the matter out in speaking of monads that come
into being and perish. Hence oµw<; must be taken with the possible difficulties in
the case of dealing with divisions of monads that neither come into being nor perish.
Thus construed, Eha n@c; ... µio:v i:avi:11v (b2-4) can be an independent problem; it
asks how the unvarying monad, though its division is always seriously disputed, is
still most assuredly this monad, that is, one of the monads that genuinely are
(µov6:oo<;; ... M.118@<; oucra<;;, bl-2). In other words, this is the problem, how to
divide one Form into many without compromising the unity not only of that one
generic monad but of each of many divided monads. The satisfactory solution to
this problem would perhaps reveal us what is called the discernment of dialectician
in Soph. 253d5-9. The direction of our exegesis of Phlb. 15b2-4 is fully explicated in
R. M. Dancy, Ancient Philosophy 4 (1984):165-176. The full analyses of Phlb. 15bl-8
and of Soph. 253d5-9, being totally beyond the scope of our present inquiry, will be
reserved for another occasion.

64F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 240, note 3. See also P.
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Seligman, Being and Non-Being, p. 34; W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 110.
65Ross writes as follows:
"And if Plato means to stick to his suggestion that only that which has the
power either of acting or of being acted on is real, he must be supposed to
adopt the other alternative, that in knowledge the object acts on the mind;
which would be at least more reasonable than the view that the mind acts
on the object, and would correspond better with the account he gives of
sensation in the Theaetetus" (Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 111).
This view is untenable. First, the premise of the argument is not the case.
In 248c8-9, as already seen, the 5vvcxµu; criterion of being is definitely rejected with
regard to oucria:; neither the power of acting nor that of being acted on is congruent
with real being. Second, prima facie, the other alternative might sound reasonable,
because it appears to safeguard the immobility of the Forms by ascribing passivity to
the soul. But we can still here ask how the Form acts on the soul. We have only two
alternatives; the Form acts on the soul either (i) by first moving itself or (ii) by
remaining itself totally unmoved. The first alternative involves at least two
difficulties. Insofar as the Form moves itself, it is moved by itself and so its
immobility is compromised. Again, if the Form moves itself, the Form thus
conceived is prone to be indistinguishable from the soul elsewhere defined as the
self-mover (Phdr. 245e7-246al). On the other hand, the second alternative can
avoid compromising the immobility of the Form. But it seems to be hopelessly
difficult to explain how the unmoved object can act on the mind. Finally, the
correspondence with the account for sensation in the Theaetetus does not insure the
plausibility of the suggested alternative, since it is not always necessary that
sensation and thought are explained under the same scheme. Furthermore, Ross'
delineation of the flux theory of perception in the Theaetetus is quite inaccurate. He
observes that Plato, under the guise of the KoµlJlfrrEpot, maintains that theory (op.
cit., p. 102). As already seen in note 50, however, this is not the case. He comments
on the theory: "He [sc. Plato) does not specify whether the object acts on the senseorgan or vice versa, but it is natural to suppose that he means the former" (italics
mine). So "the account he gives of sensation in the Theaetetus" is nothing but Ross'
supposition. Hence his reliance on the correspondence between the alternative in
question and the account for sensation in the Theaetetus is totally unfounded.
66We shall separately examine the views of Bluck, Pester, and Dies.
Bluck works out an interpretation by which "knowledge may be allowed to
involve some change in its objects without infringing the sanctity of the actual nature
of Forms" (Plato's Sophist, p. 97). He first remarks that the expression "to be
affected by " means nothing more than "to possess the quality of' in the argument
against the monists (245al-3) (p. 97). From this he concludes that the statement
"the Form may be changed in being known" does not need to mean more than that it
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may undergo change solely in respect of its inessential attribute, namely being.known, though not in respect of its nature (pp. 98-99). On this interpretation that
purports to harmonize the ouvcxµu;; criterion of being with the immutability of
Forms, however, there, as Bluck himself recognizes (p. 99), must remain the
problem why the ouvcxµu;; criterion should not have been applied to the Forms, the
problem which we have answered by presenting the textual evidence for Plato's
claim of the Form's impassability (Symp. 21 lb4-5). In conclusion, Bluck's
interpretation seems to be inadequate. First, the possession of a quality meant by
the word mx0oc:; in the argument against the monists (245al) does not necessarily
apply to na0ry.ux (248b5) entailed by the encounter of the powers of acting and of
being acted on. While the latter word explains cognitive intercourse, the former in
that argument is not associated with cognition at all. In addition, the latter is
contrasted with notTVJ.CX, whereas the former is not. As Seligman points out (Being
and Non-Being, pp. 33-34), their senses are distinct from one another. Second, Plato
nowhere says that a Form has an attribute, either essential or inessential. The
introduction of the entity-attribute distinction into the Form goes back to Aristotle.
On the basis of his claim that if Forms are participated in, there must be Forms only
of entities (Met. 990b28-29), Aristotle distinguishes participation in Forms of entities
themselves (e.g. "Double itself') and incidental participation in those attributes
which are predicated of those Forms (e.g. "eternal") (990b29-33). In this case, the
Form of the Double is said to possess the attribute of being eternal (990b33-34).
With this line of reasoning, if such an objection is raised that the application of the
entity-attribute distinction to the Forms might eliminate the so-called qualitative or
adjectival Forms, how can Bluck meet it? It is the adjectival Forms rather than the
substantival ones that young Socrates in the Parmenides can admit with less
hesitancy (130b7-c4). Thus to conceive the Form to possess some quality would
evidently involve great difficulty in positing adjectival Forms on the same footing as
substantival ones. (For the criticism of such entity-attribute distinction within the
Form as alien to Plato's own theory, see N. Fujisawa, Phronesis 19 (1974):34-39).
Third, does Plato admit that being-known is inessential to a Form? Of course, he
does not affirm the Form to be hypostatized by the soul's activity of thinking. The
Form is not a v6ry.ux (Parm. 132b3-c12). In the present passage, nonetheless, the
Form's intelligibility (Soph. 246b7) is explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
position of "the friends of Forms" and, with its incorporeality (b8), makes its
ontological status distinct from that of becoming. Moreover, the Form's knowability
by intellect is often remarked when its ontological status needs to be clearly
distinguished from that of sensible phenomena (Rep. 507b9-10; Tim. 28al-2, 48e6).
Bluck, overlooking these points, does not satisfactorily explain the reason why
being-known is inessential to the Form. Finally, even if we are justified in saying
that the Form possesses some inessential attribute, we will be still perplexed by the
difficulty concerning the eternity of the world of Forms. If being-known is regarded
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as an inessential attribute of the Form, the transition from one state that soul does
not know the Form to another state that she knows it exactly implies the
replacement of one attribute by another, namely not-being-known by being-known,
on the side of the Form. This replacement does not injure the immutability of the
very essence of the Form but involves some temporality. If this is the case, the Form
will be eternal in the substantial order and temporal in the accidental order. Such
bifurcation of the realm of Forms, needless to say, is inconceivable in Plato's own
theory. In sum, Bluck's solution by invoking the Aristotelian entity-attribute
metaphysics brings forth several difficulties rather than harmonizes the Form's
immutability with the alleged conception of knowing as acting on the Form.
Two continental commentators, Dies and Pester, believe that the ovvaµu;
criterion of being does not disappear from the dialogue.
Dies takes i;o no:v-rEA@<;
(248e7-249al) as the sensible world distinct
from ouaia (see note 54) and ascribes only passivity to the Form. The subject of
knowing is the soul or intellect of i;o no:V"tEA@<;
in which there is active
movement, while the object is ovato: in which there is passive movement alone (A.
Dies, La Definition de l'Etre et la Nature des ldees, pp. 47-48). This view is based on
Dies' observation that the substitution of the notion of movement by the notions of
action and of passion is necessary for the sequence of the argument (p. 48), because
one can conceive neither KlVEtV nor KlVEta0at without introducing notE'iv and
naaxELv (p. 41, note 121). But Dies maintains that "the friends of Forms" represent
neither Plato himself nor the Platonic philosophy (p. 129) and thereby that Plato's
own theory of Forms is not transformed at all in the Sophist (p. 133). So we here do
not need to examine seriously Dies' interpretation, because our present inquiry
precisely concerns Plato's own position. (His identification of i;o no:V"tEA@<;
with
the sensible world will be considered later.)
Pester regards "the friends of Forms" as representing stubborn dogmatism
(see note 57) and tries to solve the problem left unanswered in the Sophist, how to
relate the movements of the Form and of the soul to one another, by distinguishing
two kinds of ovaia, the immobile Idea outside the soul and the passively moved
VOllJJ.CX inside her (see note 56). Again, insofar as this solution is not Plato's own, we
do not need to be anxious about Pester's demarcation between the unmoved Form
and the moved v611JJ.CX. But we may notice that this solution, which Pester himself
regards as a revision of the theory of Forms, is supported by his observation that the
ovvo:µu; criterion of being is introduced to the notion of movement of knowledge
(Platons Bewegte Usia, pp. 19-21). Hence, if this observation is satisfactorily refuted,
his revision of the theory of Forms will be undermined.
The Platonic Form is not a v6flµo:. In the Seventh Letter, it is stressed that
those which have been thought (i;a VEVOflµEVo:) cannot be committed to writing
(343al-4). Edelstein takes the affinity of voV<;; to the Forms (342dl-3) as that of i;(x
VEVOflµEVO: to them and supposes that the author of the Seventh Letter might not be
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Plato himself and might regard the Ideas themselves as thoughts in the soul. See L.
Edelstein, Plato's Seventh Letter (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966), pp. 98-99. His argument
proceeds as follows. The only possible explanation of the kinship between the
concepts and the Forms is that the Forms themselves are thoughts. But the
suggestion that the Ideas are concepts is explicitly given up inPann. 132b3-cll.
Hence the Seventh Letter cannot be genuine. Although he correctly views that Plato
himself does not consider the Forms to be concepts in the soul, Edelstein's
argument is not convincing. In 342dl-3, Plato stresses the affinity of vo\X;; to the
Forms, but not that of concepts to the Forms. As clearly seen from the kinship
argument in the Phaedo, this affinity is genuinely Platonic. Intellect is akin to the
Form, insofar as immediate contact is possible between them, and thereby the
former is immutable state of mind as the latter is immutable entity. A concept is
always the concept of a given Form so that the formation of the concept presupposes
the soul's cognitive contact with the Form of which it is the concept. We must
notice that Plato here employs the perfect ve:vrniµ€va instead of the present
voovµ€va. This certainly implies that i:O: ve:vrniµ€va arise in the soul after voe:'lv or
v6nau; has already occurred, that is, after the soul has apprehended the Forms.
When i:O: VEVOTlJ..LEVa have been formed, the soul is no longer in immediate
cognitive contact with the Forms. If so, how can we move from the vo\X;;-Forms
kinship to the ve:vrniµ€va-Forms kinship? Even if those which have been thought
are said to be nearest to the Forms, it is not necessary for the Form to be a v6rtµa.
In the Seventh Letter the Form is nowhere regarded as a concept in the soul.
Moreover, we may not think that the word VEVOTlJ..LEVa implies the Forms' acting on
the soul during her contemplation, because i:O: VEVOTlJ..LEVa emerge on the side of the
soul after her cognitive contact with those Forms. In order to identify the
ontological status of geometrical objects in our discussion of the metaphor of the
divided line, we referred to the Form of the Circle in the Seventh Letter. The above
consideration may defend the consistency of our position; (i) the Seventh Letter is
genuine, (ii) the Form is not a VOTlJ..La, and (iii) intellection cannot be seen in terms
of activity and passivity.
67Here Cornford's translation is substantially emended. First, his
rendering of KtVflau; as "change" and of aKtVf\i:ov as "immutable" is prone to be
misleading. While the word "change" implies some passivity of that which is
changed, the statement that KtVflau; must be placed in the realm of complete being
unmistakably means that the Stranger might claim the ouvaµu; criterion of being to
be applied to the realm of complete being. But it has not been established yet that
the Stranger might do so. Second, i:~ navi:e:A.@c; ovi:t is rendered "that which is
completely real" instead of Cornford's "that which is absolutely real." As we shall
see later, the adverb navi:e:A.@c; here connotes all-inclusiveness. In order to express
this connotation, "completely" seems preferable to "absolutely."
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68F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 246-247. Ross also
maintains a similar view:
"What Plato is saying is that ... we should find it difficult to believe that
what is perfectly real cannot have movement, life, and the rest. He does
not say that whatever is perfectly real must have these things; he simply
denies that it cannot. His real meaning becomes clear in 249b5-10, where
he says, in effect, that knowledge implies minds that are real and subject
to change and objects (the Ideas) that are real and not subject to change.
He has not given up his belief in unchanging Ideas ... but he adds that
minds subject to change must also be accepted as completely reaf' (Plato's
Theory of Ideas, p. 110, (Italics mine.)).
This observation is quite reasonable to the extent that it holds that the
immutability of Forms is still defended in the present passage. Nevertheless Ross
seems to distort the meaning of 'to navtEA@c;; ov. As Cornford takes (Plato's Theory
of Knowledge, p. 245), 'tO TtaV'tEA@c;; ov, equivalent to 'tO OV 't€ Kat 'tO ncxv in 249d34, refers to the whole world of real being that does not consist solely of Forms, but
does not refer to each of the individual members of that world.
69See F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 245. On the
contrary, Martin believes that movement is ascribed to the Form and that this
ascription, modelled on Hellenic gods in motion, may be hard to be reconciled with
the fundamental thesis of the theory of Forms presented in the Phaedo and the
Republic, namely the immutability of Forms (Platons Ideenlehre, pp. 42-43). This
misconstruction seems to be due to Martin's rendering of 't~ navtEA@c;; ovtt (248e7249al) as "dem wahrhaft Seienden" (ibid., p. 236), which would unmistakably
indicate the Form.
70Seligman writes as follows: "A (sc. 249b2-3) does not affirm that being
in its own nature moves or is moved, or that forms, as vehicles of being, are moved,
i.e. affected in being known" (Being and Non-Being, p. 36). Bluck observes that
there is in the present passage no sufficient evidence for the rejection of the view
that being known implies change (Plato's Sophist, p. 100). This observation is
correct to the extent that we can here find no "sufficient evidence" for that view to
be rejected. As already seen, however, "the friends of Forms" in 248d10-e4 insist
that the Form, though known by the soul, is never moved in being known. Whether
this insistence can be a "sufficient evidence" for the rejection of the view that being
known implies change depends on the point of view. From the viewpoint of the
Eleatic Stranger, on the one hand, the claim in 248d10-e4 would perhaps not be
sufficient evidence for the refusal of that view. (See F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory
of Knowledge, p. 245: "It appears at first sight as if the Stranger himself must think
that what is known is changed by being known.") From the viewpoint of the idealists
or Plato himself, on the other, this claim would be sufficient evidence for the
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rejection of being-known to imply change, because the refusal, however eristically, is
necessary for the defense of their fundamental thesis, namely the immutability of
true being. This very necessity sufficiently justifies the idealists' rejection of beingknown to imply change or movedness.
71Tuis view is surely supported by the observation that the ouvaµu;
criterion of being disappears from the dialogue at the point of 248d10-e4. See P.
Seligman, Being and Non-Being, p. 34. The Eleatic Stranger appears to have
conceived that movement and thought always involve the polarity of activity and
passivity. This point can be seen from (i) his reaction (248e6-249a2) against the
idealists' refusal of the idea that the Form's being known implies change (248d10e4 ), that they may eventually represent complete being as totally devoid of
movement and intelligence and (ii) his understanding that the idealists, as well as
the Eleatics, think of i:o ncxv to be absolutely at rest (249cll-dl). Again, the
Stranger, as already mentioned in note 70, appears to have thought that the object
known is changed in being known. But the idealists evidently have lost interest in
the ouvaµu; criterion of being at the point of 248d10-e4. If they were to admit
spiritual or noetic, not physical, movement into that which is completely real, they,
in order to be fully consistent, should think that this sort of movement involves
neither activity nor passivity. In other words, from the idealists' own point of view,
the ouvaµu; criterion must not be linked with the notion of spiritual or noetic
movement. In this connection, Pester's revision of the theory of Forms (see note
66), based on the wrong assumption, seems to be unsuccessful, even though he
endeavors to defend the immobility of the Form by distinguishing the unmoved
Form and the VOTUJ.<X moved by the soul.
Cornford then writes as follows: "The question whether knowing and
being known do not involve something analogous to the physical intercourse of
perception seems to be left unanswered. The Stranger neither asserts this nor
denies it" (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 247). As Cornford points out, the
Stranger leaves this question unanswered. But the idealists negatively answer this
question by insisting upon the inapplicability of the ouvaµu; criterion to real being.
For Plato himself, the noetic intercourse is not analogous to the physical intercourse
of perception as regards their association with or dissociation from activity and
passivity. Apelt explicitly maintains that the soul's knowing and the Form's being
known are for Plato free from activity and passivity (Platonis Sophista, p. 152).
Moreover, he refers to Plotinus' view that such €vE:pyEto: as vodv is neither notE'iv
nor noiricru; (VI 1 [42],22,26-28) and writes: "To ytyvwcrKE'lV autem ex severiore
illo loquendi usu est EVEpyE'iv, non notEtv" (lac. cit.). But the above consideration,
prima facie, would clash with the metaphor of the sun in the Republic, where
intellection, as already seen, is compared to sight. Which is Plato's own view? The
metaphor of the sun aims at revealing the value of the Idea of the Good responsible
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for the intelligibility of the Forms by means of comparing it to the sun responsible
for the visibility of the sensibles. It does not purport to give a full account of
intellection. We must notice that even here VO€tV and VO€ta0a:t are not associated
with activity and passivity, though each of them is said to be a ovva:µu; provided by
the Form of the Good (508e2). It is the ovva:µu; neither of acting nor of being acted
on, but simply the ovva:µu;. Thus seen, the idealists' defense of their position in the
Sophist is never incongruous with the metaphor of the sun in the Republic. In
conclusion, intellection and perception, on the one hand, are not analogous to one
another, when we consider whether the polarity of activity and passivity is applicable
to each of them or not; they, on the other, are analogous to one another to the
extent that the Form of the Good is responsible for intellect's knowing and the
Form's being known just as the sun is responsible for the eye's seeing and the
object's being seen.
Taylor observes that the idealists, to be consistent, will have to deny not
only that knowing is acting and being known is being acted on but also that true
being is known by the mind (Plato: The Man and His Work, p. 385). On our
construction, however, they have only to deny the former. If and only if the former
is rejected, then the latter is consistent with the immutability of the Form.
Moreover, Pester claims that the question whether knowing in general is
action or passion or both of them is not answerd (Platons Bewegte Usia, p. 61 ). On
our construction, however, this question is definitely answered; Theaetetus replies
that the idealists, to be consistent, would hold that knowing and being known are
neither acting nor being acted on (248d8-9) and then the Stranger elaborately
explains this (d 10-e4).
There still remains a problem about the referent of 'tO na:V'tEA@c;
which is too big to be fully treated in our present inquiry. In the preceding
discussion, we have tentatively followed the line of Cornford's interpretation; 'to
na:V'tEA@c;
which is later referred to as 'tO
'tE KO:t 'to n<iv (249d3-4), indicates
the whole world of real being that includes not only the unchanging Forms but life,
soul, intelligence, and such movement as they imply (op. cit., p. 245). On this
interpretation, the adverb na:V'tEA@c;, just as seen in Phlb. 19a7 and 21a12, would
imply all-inclusiveness or plenitude. To this extent Taylor's rendering "the plenitude
of being" may not be altogether wrong. Again, 'to ... na:V'tEA@<;
in Rep. 477a3 is
of no help for considering the present problem. Comford's interpretation seems to
be more plausible than other views that regard 'to na:vi:EA.@c;
solely as the
sensible world by taking it as distinct from ouaia and 'to
(A. Dies, La Definition
de l'Etre et la Nature des /dees, pp. 73-83) and that add the sensible world to 'to
naV'tEA@c;
(H. -E. Pester, Platons Bewegte Usia, p. 110). The Stranger's criticism
(248e6-249a2) is exactly thrown upon the idealists' final defense (248d10-e4), where
the realm of becoming is not mentioned at all. By using the expression 'tO
naV'tEA@c;
the Stranger here seems to attack the idealists' conception of ouaia
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devoid of spiritual movement. He claims that the ovaia'. entertained by the idealists
must be i:o ncxvtEA@<;
embracing soul, intellect and life, if their ovaia'.-y€vEau;
distinction is to have full explanatory force in virtue of ouaux's exhaustively
containing all those which are not included in the realm of becoming. For our
possession of intelligence and constant knowledge to be possible, moreover, i:o
i:E Kcxl. i:o ncxv is said to include necessarily all that is unmoved and all that is in
motion (249d3-4 ). Apelt, alluding to Eusebius (Preparatio Evengelica XIV, 737b ),
regards oacx cXKl\/Tl'tCX Kcxl. KEKlVTlJ..LEVCX (249d3) as some common form of expression
almost equivalent to the Latin expression sacra profana (Platonis Sophista, p. 155;
see also L. Campbell, The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, p. 132). So it would be
somewhat rash to ascribe passive movement to soul or intellect by reading some
passivity in the perfect KEKlVTlJ..LEVCX. Thus seen, with Cornford, we may not add the
sensible world to i:o ncxvtEA@<;
or i:o
'tE Kcxl. i:o ncxv.
The Stranger's critical response is indeed a kind of clap-trap. In this reply,
nevertheless, we can find Plato's awareness of the possibility of an accusation
provoked by his own position. In the idealists' position, the soul as the knower is
sharply distinguished from ovaia'. as the known (248dl-2). Again, if we feel
comfortable in regarding as belonging to y€vEau; the body by means of which we
have intercourse with y€vEau;, we will be confronted with the question whether the
soul by mean of which we have intercourse with ovaia'. can be included in ovaia'. or
not. In short, the position of "the friends of Forms" in the Sophist has weakness;
although the o\Jaia'.-y€v€Ol<; distinction needs to be exhaustive from the outset for
the idealists to be competent adversaries against the materialists, they actually speak
only of the Forms as ovaia'. and leave the ontological status of soul and intellect
unexplained. We may also say that some equivocation of the term ovaia'. is tacitly
involved in the position of the idealists who confine the referent of the term to the
objects known in speaking of the soul's cognitive contact with those objects. It is
indeed true that the ovaia'.-y€v€Ol<; distinction in the Republic represents the
vorrr6v-6pcxi:6v distinction (534a2-3), the main distinction of the objective side in
the metaphor of the divided line. If the o\Jaia'.-y€VEOI.<; distinction were to be
confined to the v011i:6v-6pcxi:6v distinction, it, excluding soul and intellect from
ovaicx, would not be exhaustive. But Plato would be reluctant to restrict the
distinction to the side of cognitive objects. Cornford, though not referring to any
specific passage, observes that earlier dialogues than the Sophist frequently suggest
that the world of real being does not consist solely of the Forms (Plato's Theory of
Knowledge, p. 245). This conception of the world of real being seems to be implied
at least in two passages. First, in the kinship argument of the Phaedo, the invisible
being distinguished from the visible includes the Forms and the soul akin to
(auyyEvfy;, 79d3) them. The whole world of invisible entities is here denominated
't'OlOU't'OV 't'OltOV E't'Epov ... YEVVCXloV KCXl Kcx0cxpov KCXl al.Of\ (80d5-6). Second, at
the metaphor of the sun in the Republic, intellect and the Forms are together
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included in o von-cO<; -con<><; (508cl; see also 509d2, 517b5). Thus seen, the prototype of -co ncxv'tEA@c;;
entertained by the Eleatic Stranger has already been found
in the middle dialogues. In the Stranger's talk of -co ncxv-cEA.@c;;
and -co
'tE Kat
i:o nav instead of ouaicx, we can see Plato's tackling the problem, how it is possible
to integrate the Forms, intellect, and soul into a unified whole. This problem
certainly reflects Plato's self-examination, whether the ouai.cx-y€vEatc;; distinction in
the middle dialogues might be prone to cause such accusation that ouai.cx as
distinguished from y€vEatc;;, referring solely to the intelligible objects, might be
devoid of soul and intellect. Insofar as ouaicx remains i:O: von-c6: devoid of soul and
intellect and so their ontological status is left unexplained by the ouai.cx-y€vEatc;;
distinction, the idealists cannot compete with the materialists in their battle about
being.
Owens, in "The Relation of God to World in the Metaphysics," in Etudes
sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, ed. P. Aubenque (Paris: J. Vrin, 1979), p. 212, note 7,
compares the move from the presence of intellect in complete being to the presence
of life in 248e6-249d5 with Aristotle's attribution of intellection and life to the
unmoved mover. He then continues: "But no reason for the necessary presence of
thought is stated by Plato, except an emotional reaction against its absence" (Zoe.
cit.). It is true that Plato himself does not explicitly present any reason here.
Nevertheless, as considered above, it is possible to see his self-examination of the
ouaicx-yEVEatc;; distinction in the present passage. The presence of intellect in
complete being is necessary for the idealists to compete with the materialists. The
reaction against its absence from complete being is not merely emotional, but
precisely based on the definite reason that the absence makes the ontological status
of intellect left unexplained and thereby is to lead the idealists to defeat in the battle
. against the materialists about reality.
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72Cornford sees this introduction as a concession which the Stranger
demands from the idealists, the extremists who want to make the whole of reality
immutable (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 244 ). His view is no doubt based on the
Stranger's image of the idealists in 249cll-dl. We have taken the idealists as
representing Plato's own position in his middle dialogues. But the Stranger in
249cll-dl, as we shall see in note 73, does not accurately describe their position. As
already seen in note 71, Plato himself, in the middle dialogues, implicitly suggests
that the realm distinguished from the phenomena does not consist solely of the
Forms. Hence, although it is true, at least as regards the actual course of the
dialogue, that the Stranger would like the idealists to admit the introduction of
spiritual and noetic movement to the realm of real being, Plato himself may not
regard this introduction as his concession to the view which has not yet been
entertained in his own position.
73The text in 249cll-dl,primafacie, runs counter this. The Stranger there
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entertained in his own position.
73Tue text in 249cll-dl,primafacie, runs counter this. The Stranger there
views not only the Eleatics but the idealists as insisting that all reality stands still
(€<Tt'f1K0<;). But this section suggests neither that Plato's own position excludes
spiritual and noetic movement from the world of real being nor that "the friends of
Forms" does not represent Plato's position in which the immaterial realm does not
consist solely of the immobile Ideas. As E:crrnK6<;; in 249dl reminds us of E:crr6<;; in
249a2, the Stranger's adjudication of the idealists in 249cll-dl is based on his
criticism of them in 248e6-249a2, which is a kind of argumentum ad hominem to take
advantage of such possible equivocation of oval.ex as mentioned in note 71. The
idealists or Plato himself would find this criticism nothing more than a false charge
against them, even though they would perhaps admit some possibility of the use of
oval.ex to involve equivocation. Hence it is not successful in undermining our
identification of "the friends of Forms" as Plato in the middle dialogues by appealing
to 249cll-dl.
74Tuere still remains a problem whether some spiritual movement, even if
it is free from activity and passivity, can be totally free from vicissitude. As to the
relationship of KlV'flO'l.C; to µE'tcx{3oA.f) or cXA.A.oi.wau;, the following three passages may
be touched upon. First, inPann. 162b-163b, Parmenides tries to establish that the
non-existent One has no other motion than transition (µE'tcx{3oA.f)) from being to
non-being and vice versa. Here KlV'flO'l.C; is exhausted by (i) generation and
corruption, or transition from being and non-being and vice versa (µE'tcx{3oA.t1 OE
KlV'f10'1.C;, 162c2), (ii) locomotion (ouK
't&l YE µE'tcx{3atV€lV KlVOl't'
162c8-dl),
and (iii) alteration ( Ei OE µf)'t' cXAAOlOU'tat ... exp'
E'tl KtVOl'tO, 162d8-el).
(This notion of movement takes over the classification of movement into
locomotion and alteration in 138b8-cl and Theaet. 181d5-6.) In spite of the
unclarity of the ontological status of the non-existent One in the fifth hypothesis,
three kinds of motion mentioned here are physical, as distinct from spiritual,
motions. We thus do not need to consider our present problem with the notion of
movement to be connected to the second part of the Pannenides. Second, in Cratyl.
439e3-5, we are told that the self-identical and constant entities, not departing from
their own form, can neither change nor be moved ( Ei OE aEt ciJaau'tW<;; EX€l Kat 'tO
CXU'tO Ecrtl, n@c;
'tOU'tO YE µE'tcx{3illot ft KlVOl'tO, µ,,OEV E~lO''taµEVOV 'tfy; CXU'tOU
i0€cxc;). In spite of the contrast between constant entities and incessant process of
becoming and the use of the term i0€cx, however, it would be rash to think that Plato
here speaks of the separate Forms. Even if we are justified in thinking so, it is
difficult to see the relationship between KlV'flO'l.C; and µE'tcx{3oA.f) from this passage.
(Nevertheless it would not be totally wrong to say that the above passage prefigures
the Forms. The section µ,,OEv E:~ta'taµEvov 'tfy; au'tou i0€cxc; reminds us of Tim.
52a3-4 OU'tE cxU'tO Eh;; CXUo not i.6v.) Finally, in Leges 896bl, the soul is said to be
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µE'tcxJ)oATl<; 't€ Kal Klvfl0'€W«;; cm6:cni<; al"Cia. Plato here talks about the soul as the
principle of cosmic movement. The self-motion of the soul is regarded as µE"Ccx/30All
(895a2-3) and associated with life (895c7-8). If we were to conceive that the whole
world of real being contains soul and life, then we should admit in it the µE'tcx/30All
implied by the soul's motion. But this introduction may not necessarily infringe the
immutability of Forms, since the soul's self-motion is not such change as occurs
when Forms are acted on by the soul.
It has been seen that the introduction into "CO navtEAW<;
of the soul's
self-motion as a µE"Ccx/3oAn is not inconsistent with the immutability of Forms,
insofar as that self-motion is not cognitive contact with them. Moreover, we must
notice that the soul's self-motion not only is regarded as a kind of change but
implies her immortality, that is, her being free at least from generation and
corruption. In the argument for the soul's immortality in the Phaedrus, the soul
defined as a self-mover is said to be 6:yEV11"CO<; (245dl, 3, 246al), 6:0t6:~0op0<;
(245d4), and thereby 6:06:VITTO<; (245c5, e2, 246al). Likewise, the Form is 6:0ava"CO<;
(Phd. 79d2, 80bl; see also Symp. 211e2-3 µT, 6:v6:tlEwv ... CXUll<; noUTl<; ~Aucxpia<;
0Vll"Cfl<;). Thus, whereas the soul's self-motion is said to be a µE"Ccx/30All, it insures
her affinity to the Form with respect to immortality. (Hackforth, in Plato's
Phaedrus, translated with an Introduction and Commentary by R. Hackforth
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), p. 68, observes that the Phaedrus
proof of immortality is closely connected with the hypothesis argument of the
Phaedo. The Phaedrus proof can be viewed as supporting also the kinship argument
of the Phaedo in such a manner that the former explains the soul's immortality
without any reference to the Forms, since what the latter purports to establish is the
affinity between the soul and Forms with respect to their immortality.) Thus seen,
spiritual movement, though characterized as a kind of change, may be welcomed to
the world of real being rather than needing to be excluded from it.
How about intellect's movement? Does it involve change? Plato finds it
difficult to give an account of intellect's movement (Leges 897d8-e2) and compares
it to the circular motion that is regular and uniform in one compass about one
center, and in the same relationship, according to one single law and plan (895a8bl). (For the kinship of the circular motion of the universe to intellect, see also
Tim. 34al-6.) Although we can find in this comparison Plato's effort to describe the
constancy of intellect's movement, its relationship to the Forms still remains
unclear. Hence the problem is left unanswered how we can integrate intellect and
the Forms into 'to n:aV'tEA@<;
by reconciling intellection or intellect's motion with
the immutability of Forms. We may also say that there remains the problem how to
reconcile the notions of intellection as movement and as the immutable state of
mind as described in Phd. 79d4-7. Phd. 79d4-5 Kal n:E:n:au'tcxi 1:€ 'LOU n:A.6:vou seems
to suggest one of the reasons why intellect's movement may be appropriately
compared to the circular motion of the cosmos, from which six wandering motions
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are subtracted when the body of the universe is created (Tim. 34a5-6).
75See note 71.
76Cornford observes that this question can only be answered in the
figurative language of the Timaeus (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 248). To draw
the clear picture of the world of real being from Plato's figurative description in the
Timaeus, however, is beyond the scope of our present inquiry.
770ur modus interpretandi may be accused of treating the Republic and the
Sophist in the manner of what G. E. L. Owen has called "unitarians" who regard the
dialogues as various windows opening on to a single finished construction. Of
course, it is beyond the scope of our inquiry to discuss the modus interpretandi of
Plato by tracing the development of his thought. Nevertheless, our interpretative
attitude can be defended in terms of the immutability of Forms, which is persistently
maintained as the fundamental thesis of the theory of Forms from the middle
dialogues to the late ones (see note 63). Although Plato does not explicitly say so,
the relationship between intellect and the Form in the metaphor of the sun, for the
unchangeability of Forms to be safeguarded, may not be envisaged in terms of
activity and passivity. Indeed we must admit that the Sophist substantially differs
from the Republic in that the Form of the Good, which serves as the cause of
intellection in the latter, is not mentioned at all in the former for explaining
cognitive intercourse of the soul with Form. In spite of this difference, intellection
must be conceived apart from activity and passivity also in the metaphor of the sun,
if we purport to avoid compromising the fundamental thesis in the theory of Forms,
namely the Forms' immutability.
The soul's knowledge of the Form in Plato has been variously discussed.
The ocular and tactile metaphors for intellection and the etymology of the word
i0€a have been seriously considered. Indeed they must not be overlooked when we
discuss the soul's apprehension of the Form. But to rely heavily on Plato's
metaphors may sometimes lead to the neglect of the crucial point in the theory of
Forms. Plato's philosophy, to be sure, cannot be exhausted by the theory of Forms
alone. Nonetheless, we may not be mistaken in saying that the theory of Forms
occupies the kernel of Plato's philosophy. We have considered the relationship
between intellect and the Form from the viewpoint of the Forms' unchangeability,
that is, the fundamental viewpoint of Plato's philosophy in his middle and late
dialogues. Hence the possible accusation of our being "unitarians" in interpreting
Plato is wide of the mark. We do not see a single finished construction through the
Republic and the Sophist, but read these dialogues in terms of the single hypothesis
of the Forms' immutability, which does not represent any construction, but underlies
some construction, already finished or still under way.
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78Jn note 65, we saw that when we endeavor to explain the soul's being
moved by means of ascribing activity to the Form and passivity to the soul, we
cannot escape from conceiving the Form as a self-mover. As seen in note 74, the
soul's self-motion is characterized as µncx/3oXft. So those interpreters who define
intellection as the soul's being acted on by the Form must first of all consider how
this conception can avoid compromising the immobility and unchangeability of the
Form. We can indeed suppose a solution by invoking the Augustinian theory of
illumination; the soul is illumined by the radiance that shines from the Idea of the
Good through the Forms below it. This solution is not only supported by no textual
evidence but is prone to infringe the conjoining function of the Form of the Good
stressed in the metaphor of the sun.
79Let US consider the famous passage EnEK€lVCX i:fy; ovcriru;; ... OVVaµEt
vnEp€xovi:0<; in Rep. 509b9-10. In light of the context, this passage can mean either
(i) that the Idea of the Good has the ouvcxµt.c; to provide truth and knowledge or
cognitionally to join the Form and intellect, the ouvcxµu; that OUO'Ux does not
possess, or (ii) that the Idea of the Good has the ouvcxµu; to engender ovaUx, or (iii)
that the Good's ouvcxµu; of being known is totally distinct from the ouvcxµu; of the
Form's being known. We must recall that two kinds of ouvcxµu; in the intelligible
realm, the powers of knowing and of being known, are mentioned in the metaphor
of the sun. Unlike the Plotinian One, the Platonic Good remains a Form or i} i:ou
O:ycx0ou IB€cx (505a2, 508e2-3, 517b8-cl) and so does not possess some hyperintellective activity. The status of the Good as the Form allows (iii). In this case,
the power of knowing the Good that is correlative to the Good's power of being
known is called into question. Whether this power of knowing the Good can be
denominated VOflcrt.c; or not is meant by the problem "whether the Idea of the Good
can be apprehended by VOflO't.c; or not." (Rep. 509b9-l0 has been variously
interpreted. The key to the apt interpretation seems to lie in the identifying of the
referent of ovv6:µ€l in line 9. (iii) is based on the construction to take ovv6:µ€l as
analogous to i:i)v i:ou 6pcxcr0cxt ouvcxµtv in 509b2-3.)
80JnMet. 1074b18-22, Aristotle contrasts vouc; qua ouvcxµt.c; with VOflO't.c;
qua €v€pyEtcx. In Plato, however, VOflcrt.c; is not always sharply distinguished from
voUc;. When we compare Rep. 508el-3 where the Good is said to provide the
knower with the ouvcxµu; of knowing with 517c3-4 where it is said to provide him
with voUc;, we can easily see the flexibility of Plato's terminology. We must recall
that ouvcxµt.c; in Rep. 518c2, as seen in note 17, is equivalent to Aristotle's €v€py€tcx
and indicates the actual exercise of intellect, namely VOflcrtc;. In addition, Harward,
in The Platonic Epistle, translated with Introduction and Notes (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1932), p. 215, views that vouc;, which belongs to the
fourth kind in the Seventh Letter (342c4-d3), is the active principle whereby
€mai:f\µfl is reached. Morrow, in Plato's Epistles, a Translation, with Critical Essays
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and Notes (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), p. 73, also points out the parallel
between v6ncru; in the metaphor of the divided line in the Republic and vo\X; in the
Seventh Letter.
81See notes 17 and 71.

CHAPTER II
INTEUECTION IN ARISTOTLE

Aristotle's notions of voVc; and vrn,au; play an important role in his various
works, not only in the Metaphysics, but in De Anima, the Nicomachean Ethics, and
the Posterior Analytics. In the following, of course, we do not purport to present a
systematic study of his doctrine of voVc; by analyzing all the relevant passages from
his works, but to clarify the relationship among ovaUx, vrn,au;, and €v€pyEu:x in the
Metaphysics. The inquiry into this relationship is possible only in the Metaphysics.

Whereas the Platonic Form is referred to interchangeably by the words oval.ex and

i:o ov, Aristotle claims that i:o ov is variously expressed in relation to one thing
(Met. 1003a33-34), that is, in relation to oval.ex. What we shall explore is not the

connection of that which is called i:o

ov in reference to oval.ex with VOT)CJl<;; and

€v€pyEu:x, but that of oval.ex itself with them. According to Aristotle, it is the task of
first philosophy to consider being qua being or the causes and principles of beings,
inter alia, an immovable entity (i:u; oval.ex 6:KiVT)i:oc;) (1026a27-32).1 Hence our

inquiry must be focused on the Metaphysics, especially A 7 and 9.
First of all, we need to specify the instance of the ouvcxµu;-€v€pyncx
relationship in the case of God's intellection. It is urged that we cannot define
potentiality and actuality, but must be content to grasp the analogical relationship of
their instances (Met. 1048a35-b4). As regards the cognitive activity of the unmoved
mover, the potentiality-actuality relationship is embodied by that between the
faculty of intellection (vo\X;) and the act of intellection (v6T)at<;;) (1074b21-22),2 or
between intellect capable of receiving the intelligible object and entity (i:o ...
0EK1:lKOV l:OU VOT)l:OU KCXt

i:flc; ouai.cxc;) and intellect possessing (EXWV) it (1072b22-
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23).3 In a word, the potentiality-actuality relationship is found between intellect
that has not received its object yet and so remains a mere capability of intellection
and the exercise of intellect that has already possessed its object and so is thinking it.
But Aristotle admits neither divine intellect's ever being in potentiality nor its
transition from actuality to potentiality. Divine intellect is always in actuality.
Aristotle refers to the mere capacity of intellection simply in order to describe
intellect in actuality by showing the analogy of actuality and potentiality in the case
of divine intellect.4
As for the cognitive activity of the Aristotelian God, the ovvcxµtc;-€v€pyEta
relationship is instantiated by votl<; and v6r)atc;. But we must notice that the term

vbr1atc; in Met. A 7 and 9 is subtly employed to mean not only (i) the actual exercise
of intellect but (ii) intellect that is actually thinking.5 The word in its original sense
of (i) is used in a couple of places. In 1072bl7-18, VOflatc; of divine intellect, as well
as its €ypityopatc; and cxfo0flatc;, is said to be most pleasant. In 1072b 18-19, divine
intellection, rendered as ii ... VOflO"tc; ... Kcx0' cxvi:f}v, is distinguished from human
thinking which depends on sense or imagination.6 In 1074b31, moreover, VOE'iv and
vbr,atc;

are juxtaposed.7 The potentiality represented by vovc;, however, is not

exhausted by the ability of intellection. Novc; is really i:o ... OEK"ttKOV i:ov VOfl"tOV

KO:t "tllc; ouaicxc; (1072b22).8 In other words, VOV<; is potentially 1:0 VOfl"tOV or the
pure form without matter.9 Aristotle applies to divine thinking his psychological
formula that intellect in activity is identical with the object of intellection
(1072b21).10 Since the activity of intellect is nothing else than VOflO"tc; and intellect
is actualized only when it possesses its object (1072b22-23), the identity of the
actualized intellect with its object is also expressed as that of intellection with its
object:
Since, then, intellect (i:ov vov) and the object of thought (i:ov voouµ€vou)
are not different in the case of things that have no matter, they will be the
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same, that is, intellection (it VOflO'l<;) will be one with the object of thought
(i:&i voovµ€v~) (Met. 1075a3-5).
Thus the word v6flau; indicates the identification of intellect and its object
and thereby intellect that actually thinks the object identical with itself. This sense
of the word is found in the consideration of the difficulties concerning divine
intellect in A 9. In 1074b18-20, we are told that the ovaicx of divine intellect, in
order to be the best entity, must be v6flau;, but not vo\X; or the mere ability of
thinking. Since the word VOflO'l<; here precisely refers to that which is the essence of
divine intellect (i:ovi:o 0 E0'1:lV oo'rtov it ovaicx, 1074b19-20), it refers to the
actualized intellect itself rather than the exercise of intellect. In other words, the
pure form identical with intellection is implicit in this sense of the term. Thus the
potentiality-actuality relation instantiated by voVc;; and VOflO'l<; can be defined in two
ways, so that VOflO'l<; is endowed with two senses.11 The VOflO'l<; which we shall
explore in the following is that in the first sense, the cognitive exercise itself as seen
in separation from its agent and object.
The passage from A 7, where Aristotle deals with the inner life of the
unmoved mover, is considered for the purpose of our inquiry. The Stagirite writes:
And (its) life is such as the best which we can enjoy, and enjoy for but a
short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its actuality
(it €vE:pyEt.a) is also pleasure. (And for this reason are waking
( €ypiiyopau;), perception (afo9flat<;), and intellection ( VOflO't<;) most
pleasant, and hopes and memories are so on account of these.) And (its)
intellection (it ... VDllO'l<;) is intellection in itself (it Ka9' avi:r,v) that deals
with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the fullest
sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And intellect thinks itself
according to its communion with the object of thought (avi:ov OE voEt o
voVc;; Kai:a µE1:cXAfl~lv i:ov VOfli:ov); for it becomes the object of thought in
coming into contact with and thinking (9lyyavwv Kat vo@v) its object, so
that intellect and the object of thought are the same. For that which is
capable of receiving the object of thought and entity ('to ... OEK"tlKOV 'tOV
VOfl'tOV Kal 'tfl<; ovaicx<;) is intellect. But it is active when it possesses this
object (€vEpyE1 OE €xwv). Therefore the possession rather than the
receptivity is the divine disposition which intellect seems to maintain, and
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(its) envisagement (ii 0Ewpia) is what is most pleasant and best ... And life
also belongs to God; for the actuality of intellect (ii ... vov €v€pyEux) is
life, and God is that actuality; and God's actuality in itself ( €v€pyEux ... ii
Kcx0' cx\rri)v EKEivov) is life most good and eternal (1072b14-28, tr. W. D.
Ross, adapted by A. Sumi).
Wedin observes that in this passage the theses which he calls "the sameness
thesis" and "the causal thesis" are brought into a single account 12: "the causal thesis"
is that the mind is brought to activity by the object of thought13 and "the sameness
thesis" that the mind in activity is the same as that object.14 The relationship of

vCn,au;; qua €v€pyEux to ovcria qua 'tO VOfl'tOV must be viewed precisely as the
causal relation between the intelligible object and the intellective capacity.
The primacy of ovcria over VOflO'l<;; qua €v€pyEux can be easily seen in the
above cited passage. First of all, intellection of the prime mover is VOflO'l<;; ... Kcx0 '
cxu'tTlV (1072b18), namely intellection that does not depend on sense and
imagination.15 So the intelligible form which intellection concerns does not exist in
abstraction from physical things, but always subsists without matter. Aristotle here
explains the inner structure of divine self-intellection through the fact that when
intellect knows it becomes identical with what it knows. What intellect knows or 'to
VOfl'tOV

is the pure form and in this sense the oucria (line 22).16 Aristotle, in giving

an account of the cognitive relation of divine intellect to the intelligible form,
invokes the formula which he frequently employs in De Anima, the causal thesis that
the cognitive ability is brought to actuality by the cognitive object. In the present
case, the pure intelligible form brings to activity intellect which has been per se a
mere capacity of receiving that form ('to ... OEK'ttKov 'tou VOfl'tOU Kcxl 'tfi<;; oucricxc;;,
line 22).17 In other words, intellect exercises intellective activity only when it has
the intelligible object ( €vEpyE1 OE €xwv, lines 22-23).18 The knowable object plays
the causal role in the actualization of divine intellection and to this extent the oucria
is prior to the E:vE:pyEux qua VO'flO'l.<;;.19 Needless to say, "the actualization of divine
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intellection" does not imply that divine intellection has ever been caused by its
object. Aristotle here simply analyzes the internal structure of self-thinking of the
prime mover. Different from human intellect which does not always think,20 divine
intellect thinks itself eternally and continuously.21
Aristotle's conception of divine intellect's relation to its object is further
illuminated by two sections in the aforementioned passage. First, the participles
0Lyyavwv and vo@v (1072b21) characterize intellect's becoming identical with the
intelligible object in the actual exercise of intellection. As Ross comments on
0LyEtV in 1051b24,22 the tactile metaphor in the description of simple apprehension
implies (i) the absence of any possibility of error and (ii) the absence of a medium.
In both implications, Aristotle's conception of divine intellection agrees with Plato's.
Plato distinguishes €mcnf1JJ.Tl and oo~cx as that which does not make mistakes and
that which does (Rep. 477e6-7) and describes the immediacy of the soul's cognitive
contact with the Idea (aEl µEi:' EKEivou 1:€ ytyvE"tCXl, Phd. 79d3) by the verb
€cj><Xni:Ecr0m. But Aristotle's tactile metaphor of intellection represents more
unified relation of subject and object; intellect in actuality becomes identical with
· the intelligible object for Aristotle (Met. 1072b20-21), while the soul with
intellection becomes at best adjacent to the Form (µEi:' EKEivou) for Plato.23
Second, µE"tclAfllJlt<; in 1072b20 implies (i) the receptivity of intellect prior to its
actualization just as i:o ... O€K"tlKOV in line 22 does24 and (ii) the community
between intellect and the intelligible form as the prefix µEi:cx- does.25 As said in De

Anima 429a20-22, the receptivity or potentiality of intellect based on its
characterless nature allows itself to take the character of whatever it knows. So
divine intellect is able to receive the goodness of the intelligible form without
hindering or obstructing it. As 0LyyavELV in 1072b21 implies the absence of any
possibility of error from intellect, the "hylic" nature meant by the term µE"tclAfllJlt<;
points to the absence of any possibility of distorting the nature of the knowable
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object from divine intellect. Moreover, intellect's community with the intelligible
object, if we can construct it in light of De Anima 429b29-31, exactly implies that the
former is potentially the latter rather than that the former is thought to be acted on
and the latter to act.26 It must surely be avoided to consider the relation of intellect
to its object in terms of activity and passivity, for the immutability of divine intellect
to

be defended. Rather, we may say that the unbroken sameness of divine

intellection already abrogates the possibility to view intellection in terms of activity
and passivity, because activity and passivity presuppose the distinctness between that
which acts and that which is acted on.27 Although Aristotle does not explicitly say
so, the immutability and unaffectedness of the prime mover seems to be due to such
internal structure of divine intellection that involves neither activity and passivity
nor any movement whatsoever.28
Moreover, E:ypilyopau;; in 1072b 17 is a source of Plotinus' description of
the One's hyper-consciousness in VI 8 [39],16,30-34.29 As the waking is the
actualization of the sleeping (1048bl-2), the waking that represents the activity of
divine intellect can be contrasted with the sleeper that refers to intellect which
thinks of nothing (1074b17-18). So the word seems to denote the actualization of the
capacity of intellection. In De Anima 412a25-26, further, we are told that waking is
analogous to contemplation or the exercise of knowledge qua €v€pye:tcX and sleep to
the possession of knowledge qua

€~u;;.

The word E:ypilyopau;; thus turns out to be

the appropriate characterization of the cognitive activity of divine intellect.30
Unfortunately, we cannot know more about the E:ypilyopau;; of the prime mover. It
shall be explored later how Plotinus makes this word apt to describe the unique
awareness of the One.
As already mentioned, Aristotle exploits several psychological formulae

developed in De Anima r 4 in order to give an account of the noetic structure of the
inner life of the prime mover in Met. A 7 and 9. To refer to the passages from De
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Anima

r 4, in fact, has much helped us interpret the passages in the Metaphysics.

But it is not correct to say that the account given of the emergent process of human
intellection is exhaustive in De Anima

r 4.

The occurrence of human intellection

cannot be completely elucidated by means of the receptive intellect and the
intelligible object. The object of thought is not capable of actualizing the passive
intellect/or itself alone. It is not the object but the so-called agent intellect that is
the cause (De Anima 430a12) of the actualization of the passive intellect. In the
respect of being entirely actual, as Hamlyn puts, 31 the agent intellect is like the
prime mover in the Metaphysics at large. But, since Aristotle's description in De
Anima r 5 is extremely concise and so its exegesis is highly disputed, it is always
difficult to consider the passages in the Metaphysics with De Anima

r

5 in view. In

the actual course of the history of philosophy, the tradition from Alexander of
Aphrodisias to Averroes regards the agent intellect as a transcendent entity,
identical with the divine intellect in the Metaphysics. But it does not seem easy to
find the definite link between the description of the agent intellect in De Anima r 5
and the account for the inner structure of the unmoved mover's self-knowledge in
Met. A 7 and 9. Let us mention two reasons why we have not referred to De Anima

r

5 in our preceding discussion.
First, the fact that Aristotle does not clarify the internal structure of the

activity of the agent intellect makes it difficult to compare it with divine intellect.
There are two competing views about the agent intellect's knowledge. On the one
hand, Ross attributes some pre-existing knowledge to the agent intellect. The agent
intellect, he writes, is "something in us that actually knows already, some element
that is cut off from our ordinary consciousness so that we are not aware of this
knowledge."32 Ross, however, here does not mean that the agent intellect possesses
all the intelligible objects within itself, as Avicenna holds. He considers the analogy
of light in De Anima 430a15 and characterizes the agent intellect as "a third thing,
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besides passive reason and object."33 But, if the knowing of the passive intellect and
the knowing of the agent intellect were taken univocally, the agent intellect would
be no longer the "agent" or "active" intellect, but at best the always "actualized"
intellect, precisely because intellectual knowledge for Aristotle is nothing but the
reception of intelligible forms. In other words, if intellection were generally viewed
in terms of the reception of and identification with the intelligible forms, one would
wonder how an intellect that makes all things (430a12, 15) can be said to be always
thinking. As a matter of fact, there appears to be no generic account for intellection
that would be able to encompass the descriptions of both the agent and the passive
intellects. Therefore, unless an adequate account is given of the unique knowledge
of the agent intellect that is clearly distinguished from the knowing of the passive
intellect, Ross' interpretation is untenable. On the other hand, Rist criticizes Ross'
view by denying the pre-existing knowledge of the agent intellect34 and observes that
the agent intellect does not possess knowledge of the external world, but knowledge
of itself that is akin to the self-knowledge of the prime mover.35 Let us remind that
Aristotle elucidates the possibility of intellect's knowing itself in terms of the
identity of the receptive intellect with the object known (430a2-5). As already seen,
the self-knowledge of divine intellect is not exempt from this. Now Rist denies to
the agent intellect ordinary knowledge, namely the identification with the
intelligible object.36 Hence Rist's view of the self-knowledge of the agent intellect
first becomes satisfactory by giving an account of that self-knowledge without
recourse to the identity of intellect with its object. But he actually gives no account
of it. Again, even if he succeeds in doing so, he is compelled to defend the alleged
kinship of the agent intellect to divine intellect whose self-intellection is defined in
terms of the very identity of divine receptive intellect with the intelligible form. In a
word, if we try to keep consistent the definition of intellectual knowledge in terms of
the reception of and identification with the forms of the objects known and the
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nature of the agent intellect that produces all the intelligible objects, any attempt to
ascribe some knowledge to the agent intellect will faiI.37 If we obstinately attempt
to do so, we are forced to find out the generic account for intellection that would be
able to encompass the descriptions of both the agent and the passive intellects.
Even if it is found out, the problem still arises whether it can encompass the
description of divine intellect. In conclusion, the internal structure of the noetic
activity of the agent intellect is totally unclear, so that it is difficult to discover the
link between divine intellect and the agent intellect in respect of their cognitive

states and activities.
Second, the internal structure of divine thinking in Met. A 7 is congruent
with the process of human intellection to take place in De Anima

r 4-5 in part, but

not completely. The latter invokes the agent intellect as "a metaphysical ground for
the actualization of the potentialities which make up the soul."38 In the former,
however, it is the intelligible form that plays the causal role of bringing the receptive
intellect to activity. The reason why Aristotle does not refer to anything equivalent
to the agent intellect in his description of divine intellection becomes clear as soon
as we see the consequence of the supposed case that he does so. This supposed case
precisely implies that the intelligible object is not capable of actualizing the
receptive intellect for itself. If so, we cannot see why Aristotle endeavors to identify
the form with the oucricx in Met.

z 17 and with the €v€pyEux in 8 8, given the

supposition of the compositional unity of the Metaphysics. Even within the context
of A 7 alone, the supposed case brings about the problem concerning the
ontological status of something equivalent to the agent intellect. Furthermore, if
divine intellect that consists of the receptive intellect and the intelligible form were
to depend on that which is comparable to the agent intellect for its actualization, it
would not be completely free from potentiality and therefore could no longer
remain the final cause of the eternal, continuous motion of the outermost heaven.
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(But it is indeed true that Aristotle does not fully elucidate how the full actuality in
divine inner life can induce the first moved to locomotion.) As Ross suggests,39
indeed, the description of the agent intellect in De Anima r 5 is compatible with
that of God in Met. A in such a way that the agent intellect is a member of the
hierarchy of actuality that reaches continuously from the lowest entities to God. As
regards the account for the process of intellection to occur, however, the description

inDeAnima r 4-5 is not fully compatible with that inMet. A 7. Hence to refer to
De Anima r 5 does not always help us interpret Met. A 7.40
In conclusion, oucria, also for Aristotle, is ontologically prior to VOTlO'L<; as
the €v€pyEto: of voD<;. It is only when the receptive intellect possesses the pure
intelligible form or oucricx that it is brought to activity and exercises intellection. It is
nothing else than the intelligible object that makes divine intellect the oucricx by
providing it with definiteness and that plays the causal role in the occurrence of
intellection. Aristotle, however, does not agree with Plato in that he sees
intellection without any implication of movement. In Plato, as already seen,
intellection is associated with some kind of movement, insofar as that movement
· does not compromise the immutability of the Forms. In Aristotle, on the other
hand, the proposed avoidance of the infinite regress in the series of movement
necessarily postulates the absence of movement whatsoever from the inner activity
of the prime mover. Again, since every movement is incomplete (Met. 1048b29), it
is not appropriate to intellection; when someone is thinking, he has already thought
(1048b24 ). Intellection is thus a fortiori €v€pyEto:, but not KtVT1cru;.41 Furthermore,
intellection as the activity of divine intellect is identified as God's life (1072b26-27).
This identification becomes more conspicuous in Plotinus. More important would
be Aristotle's formula of the identity of intellect in activity with the intelligible
object it thinks. It is certain that this idea constitutes the background of Plotinus'
doctrine that Intellect thinks the intelligible objects within itself. Roughly speaking,
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this doctrine can be said to represent the combination of the Platonic theory of
Forms with the Aristotelian doctrine of intellect.42 Armstrong further historically
specifies this combination as follows:
... the principal stimulus to the train of thought which led Plotinus to
formulate his own doctrine was his study of the Peripatetic doctrine of the
identity of divine intellect and its object in the light of Albinus'
identification of the Peripatetic divine vmrr6v with the vmrra of the
"thoughts of God" interpretation of Platonism, the Forms of Ideas.43
Although Armstrong does "not wish to deny that Plotinus may have found
the Peripatetic doctrine in Aristotle himself," he views that Plotinus' "most likely
principal source is the very full and clear exposition in the psychological writings of
his great near-contemporary, Alexander of Aphrodisias."44 Whether the direct
source of Plotinus' doctrine is Alexander or Aristotle himself, it is certain that the
notion of the identity of intellect in activity and its object has been inherited by
Plotinus.45 Considered apart from the actual course of the history of philosophy, the
notion of this identity already abrogates the option of seeing intellection in terms of
activity and passivity, the very option that has perplexed Plato in the Sophist; as
already seen,46 the activity-passivity relationship, insofar as it presupposes the
duality of that which acts and that which is acted on, is impossible in the case of
intellect and the intelligible object that are inseparably unified in a single real entity.
The notion can thus safeguard the immutability not only of the intelligible object but
of the intellective agent. Moreover, the vouc;-vorrr6v identity insures the highest
degree of orientation of intellect by and towards the intelligible objects and makes
intellection completely free from any falsehood or distortion. It is not always easy to
investigate whether and how the problem concerning the relationship of intellect
and its object, the problem with which Plato is seriously confronted in the Sophist,
has been inherited through several thinkers to Plotinus. As already mentioned, 47
Plotinus' doctrine of the vo\Jc;-vmrr6v sameness would have been stimulated by
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Alexander of Aphrodisias and the middle Platonists, and he himself has sought the

locus classicus for that doctrine in Parmenides and Plato. Then, what kind of
problem does he try to answer by appealing to that doctrine? The problem Plotinus
tackles is what kind of relationship of voD<; and vorrr6v can at the same time (i)
insure the immutability not only of the intelligible object but of Intellect, (ii) make
Intellect free from any falsehood or distortion, and finally (iii) conceptually underlie
the presence of the intelligible objects within Intellect. In a word, it is the problem
concerning the relationship of the knowing subject and the object known, with which
Plato and Aristotle have dealt respectively in the Sophist and De Anima r 4. This
very fundamental problem of ancient Greek philosophy seems to constitute the
"aporetic" background of Plotinus' doctrine.48 If the knowable object is outside the
knowing subject and their cognitive relationship is viewed in terms of activity and
passivity, many aporiae will arise. For instance, intellectual knowledge will be
changeable so that the soul will lose the criterion for her reasoning, Intellect will be
prone to be deceived in its knowing the object so that the goodness of the demiurge
will be compromised, and so on. Plotinus would have been urged to escape from
the cul-de-sac of these aporiae. Now we shall move to Plotinus' conception of
intellection. 49
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NOTES

lin the subsequent discussion, following Owens (The Doctrine of Being in
the Aristotelian 'Metaphysics,' 3rd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Studies, 1978), pp. 137-154), we shall render the Aristotelian oucrlcx "entity" rather
than "substance."
Reale sees in the present passage the coincidence of Aristotle's ontology,
ousiology, and theology (Aristotele, La Metafisica, Traduzione, Introduzione e
Commento, 2 vols. (Naple: Luigi Loffredo, 1968), 1:505-506, note 18). Since it is
enough to recall that the study of oucrlcx is imposed on nothing else than the first
philosophy, we do not consider the problem of the unity of thought in the

Metaphysics.
2As Ross notes, voVc;; in line 21 answers to ouvaµt.c; in line 20 (Aristotle's
Metaphysics, a Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, 2 vols. (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1924 ), 2:398). See also 1074b28 El µi} v611crlc; €cri:tv <XAAO:
ouvaµt.c;. This terminological distinction, however, is not in play throughout Met. A
7 and 9. Before the distinction is made, i:ov vo\Jv in 1074b15 refers to the actually
self-thinking principle.
3With Ross (Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2:380), we follow Alexander's
interpretation of €xwv in line 23: EVEpyEt OE 6 i:otoU'tO<; voVc;; €xwv €v €avi:&J i:O:
vo11i:O: xwpicrac; (Jn Met. 698.29-30). Reale follows the same line (Aristotele, La
Metafisica, 2:289, note 29). See also H. Bonitz,Aristotelis Metaphysica, 2 vols.
(Bonn: Marcus, 1848-1849; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1960), 2:501-502;
and A. Schwegler, Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles, Grundtext, Ubersetzung und
Commentar, nebst erlauternden Abhandlungen, 4 vols. (Ti.ibingen: L. F. Fues, 18471848; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1960), 4:267. Ravaisson rightly points
out that divine intellect is not properly the OEK'ttK6v in the sense of voVc;; ovv6:µn
(Essai sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, 2 vols. (Paris: L'Imprimerie Royale, Joubert,
1837-1846; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), 1:578-579, note 3.
4It is necessary for our inquiry to ascertain the specific instance of the
actuality-potentiality relationship in the case of divine intellect, because the word
€vE:pye:ux, in fact, refers to many notions in Met. A. In 1071b19-20, for instance, the
immobile entity is characterized as the apxi\ whose oucrlcx is €vE:pyna. As
construed with aVE\J \JA.11<; in line 21, €vE:pyEta here denotes a pure form without
matter. (For the form as actuality, see 1043a25-28 and 1050b2-3.) Since we cannot
adequately explore the bearing of €vE:pyEta-qua-v611crt.c; upon oucrlcx in such
passages, we need to ascertain the appropriate instance of the actuality-potentiality
relationship prior to our inquiry.
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5Jn Alexander's expression, (i) would correspond to KlVT\O"l<; ... vou (In
Met. 694.10), while (ii) to 6 voll<; KITT' €v€pyEto:V (697.16-17, 698.14-15) or 6 voll<;
€vEpyE~ (698.26, 39-40). But it will be discussed later whether Aristotle himself is
willing to admit that intellection is movement of intellect or not.
6For this interpretation, see W. D. Ross, op. cit., 2:379.
in 1072a30 apm yap ii vCniau;, the word is used in the original
sense. As Schwegler notes, cXpXll here is cXpXll ·roll 6p€yEa0cxt (Die Metaphysik des
Aristoteles, 4:260). Reale's translation follows a similar line: "infatti e il pensiero il
principio della volonta razionale." Then, the force of yap indicates that the present
sentence explains line 29 6pEy6µE0cx 0€ ot6i:t OOKEt µQU.ov fi OOKEt 6pEy6µE0cx.
So VOflO"l<; here is forced to mean also OOKEtV and so cannot refer to the activity of
divine intellect. As the first person plural 6pEy6µE0cx suggests, it is to us that the
immobile entity seems to be beautiful.
7Also

8See also De Anima 429a15-17 OEK'ttKov ... -roll<; E't00V<;. Ravaisson, in
his comment on this section, does not attribute the intellect-intelligible identity to
human intellection: "L'entendement n'est pas identique, mais semblable a son
object" (Essai sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, 1:580, note 4). In V 1 [10],3,23-24,
Plotinus compares the relationship of the soul and Intellect to that of OEXOµEvov
and ElOO<;. Gandillac considers the parallel between Aristotle's OEK'ttK6v and
Plotinus' OEXOµEvov to suggest a sort of analogical application of Aristotle's
formula concerning pure intellective activity to the relationship between the second
and the third hypostases. See M. de Gandillac, "Plotin et la 'Metaphysique'
d'Aristote," in Etudes sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, ed. P. Aubenque (Paris: J. Vrin,
1979), p. 252.
9See De Anima 429a16, 29.
lOSeeDeAnima 430a2-5, 19-20, 431bl7. Ross, on the one hand, tries to
clarify the implication of the identity of the actualized intellect and the actualized
object of intellection in terms of the identity of actualized sensation and the
actualized sensible object (Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2:379-380). Hamlyn, on the other
hand, observes that the former identity, since intellect has no organ, is not exactly
parallel to the latter and so remains extremely obscure. See D. W. Hamly,Aristotle's
De Anima, Books II and Ill, translated with Introduction and Notes (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 139-140. Although we do not go into details about what
this formula of the identity means precisely and how intellect receives the
intelligible form, it can be seen at least that the status of vo\K; as that which is
capable of receiving the object is implied in the formula.
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llTue notorious passage describing the self-thinking of divine intellect, Kat
E<TtlV ft VCn1<1l<; Voft0'€W<; VCn,atc; (1074b34-35), must be taken in light of these two
meanings of vCn,aic;; it is meant that the intellective activity of God is the
intellective exercise whose object is the actualized intellect, namely God himself.
The passage in question reiterates cx\nov ... voe:'l (1074b33-34). In 1074b29-30,
then, we are told that if divine intellect were voOc;; or mere ability of intellection, -ro
voouµEvov would be evidently something else (&A.Ao -ri) more precious than itself.
Hence cx\n:6v in line 33 refers to voVc;; that has become identical with voouµEVOV or
v011-rov, that is, the actualized intellect or vCn,aic;. Therefore the genitive vof\aEwc;
in line 34 must be taken as intellect in actuality rather than the intellective exercise.
12M. V. Wedin, "Aristotle on the Mechanics of Thought," Ancient
Philosophy 9 (1989):75.
13Tue causal thesis and the sameness thesis are exactly operative in the
above cited passage. But the extent to which the causal thesis is operative in the
present context concerning the inner life of God must be clearly ascertained.
Wedin refers to De Anima 429al4, 17-18, and Met. 1072a30 as the texts
warranting the causal thesis (op. cit.:72-73). In these passages and Met. 1072b22-23
(€vEpyE10€ EX<l>V), indeed, the causal role of the intelligible object is clearly seen.
On the causal role of the intelligible object, see also D. K. Modrak, "Aristotle on
Thinking," Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 2
(1987):223. But this fact does not necessarily allow us to take Met. 1072b22-23 in
terms of these other passages.
First, we must notice that Met. 1072a30 and 1072b22-23 differ
.contextually; Aristotle thematically speaks of the way in which the unmoved mover
moves the first heaven in the former, while of the inner life of divine intellect in the
latter. Hence the causal thesis applies to the relationship between human intellect
and divine intellect qua the primary intelligible object in the former, whereas, if we
may call it "relationship," to the relationship between divine capacity of intellection
and divine intelligible form in the latter. See Schwegler's note on 1072a26-27: "Im
Verhii.ltnis zum Bewegten ist Gott ein 6pEK-rov und v011-r6v, und zwar das np@-rov
VO'fl"tOV Kat 6pEK-r6v, das absolute Idea menschlichen Denkens und Strebens" (op.
cit., 4:259, (Italics mine.)). Again, intellect is said to be moved (KlVE'l-rai) by the
intelligible object in 1072a30. So the causal thesis is here linked with the movedness
of intellect by its object. But the introduction of any KtV'flO'l<; into the internal
structure of divine intellection would inevitably compromise the immobility of
divine intellect and make it something proximate to the Platonic soul or self-moving
mover rather than the unmoved mover. Therefore, the causal thesis, when applied
to the process of divine intellection taking place, must be severed from the
movedness of intellect by the intelligible object.
Second, there arises the problem whether the causal thesis could imply the
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mind's being acted on by the object of thought or not. In De Anima 429a13-15, from
which Wedin draws the causal thesis, Aristotle writes:
"Now, if thinking is akin to perceiving, it would be either being affected in
some way by the object of thought (il mxcrxe:tv l:t av e:'(11 \mo i:ou VOfl1:0U)
or something else of this kind (il i:t i:oto\Ji:ov €i:e:i:ov)" (tr. D. W. Hamlyn).
Many critics are unanimous in that Aristotle here accepts the second
alternative. But it is quite obscure what the second alternative il i:t i:oto\Ji:ov
Ei:e:pov indicates exactly. Norman links passivity with intellect's receptivity:
"Aristotle ... suggests that the manner in which intellect is acted on by the objects of
thought is in being 'capable of receiving the form,'" in "Aristotle's Philosopher-God,"
Phronesis 14 (1969):64. But we must notice that Aristotle stresses intellect's
unaffectedness (emcx9€c; &pcx oe:1 e:tvcxt, line 15). Ross hence correctly thinks that
Aristotle rejects the first alternative (Aristotle, De Anima, edited with Introduction
and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 291). According to Hamlyn,
the reason why the second alternative is accepted is that the formulae applied to
perception in consequence of Aristotle's original idea are applied to intellect;
Aristotle proceeds to put refinements and qualifications on his original thesis that
perception is a form of being affected, in a way which leads eventually to the
rejection of that thesis in 429a29-31 and 431a5 (op. cit., p. 136). If Aristotle's
insistence on the unaffectedness of intellect is seriously taken into consideration and
the line of interpretation by Ross and Hamlyn is followed, the causal thesis does not
point to such a conception of intellection as the mind's being acted on by the object
of thought. Wedin maintains that the mind's being moved by the object of thought
is enough for attribution of the causal thesis and regards the process of thinking as a
non-standard case of being-affected (Ancient Philosophy 9 (1989):73). Insofar as
Wedin does not clarify how this non-standard case of being-affected is congruent
with intellect's unaffectedness, we cannot follow his view. Towards the end of De
Anima r 4, however, we are confronted with the following problematic passage:
"Now (fi), being affected in virtue of something common has been
discussed before--to the effect that the intellect is in a way potentially the
objects of thought, although it is actually nothing before it thinks" (429b2931, tr. D. W. Hamlyn).
As np6i:e:pov in line 30 indicates, Aristotle here recalls the distinction of
two kinds of mxcrxe:tv already made in 417b2-7; (i) the transition from one state to
its opposite and (ii) the actualization of what is already potentially such. In the
above cited section, he replies to the difficulty raised in 429b23-26 by appealing to
the second sense of being-affected; although intellect has something in common
with its object in the sense that it is potentially its object rather than that it is altered
by its object in being affected, insofar as it is actually nothing before it thinks, its
unaffectedness is safeguarded. (429b25-26 yap i:t Kotvov 6:µ<j>o1v UTIOpXEt, i:o µ€v
ltotELV OoKEl 1:0 OE mxcrxnv reminds us of Soph. 248b5-6, where the Eleatic Stranger
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proposes to construe KOlVWVEtV as entailing rnx9TlJ..l.a and noiTlJ..l.a.) Here two points
must be noticed. First, the difficulty to which Aristotle replies in 429b29-31 is not
raised by himself but by an imaginative interlocutor (i:u;, line 23). Second, as Ross
points out (Aristotle, De Anima, p. 294), ft in line 29 indicates the beginning of a
tentative solution of the problem raised in lines 23-26. Hence we cannot conclude
that Aristotle here explicitly admits intellect's being affected by the intelligible
objects in being actualized by them. Rather, Aristotle later comes to feel reluctant
to use naaxEtv in the sense of the actualization of what is already potentially such:
"It is clear that the object of perception makes that which can perceive
actively so instead of potentially so; for it is not affected (OU ... naax€l)
or altered" (43 la4-5, tr. D. W. Hamlyn).
On this passage Hamlyn comments as follows:
"Here Aristotle finally denies explicitly, despite much of what he had said
earlier, that perception, being an activity or actualization, is a form of
being affected or of movement generally" (Aristotle's De Anima, p. 145,
(Italics mine.)).
Insofar as perception is not conceived to be a form of being affected, the
alleged kinship of intellection to perception (429al3-14) may not entail intellection
to be some affection by the intelligible objects. Hence the passage T1 n i:otoui:ov
€i:Epov in 429a14-15 must be construed to denote Aristotle's rejection of the
conception of intellection as a form of being acted on. Intellection thus conceived is
consistent with the unaffectedness of intellect. In conclusion, the causal thesis, when
applied to divine intellect, must be taken to mean nothing more than that intellect is
brought to activity by the object of intellection. In other words, it simply refers to
the causal relation between intellect and its object, but not to how the former is
actualized by the latter. The aforementioned final conception of perception by
Aristotle suggests that €v€pyEta or EVEpyEtV does not need to be either notEtV or
naaxEtV. To this extent, Apelt, who regards the soul's ytyvwaKElV of the Forms in
Plato as EVEpyEtV rather than notEtV (see note 71 in the first chapter), would agree
with Aristotle. But the reason why intellection must not be viewed in terms of
activity and passivity distinctly differs in Plato and Aristotle; in the former for the
immutability of the intelligible objects or Forms, while in the latter for the
unaffectedness of the intellective agent.
14Tue implication of the sameness thesis differs when it is applied to
divine thinking and when applied to human thinking. In the former, the mind in
activity is the same as the object of thought that is never other than the mind itself,
whereas in the latter the actualized mind is the same as the knowable object that is
other than the mind when the mind is not in activity. Norman, then, regards divine
self-intellection as "the same activity that human minds perform when they engage
in abstract thought" (Phronesis 14 (1969):67). Owens criticizes this view as follows:
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"Norman merely assures that separate substance can have and has knowable objects
other than itself," though "it is difficult to see how for Aristotle its [i.e. the prime
mover's] pure actuality could allow it any other knowable forms than itself' (Etudes
sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, p. 214, note 13). See also W. D. Ross, Aristotle,
(London: Methuen, 1923; reprint ed., London: Methuen, 1964), p. 183: "... what
Aristotle ascribes to God is knowledge which has only itself for its object."; G.
Reale,Aristotele, LaMetafisica, 2:289, note 29: "... e impossibile che l'oggeto
dell'intelligenza divina sia altro rispetto all'intelligenza medesima."; F. Ravaisson,
Essai sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, 1:585. On the sameness of divine thinking as
ordinary human abstract thinking, further, Norman differentiates the prime mover's
self-thinking from self-contemplation and regards the object of the former as only
incidentally intellect itself (op. cit. :72). To this interpretation runs counter
Aristotle's own text. Immediately after concluding that divine intellect knows itself
in Met. A 9, he writes:
"But evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding
have always something else as their object, and themselves only by the way
(Ev rnxp€py~)" (1074b35-36, tr. W. D. Ross).
Aristotle here contrasts divine thinking with other cognitive activities. As
Ross construes it, the above passage suggests that "the divine VOflO't<; knows itself
not EV nap€py~. but as its only object (Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2:398). Moreover,
Alexander takes EV nap€py~ in the sense of Ko:i:a cruµf3E/3flK6<;; (In Met. 713.5).
Thus construed, the thesis is rejected by Aristotle himself that the prime mover
knows itself only concomitantly.
15See note 6.
16For i:fy; ovcrio:<; in 1072b22 in the sense of essence or pure form, see W.
D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2:380; and H. Bonitz,Aristotelis Metaphysica, 2:501.
17Tue receptive character of intellect is also marked by Ko:i:a µE'taAfllfJtv
·rov VOfl'tOV in line 20. Reale's translation suggests that i:o ... OEK'ttKov i:ov VOfl'tOV
Kcxl i:fy; ovcrim;; is to be closely taken with Kcx'ta µE'tMfllfJtv i:ov VOfl'tov; he renders
the former "capace di cogliere l'intelligibile e la sostanza" and the latter "cogliendosi
come intelligibile." Aristotle appears to imply receptivity of intellect and community
between intellect and intelligible object by the word µE'taAfllfJt<;. Ross reads into
this term the presence of the intelligible object in intellect by referring to De Anima
430a8-9 EK€lV~ (sc. vfij) 'tO VOfl'tOV unap~Et (Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2:379).
The receptive implication of the word µE'taAfllfJt<; would have bearing on
the fact that Aristotle regards i:o µE'tcxAfln'ttK6v as apt for identifying the
Receptacle in Plato's Timaeus (Phys. 209b12-14; see also 209b35 i:o µE8€K'ttKov).
Several critics view this identification as fair. See G. S. Claghorn, Aristotle's
Criticism of Plato's Timaeus (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), p. 6. It is to some
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extent probable that Aristotle may have taken Tim. 51bl µEi:cxA<Xµl)avov OE ... i:ou
VOfl'tOV to indicate the Receptacle's "participation" in the Idea. See N. Fujisawa,
"EXElV, ME't€XElV, and Idioms of 'Paradeigmatism' in Plato's Theory of Forms,"
Phronesis 19 (1974):47-48, note 48. Ancient and modern commantators actually do
so. See Proclus, In Pann. 876.34-35, Cousin; K. M. Sayre, Plato's Late Ontology: A
Riddle Resolved (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 250. But, since
Tim. 51bl does not refer to the separate Form, as in N. Fujisawa, Zoe. cit.; A. E.
Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928; reprint
ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 331; R. D. Archer-Hind, The Timaeus of
Plato, edited with Introduction and Notes (New York: Macmillan, 1888; reprint ed.,
New York: Arno Press, 1973), p. 179: W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics, a Revised Text
with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 566,
Aristotle's identification does not seem to be appropriate. I cannot see why Ross
maintains that "it is correct to say that the Timaeus identifies xwpcx and i:o
µe:i:cxA.rtni:tK6v" (Aristotle's Physics, p. 565), though he correctly observes that
"Aristotle's phrase i:o µEi:cxA.rtni:tK6v may be due to a misinterpretation of the
phrase µEi:cxA.cxµl)avov OE ... i:ou vorti:ou" (op. cit., p. 566). For Plato's own use of
µe:i:<lArtlJlt<; for describing the thing's participation in the Form, see Parm. 131a5.
For the disappearance of participation terminology from the contexts dealing with
separate Forms in Plato's late dialogues, see N. Fujisawa, Phronesis 19 (1974):54; R.
D. Archer-Hind, The Timaeus of Plato, p. 182; H. Cherniss, "The Relation of the
Timaeus to Plato's Later Dialogues," in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E.
Allen (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 362-364; W. D. Ross, Plato's
Theory of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951; reprint ed., Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1976), p. 230.
11

18For the interpretation of this passage, see note 3.
19In the present discussion, the word oucrio: has double meaning; (i) the
intelligible form as considered in separation from receptive intellect and (ii)
intellect that has become identical with that intelligible form and exercises
intellection. It is the oucrio: qua (i) that is now said to be prior to E:v€py€tcx qua
v6rtcru;. Indeed, (i) itself can be called E:v€pyEtcx as it is a pure form (see Met.
1050b2-3). But we have already defined E:v€pyEtcx in our inquiry as v6rtcru; for our
comparison of Aristotle with Plato and Plotinus. Hence the primacy of oucrio:
stressed here is not the priority of an agent to activity it exercises, but that of an
object to activity it causes. Of course, although it is possible to establish the priority
of oucrio: to E:v€py€tcx in terms of the Aristotelian metaphysical principle that operari
sequitur esse, we do not pursue that line here.
There seem to be two criteria whereby (ii) is said to be in actuality; the
employment of the intellective ability (see 1050a21-25) and the definiteness given by
the possession of the intelligible object within intellect (see Aristotle's identification
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of n€pcxc;; with ElOcx;;, 'tEAO<;, and 'tO -rt fiv Elvm in Met. fl. 17). Since (ii) can be said
to be in actuality because of definiteness besides the facts that the noetic exercise of
(ii) is caused by (i) and that the definiteness of (ii) is provided by (i), definiteness
seems to be the crucial criterion of actuality for Aristotle. Rorty then endeavors to
spell out Aristotle's failure in identification of definiteness with actuality. See
"Matter and Event," in Explorations in Whitehead's Philosophy, ed. L. S. Ford and G.
L. Kline, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1983), pp. 68-103. He first pays
attention to two roles of matter. On the one hand, matter, in the account for
substantial change, must be cuddly, malleable, and receptive. On the other, it, in the
account for accident, individuation, and monstrosities, must be resistant,
obstreperous, and stubborn. According to Rorty, the second role is to entangle
Aristotle's own identification of definiteness with actuality:
"Now when one focuses on this second role, one sees that matter is not
resistant because of its indefiniteness, but precisely because of its
definiteness. It is not because a lump of marble is 'formless' that it resists
the sculptor, but because it has the wrong form" (ibid., p. 87).
There seems to be serious confusion in this observation. We must notice
that the sculptor is the efficient cause in the substantial change of the lump of
marble. So Rorty confuses the first and the second roles of matter. What might
resist the efficient cause in a given substantial change, if anything, would be the
definiteness present in the privation of a given form which is the very "contrary" to
that form (Met. 1069b33-34, 1070b31-32; see also 1018a20-21, 1054a23-24,
1055a33ff., 1057a36; Phys. 193b20-21; Cat. llb17-19). Aristotle characterizes as
a-ra~i.a privation rather than matter (Met. 1070b28). It would be a union of
privation with matter that has the "wrong" form, such a union that is instantiated by
Kaµvov in 1071a10 (see W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2:363). The composite
of privation and matter is endowed with definiteness, precisely because privation is
ElOcx;; nclx;; (Phys. 193b19-20). Hence, Rorty, besides his confusion between the first
and the second roles of matter, seems to confuse matter and the composite of
privation and matter. It is indeed true that Aristotle regards matter as the cause of
the accidental (Met. 1027al3-15). But Ross observes that Aristotle fails in ascribing
the occurrence of the exceptional to the capacity of matter:
"But obviously matter when acted on by the same forces will receive the
same determination; its indeterminateness does not involve contingency.
There will be exceptions to rules, but these exceptions will be according to
rule" (Aristotle, p. 77, (Italics mine.)).
From Aristotle's failure in ascribing contingency to indefiniteness,
however, we cannot conclude that exceptional events are caused by the alleged
definiteness of matter, since these events, as Ross sees, can be viewed as "simply a
name for the unforeseen meeting of two chains of rigorous causation" (ibid., p. 78).

89

20See De Anima 430a5.
21It must be noticed that cruVEXtlc; in 1072b29 is taken over by "t'O cruVEXE<;
... "t'fy; voi}aEwc; in 1074b29. Alexander takes the continuity of divine life
mentioned here in relation to the contemplative activity of God (In Met. 699.22-23).
It is evident that the sempiternity and continuity of the prime mover's life must be
established as that on which everlastingness and continuity of the circular movement
of the outermost heaven depends. However, needless to say, the continuity of divine
life must be taken non-spatially to indicate the incessancy or unbrokenness of
contemplative activity, as Alexander suggests (In Met. 699.23, Ei yap ol.CXAlµnav€1.,
OUK CxlOlOV).
The continuity of divine contemplation certainly illuminates Aristotle's
conception of divine eternity. As continuity in general implies endurance, it is hard
to suppose that Aristotle has formulated the non-durational conception of eternity.
Whittaker, referring to Met. 1072b14-16, 24-30, and 1073a7, observes that the prime
mover, enduring but not being subject to change, is "not exempt from duration" in
"The 'Eternity' of the Platonic Forms," Phronesis 13 (1968):142. He summarizes the
historical locus of the Platonic and the Aristotelian notion of eternity as follows:
"Neither Plato nor Aristotle felt any need to formulate a non-durational
conception of eternity, but each contributed towards preparing the
grounds for the new notion, the actual origin of which should be sought in
the religious philosophizing of the following centuries" (ibid.:143).
In his annotation on Met. 1072b29 Alexander construes divine eternity as
essentially durational (In Met. 699.24, ai.Wv yap €anv Ti EKcXO"'t'~
cruµnap€K"t'€lvoµ€VTt ~wi}). Plotinus' non-durational notion of eternity is precisely
based on the denial of continuity and "stretch" to eternity (III 7 [45], 11,52-54, CxV"t't
0€ CxOlaO"'t'cX"t'O\J Kat €v0<; E'i&.>A.ov "t'OU €v0<; "t'O E:v a\JVEXE~ €v; I 5 [36],7,26-27,
000€ nap€K"t'a"t'EOV "t'O CxOuXO'"t'a"t'OV).
22w. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2:277. See also Ravaisson's
comment on 1072b20-21: "Mais, dans la pensee pure, l'objet et le sujet qui le touche
son egalement indivisible: ce sont done comme deux points qui ne peuvent se
toucher sans se confondre, et sans s'identifier integralement" (op. cit., 1:580).
Berti dismisses such a possible interpretation that the immobile entities
could be apprehended by human mind with the help of OtyE'lv, by regarding it as a
form of mysticism totally incompatible with the philosophy of Aristotle and by
pointing out that Met. 1072b21 allows the prime mover alone the cognitive contact
of this sort. See Etudes sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, ed. P. Aubenque (Paris: J.
Vrin, 1979), p. 85.
23Plato's position thus clarified seems to have some bearing on the fact
that he qualifies 6µoiwcrt<; 8€4J by Ka"t'a "t'O ovva"t'ov (Theaet. 176bl-2), whereas this
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qualification drops in Plotinus. See also J.M. Rist, "Forms of Individuals in
Plotinus," Classical Quarterly 13 (1963):230; and G. J.P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy
of the Self (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 55.
24See note 17.
25Also in Plato's theory of Forms, µ€0E~tc;, either a sensible particular's
participation in the Form or the participation of one Form in another within the
systematic complex of the Forms, is closely allied with Kotvwvi.a (Phd. 100d6; Soph.
256bl-2). Again, we may recall Plato's description of intellection as KOLVWVElV
between the soul and the Form (Soph. 248a10-11).
26For the interpretation of De Anima 429b29-31, see note 13.
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27See Met. 1046a22-28, especially lines 22-26 ti µ€v EV"[~ naaxovi:t ... ti
€v i:~ nmotlvi:t and line 24 KCXt CiAAo int' CiAAou.
28For the a-kinetic nature of divine intellection, see notes 13 and 41.

29See P. Hadot, "Etre, Vie, Pensee chez Plotin et avant Plotin, " in Les
Sources de Plotin (Geneva, Vandoevres: Fondation Hardt, 1957), p. 112, note 6.
'30We must notice that ot.0: i:otli:o in 1072b 17 refers to the fact that the
prime mover's E:ypityopau:;, as well as his cxfo9riau:; and v6riau:;, is the E:v€pyEtcx
that is pleasant (see W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2:379). In addition, E:A.nIBEc;;
... Kcxl µvf1µcxt in lines 17-18 would point to such conception of divine eternity by
Aristotle as pointed out in note 21.
31D. W. Hamlyn,Aristotle's DeAnima, p. 140.
32W. D. Ross, Aristotle, pp. 149-150. See also ibid., p. 150: "Similarly, the
fact that active reason already knows all intelligible objects makes it possible for the
passive reason, in itself a potentiality, actually know, and for the knowable actually
to be known."
33W. D. Ross, Aristotle, p. 150, italics mine.
34J. M. Rist, "Notes on Aristotle De Anima 3.5," Classical Philology 61
(1966):12. See also D. K. Modrak, op. cit.:225.
35J. M. Rist, Classical Philology 61 (1966):15-16.
36See J.M. Rist, Classical Philology 61 (1966):12. Rist regards voriau:;
than E:mai:ftµri as more appropriate to the agent intellect (op. cit.:15). This view is
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based on 430a22 au' oux CrtE µ€v VO€l O'tE 0' OU VO€l, which would imply that the
agent intellect always votl Hamlyn admits this implication: "The active intellect
must always think because it is actual ... " (Aristotle s De Anima, p. 141 ). Insofar as
the agent intellect is precisely o\Ji:<><; 6 vo\)(; ( 430al 7), it is impossible to conceive
that it does not exercise intellection. Aristotle is thus forced to conceive such
vbrial.C.; that is distinct from the identification of intellect and its object. But it is
highly dubious that he is willing to entertain such vbrial.C.; that concerns no
intelligible object; for object-less intellection is said to be just like sleeping (Met.
1074b17-18) and would not be appropriate to the agent intellect. The necessity that
some intellection must be ascribed to the agent intellect is incompatible with the
conception of intellection as the identification of the receptive intellect and the
knowable object. This incompatibility would hence be due to the fact that there is
no generic account for intellection in Aristotle that can encompass the descriptions
of both the agent and the passive intellects.
37St. Thomas' doctrine of the agent intellect seems to have the
philosophical, but not exegetical, advantage that can harmonize the definition of
knowledge as the reception of the intelligible forms with the function of the agent
intellect that makes all the intelligible objects. That is, he attributes abstraction or
illumination to the agent intellect and knowing or comprehension to the passive
intellect alone and construes n6:vi:a notEtV as "making all the species intelligible."
Modrak also denies the apprehension of the objects to the agent intellect
(see note 34). She further pushes this view and characterizes divine intellection as
object-less activity:
"Therefore I shall argue for an alternative interpretation of VOflCYl.C.;
VOflCYEW<;;: it is not a genuine cognitive activity for its object is not a
genuine cognition. It is a mental activity directed upon itself; since the
original activity had no object, it has no character and hence the reflexive
activity has no object. This 'thinking' resembles the active vo\}(;"
(Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquim in Ancient Philosophy 2
(1987):232).
We are reluctant to accept Modrak's view. On her view, the account for
divine intellection can do away with the sameness thesis and the causal thesis (see
note 12). If divine intellection has no object, we wonder how it is possible to defend
the substantiality and the definiteness of the prime mover. Modrak's view, in fact, is
based on her observation that Aristotle wished to say that God was both an object
and the activity of thinking, but unsuccessfully tried in his definition to have it both
ways. But it would not be justifiable to move from the alleged failure of Aristotle to
the conclusion that divine activity of thinking has no object. Modrak does not
sufficiently consider whether the sameness and the causal theses can at the same
time insure the substantiality and the eternal actuality of God.
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38D. W. Hamlyn,Aristotle's DeAnima, p. 140, italics mine.
39W. D. Ross,Aristotle, p. 153.
40We may here touch upon the problem, how Aristotle's phrase 6
rnx0rrrtK0c; vo\Jc;; in De Anima 430a24-25 is consistent with its being ana0E:c; ( 429a15,
29, b23). As Ross maintains by rejecting Alexander's interpretation (Aristotle's De
Anima, pp. 42-43), we may not conceive that the agent intellect acts on the passive
intellect. So the phrase does not imply that the relation between the agent and the
passive intellects points to that between that which acts and that which is acted on.
41Tuis point surely reminds us of Ethica Nicomachea 1154b27-28, where
God's pleasure in rest (ti&>tn1 ... €v i}p€µ~) is identified with €vE:py€ta ...
aKtVT)al.ac;. See also Skemp's observation: "Here in A 9 the positive value of the
EVEpy€ta aKlVT)O'la<; is taken from ethics, and here the aKlVT)O'la does not consist in
the absence of being acted upon" ("The Activity of Immobility," in Etudes sur la
Metaphysique d'Aristote, ed. P. Aubenque (Paris: J. Vrin, 1979), p. 231). According
to Skemp, the "positive value" of the €vE:py€ta aKtVT)al.ac; is the merit attached to
the object of op€~l<; "which in fact provides for God joy which is single and pure"
(op. cit., p. 240). Moreover, Skemp seems to indicate the non-reciprocal relation of
the prime mover and the first moved by "the absence of being acted upon." Indeed
the prime mover is not acted on by any other entity. Then, does the prime mover's
immobility have no bearing on its internal structure of self-thinking that is regarded
as free from activity and passivity?
The a-kinetic nature of intellection would need further consideration.
Remarking that the prime mover's moving as the €pwµ€VO<; could hardly induce the
heaven to locomotion, Skemp points out that "ambiguity between the 'psychical' and
physical senses of KlV€ta0at can hardly be eliminated from Metaphysics A." (op. cit.,
p. 240). So there seems to arise such possible objection that the alleged kinetic
character of intellection may not infringe God's immobility, since his immobility is
mentioned in relation to the everlasting movement of the heaven (1072a25, b7,
1073a23ff.). For this objection to be sound, the alleged "psychic" sense of movement
must be distinguished from its physical or locomotive sense. Upon this conceptual
distinction, one could claim that intellective movement does not compromise the
prime mover's immobility in its physical sense. But this claim is obviously awkward;
for the unmovedness of the prime mover, as already mentioned, does not consist in
the absence of being acted on by another entity and so must not be taken in the
physical sense. The ambiguity is found in the movedness of the first moved, but not
in the unmovedness of the prime mover. Hence, one is forced to answer how the
alleged intellective movement can be compatible with the "spiritual" immobility of
God. But it would be hopelessly difficult to solve this problem.
Our claim of intellection to be a-kinetic is based on the following two
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textual warrants. First, Aristotle, in distinguishing €v€pyELCX from KlVTlO'I.<;, mentions
voE'iV as an instance of the former (Met. 1048b24, 34). In the case of divine inner
life the intellective exercise is continuous, so that it can be said to attain always its
i:€A<><;;. In this case, any process towards the actualization is inconceivable.
According to Skemp, the definition of KlVTlO'I.<; as €v€pyELCX 6:i:EAi}<;; means that
"where there is KiVT'lO'u; there is a process towards €v€pyELCX rather than that
"KiVTlO'I.<; is a kind of €v€pyELCX but the kind which is ITTEAi}<;;" (op. cit., p. 245).
Second, in De Anima 43 la4-7, Aristotle finally rejects his original idea expressed in
416b33-34, that perception is a form of movement. The reason why Aristotle admits
the second alternative in 429a14-15, as Hamlyn observes, is that "the formulae
applied to perception in consequence of his original idea are here applied to the
intellect" (Aristotle's De Anima, p. 136); intellection is not a form of being acted on
or of movement. See also note 13.
11

42See K. -H. Volkmann-Schluck, Plotin als Interpret der Ontologi,e Platos,
3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1966), p. 37.
43A. H. Armstrong, "The Background of the Doctrine 'That the
Intelligibles are not outside the Intellect,"' in Les Sources de Plotin (Geneva,
Vandoevres: Fondation Hardt, 1957), p. 54. Owens expresses the all-pervasive
influence of Aristotle's metaphysics on Plotinus as follows: "Imagine the Plotinian
doctrine without the Aristotelian starting point of the presence of the intelligibles
within the intelligence ... " (Etudes sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, p. 261). But we
must notice that the presence of the plural vorrr6: within divine Intellect is not
purely Aristotelian. The historical locus of Aristotle's doctrine is rather accurately
.rendered by Theiler:
"Sollte eigentlich die voriau; vof}aEW<; die Zusammenfassung aller E'iOri
der Natur im gottlichen Geiste bedeuten? Es gab also in der spateren
Philosophie ein Weiterdenken und Vollenden dessen, was Aristoteles
nicht ausgefiihrt hatte" (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 415).
44A.

H. Armstrong, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 412.

45Plotinus himself thinks that the identity of Intellect and its object has the
historical origin in Parmenides' fragment 1:0 yrxp au-ro VOElV EO'"Cl "CE Kat Eivm (DK
B3). He takes this fragment to indicate the substantial (oua~) identity of Intellect
and the intelligible object (III 8 [30],8,7-8). Armstrong comments on this section as
follows: "Plotinus ... uses (Parmenides' fragment) explicitly, as he does here
implicitly, in support of his doctrine that the intelligible objects are not outside
intellect." See A. H. Armstrong, Plotinusi Text with an English Translation, 7 vols.
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966-1988; London: William
Heinemann, 1966-1988), 3:384, note 1. Again, Plotinus juxtaposes this fragment
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with De Anima 430a3-4 and 431al-2 in V 9 [5],5,29-31. He also here claims the
identity of the intelligible objects with and the presence of them within Intellect
(lines 26-27). Armstrong then views that Plotinus "knew, and wished to respect at
least verbally, the tradition which made the Forms in the Timaeus the plan in the
mind of the divine architect" (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 411). Beyond this
observation, however, Plotinus, in III 9 [13], 1 where he thematically deals with the
exegesis of Tim. 39e7-9, interprets the presence of the intelligible object within
Intellect to be said by Plato himself: 0 yap Kcx0op<;x ov ~T)O'lV EV €i:€p~ naV'tW<;;,
Ci).)..' EV crirt&l i:&> EV crirt&l i:o VOT)'t:OV EXE'tV (lines 14-15). Plotinus here construes
Tim. 30c7-8 to warrant the presence of the intelligible object within Intellect, though
that passage, in fact, simply refers to the all-inclusiveness of the world of Forms. So
Armstrong is right in regarding this passage as a misinterpretation, or careless
reading, of Tim. 30c7-8 (Plotinus, 3:408, note 1). In VI 6 [34],7,16-17, however,
Plotinus takes that passage to indicate the all-inclusiveness of the noetic universe.
Therefore, although Plotinus' exegesis of Parmenides and Plato is quite arbitrary, it
is certain that he would himself have considered his doctrine of the voD<;;-vOT)i:6v
identity to be traced back through Plato to Parmenides. Needless to say, this fact is
fully compatible with Armstrong's view as stated in note 43; for what Armstrong
points out is the historical background that has stimulated Plotinus' philosophizing,
whereas what we indicate is the locus classicus which Plotinus has sought in support
of his doctrine.
Pepin, independently of Plotinus' exegesis of Plato, tries to show that the
voD<;;-voT)'t:OV identity was presented, though in obscure and dispersed fashion, by
Plato himself in his "Elements pour une Histoire de la Relation entre !'Intelligence
et l'Intelligible chez Platon et dans le Neoplatonisme," Revue Philosophique de la
France et de l'Etranger 146 (1956):40-44. The dialogues' passages to which Pepin
refers are categorized into two groups; the passages concerning the soul's relation to
the Forms and those concerning the Demiurge's relation to the Forms. We have no
objection to the soul's kinship to the Forms or her intelligible nature in the former
group of passages (Phd. 77dff.; Rep. 490b3-5, 500c2-5; Tim. 35al-2; Leges 898e2) as
having some bearing on the doctrine of the voD<;;-voT)i:ov identity. But Pepin's
observation that the voD<;;-voT)i:ov identity is entertained by Plato, based on the
latter group of passages, seems to be unconvincing. First, we cannot see why Pepin
appeals to such an exceptional passage like Rep. 597d2, where the Form is described
as if it were created by the Demiurge. Second, Pepin concludes not only the Form's
presence in the Demiurge's mind but its being a v6riµcx from the verb expressing the
reasoning of the Demiurge (iiyilacxi:o yap ... 6 auv0t:l.c;, Tim. 33d2): "Non que cet
intelligible produit par le demiurge s'en detache comme une forme separee
subsistant a part; il demeure en lui, dont il est la pensee" (op. cit.:43). But this
conclusion is obviously incongruent with Plato's insistence that the Idea is not the
VOTlJJ.CX. We cannot but wonder how such construction is possible from the simple
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verb nyE'lcr0at. Finally, Pepin refers to Tim. 37al i:@v VOT)1:WV cXEl 1:€ ovi:wv, where
the Demiurge is counted among the intelligible entities. To be sure, this phrase is
construed by Archer-Hind to identify the Demiurge or vo\X; with the Idea or VOT)i:6v
(The Timaeus of Plato, p. 115). But it seems difficult to read the vo\X;-vOT)i:6v
identity in this pharse. See also A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, p.
176: "It is a mistake to attempt to get some kind of modern 'idealism' out of this
simple phrase." As Cornford indicates (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 248), how
intellect is related to the Forms is "a question that can only be answered in the
figurative language of the Timaeus."
In fact, it would not be difficult to imagine that Plato had more than once
envisaged the identity of intellect and the Forms or the presence of the latter in the
former. The identity, on the one hand, has the advantage of establishing the
relationship, of intellect to the Forms, which is free from activity and passivity, as
already suggested in Aristotle's case. On the other hand, however, the presence of
the Ideas in intellect is likely to invite such a fatal charge that they might be nothing
else than voi)µcxi:cx. The VOTVJ.CX arises oU&xµou ... CXAA.o0t fi E:v ~uxcxlc; (Parm.
132b4-5). The vo\X;-v011i:6v identity thus seems to have appeared a two-edged
sword to Plato himself. Unfortunately, Pepin does not envisage any possible
consequence that the vo\X;-vor1i:6v identity might entail to be obnoxious in Plato's
philosophy.
46See note 27.
47See notes 43, 44, and 45.
48See A.H. Armstrong, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 401:
"Plotinus in formulating his doctrine that the Intelligibles are in Intellect
seems to me to be concerned with a question of a different sort 'What is
the relationship of eternal intuitive thought to its object (or objects) and
how is that object to be conceived?"' (Italics mine.).
Armstrong here maintains that Plotinus' doctrine of the voD<;-VOf11:cX
identity is not really "demiurgic" and that the problem with which that doctrine is
concerned is different from the problem concerning the relationship between the
demiurge and the pattern he uses (Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 400-401). The problem
in question is precisely one of the fundamental problems of speculative philosophy
that both Plato and Aristotle have seriously tackled. Viewed from such a thinker
like Plotinus who acknowledges himself as the true successor of the vetera of Plato's
philosophy, it is the problem of the cognitive Kotvwvicx between the soul or intellect
and the Ideas that has much troubled Plato in the Sophist, a matter of life or death
in the theory of Forms; it is the serious problem of harmonizing the status of the
Idea as i:o VOf11:0V with its immutability, the fundamental thesis in the theory of
Forms. Hence we can say that Plotinus, in this respect, patiently tackles the
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problem that Plato has left unsolved.
49Before moving from Plato and Aristotle to Plotinus, we may briefly
touch upon the problem concerning the fundamental character of their doctrines of
intellect. Schwyzer regards the Plotinian Intellect as Aristotelian rather than
Platonic in respect of its substantiality; the Platonic intellect, on the other hand,
remains a "faculty" or "property," in '"BewuBt' und 'UnbewuBt' bei Plotin," in Les
Sources de Plotin (Geneva, Vandoevres: Fondation Hardt, 1957), p. 346. As
mentioned in note 15 in the first chapter, however, this view is not cogent enough;
for Plato nowhere rejects the possibility of the transcendent intellect to subsist apart
from the soul.
Barnes maintains that Aristotle's conception of intellect in De Anima is
non-physical and non-substantial in "Aristotle's Concept of Mind," Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society 72 (1971-72):101-114. Since our focus is on divine intellect in
the Metaphysics, we may here have no need to examine Barnes' position seriously.

CHAYfERill
INTELLECTION IN PWTINUS

Introduction

In this chapter we do not attempt to present the systematic picture of
Plotinus' doctrine of Intellect. As Armstrong observes, Plotinus "tries to pack too
much and too varied a content of tradition and experience into his account of his
Second Hypostasis for consistency."1 It is totally beyond the scope of our inquiry to
analyze fully the content of his doctrine of Intellect. We intend to establish the
following three points in this chapter:

(1) Plotinus' doctrines of the intellect-intelligible identity, stimulated by
Aristotle's psychological formula, can satisfactorily answer the
problem, raised in the Sophist, concerning the cognitive relation
between intellect and the invariable Forms (Sections I, II and V).
(2) lntellection for Plotinus is the €v€pyEt.a inseparable from ouai.a:
(Section VI).
(3) In Plotinus' system, the doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity or
self-intellection is closely connected with the doctrine of Intellect's
relation to the One, from which the problem of the One's knowledge
may arise (Sections VI-VIII).
We shall also consider Intellect's self-consciousness in Section III and
ascertain Plotinus' departure from the Middle Platonic view of the Form as God's
v6Tlµo: in Section IV. The last chapter was closed with the brief remark on the
historical locus of the Peripatetic doctrine of the intellect-intelligible unity. Hence
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we may resume our inquiry with Plotinus' doctrine of the intellect-intelligible
identity.
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1. The Presence of the

Intelli~ible

Objects within Intellect

Plotinus applies to the relation between Intellect and the intelligible
object the Aristotelian formula of their identity rather than the Platonic view of the
soul as adjacent to the Form in her contemplation. But this formula thus adopted
undergoes substantial transformation. As Armstrong points out,2 Plotinus, in his
argument for Intellect's self-thinking in V 3 [49],5, seems to assume without
discussion the identity of the Aristotelian vorrr6v with the Platonic vorrr6:. In
Plotinus, hence, intellection concerns the multiplicity of the Forms and represents
the identification of Intellect and the intelligible objects. Intellection cannot be
absolutely simple:
Therefore the thinker ( -ro voouv) must apprehend one thing different
from another and the object of thought (-ro voouµEVOV) in being thought
( Kcx-rcxvoouµEvov) must contain variety; or there will not be a thought
(v6nau;) of it ... (V 3 [49],10,40-42, tr. A.H. Armstrong).3
Because of such manifold nature, as we shall see later, intellection is
definitely denied to the One.
The connection between intellection and multiplicity is not exhausted by a
multitude of the intelligible objects. On the one hand, Intellect and its object are
substantially (-rn oua((;x) one (V 6 [24],1,4-5).4 On the other hand, they are
conceptually (A.6y41) distinguished (VI 7 [38],40,17).5 Hence Intellect is at the same
time said to be one because it thinks itself and to be two because it thinks itself as
the intelligible object (V 6 [24], 1,23). With O'Daly, we can say that "intellection is
described as proceeding from an initial unity which dualizes itself intellectually."6 If
Intellect is two, it must be necessarily many (V 3 [49], 15,39). Because of this duality
Plotinus refuses to regard Aristotle's self-thinking Intellect as the primary principle
(V 1 [10],9,7-9).7 When Plotinus argues for the absence of intellection from the
One, he generally invokes not only the unbroken connection between intellection
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and the multiplicity of intelligible objects but also the duality inevitably implied in
self-intellection.
Needless to say, the conception of intellection as the identification of the
intellective agent and the knowable object originates from Aristotle's psychology
and metaphysics. As already seen, however, Plotinus himself believes that
Parmenides and Plato have already held this conception.8 Hence it is no wonder
that he endeavors to relate several elements in Plato's philosophy to his own
doctrine of the presence of the Forms in Intellect. For instance, Plotinus applies to
the structure of self-intellection the scheme of five genera in the Sophist. Again,
more importantly, the basic motive for his doctrine of the presence of the intelligible
objects in Intellect is very close to the necessity by which Plato must defend the
immutability of Forms, the fundamental hypothesis in his theory of Ideas. In the
following, we shall explore these two similarities between Plato and Plotinus in
detail.9
In V 1 [10],4, Plotinus ranges Intellect with the thinking agent or activity
and Being with the intelligible object (lines 26-33) and proceeds to the elucidation
of the duality-in-unity structure of self-intellection with recourse to the Platonic
genera:
If there were neither otherness nor sameness, thinking would not arise.
Accordingly, the primaries are Intellect, Being, otherness and sameness;
and one must also include motion and rest. There must be movement if
Intellect thinks, and rest so that it may think the same thing [as itself].
There must be otherness so that there may be a thinker and that which is
thought; if you take away otherness, Intellect and Being will be one and
become silent (lines 33-39).
Otherness here functions as the principle of distinction between the
intellective agent and the intelligible object, whereas sameness is the principle of

unity between Intellect and Being.IO Without otherness, there would be no subject-
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object duality and thereby no intellection. Otherness, moreover, has another role.
Plotinus continues:
But the objects of thought must be different in relation to each other
(lines 39-40).
Otherness is also the principle of distinction among the intelligible
objects.11 Since each object is defined by its own form, otherness in this role
precisely represents the difference (01.acpopa) (line 41).12 The connection between
intellection and otherness in this second role is more clearly described in VI 7
[38], 13.13 Otherness is said to have awakened Intellect into life and activity (lines
11-12). So Intellect went forward with otherness (line 20). Without the otherness
that pluralizes the intelligible world, Intellect stands still so that neither intellection
nor intellective movement will occur, and no Intellect will be hypostatized (lines 3740). Also in this sense, otherness is necessary for intellection to take place.
Consequently, the incompatibility of otherness with the absolute simplicity of the
One naturally leads to the denial of intellection to it (VI 9 [9],6,42).14
The introduction of Aristotle's doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity
results in the presence of multiplicity in Intellect as well as its simplicity.15 Let us
move to the problem concerning the basic motive of Plotinus' doctrine of the
intellect-intelligible identity. What does he endeavor to defend by this doctrine?
More simply, why does he maintain that all the intelligible objects are inside
Intellect? Plotinus' arguments for the doctrine are developed mainly in V 9 [5],5, V
5 [32],1, and V 3 [49],5. We may first review his arguments in their chronological
order.
The object of V 9 [5] as a whole is to display the true nature of Intellect.
As Armstrong points out,16 this treatise gives the impression of having been

hurriedly written. So Plotinus' argument for the intellect-intelligible identity in the
fifth chapter is quite brief. The premise of his argument is the pure actuality and
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eternity of Intellect; Intellect in the true sense neither is in potentiality nor passes
from stupidity to intelligence (5,1-4). If the essence of Intellect and those objects
which it thinks were different from one another, the essence of Intellect would itself
be unintellectual (av6rrrcx;) and in potentiality (5,7-9). Insofar as Intellect is totally
in actuality and so is not actualized by anything else, it does not have its thinking
from outside (µit €ncxKi:ov), but thinks and possesses its objects from itself (ncxp'
cxui:ou KCXl €~ cxui:ou); in other words, Intellect is itself the intelligible objects (5,4-7).
This is the argument from the ever-presence of some actualizing principle within
Intellect. This argument, however, will not be fully clear, unless the causal
connection between Intellect's activity and the intelligible objects is clarified. In
5,12-13, Plotinus writes:

It is clear that, since it is Intellect in its true sense, it thinks beings and
establishes them in existence (ixj>tai:T\atv).
This passage means that intellection hypostatizes the intelligible objects.
If this is the case, those objects will be nothing other than vofiµcxi:cx. But Plotinus

definitely rejects the conception of the Forms as vofiµcxi:cx later in 7, 12-1717 and 8,811. Even if the intelligible objects are hypostatized by Intellect's activity, unless the
reason is explained why those objects thus hypostatized must lie within Intellect
itself, the presence of the actualizing principle in Intellect will not lead to the
proposed conclusion. On the contrary, Plotinus claims the priority of the objects to
Intellect:
But since we think of being as preceding Intellect, we must assume that
beings are placed in the thinking subject, and activity and intellection over
the real beings, just as the activity of fire over fire already existing; so that
the real beings may have one Intellect over themselves as their activity
(8,11-15).18
In this passage, the actualizing principle is placed on the side of the
intelligible objects. The actualization of the intellective subject, designated as the
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essence of Intellect, by the activity of the intelligible objects seems to be tacit in the
argument under discussion.19 In this argument, therefore, the thesis that Intellect is
always in actuality implicitly means the perpetual actualization of the thinking
subject by its objects. From this perpetual actualization is concluded the identity of
Intellect and its objects. As regards the present argument thus articulated, we need
to

notice two points. First, except for the difference between the singular vmrr6v

and the plural vorrrcl, Plotinus follows the line of Aristotle's account for the actuality
of the prime mover by its possession of the divine intelligible object in Met. 1072b1923 and adopts his inference, in 1074b29-30, of the presence of the intelligible object
outside Intellect from the suggestion that divine Intellect remains a mere capacity
for thinking. Also philologically viewed, the designation of the thinking subject as ii
ouai.cx o:ui:ou [sc. vou] (5,8-9) reminds us of the one by Aristotle in Met. 1074b19-22.
Second, the contrast between Plotinus' recurrent use of o:ui:Oc; and the intensive
o:ui:Oc; in 5,5-7 and the phrase MAfl ... €i:Epo: ... in 5,7-8 shows that he does not
fully distinguish self-intellection from the intellect-intelligible sameness; he makes
the distinction of these two notions in the late treatise (V 3 [49],5,28-31 ). In other
words, Plotinus accepts Aristotle's account for self-intellection, human or divine, by
means of the intellect-intelligible identity without fully distinguishing them.20 To
this extent, the argument in V 9 [5],5 can be said to be much indebted to Aristotle's
conception of self-intellection.
In V 5 [32], 1, Plotinus devotes the entire chapter to the defense of the
voD<;-VOfl1:0V identity. Different from the argument in V 9 [5],5, his argument is

here a negative one against the claim that the intelligible objects lie outside
Intellect.21 It proceeds by disclosing several absurdities entailed by the view
opposed to Plotinus' own. The question ~e raises at the beginning of the chapter is
as follows:
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Could anyone say that Intellect, the true and real Intellect, will ever be in
error and believe the unreal (µil i:a ovi:a oo~6:crE:tv)? (1,1-2, tr. A.H.
Armstrong). 22
The definitely negative reply (1,2) to this question naturally points to the
infallibility of Intellect. Plotinus hence tries to show the necessity of the presence of
the intelligible objects inside Intellect for the defense of its infallibility by means of
arguing that the presence of them outside Intellect must unavoidably invite
Intellect's fallibility, its exercise of discursive thinking, and, to be worse, its
ignorance.
There are seven arguments in this chapter. Plotinus' own position about
intellectual knowledge is briefly presented before these arguments:
For how could it still be Intellect when it was being unintelligent
(avorii:atvwv)? It must, then, always know and not ever forget anything,
and its knowing must not be that of a guesser, or ambiguous, or like that of
someone who has heard what he knows from someone else ( 1,3-6, tr. A. H.
Armstrong).
The first argument (1,6-19) immediately follows this. Although Intellect's
knowing does not depend on demonstration, even if anyone did say that some of the
things known were by demonstration, some should still be self-evident to Intellect
(1,6-8).23 Of course, this argument appeals to the Aristotelian view that

demonstration always starts from a self-evident premise. But Plotinus himself holds
that all things are self-evident to Intellect (1,8). If this is not the case, the problem
arises how we can distinguish those which are self-evident to Intellect from those
which are not (1,8-9). Again, another problem occurs concerning what insures
Intellect's knowledge to be self-evident and confident (1,9-12). Plotinus here refers
to the case of sense-perception; although the sensible objects seem to inspire the
strongest confidence in their self-evidence, insofar as they remain outside the sense
organ, sense-perception cannot grasp the objects themselves (1,12-19).24 The tacit
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conclusion would be that the self-evidence of Intellect's knowledge cannot be
insured if the intelligible objects are placed outside Intellect.25
The second argument (1,19-23) is quite simple. If Intellect knows its
objects as being other than itself, it will be conceivable that Intellect has no contact
with (cnJvrvyxavElV) them.26 In other words, the premise in question will not only
entail the possibility of Intellect's being ignorant but also compromise the perpetuity
of intellection.
The third argument (1,23-28) is a variant of the second. Plotinus critically
examines the suggestion that Intellect and its objects are linked together
( a~Evyvuvm). Different from cnJvi:vyxav€lv, the verb av(.Evyvuvm can

describe the unbroken connection of Intellect and its objects, so that the perpetuity
of intellection is defended and Intellect is saved from the possibilities of being
ignorant and of forgetting its objects. But if the verb is not taken to mean the
intellect-intelligible identity,27 intellection will concern the external objects, just as
sense-perception does so, and be mere impressions (i:unm) or impacts (nA.riyat). In
other words, insofar as Intellect does not grasp the intelligible objects themselves, it
cannot be completely free from the possibility of being deceived.28 The infallibility
of Intellect cannot be satisfactorily insured except by the unbrokenness of the
intellect-intelligible connection.
The fourth argument ( 1,28-32) seems to supplement the third; it points out
Intellect's lack of confidence in its apprehension of truth, while the third implicitly
discloses the possibility of Intellect's being deceived. If the intelligible objects lie
outside Intellect, Intellect will not be concerned with those objects themselves nor
be able to know that the Form, say, of Justice that it apprehends is exactly Justice.
It will not possess within itself the principles of judgment (al -rf)<; KplaEw<; apxal)
whereby it can ascertain what the object grasped is exactly.29
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The fifth argument (1,32-41) introduces a new viewpoint. Whereas the
preceding arguments have pointed out the absurdities that might occur for the
intellective agent or intellection, this argument concerns the intelligible objects. If
the intelligible objects are "senseless and without share of life and intelligence
(avcxia0rrrcx KCXt aµotpcx {,wfy; KCXt vou)" (1,32-33) or "without intelligence or life
(c:Xv6rrrcx Kcxl avEu {,wfy;)" (1,37-38), we cannot see what they are.30 On the other
hand, if those objects are conceived to possess the intellective agent, they are the
primary Intellect that apprehends truth. Hence the total separation of the thinking
principle from the intelligible objects is prone to obscure the ontological status of
those objects.31
The sixth argument (1,41-50) attempts to point out that the presence of
the intelligible objects outside Intellect causes intellection to be discursive. Given
the discreteness of each of the objects,32 their presence outside Intellect makes
them dispersed (otEancxaµ€vov EKcxai:ov) because of the absence of the unifying
subject in which they may reside. In this case, Intellect will run around (nEpt0€wv)
looking for them and therefore not be able to remain in itself.33 Again, insofar as
the intelligible objects are dispersed outside Intellect, intellection will be just like
sense-perception that apprehends the impression of an object made of matter of
some sort.34 Another difficulty still arises why such material object can be, say,
Justice.35
The final argument (1,50-61), with full emphasis, attempts to disclose that
the placing of the intelligible objects outside Intellect inescapably causes Intellect to
be deceived. Plotinus feels this to be the greatest absurdity of all (µE:ytai:ov ...
n6:vi:wv, 1,50). If it is admitted that Intellect contemplates its objects outside itself,

it will not know the objects themselves or the truth (i:o cXAT)8€c;) of them, but simply
their images ( E'i&JA.a), so that it will be necessarily deceived.36 Moreover, whether
Intellect is aware of its being deceived or not, it will be far from the possession of
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truth. For Intellect's infallibility to be sufficiently defended, therefore, the
intelligible objects must be placed inside Intellect.37
The argument is concluded in the second chapter. For Intellect to be
completely infallible, it must "live with and be fused with ( 01Jv6vrru; Kat

C7\JyKpa0€vra<;;)" its objects (2,8); it is "the foundation of all real beings (€opa ...
i:ou;; oucrt)" (2,11).38 In the first chapter of the immediately following treatise, II 9
(33], Plotinus develops this identity of intellect and intelligible object in relation to

self-intellection which is formulated as follows:
... and when it [i.e. Intellect] sees itself, it does so not as without
intelligence but as thinking (OUK cXVOfl1:atVovt:a, cXAACx VOOUV1:a) (1,4950).39
This conception of self-intellection is exactly based upon the fifth
argument that has urged us to think of the intelligible objects as thinking and
living.40
Plotinus' object in V 3 [49] is to define self-knowledge and further to
demonstrate the need to go beyond Intellect for the search for the first principle of
reality and the soul's true end. In the fourth chapter, he distinguishes two types of
self-knowledge; (i) the soul's awareness of the nature of her reflective power with
recourse to standards given from Intellect and (ii) her immediate contemplation of
herself qua Intellect by becoming identical with it. In order to give a sufficient
account of the latter type of self-knowledge or self-intellection in the proper sense

(i:o o:ui:o €aui:o Kupiw<;; voE'iv, 6,1-2), Plotinus in the fifth chapter tackles the
problem how Intellect knows itself. In this context the doctrine of the intellectintelligible identity is fully exploited. He rejects the suggestion that one part of
Intellect sees another, whether they are homogeneous or not; because it means at
best the knowledge of that which is contemplated by that which is contemplating
and does not guarantee self-knowledge in its proper sense (5,1-15). Under the
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supposed division of the contemplator and those which are contemplated, unless we
conceive that the contemplator sees and possesses its objects prior to the supposed
division, Intellect will simply have an impression of its objects and not attain truth;
hence Intellect is the same as the intelligible objects (5,16-28). The argument up to
this point is much indebted to II 9 [33],l and V 5 [32],1-2 in two respects. First,
Plotinus here invokes the proper notion of self-knowledge that Intellect
contemplates itself as thinking. Second, he recalls the thesis that Intellect's
infallibility is satisfactorily insured by its identity with the intelligible objects.
In this chapter, however, Plotinus is not satisfied with the concluding of
the intellect-intelligible identity. He is fully aware of the conceptual distinctness
between this sameness and self-intellection (5,28-31). His object in the rest of the
chapter is to give an account of the possibility of the latter.41
Plotinus believes that self-intellection can be derived from the intellectintelligible identity without substantial difficulty. He returns to the viewpoint of the
fifth argument in V 5 [32], 1. If intellection is the same as its object, that object is
neither in potentiality nor unintellectual (av6rrr:ov) 42 nor lifeless, but, since it is
·always being thought and thinking, €v€pyEux i:u:;, more specifically ovcru.OOfl<;
v6riau; (5,31-37).43 Insofar as such intellection is activity and substantial

intellection, it is not different from the intellective subject; otherwise the intellective
subject will be Intellect in potentiality (5,38-41).44 The above consideration thus
yields the triple identity of the intellective subject, intellection, and the intelligible
object (5,41-44 ).45 Intellect's self-knowledge is immediately derived from this triple
identity; Intellect knows itself in that both intellection and the intelligible object are
Intellect itself (5,44-48).46
In V 3 [49],5 Plotinus brings the arguments in V 9 [5],5 and V 5 [32],1-2
into a higher synthesis. The necessary connection between Intellect's infallibility
and its identity with the intelligible object is recalled also in this chapter as is in V 5
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[32],1-2. In V 9 [5],5 Plotinus already infers from its actuality that Intellect itself is
the intelligible object. But there are three novel points in the present chapter. First,
Plotinus attempts to establish that the intelligible object is living and thinking.
Second, he defines both the intellective subject and the intelligible object as the
primary €v€pyEux to entail the triple identity of vo\Jc;, v6riau;, and vorrr6v. Finally,
Plotinus relates the first and the second points to Intellect's self-knowledge. In this
chapter, therefore, a sort of logical nexus is recognized consisting of (i) Intellect's
infallibility, (ii) its full actuality, (iii) the living and thinking conception of the
intelligible object, (iv) the identity of voV<;, v6riau;, and

VOfl'tOV,

and (v) Intellect's

self-knowledge.47
The above review of Plotinus' arguments reveals his motive for the
doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity. Pepin is right in saying that the identity
concerns (i) the exigencies of intellectual knowledge compared with the character of
sense knowledge and (ii) the existence and the modalities of self-knowledge, rather
than being motivated by Plotinus' reflection upon the Timaeus.48 It is exactly these
two problems that Plotinus works out in the texts above reviewed. But the motive
for his doctrine would not be exhausted by the reasons that have emerged in his own
philosophical system. Viewed in the broad context of the history of Greek
philosophy, the intellect-intelligible identity represents Plotinus' answer to the
problem concerning the relation of intellect and its objects, which had been present
since Plato and Aristotle. It is one of the most fundamental problems of philosophy,
so that insofar as Plotinus tries to be a self-assured philosopher, he cannot avoid
considering it. In Plato, as already seen, this problem cannot be avoided in order to
define the Idea precisely as

VOfl'tOV

and to maintain its intelligibility. In addition,

"the friends of Forms" are urged to answer this problem without infringing the
Forms' immutability, which is the basic thesis in the theory of Forms. We can say
that Plotinus' doctrine of the intellect-intelligible unity is based on his philosophical
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effort to reply to one of the fundamental problems in Plato's philosophy, even
though it is not motivated by his exegetical reflection upon the Timaeus or some
other dialogues.49 In one place, Plotinus explicitly mentions the definite position
that the intellect-intelligible unity must defend:
But, since one must bring in knowledge and truth and watchfully preserve
real beings ('taovtcx) and the knowledge of what each thing is (yvwcrtv
'tOV 'tt EKCXO"COV €cr"ttv)--but not the knowledge of what it is like (not6v 'tl
EKCXO"tov), since we should have an image and a trace of real beings, and
not possess and live with and be fused with the real beings themselves ...
(V 5 [32],2,4-8, tr. A.H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).
Plotinus here employs Plato's distinction between "to

ov or "to "Ct and "CO

not6v n (Epist. VI 342e7-343al). This distinction is made within five kinds in such a
way that the former corresponds to the Form itself as
€cr"tlV

oot1 yvwcr"t6v "CE Kcxl CxA.119@<;

ov (342bl) and the latter to a name, a definition, an image, and a knowledge

of that Form. "To preserve real beings and the knowledge of what each thing is"
thus surely means to defend the existence and the complete intelligibility of the
Forms. In Plato, as already seen, the denial of the existence of immutable Forms
results in the destruction of the possibility, not only of philosophy, but of all
discourse (Pann. 135b5-c2), so that the immutability of Forms must be regarded as
the fundamental thesis in his theory of Forms.SO The possibility of philosophy and
other significant discourse, however, cannot be safeguarded solely by the positing of
immutable Ideas. Plato himself seems to have been aware of this point:
The result is that the hearer is perplexed and inclined either to question
their [i.e. the Forms'] existence, or contend that, even if they do exist, they
must certainly be unknowable (&yvwcr'tcx) by our human nature (Pann.
135a3-5, tr. F. M. Cornford, adapted by A. Sumi).
Even if the existence of the immutable Ideas is admitted, the denial of
their knowability will destroy the possibility of philosophy and other discourse.
Hence we can say that the existence of the invariable Forms is the fundamental
thesis and their intelligibility the second-fundamental thesis in the theory of Forms.
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In fact, the position of "the friends of Forms" in the Sophist comprises these two
theses (246b7-8, 248all-12). For both theses to be satisfactorily defended, "the
friends of Forms" are forced to define the cognitive Kotvwvi.a between intellect and
Forms without compromising the Forms' unchangeability. Thus those philosophers
who attempt to defend the very fundamental position of the theory of Forms cannot
avoid presenting the clear picture of the intellect-intelligible relation that not only is
harmonious with the Forms' immutability but insures their complete intelligibility.
In this connection, Plotinus seems to say that we need to maintain the intellectintelligible unity to preserve not only real beings themselves but the knowledge of
what each of the real entities is.
But Plotinus might think that the intellect-intelligible identity is still
insufficient for defending the possibility of discourse. For our statements in general
to be possible, the identity must be coherently related to some epistemological and
psychological doctrines. As already seen,51 in order to make a judgment about
sensible particulars, our ot.6:vmo: needs not only to react to the sense-data of a
physical object but to refer to the Kav6vE<; or standards as the impressions of the
relevant Forms. For these standards to be available to the soul, there must be
within us Intellect always possessing the Forms (aEl €xovi:a i:o oiKatov vo\.lv €v

tlµ.'iv, V 1 [10),11,6) or Intellect providing the reasoning (6 [sc. vo\.l<;] A.oyi(.Ea9at
napE:xwv, 10,13).52 Thus related not only to the doctrine of the intellect-intelligible
unity but to other relevant epistemological and psychological doctrines, the
fundamental thesis in the theory of Forms can be satisfactorily defended that the
positing of the immutable Ideas is necessary for making a judgment about sensible
particulars and performing subsequent discourse. As Plato suggests, the wholehearted defense of the theory of Forms requires going through "a long and remote
train of argument" (Pann. 133b8-9). Plotinus patiently goes through it.
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As already seen, Plotinus argues for the intellect-intelligible identity by
appealing to the linking concepts of VOflO'tc; and €v€pyE1.a. This naturally leads us

to the consideration of the connection between the definition of intellection as pure
activity and the immutability of the intelligible objects. Before beginning this
consideration, we need to go through the following three problems related to our
present discussion. First, how does Plotinus interpret Soph. 248d-249a? Second,
how is the characterization of intellection as auvcxia0flatc; related to the presence of
the multiplicity of intelligible objects in Intellect? Finally, in which points does
Plotinus doctrine of the intellect-intelligible unity differ from the Middle Platonic
view of the Forms as God's voflµcxi:cx, the view which likewise maintains the
presence of the Forms in divine mind? Or, how does he try to defend Plato's
rejection of seeing the Forms as VOTlJJ.m:cx?53
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2. Plotinus' Interpretation of Sophist 248d-249a

In the Enneads there are several explicit references to Soph. 248d-249a.
These references, however, do not tell us the true story about Plotinus' approach to
the problem with which Plato was seriously confronted in that dialogue. In IV 4
[28),35,61-64, for example, Plotinus contends that 1:0 OV possesses the ovvcxµu;
either of acting or of being acted on. But this passage cannot be taken as evidence
for his acceptance of the o\Jvcxµu; criterion of being in the Sophist, because here he
simply speaks of the forces of the figures seen in the universe. This passage does
not allow us to say that Plotinus applies the ovvcxµu:; criterion of being to the
intelligible world. In VI 7 [38),39,28-34, again, Plotinus, interpreting the Eleatic
Stranger's statement in 248e6-a2, remarks that the One, which transcends
intellection, would stand in solemnness (i:ou 6€ µ11 voouvi:rn; crE:µvoD
E:cri:f\(oµ€vou), while the o\Jcri.cx vooucrcx would not do so.54 From these references,
however, we cannot read Plotinus' effort to defend the theory of Forms by
satisfactorily meeting the challenge of the Stranger or a similar opponent.
As a matter of fact, Plotinus seriously endeavors to work out the problem
raised in Soph. 248d-249a, insofar as he is concerned with the defense of the theory
of Forms and the scheme of his metaphysics accords with that of Plato's position.
His endeavor is clearly recognized in the following three attempts. First, Plotinus
willingly admits the introduction of intellection, life, and movement into the
intelligible world, to remark that this introduction rather insures Intellect's majesty.
In order to reconcile that introduction with the immutability of the Forms, he is
further compelled to establish two points. Second, Plotinus remarks that intellectual
movement does not infringe the Forms' invariability. Finally, in order to justify the
second point, he rejects seeing intellection and noetic movement as a form either of
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acting or of being acted upon and argues for his rejection. Let us look into these
points in detail.
As Hadot points out,55 the historical origin of Plotinus' vital conception of

the intelligible world goes back to Soph. 248e6-249a2, where the Eleatic Stranger
claims the presence of movement, intellect, and life in 'to no:vtE"A@<;;

ov.

Plotinus

not only accepts this claim but further systematizes and transforms it. It is
systematized in such a manner that intellection is defined as movement towards the
Forms or the One56 and identified with life.57 Again, the Stranger's claim can be
said to be transformed by Plotinus' view of the intelligible objects as purely living
and thinking.58 The Stranger's reaction thus systematized and transformed can be
formulated by Plotinus as follows:
For that which is called real being (oucri.o:v) in the primary sense must not
be a shadow of being, but have the fullness of being (nAf\pE"<; 'to E"tVcxt).59
And being is fulfilled when it has the form of thinking and living. So
thinking ('to voE'iv), living ('to ~flv), and being ('to Etvm) are all together
in what is real ("tfii OV"tt) (V 6 [24],6,18-23, tr. A.H. Armstrong, adapted by
A. Sumi).60
The intelligible world thus conceived is exactly "boiling with life" (VI 5
[23],12,9; VI 7 [38],12,22-23). Intellect or the noetic universe is majestic (crEµv6c;)
because of its always exercising intellection. The majesty must not be ascribed to
the absence of intellect, life, and movement from the intelligible universe.61
The immutability of the intelligible world is not infringed by noetic
movement. In VI 2 [43],7 Plotinus introduces two Platonic genera, being and
movement, and maintains their inseparability by defining movement as the
€v€pyE"Lo: of being (lines 18-20). He gives an account of this inseparability as
follows:
But since movement appears in the sphere of being, not as changing the
nature of being, but rather in being as if making it perfect, if one does not
introduce rest as well one would be even more perverse than one who did
not grant that there was movement; for the notion, and intellectual
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perception, of rest comes readier to hand where being is concerned than
that of movement; for that which "exists in the same state and the same
way" and has one formative principle (to ... Kcxi:a i:cx\.n:a Kcxl ci.>acxvi:W<; Kcxl
€vex Aoyov €xov) is there in being (lines 24-31, tr. A.H. Armstrong,
adapted by A. Sumi).62
First of all, it must be noted that Plotinus here explicitly refers to Soph.
248a12 Kcxi:a i:cxui:a ci.>crcxvi:W<; EXElV, the phrase which marks the very fundamental
position of "the friends of Forms," the Forms' immutability. The immutability of
being63 is not only defended but is supported by the conception of movement as the

€v€pyEta, more specifically, the €v€pyEtcx ouK Cx1:€Ai)<; (21,25) of being.64 On the
other hand, the immutability of being is first insured by the introduction of rest in
addition to movement. When "the nature of being' is considered in itself, its own
unchangeability or immobility is understood as rest. We can hence summarize that
rest represents the invariability of being itself and that movement as the complete
activity of being is compatible with the invariability of being by virtue of the
activity's being free from any potentiality which may imply change and transition.
Thus the compatibility between the immutability of being and intellectual
movement can also be described as that between rest and movement in the noetic
realm.65 This compatibility seems to enable Plotinus to speak of the prima facie
paradoxical "static intellectual activity" which precisely means the self-intellection of
Intellect.66 Thus seen, the connection is clearly recognized between self-intellection
or the intellect-intelligible unity and the coherence between the immutability of
being and noetic movement.67
Finally, the compatibility between the immutability of being and noetic
movement is justified by Plotinus' rejection of defining intellection in terms of
action and passion. He replaces the Aristotelian categories of notEtV and n6:ax€lv
by the Platonic genus of KlVf'IO'l<;. The reason why he refuses to regard intellection
as either action or passion must be explored in his critical examination of those
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Aristotelian categories. The relevant chapter is VI 1 [42],22. The argument begins
with the distinction between nmEtV and n6:ax€lv (lines 1-10); while action is
unaffected (6:no:0€<;;), passive affection consists in being disposed otherwise than it
was before (to OE n6:0'X€lV EV i:&> ouxi:i0Ea0o:t €i:E:pW<; fi np6i:Epov ElXE). Since
neither that which acts or gives motion nor that which is affected or receives motion
is viewed by itself (Ko:0' oo'.rt6), the category of relation (np6<;; i:t), namely taking
(Afl~t<;;) and giving (ooat<;;), is seen between them (lines 10-19). In sum, the action-

passion relation necessarily implies some change, substantial or accidental, in that
which is affected. After mentioning the cases in which action and passion may
involve the category of possession (EXEtv) (lines 20-22), Plotinus considers whether
thinking is action or not:
But one must consider whether forethought (i:o npovoE'iv) is action, if
being the object of forethought (i:o npovoio:<;; i:uyxavEtv) is being
affected; since forethought is directed to something else and is about
something else. Now forethought is not action, even if the thought (i:o
voE'iv) is about something else, nor is being its object being affected. And
thought (i:o voE'iv) is not action either--it is not directed to the object
itself, but is about itself: it is not any kind of doing or making (noinat<;;).
And one should not call all activities ( €vEpyEio:<;;) doings or makings, or
say that they do something. Doing is incidental (lines 22-29, tr. A. H.
Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).68
Plotinus here is not speaking exclusively of the intellection of the second
hypostasis but of thinking in generaI.69 The thought is not directed to any external
object but concerns the thinking agent itself as its object. Hence it is free from the
category of relation and thereby from those of action and passion. Since it is neither
notnat<;; nor nmEtV, the thought has no passivity (i:o naaxov) (18,9-10) and so does
not imply any change in that which it concerns. Thought is thus regarded as the
€vE:pyEto: which is neither action nor passion; he calls such activity the KlVTIO'l<;;
6:n6Aui:0<;;, which is distinct from nmT,aEt<;; and nEtO'El<;; (VI 3 [44 ),28,2-3 ).70 As
already seen,71 Apelt, referring to the above cited passage, remarks that the soul's
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knowledge of the Form in the Sophist does not need to be taken as notELV or
notnau;. In order to see whether the conclusion in the above passage can be applied
also to intellection proper, we must look at another passage, where Plotinus defines
€mai:fu..Ln in terms of the Platonic genera:
And knowledge is self-movement (cx\rroKivnau;), since it is a sight of being
(o"1u; ... -rov ov-r0<;)72 and an active actuality, not a state (€~u;), so that it
also comes under movement--but, if you like, under rest, or under both
(VI 2 [43],18,8-10, tr. A.H. Armstrong).
Here it is not explicitly mentioned that intellectual knowledge is a form
neither of action nor of passive affection. But the point that knowledge is subsumed
under rest indicates that its object must be immutable. Insofar as knowledge is the
sight of being, it must come under rest which implies the unchangeability and
constancy of being. If this knowledge is seen in terms of the action-passion relation,
insofar as this relation unavoidably implies some change in that which is affected,
the invariability of being will be infringed. Therefore we may conceive that the
point made in VI 1 [42],22,22-29 is a fortiori applied to intellectual knowledge. In
other words, Plotinus abides by the refusal, of "the friends of Forms," to apply the
ouvaµu; criterion of being to the cognitive intercourse between the soul or intellect
and the Form.73
In conclusion, Plotinus seriously deals with the problem, raised in Soph.
248d-249a, concerning the fundamental position of the theory of Forms, though his
references to this passage do not fully show his attitude towards the problem. He
remarks that noetic movement does not infringe the immutability of being and
attempts to justify this remark by indicating that intellection is neither action nor
passive affection, because it is not directed to any external object but always
concerns the thinking agent itself. The intellect-intelligible identity not only leads to
the definition of intellection as the primary E:vE:pyEtcx, by which the immutability of
being is sustained, but leaves no room for the conception of intellection as either
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action or passion. This identity, as already mentioned,74 is not motivated by
Plotinus' interpretation of Plato's dialogues. Nevertheless it unmistakably
represents Plotinus' efforts to defend fundamental theses in the theory of Forms, the
immutability and the complete intelligibility of the Ideas, and to reply to the
problem of the cognitive relation of intellect and its objects, one of the fundamental
problems of philosophy, raised in the Sophist. 75 Plotinus' insight can be said to lie in
his full explication and exploitation of the Aristotelian formula of the intellectintelligible unity in his above mentioned efforts.
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3. Intellection as :Luvcxicr0nqu;

As already mentioned, intellection represents the presence of the

multiplicity of intelligible objects in Intellect itself. The mode of self-intellection as
the apprehension of multiplicity in unity is prominently observed in the definition of
intellection as intimate self-consciousness. In fact, Plotinus' notion of consciousness
on diverse levels needs to be considered from various perspectives. In relation to
our present inquiry, however, it will suffice to investigate the connection between
Intellect's self-awareness and self-intellection.
Plotinus evokes the definition of intellection as the consciousness of the
internally complex whole in the context which thematically deals with the absence of
intellection from the One:
For in general thought (i:o voE'lv) seems to be an intimate consciousness
( cruvcxicr0T}cru;) of the whole when many parts come together
(crvvEA06vi:wv) in the same thing76; [this is so] when a thing knows itself,
which is knowing in the proper sense (Kupiwc;) (V 3 [49],13,12-14, tr. A.H.
Armstrong).
The definition is a fortiori applicable to self-intellection. because selfintellection in the proper sense exactly refers to the case in which Intellect thinks as
a whole with the whole of itself, not one part of itself with another (6,7-8).77 As
Gurtler points out,78 cruvcxicr0T}cru; here stresses the internal unity of intellection,
marked by the aorist participle crvvEA.06vi:wv (13,13).79 In addition, the conception
of the self as the whole80 also seems to be operative here. In the same chapter,
Plotinus uses the word to emphasize also Intellect's being manifold:
For intimate self-consciousness (ti cruvcxicr0T}crt<;;) is a consciousness of
something which is many: even the name bears witness to this. And
thinking (ti v6T}cru;), which is prior, turns inward to Intellect (Efow Eic;
cxui:ov ETCl01:pE~El) which is obviously many (13,21-24, tr. A.H.
Armstrong).
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As already noticed,81 np01:€pa in line 23 indicates that the cruvaicr0flcru;;

mentioned here is that of soul in its root meaning of unifying sensations and so
cannot apply to Intellect's consciousness of the internal unity of its own. But
Plotinus here remarks the multiplicity implied by the prefix cruv- of cruvaicr0flcru;;,82
since he, in this chapter, attempts to elucidate the involvement of multiplicity in
intellection for establishing the absence of intellection from the One (13,34-36). In
the present passage, hence, Plotinus suggests that the earlier definition of
intellection as the cruvaicr9flcru;; 'LOU oA.ou can also imply the internal multiplicity of
Intellect. Furthermore, he reiterates the nature of self.,intellection as self-reversion
(6,5; 6,40),83 so that Intellect's cruvaicr0flcru;; is characterized as the €mcrTpO<J>it
towards itself. In summary, the cruvaicr0flcru;; of Intellect can be characterized as
turning inward unifying Intellect's own interior multiplicity84 and as noetic
perception of a plurality in a unity.85
The hypostatization of Intellect through the articulation and pluralization
of its vision is effectively described in terms of the possession of cruvaicr0flcru;; by the
fully actualized Intellect. Whereas the inchoate Intellect looked at the Good
unintellectually (€/3A.EnEv O:voi)TW<;) (VI 7 [38],16,14),86 the fully formed Intellect
has the vision full of the clearly articulated contents:
... next it [i.e. Intellect] became all things and knew this in its selfconsciousness (€v cruvmcr9itcrn o:u'tou) and was now Intellect, filled up in
order that it might possess what it would see, and looking at them with
light, receiving this light also from that which it gives them (16, 19-22, tr. J.
Bussanich, adapted by A. Sumi).87
In its self-consciousness Intellect does not know simply all things but the
fact that it itself has become all things. The cruvo:icr9ricru;; here is the knowledge of
the internally complex self.88 This role of Intellect's cruvo:icr9ricrt<; is repeated later
in the same treatise:
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For in seeing the Good, Intellect had the products and was conscious
(cruvfla0Ei:o) of them as having come to be and being within it
(€v6vrwv); when it sees them, it is said to think (voE'iv) ... (35,30-32).
In this passage the connection between Intellect's consciousness and its

interior multiplicity is seen more prominently.89 In VI 7 [38],35,30-32, on the one
hand, Intellect is said to have cruvaia0riatc;; in seeing the Good. In V 3 [49],13,2124, on the other, Intellect's cruvaia0riatc;; is characterized as self-reversion. The
question will naturally arise how the nature of ouvaia0riatc;; as self-reversion is
related to Intellect's contemplation of the Good. Thus we must move to V 6 [24],5.
Plotinus writes in the very beginning of the chapter as follows:
And again, the multiple might seek itself and wish to incline to and be
conscious of itself (O'UVVEVElV Kat O'UVato0aV€0'0at aui:ou) (5, 1-2, tr. A.
H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).
From this Plotinus immediately concludes that the absolute simple One is
beyond auvaia0riatc;; and v611atc;; (5,2-5). The juxtaposition of self-inclination and
self-consciousness seems to suggest that Plotinus here speaks of Intellect's selfknowledge.90 But he does not explicitly define ouvaia011atc;; in the present chapter.
Gurtler, with the proviso that his interpretation needs further confirmation, takes
the auvaia011atc;; as a power moving from multiplicity to unity, in conjunction with
the definition of intellection as the movement towards the Good (5,8-9).91
Unfortunately, we are not able to confirm fully this interpretation. But the
consideration of Plotinus' definition of intellection in this chapter will reveal the
connection between Intellect's self-consciousness and its contemplation of the
Good. In this exploration we need to refer to passages from other treatises. The
connection in question will be shown through the following train of thought:
(1) Intellect seeks the Good by and through seeking self-convergence and
self-consciousness as self-intellection, because the desire of the
Good92 generates the original intellection directed to the Good by
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virtue of which Intellect becomes complete (5,1-2 and 5,9-10 in
conjunction with III 8 (30],11,41-44, III 9 [13],7,4-6, 9,10-12, 9, 18-22,
VI 7 [38],37,19-20, VI 9 (9],6,18-20, and 6,35-37).
(2) (1) is explained such that Intellect perpetually desires the Good and
always attains in intellection the pluralized images of the Good which
makes Intellect like the Good (5,12-16 in conjunction with III 8
[30],11,16-19 and 11,22-24).93
(3) Since self-intellection logically depends on the original intellection
directed to the Good, Intellect is said to think itself incidentally ( Km:a

"

auµ/3EJ3l1K6<;;) in thinking the Good (5,16-17).
Self-intellection is incidental to and causally dependent on the original
intellection towards the Good in its desire of that Good.94 May we infer from this
that self-convergence and self-consciousness of Intellect is also causally dependent
on the original intellection directed to the Good? Here we must return to the
passage previously mentioned:
But does that Intellect see things piecemeal, now some things and now
others? No, for the rational account didactically makes them appear as
[two] events, but Intellect always has intellection and always nonintellection, rather seeing the Good in another way. For in seeing the
Good, Intellect had the products and was conscious (auv(1a9Ei:o) of them
as having come to be and as being within it; when it sees them, on the one
hand (µ€v), it is said to think (voE1v); on the other (0€), it sees that Good
by the power by which it was going to think (€µEAAE voE1v) (VI 7
[38],35,27-33, tr. J. Bussanich, adapted by A. Sumi).
This passage is extremely important for the consideration of Intellect's
relation to the One and will be fully considered later. At the present stage, it
suffices to notice that Intellect's auvo:ta811at.c; of its interior contents, equivalent to
the

VOEtV

of them, causally depends on its pre-noetic contemplation of the Good

which is eternally operating in Intellect itself. The verb EµEAAE in line 33, just as
Ko:i:a auµ/3E/3flKO<; in V 6 [24],5,16, indicates self-intellection as following the
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contemplation of the Good. Thus seen, the reason will become clear why Plotinus
says in V 6 [24],5,1-2 that the multiple seeks self-convergence and selfconsciousness, insofar as this self-consciousness means self-intellection; the multiple
Intellect, to be completed and made good by the pluralized images of the Good,
must have self-consciousness, which always follows the pre-noetic desire or
envisagement of the Good and always attains those images of the Good within itself.
Moreover, the phrase TI ouvaµ€l €µ€AA€

VO€lV

in VI 7 [38],35,33 would confirm

Gurtler's interpretation of the cruvaicr9ricru;; as a power.95
The definition of self-intellection as the cruvatcr9ricru;; unifying the
multiplicity of intelligible objects is really inseparable from the intellect-intelligible
identity in abrogating the conception of intelligible objects as avatcr9rii:a (V 5

[32], 1,32). On the one hand, likewise, Plotinus ascribes o'lov cruvatcr9ricru;; to the
One which is not o'lov 6:vaicr9rii:ov (V 4 [7],2, 15-18). On the other hand,
cruvaicr9ricru;; is excluded from the One because of its implication of multiplicity (V

6 [24],5,3-5; VI 7 [38],41,25-27). These passages will be fully analyzed later in our
consideration of the One's knowledge.96
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4. The Intellect-Intelligible Identity and the Doctrine of the Forms as God's
Thoughts

The intellect-intelligible identity, on the one hand, has the philosophical
advantage of defending the Platonic theory of Forms. Plotinus, on the other, is
forced to prevent the identity from leading to the view of the intelligible object as a
VOfll.LCX,

the view which Plato definitely rejects.97 In order to dismiss the so-called

Third Man Argument, the young Socrates in the Parmenides suggests the following:
May it not be that each of these Forms is a thought (v6flµo:), which cannot
properly exist anywhere but in mind (oOOo:µoU ... &A.Ao8t Ti €v ~uxo:U;)
(132b3-5, tr. F. M. Cornford).
This statement may adumbrate that the presence of the intelligible objects
in Intellect is likely to be interpreted as representing the Form as a divine v61"\µo:. In
the subsequent discussion, we shall inquire into how Plotinus undermines such a
possible implication of his doctrine of the intellect-intelligible unity.
Before beginning our inquiry, we need to put the proviso that the FormVOT\µO: theory implies that the Form is hypostatized by intellection. This proviso is
necessary because Plotinus sometimes describes the intelligible object as VOT\µQ:.98
By so describing it, however, he does not purport that the intelligible object is a
concept hypostatized by intellection. The word VOT\µO: originally means that which is
thought so that the description of the Form as the VOT\µO: can represent it as being
always thought, whereas the word vorrr6v, meaning intelligi-ble, may imply a case
where the Form always subsists but is not always thought. Plotinus seems to apply
the word to the Form especially in the context where he stresses the Form's being
always contemplated and the contentual plenitude of the Form. We must notice
that he, in the passages where he refers to the Form as the VOT\µCX, does not
maintain that the existence of the Form causally depends on intellective act.99
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Plotinus definitely rejects the view that the intelligible object is
hypostatized by intellection (V 9 [5], 7, 12-17; VI 6 [34 ],6,5-14).100 He points out the
difficulty in this view as follows:
If Justice is the same as such intellection [that hypostatizes the Form], it is

absurd that Justice is nothing else than something like its definition
(optcrµov); for what else does it mean than the apprehension of their
definition (-ri EO'"ttv) to have thought Justice or Movement? This is the
same as the apprehension of the concept (A6yov) of the thing which has
not existed, which is impossible (VI 6 [34],6,14-19).
The acceptance of the view in discussion entails the Forms to be "arbitrary
concepts without any substantial content of their own."101 On the Form-v6rtµcx
theory, Intellect is forced to hypostatize the Forms by grasping the concept which is
not yet existent. To avoid such absurdity, we have to posit the intelligible object
prior to the hypostatizing intellection (V 9 [5],7,16-17). But the Form-VOTlJ..LCX theory
is not sufficiently undermined solely by the ontological priority of being to
intellection. The reasoning from the intellect-intelligible identity to the FormVOllJ..LCX theory is first prevented by the view that the activity of the intelligible object

actualizes the essence of the intellective subject and that activity is one with the
activity of the intellective subject thus actualized (V 9 [5],5,4-10; 8,11-19). Plotinus
elsewhere tries to undermine this reasoning by mentioning that the intelligible
object, which is itself Intellect and Knowledge, makes knowledge true only if it is
identical with the object itself (VI 6 [34],6,19-20). In a word, the possible reasoning
is undercut by the view of the intelligible object as possessing €v€pyncx for itself. If
it is admitted that the Form itself thinks, it will be impossible to say that the Form is
hypostatized by intellection. In summary, the intellect-intelligible identity or the
presence of the Forms within Intellect is prone to be interpreted in terms of the
Form-VOllJ..LCX theory. To exclude such a tendency, it must be explicitly remarked that
the intellect-intelligible sameness necessarily makes the Form a thinking and living
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entity. To this extent, the intellect-intelligible identity as explicated by Plotinus is
really incompatible with the Form-VOTlJ..l.CX theory. In this perspective, it must be
stressed that the Ideas are Intellect rather than that Intellect is the Ideas. The
intellect-intelligible unity can be said not only to defend the fundamental theses in
Plato's theory of Forms but also, if sufficiently explicated, to eliminate the Formv6r\µ<x theory which Plato rejects.102

In VI 7 [38],40,10-19, we are told that the vbr}au; generates being; the

VOT\O'tc.; here designates the inchoate Intellect which is eternal in Intellect proper as
its hyper-noetic phase.103 But this logical priority of the pre- or hyper-noetic
intellection to being does not contradict the aforementioned priority of being to
intellection.104 The former priority also does not lead to the Form-VOTlJ..l.CX theory,
because the pre-noetic intellection cannot generate the Forms for itself but needs
the One as their cause; the One's causality is emphasized even in the context dealing
with the hypostatization of the Forms by the reversion of the inchoate Intellect
(16,22-31).105 The ontic ground of the Forms lies in the One, but not in the prenoetic intellection. Moreover, whereas beings are generated by the pre-noetic
intellection, the transition from the pre-noetic intellection to fully intellectual
activity does not occur unless the inchoate vision of Intellect is filled with and
saturated by beings as the pluralized images of the One. To this extent, Intellect
and the Form are closely inter-dependent (V 1 [ 10),4,27-31 ).106 Such interdependency is obviously incompatible with the Form-VOT\J.lO'. theory. In Plotinus'
doctrine of Intellect, therefore, there is no room for the Form-VOT\J.lO: theory.
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5. Intellectual Activity and the Immutability of Bein&

In Section I it was seen that Plotinus employs the linking concepts of
v6ncru; and €v€pyEux in his argument for the intellect-intelligible identity, which
safeguards the complete intelligibility of the Form, the second-fundamental thesis in
Plato's theory of Forms. How are these linking concepts coherent with the
immutability of the Ideas, the first-fundamental thesis in that theory? In Section II
it was pointed out that the Kivncru; as the complete activity of being does not
infringe the invariability of being. In the following discussion we shall explore how
intellectual activity more positively coheres with the immutability of being in
Plotinus' system.107
Noetic activity systematically coheres with the unchangeability of being.
Plotinus holds that the former requires the latter:
Intellect always has the same passage (ot€~ooov)108 through those which
are not the same, because it does not change. The existence in the same
way and in the same state ("to wcrm'..n:wc; Kal Ka'!a '!a\.mx) is with the others.
Because, if the existence in the same way and in the same state is not by
the others, Intellect is completely inactive (apyE'i), and that which is in
actuality ('!o €vEpyEi<;x) and the activity (-rl €v€pyEux) exist nowhere (VI 7
[38], 13,4 7-51 ).
Also here Plotinus adduces Soph. 248a12 Ka'!Cx '!aU'!Cx wcra\J'!W<;. From this
passage alone, however, we cannot fully see why intellectual activity requires the
unchangeability of being. In the earlier part of the same chapter, Plotinus writes:
For unless Intellect has difference and some kind of otherness ( E'!EpO'!f1<;)
awakens it to life, it will not be activity ( €v€pyEux); because such state will
not differ from non-activity (µil EVEpyEiac;) (13,11-13).
This passage would suggest the connection between the immutability of
being and otherness, which is also adumbrated by the phrase otix '!WV OUK au'!wv in
line 48. In order to understand fully this connection, we must look at the following
passage from another treatise:
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If this is a correct statement, it [i.e. being] must necessarily be in life, and
in perfect life; or, if it falls short of this, it will be no more existent than
non-existent. But this means that it must be intellect, and wisdom in its
fullness. And it must therefore (apex) be defined and limited (wplcrµE:vov
... Kcxl Tt€Tt€pcxcrµE:vov), and there must be nothing to which its power
does not extend, nor must its power be quantitatively limited; otherwise it
would be defective. And so (ot.O), too, it must be eternal and always the
same (to wcroo'.rrW<;), and unreceptive of anything (to CXO€K'tlKov nO:v-roc.;;)
and nothing must come into it (III 6 [26],6,14-20, tr. A.H. Armstrong).109

The connection between intellectual life and the limitedness of being will
become more clear when we further look at II 4 [12],5,15-16, where intelligible
matter is said to possess limited and intellectual life (C:WflV wplcrµEVTlV KCXt VO€pav)
when it is defined by the forms.110 The limitedness of being exactly means the
eidetic definiteness which stabilizes being.111 The eidetic definiteness thus insures
not only the immutability of being but the limitedness of intellectual life. It is
inseparably related to otherness which is said to awake Intellect to life and activity,
since otherness, as already seen, 112 represents the distinction of one intelligible
shape, which defines each object, from another. Mediated by the eidetic
definiteness, therefore, the immutability of being and Intellect's E::vE:py€lCX as limited
· and intellectual life can be systematically coherent.113
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6. The Hyper-Noetic Activity of Intellect

As shown in the last section, Intellect's activity is fully coherent with the
immutability of being. This point can be seen also in terms of Plotinus' view of the
unity of three Platonic genera, being, rest, and movement, in VI 2 [43],8. Rest,
placed on the side of the Idea (line 23), represents the stability of being (lines 18-20)
and the definiteness of Intellect (n€pac; ... vou) (lines 23-24 ). On the other hand,
the intellective agent or intellection is linked with Kivncrtc; (line 24). By associating
KtVT)crtc; with intellection Plotinus does not regard intellection as a sort of
incomplete E:vE:pyEt.a, but as the €v€pyEtcx of being (7,18; 8,11-12; 13,3-4), or more
specifically, as the E:v€pyEtcx OUK ai:EA.ilc; (21,25).114 Intellection is at the same time
E:v€pyEtcx and KLVT)crtc;. The activity of Intellect or self-intellection115 is exactly selfreferential

(ti . . . EVEpyEtcx ti Ei.c; aui:ov, 8, 14).116

In Section III we saw that Intellect's cruvo:icr811crtc; or self-intellection is
incidental to its original intellection of the Good. We did not fully consider the fact
that in V 6 [24],5,16 Intellect is said to think the Good (E:v i:n voflcrtt aui:otl [sc. i:ou
O:ya9ou]).117 In Section I it was clearly remarked that intellection always concerns
the multiplicity of intelligible objects. How does the intellection of the transcendent
One differ from intellection proper? How do these two levels of intellection related
to one another?
If Intellect's activity is solely self-referential, Intellect will be the first

principle. Plotinus indicates the dual nature of Intellect's activity in claiming the
existence of the One over Intellect:

It is necessary that Intellect is in thinking ( vodv ), and the best Intellect,
not looking to that which is external, thinks (voE'iv) that which is prior to
it: for in turning to itself it turns to its principle (tic; o:ui:ov yap
E:mcri:p€~wv Ei.c; apxilv E:mcri:p€~tt). And, on the one hand (µEv), if
Intellect itself is that which thinks and that which is thought, it will be
double and neither simple nor the one. On the other hand (5€), if it looks
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to another (€i:Epov), it will certainly look to that which is better than and
prior to itself. But if it looks both to itself and to that which is better than
itself, it will be the second also in this way. And one must suppose that
Intellect is of such a kind that, on the one hand (µ€v), it is present to
(mxpE'ivo:l) the Good and the First and looks to him, and, on the other
(0€), is present with (O'UVELVo:l) itself and thinks itself and thinks itself as
being all things (VI 9 [9],2,33-43).
Intellect not only thinks itself but looks to the One. Its cognitive presence
to the One is also called VOELV and characterized as the €mcnpocf>i1 to the higher
principle.118 This type of VOELV involves otherness as intellection proper does; but
otherness here is not that between the intellective subject and the intelligible object
but that between the first and the second hypostases.119 Hence this sort of
intellection, different from self-intellection, concerns that which is other than and
prior to Intellect itself.
The higher type of intellection is later ascribed to what is called the
primary part of the pure Intellect ( Ko:0cxp~ i:~

v~

... Ko:l i:ou vou i:~ npwi:~, VI 9

[9],3,26-27), which contemplates that which is prior to Intellect (3,36). This "primary
part of pure Intellect," as many critics point out, refers to the hyper-noetic phase of
Intellect variously denominated "that of Intellect which is not Intellect
µT,

v~)"

(i:~

€o:ui:ou

(V 5 [32],8,22-23), "Intellect loving (vouc; €pwv)" (VI 7 [38],35,24), and "the

inner Intellect (6 €voov votlc;)" (V 3 [49],14,14-15).120 Plotinus stresses that
Intellect at the same time exercises self-intellection and contemplates the One (VI 7
[38],35,28-30).121 He further remarks the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect is
equivalent to the pre-noetic or inchoate state of Intellect, which is often mentioned
in his account for the hypostatization of Intellect:
Intellect then has one power (i:T,v . .. ouvo:µlV) for intellection, by which it
sees its own contents, and one by which it sees what is beyond it by an
intuitive awareness and reception ( €nt130A.n i:tvl Ko:l ncxpo:ooxTI), by which
also at a prior moment it only saw (Ko:0' fiv Ko:l np6i:Epov €wpo: µ6vov),
and later by seeing possessed Intellect and is one (35,19-23, tr. J.
Bussanich) .122
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From this passage it is concluded that the pre-noetic phase of Intellect,
identical with the hyper-intellective phase of the fully formed Intellect, coexists
eternally with its self-thinking phase.123 Plotinus here speaks of two phases of
Intellect as if they are two distinct powers. But these phases are actually derived
from one original power (EKtlVO OE TI ovvcxµtl €µEU€ VOtlV, 35,22-23). The verb
€µEU€ would imply that the original power of Intellect is primarily for the seeing of
the One, which is logically followed by self-intellection.124
In V 6 [24 ],5 the logical relation of the contemplation of the One and selfintellection is more fully articulated. First, we need to look at the definition of
intellection as "a movement towards the Good in its desire of that Good (KiVT)atc;;
npO<; O:ycx9ov

E:~t€µEvov

EKEivov)" (5,8-9). Although Plotinus does not explicitly

mention two phases of Intellect in this chapter, the addition of KtVT)atc;; and

E~Eatc;;

to the definition of intellection, as Bussanich notes, 125 suggests that this definition
refers to the striving of the eternally pre-noetic phase of Intellect. The definition is
not unnatural because Plotinus sometimes speaks of the voEtV directed towards the
One126 and calls the inchoate Intellect v6ricrtc;;.127 The causal connection between
the intellection of the Good and self-intellection is now revealed; self-intellection,
which is the contemplation of the multiple images of the Good within Intellect
itself, 128 is incidental ( Kcxi:a crvµ/3tl3riKoc;) and necessarily follows the intellection of
the Good (5,16-17).129 Taking the present passage and VI 7 [38],35,22-23 together,
we can conclude that the original power of Intellect is properly directed towards the
One and only incidentally and secondarily towards itself as the complex of the
Forms.
Another prominent mark of the aforementioned definition of intellection
is that the pre- or hyper-noetic intellection towards the One, as well as selfintellection, is characterized as a KtVT)atc;. We can more fully understand this
definition by looking at the passage immediately preceding that definition:

132

... when the Good (already] existed (\m€cn:fl)130 and (i) moved what had
come into being to itself, and (ii) it was moved and saw (V 6 (24],5,6-8, tr.
A. H. Armstrong).
Plotinus here does not mention the inchoate Intellect prior to its reversion
to the One. But we can see that the definition of intellection exactly refers to (i) the
processive state in Intellect's reversion before (ii) its full actualization.131
Considered with Plotinus' detailed account for the actualization of Intellect in VI 7

[38], 16, 16-19, the stage of (i) would correspond to the intermediate, processive
stage, described as i:~ EKEt KtVEtcr0cxt Kcxl nEpl EKE'ivo, after the inchoate Intellect
not yet involved in reversion as

f1 ... KlVflcrt<;; cxui:fl or KlVflcrt<;; ... µovov and before

the fully actualized Intellect as KlVflO"t<;; otcxKoptl<;; Kcxl nA.i\pfl<;. Furthermore, the
definition of intellection in question also contains the desire for the Good. The
already established thesis that the pre-noetic state of Intellect eternally coexists with
its self-intellective phase can be rendered such that the indefinite desire for the
Good always persists in the self-thinking Intellect. Plotinus writes:
The Good, therefore has given the trace of itself on Intellect to Intellect to
have by seeing, so that in Intellect there is desire (il E~Ecrt<;;), and it is
always desiring and always attaining ( E~tE:µovrn;: aEl KCXt aEl i:uyxavwv)
(III 8 [30], 11,22-24, tr. A. H. Armstrong).
This passage would illuminate the modality of the movement in the
definition of intellection under discussion. Notice the second-half of the passage is
parallel with 11,25-26 E~Ecrt<;; yap Kcxl E:v i:oui:cp (sc. v~) Kcxl cruvvEucru;; npCx; i:o
E'IBcx; o:ui:ou. In light of this convergence with the form and 11, 16-17 i:uyxavwv i:ou
ayo:0ou ayo:00Et0Ec; yiVE1:0:t, the phrase aEt i:uyxavwv in 11,24 turns out to be
appropriate to the self-thinking phase of Intellect.132 Again, the passage in 11, 16-17
is explained by 11, 17-19 i:ou µE:v E'toouc; i:ou E:n' o:ui:~ mxpa i:ou ayo:0ou flKovi:rn;:
ayo:0oEtOfl notouvi:rn;:. Moreover, aEl i:uyxavwv in 11,24, as W0-1:€ in 11,23 marks,
is related to i:o ... '(xv<><; o:ui:ou [sc. i:ou ayo:0ou] ... €xnv in 11,22-23. Self-
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intellection or the contemplation of the Forms can thus be expressed as having
possessed and being always attaining the intelligible objects as the pluralized copies
of the Good. It is always in T, nA.f}pwau; ... Kat T, o1ov 'tEAEiwau; ( 11,6-7).133 This
modality of self-intellection well conforms to its nature as the not incomplete
activity.134 On the other hand, the aforementioned definition of intellection,
referring to the processive state in the reversion of the inchoate Intellect, well fits
the phrase €cjn€µEvoc;; cXEt in 11,23.135 This processive state, especially characterized
by indefinite desire, is logically prior to the completion and fulfillment of Intellect.
In this connection Bussanich holds that Aristotle's notion of movement as a6ptai:oc;;
and ai:EAtl<; (Phys. 201b27-35) is applicable to the reversion of the inchoate
Intellect.136 In summary, the Kivriau; or aui:oKivriau; (VI 2 [43],18,8) as selfintellection and the pre- or hyper-noetic Kivriau; towards the One are clearly
distinguished by their modalities. The former is characterized by satiety, the latter
by desire.137 With the combination of movement and desire in the definition of
intellection and the identification of movement and desire (III 9 [13],9,4 ), the
definition of intellection as a movement indicates the defectiveness of Intellect in
· relation to the Good. This definition has an efficacy in the context where it occurs;
Plotinus, in V 6 [24],4-5, argues for the absence of intellection from the One which is
said to be "not in want (aVEVOEE<;;)" (4,1).138
The pre-noetic intellection is also characterized as the €v€pyEta. In VI 7
[38],40 devoted to the "persuasion (nEt9w)" (line 4) that the One has no intellection,
Plotinus elucidates two levels of intellection. He first mentions fully actual
intellection:
One must, then, know and understand that all intellection (v6riau;) comes
from something and is of something. And one kind of intellection (T, µ€v),
which keeps close to that from which it comes, 139 has as its substrate
(vnoKELµEvov) that of which it is the intellection and becomes a kind of
that which rests upon (o1ov .. . €mKdµEvov), being its substrate's activity
( €v€pyEta) and fulfilling (nA.ripouaa) that substrate's potentiality without
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generating anything itself: for it is a kind of completion ( otov 'tEAEiwau;)
of that of which it is (40,5-10, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).

As often repeated, 140 intellection proper as the activity of being completes
and fulfills the being from which it arises. Plotinus now deals with another kind of
intellection that generates being:
But the intellection which accompanies real being (n 0€ ovacx vOr,au;
µEi:' ovaicxc;) and has brought real being into existence could not be in
that from which it came to be: for it would not have generated anything if
it was in that. But since it was a power of generation by itself (ovvcxµu;
i:ou yEvvav E:~' E:cxui:fy;), it generated, and its active actuality (n E:vE:pyEux
cxvi:fy;) is real being, and also in real being it is there with it (Kcxt avvEa'tt
Kcxt E:v i:n ova~), and the intellection and this real being are not different
things, and, again, in that the nature thinks itself, they are not different
except in definition, what is thought and what thinks, that is a plurality, as
has often been demonstrated. And this is the first activity (npW'tfl
E:vE:pyEux), which has generated an existent which came to be real being
... (40,10-19, tr. A.H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).
The second VOflau; is the power of generating ovaicx, the power given
from the Good (15,18-20).141 As Bussanich states,142 this point is made less
explicitly in V 1 [10],7,11-17 and V 6 [24],5,12-15. In the present chapter Plotinus
more explicitly mentions the generative aspect of the pre-noetic intellection. That
the second intellection in VI 7 [38],40 is the pre-noetic one becomes clear in 40,4651, especially in 40,51 EK i:Tl<; CXU.ou 8€cxc;:. The pre-noetic intellection, which is
ascribed to the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect, is now called the npwi:fl €v€pyEux
(40,18-19; 40,22-23).143 This characterization is exactly contrasted with the denial of

E:vE:pyEta and VOflau; to the One (40,23-24 ). The reasons why this activity is called
primary, prima fade, would be that there is no activity before it (40,22-24) and
perhaps that it is higher than the first intellection.144 But the earlier occurrence of

npW'tfl E:vE:pyEux in 18,12 and 18,41 tells us that it is the expression of the inchoate
life prior to its limitation. The contrast between the second intellection and the One
in the present chapter can be considered to supplement the earlier contrast between
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intellection as €v€pye:ux (37,16-17) and the denial of €pyov to the One (37,28-29)
by analyzing intellection into two levels.
Why is the second intellection regarded as the €v€pye:ux? From the
statement about the One, ov yap €ve:pyilcrcxc; npfrre:pov €y€vvricre:v €v€pye:ux
(40,29-30), we understand that the second intellection generates real being as its

actualization by being itself active. Then, by which criterion can it be defined as the
€v€pye:ux? Now we must return to V 6 [24),5. In the following passage Plotinus
develops the aforementioned definition of intellection as a movement towards the
Good (5,8-9):
For when what is other than the Good thinks it, it does so by being "like
the Good" and having a resemblance to the Good, it thinks it by becoming
as Good and desirable to itself and by having a kind of appearance of the
Good. And if it is like this for ever, it thinks the Good for ever (e:l 'ae:i
ofrrwc;, ae:l "t'OU"t'O). For in fact (KO'.t yap), moreover, in thinking the Good
it thinks itself incidentally: for (yap) it is looking to the Good it thinks
itself; for (yap) itself in actual activity ( €ve:pyo0vi;cx); and the actual
activity ('Ii ... €v€pye:ux) of all things is directed to the Good (5,12-19, tr.
A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).

o

The brief passage e:l o' ae:l oui;wc;, ae:l i;o\.li;o (5, 15-16) indicates that
Intellect's eternal attainment of the multiple images of the Good is logically
dependent on its eternal intellection of the Good itself. This passage can certainly
be illuminated by III 8 [30),11,23-24

€~t€µe:vrn;

ae:l Kat ae:l i;uyx6:vwv, since in the

present chapter the intellective movement towards the Good is combined with the
desire for it (5,8-9). Now the criterion, by which the pre-noetic intellection of the
Good is characterized as the €v€pye:ux towards it, turns out to be the very continuity
and perpetuity of that intellection.145 Taking V 6 [24 ),5 and VI 7 [38),40 together,
we can summarize that the pre-noetic v6ricrtc; eternally generates oucricx by always
receiving the pluralized images of the Good in its eternal €v€pye:ux towards the
Good.146 Needless to say, this point perfectly coheres not only with the eternity of
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the pre-noetic phase of Intellect but with the perpetuity of the procession from the
One.
Finally, it must be noted that the second intellection in VI 7 [38],40 is not
separable from OVCJ'icx, but coexists with and in it (Kat crUV€CTtl Kat €v "tTI OVCJ'\c;x,

40,15; also 40,11 µE-r' ovcrlac;;). Again, this intellection is said to be not different
from ovcrio: (40, 15-16). This inseparability is precisely pointed to the repeatedly
mentioned eternal coexistence of the hyper- or pre-noetic and the self-thinking
phases of Intellect. Our analysis of the phrase Ka-ra crvµ/3€f311K6c; in V 6 [24],5,16
shows that self-intellection as the contemplation of the multiple images of the One
is the necessary consequence from or epiphenomenon of the intellection of the One
itself.147 In light of this thesis, the inseparability of the second intellection from
ovcrio: is explained such that the reversion of that intellection towards the One
unavoidably entails the genesis of real being within itself. The pre- or hyper-noetic
intellection is therefore the €v€py€ta inseparable from the ovcrio: it generates. This
point is extremely important, because the contrast between it and the One's status as
the primary activity without being ( €v€pyEtaV "tflV npwi:11v ... CXV€V ovcrio:c;, VI 8

[39],20,9-10) not only makes the One's hyper-intellectual activity quite unique and
absolutely transcendent but is definitely coherent with the frequent negation of
intellection to the One.
In the above discussion, we have clarified the causal connection between
the original intellection of the One and the consequent self-intellection as the
contemplation of the intelligible objects. Plotinus' doctrine of the intellectintelligible identity is closely connected with his doctrine of the relation of Intellect
to the One. We have considered the Intellect's relation to the One in terms of the
pre- or hyper-intellective activity of Intellect in the present chapter. In the next
chapter we shall explore it in terms of the description of the One as i:o vo11i:6v.
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7. The One as 'to von'tov

In the last section we observed that the word v6r)cru; is sometimes used for
describing the relation of the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect to the One. One would
naturally suppose that the One may be denominated 'to VOfl'tOV in relation to the
hyper-intellectual v6r)cru;. In showing that Intellect, in order to exist, necessitates its
object (V 6 [24],2,7-12), Plotinus refers to the One as 'tO VOfl'tOV. But the One as 'to
VOfl'tOV does not have a thinking agent and intellection within itself (2,4-5). It is 'to
VOfl'tOV solely to Intellect (npO<; ... 'tOV vo\Jv), but not in itself (Ko:0' €o:u'to) (2,8-9).

Then, how can Plotinus justifiably preclude intellection from the One described as
'to VOfl'tov? In V 6 [24],2, no reason is given why every object of intellection does

not necessarily think. In VI 9 [9],6,52-55, in which intellection is denied to the One,
the One is said to be "the cause of intellection for the other (o:l'ti.o: 'tOU voe:'iv ~)"
( 6,54 ). The idea here in play is the principle that the cause is not the same as that

which is caused (6,54-55). Also in V 6 [24],2, the One assumes the role as the cause
of Intellect's exercising intellection. Therefore intellection can be precluded from
the One as 'to VOfl'tOV by virtue of the principle of the transcendence of the cause
over that which is caused.148 The absence of intellection from the One leads to the
absence of the VOflO'tc;-Vofl'tOV or vo\Jc;-vofl'tOV duality from it, which is indicated by
the remark that the One is not 'tO VOfl'tOV "in itself' (2,9). That the One is 'to
VOfl'tOV "to Intellect" means that otherness lies between them.149

In what sense is the One said to be 'tO VOfl'tOV? To this question, we must
refer to other passages in which the One is so called. In a doxographical passage
mentioning Heraclitus (V 1 [10],9,3-4), the One is said to be VOfl'tOV. But this
passage is not relevant to the present problem. Also in V 4 [7],2,4ff., where Plotinus
thematically speaks of the genesis of Intellect, the One is so called. Here 'to VOfl'tOV
is correlative to VOflcrt.c; as the inchoate Intellect (2,4 ), and represents that which
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completes and defines it in its reversion to the One. To this extent, Rist would be
correct in his attempt to see the meaning of i:o VOfl"tOV applied to the One in light of
Ill 8 [30], 11, where Plotinus again elucidates the emergence of the second hypostasis
through the reversion of the inchoate Intellect towards the One. He writes:
One would suppose that, since he [i.e. Plotinus] has previously been
discussing the relationship between the Divine Mind and the Forms, he
would here say that for the act of intellection to take place satisfactorily,
the Forms are required as objects of Intellection. But instead of speaking
of the Forms, he says that it is the Good (i.e. the One) that is needed. This
should remind us that the One is the real object of the Divine Mind's
Intellection and that the Forms are only a second best. Nolle; sees the One
as the Forms, but the intelligibility of those Forms is supplied by the
One.150
Then, can we call the One i:o

VOfl"tOV

only to the inchoate Intellect? It

seems that Plotinus, in V 6 [24],2, does not thematically discuss the hypostatization
of Intellect. The subjunctive 01.Jcri:cxi11 (2, 7) would not sufficiently confirm that the
inchoate Intellect is in play in this context. But Plotinus also refers to the pre-noetic
intellection by VOflcrtc; in the same treatise. As seen in the last section, the definition
of intellection as "a movement towards the Good in its desire of that Good" (5,8-9)
· is appropriate to the hyper-noetic activity of Intellect. Again, our construction of

5, 16-17 Kcxl yap cx\J E-v i:n voflcrtt cxui:oO Kcxi:a crvµJ3E/3T1KOc; cxui:o voE'i is that selfintellection is the necessary consequence from the original intellection of the
Good.151 This point indicates the eternal coexistence of the pre-noetic phase with
the self-thinking phase of Intellect. Insofar as the pre-noetic phase is eternal within
the fully formed Intellect, the One can be called i:o VOfl"tOV in relation to the fully
actualized Intellect. In this case, i:o vo11i:6v is precisely correlative to the hyper- or
pre-noetic VOflcrtc;. The One always fulfills Intellect's desire, which perpetually
originates from its eternally pre-noetic phase, by affording the images of the One
itself (III 8 [30], 11,22-24). To this extent, Intellect's possession of an intelligible
object is due to the very existence of the One prior to it (VI 7 [38],40,49-50). The
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One is hence 'to VOTl'tOV as the transcendent content-determining cause of
intellection. It can also be rendered the emanative cause of the Forms. In the
context concerning the inchoate Intellect's reversion, the One is said to be the cause
of oucricx (16,22-24).152
Henry, though he does not mention the reason, believes that Plotinus'
description of the One as

'to VOfl'tOV is a sort of simple-mindedly strange

expression.153 Indeed this expression seems to have several assailable points. First,
the term 'to VOfl'tOV itself has such ambiguity that can be applied both to the One
and to the Form. But this ambiguity can be dismissed by Plotinus' careful remark
that the One is not 'to VOfl'tOV in itself but only in relation to Intellect (V 6 [24],2,8-9),
whereas Intellect possesses 'to VOfl'tOV in itself (2,4).154 Second, we must remind
that the One is 'to VOfl'tOV precisely in relation to the eternally pre-noetic v6Tlcru;.
In the middle and late treatises, however, Plotinus is somewhat reluctant to describe
the eternally pre-noetic activity as v611cru; or

VOEtV

(V 5 [32],8,22-23; VI 7

[38],35,32; V 3 [49],10,40-44).155 In this case, the expression of the One as
VOfl'tOV

'to

is no longer sustainable. Moreover, when this expression is mistakenly

construed so that the One is grasped by intellection in the sense of the intuitive
apprehension of the Forms, it appears to contradict Plotinus' frequent statement
about the unintelligibility of the One.156 In a word, the expression is legitimate
solely within the scope of the description of the eternally pre-noetic activity as

v611cru; or VOEtV. Finally, the transcendent VOfl'tOV is outside Intellect so that it has
neither a thinking agent nor intellection within itself (V 6 [24],2,4-5). In one of the
arguments for the intellect-intelligible unity, as already seen, Plotinus critically
regards the intelligible objects outside Intellect as avaicr811'ta Kat aµotpa

~wfy;

Kat

voD (V 5 [32],1,32-33). From these points one would certainly suppose that the

inner life of the transcendent

VOfl't'OV

may be inactive and vacuous. Thus Plotinus is

compelled not only to dismiss such supposition by presenting some detailed
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conception of the internal cognitive activity of the One but also to reconcile this
conception with the necessary absence of intellection from the One. Here arises the
problem of the One:S- knowledge. This problem is inseparably related to the problem

concerning the description of the One as i:o VOf\1:0V in the doctrine of Intellect's
relation to the One.157
As for the thesis that that which is beyond being is the cause of
intellection, Plotinus faithfully abides by Plato's position as developed in the
metaphor of the sun in the Republic. But Plotinus' scheme that Intellect receives the
Forms in its eternal reversion to the One clearly deviates from Plato's scheme that
the Good cognitionally conjoins intellect and the Forms by providing the former
with knowledge or the power of knowing and the latter with truth or the power of
being known. Plato, in the metaphor of the sun, nowhere states that intellect looks
to the Good. In that scheme Plato speaks of the Good as the cause of knowledge
and truth (508e3-4). But the further (µCXAA.ov ... €i:t) consideration of the sun
(509a9-10) comes to introduce the derivation of being from the Good into the
scope:
Therefore it must be said that not only (µil µ6vov) being-known is present
from the Good in those which are known, but also existence and being
belong to them from the Good (ilia Kat 1:0 ELVai 1:€ Kat i:ilv ouaicxv \Jn'
EKELVO\J aui:otc; npocrEtVat) (509b6-8).
Another question would naturally follow this statement. How is intellect
ontologically related to the Good? Plato presents the causal relation of the Good

and intellection, but tells nothing about the causal relation of the Good and the very
existence of intellect. In the metaphor of the sun, he gives an account of the
cognitional relation among the Good, the Forms, and intellect, but is totally silent

about their ontological relation. The aforementioned scheme embodies the former
relation, but is not necessarily applicable to the latter relation. We are hence
allowed freely to conceive another scheme in working out the problem left by Plato.
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Plotinus' doctrine of Intellect's relation to the One is his attempt to answer this
problem.
As already examined, Plotinus' doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity

is the insight, stimulated by Aristotle's psychological formula, that can satisfactorily
answer the problem, raised and left unanswered in the Sophist, concerning the
cognitive relation of intellect and the Forms, without compromising the Forms'
immutability. The doctrine of the intellection of the Forms or self-intellection, as
already seen, is inseparably tied to the doctrine of Intellect's relation to the One.
Plotinus' deviation from Plato's scheme of the cognitional relation among the Good,
the Forms, and intellect seems to be unavoidable for the coherence between these
two doctrines, because Plato's scheme apparently places the Forms outside
intellect.158
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8. Self-Intellection and the One's Knowledge

In the last section, it was pointed out that the problem of the One's
knowledge unavoidably occurs when the relation of Intellect to the One is
established to be consistent with the doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity.
The charge naturally occurs that the transcendent vorrr6v outside Intellect may be
inactive and lifeless. For this possible charge Plotinus prepares his own reply that
the intellect-intelligible unity rather necessarily calls for the transcendent vorri:6v
possessing a rich inner life:
There is, then, something beyond Intellect. For (yap) being is not a dead
thing, nor is it not life or not thinking: Intellect and being are then (ot1)
one and the same thing (V 4 [7],2,42-44, tr. A.H. Armstrong, adapted by
A. Sumi).
As shown in Section I, the conception of being or intelligible object as

living and thinking159 is the copestone of Plotinus' doctrine of the intellectintelligible identity. As pointed out in Section IV, again, this conception can
sufficiently prevent that doctrine from being interpreted in terms of the Middle
Platonic view of the Form as divine VOT1J.l.O:. Plotinus expresses the relation between
the One and Intellect in terms of archetype and image in 2,25-26.160 The archetype
of real being which is truly living and thinking must not be lifeless, senseless, and
unthinking. That which is prior to Intellect must have the very plenitude of life that
can engender rich intellectual life. Otherwise Intellect would think a lifeless and
unthinking object so that self-intellection in its proper sense would be impossible.
The doctrine of self-intellection therefore calls for the detailed description of the
inner life and cognitive activity of the One. Deck observes that Plotinus' doctrine of
the One is supported by "the continuity of knowledge":
Thus knowledge, which appears in a way in nature, more fully in soul,
perfectly in the Nous, is not absent from the highest "nature," the One: the
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continuity of knowledge is not abruptly broken in the ascent from the
Nous to the One.161
Unfortunately, the notion of the continuity of knowledge is nowhere
explicitly developed in the Enneads. Instead Plotinus exquisitely expresses the
continuity of life:
All things are then like a long life stretched out at length; each part is
different from that which comes next in order, but the whole is continuous
with itself, but with one part differentiated from another, and the earlier
does not perish in the latter (V 2 [11),2,26-29, tr. A.H. Armstrong,
adapted by A. Sumi).162
The One, sustaining such continuity of life, must be the "spring of life

(rrrryt1v ... ~wfy;)" (VI 9 [9],9,1).163 The doctrine of the One's knowledge is not the
description of the secluded life of the isolated Absolute. From the One's life hangs
the catena aurea of life. The doctrine really occupies the principal position in
Plotinus' own system.
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lA. H. Armstrong, "Eternity, Life and Movement in Plotinus' Accounts of
NOY}.:," in Le Neoplatonisme (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique,
1971), p. 74.
2A. H. Armstrong, "The Background of the Doctrine 'That the Intelligibles
are not outside the Intellect,"' in Les Sources de Plotin (Geneva, Vandoevres:
Fondation Hardt, 1957), p. 408. We may here recall Armstrong's observation that
the principal stimulus to Plotinus' doctrine is his study of the Peripatetic doctrine of
the identity of divine intellect and its object in light of Albinus' identification of the
Peripatetic divine vorrr6v with the vorrra as "God's thoughts" in this interpretation
of Platonism, the identification through which alone the doctrine of the self-thinking
intellect can be brought into a Platonic system (ibid., pp. 411-412).
3See also the following passage: "... each intellection (v6f1crtc;;), if it is to
be intellection, must be something manifold ..." (VI 7 [38],39,17-18). In what sense
is intellection here said to be manifold? We must notice that E:v CXAA.ou;; in line 17
refers back to VI 9 [9],2,40-44, where Intellect's manifold (notKiAov, line 44) is
explained by its being i:a navi:cx (line 43). In the above quoted passage, as well as in
V 3 [49],10,40-42, intellection's manifold is due to the multiplicity of its objects. For
the necessary connection of intellection and the multiplicity of intelligible objects,
see also V 3 [49],10,29-31, 11,25-27, and VI 7 [38],13,40-42. Again, Intellect is often
said to possess all things in itself. Its possession is in fact "as in intellection" (VI 2
[43],21,28).
That intellection apprehends the multiplicity of intelligible forms can be
seen also from the definition of intellection as cruvcxicr9f1crtc;; i:ov oA.ou (V 3
[49],13,13), the consciousness of the integrated whole. Insofar as Intellect attains
self-sufficiency by being the whole consisting of all things (lines 19-20), intellection
turns inward to Intellect itself and reveals that it is multiple (lines 22-24 ). But we
must notice that npoi:E-pcx in line 23 indicates T1 cruvcxicr9f1crtc;; in line 21 to be
attributed to the soul rather than to Intellect. Gurtler aptly distinguishes
auvcxicr9f1crtc;; in lines 13 and 21; the latter occurrence expresses the term's root
meaning, on the level of soul, of unifying sensations, which cannot apply to
Intellect's consciousness because of the internal unity of its own. See G. M. Gurtler,
Plotinus: The Experience of Unity (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), pp. 79-80. Notice
that the self-unity of Intellect is suggested by the aorist participle auvcA.96vi:wv in
line 13. For the bearing of multiplicity on the definition of intellection in terms of
auvcxicr9f1crtc;;, see G. M. Gurtler, op. cit., p. 80: "Intellection ... turns inward
unifying its own interior multiplicity."; and R. Arnou, Le Desir de Dieu dans la
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Philosophie de Plotin, 2nd ed., (Rome: Presses de l'Universite Gregorienne, 1967), p.
101: "Bref, toute connaissance ... est ... l'activite interieure par laque/le le multiple
s 'unifie pour etre lui-meme. "
Beutler and Theiler compare i) vonau;; npo"t€pcx in V 3 [49),13,22-23
with µE"Ca "tTlc; npo"t€pcxc;; yvwaEW<; in I 4 [46], 10, 15-16. See Plotins Schriften,
iibersetzt von R. Harder, Neubearbeitung mit griechischem Lesetext und
Anmerkungen von R. Beutler und W. Theiler, 6 vols. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner,
1960-67), 5b:384. In I 4 [46),10, indeed, Plotinus places vo\X; and ot6:voto: above the
center of empirical consciousness. See A. Smith, "Unconsciousness and
Quasiconsciousness in Plotinus," Phronesis 23 (1978):299. According to Schibli, it is
the middle soul where this consciousness or aV"CiAn"1u;; exercises its pivotal function
and the images of ot6:votcX and vo\X;; are mirrored. See H. S. Schibli, "Apprehending
Our Happiness: Antilepsis and the Middle Soul in Plotinus, Ennead I 4.10," Phronesis
34 {1989):209-215. The phrase µE"Ca "tTlc; npo"t€pcxc; yvwaEW<; thus indicates that the
knowledge that vo\X; and ot6:votcX are active is received from the state ontologically
prior to av"CiATt"1u;; (see H. S. Schibli, Phronesis 34 (1989):211-215; and G. M.
Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 177). In I 4 [46),10, this ontological
priority is established from the outset (lines 3-6). But, first of all, is the comparison
by Beutler and Theiler appropriate? It is certain that the auvcxta0riau;; in V 3
[49],13,21 refers to that of the soul in 2,4, which is described also as the aV"CiATt"1u;; in
2,5. But we should not be misled by the co-occurrence of auvcxta0riau;; and
aV"CiAT1"1tt;; in this passage. Plotinus here speaks of i;c) cxia0riuK6v of the soul (2,2-3).
As already seen, on the other hand, the av"CiAT1"1u;; in I 4 [46),10 is attributed to the
middle soul and functions as "a link between sense perception and the soul's
intellectual activity" (H. S. Schibli, Phronesis 34 (1989):214). Hence the level of the
soul's consciousness differs in V 3 [49],2 and I 4 [46),10, so that npoi;€pcx in V 3
[49),10 has no bearing on that in I 4 [46),10,16. In addition, Warren, referring to V 3
[49],2, considers auvcxta0riau;; to involve perception of a plurality. See E.W.
Warren, "Consciousness in Plotinus," Phronesis 9 (1964):91. But this remark is not
clear until we see its relation to the plural genitive ytvoµ€vwv in line 4.
We may briefly touch upon the soul's intellection. When the soul is
present in the intelligible world, she does not apprehend the multiplicity of
intelligible objects by a single intellection (Kcxl O'IJ KCX"tcX µio:v voriatv naV"CCX, IV 4
[28], 1,34 ). Although the soul comprehends all the intelligible objects at once by her
single power, her power is divided and individualized in those objects (lines 33-36).
(With Armstrong, we read Theiler's axt~oµE-vn for H-S2 ytvoµ€µEvwv in line 36.)
Hence the soul's contemplative activity is said to be as if all intellections, with their
many objects, were all together (W<;; noA.A@v oµou n6:acxc; voi)aEu;;, line 21).
The above mentioned pluralized intellections of the soul seem to be
parallel to the pluralized powers in the fully formed Intellect. If we are allowed to
take VI 7 [38], 15, 18-22 and 35,32-33 together, we can state that Intellect's original
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power whereby it sees the One is pluralized in its thinking itself. It seems to be due
to this pluralization that the plural VoftO'E:l<; is sometimes used of the fully actualized
Intellect (V 3 [49],11,16; V 9 [5],8,18; see also II 9 [33],1,49-50 op@v o' ECX\T[OV ...
voouvtcx op~; v 6 [24],5,17-18 EVE:pypouvtcx yap cxU ECXV't:OV VOE:l).
4See

also III 8 [30],8,6-8, EV aµcj>w OUK olKE:tWO'E:l, wcmE:p €nl i:fy; iVvxfy;
i:fy; aplai:T)<;, ill' ova~ ... E:lvcxt. On the unity of the soul and the A6y<><;; within
her in the manner of olKE:i.wat<;, see 6,20-22. The soul, different from Intellect,
contemplates the A6y<><;; as something else than herself, even when she is united with
it (6,24-25). Plotinus describes such character of the soul's discursive thinking as
oiov voD<; ... op@v &Uo (6,25-26).
ssee also III 9 [13],1,13 olCXtpouµE:vcx 0€ i:n vof}crE:t.
According to Plotinus, the conceptual distinction of Intellect and its object
is due to our habit derived from sensation and its object (V 9 [5],5,10-11). This
remark makes sharp contrast with Aristotle's analogy from the sense's reception of
and identification with sensible objects to intellect's reception of and identification
with intelligible objects (De Anima 429a17-18).
In II 9 [33],1,51-52, we are told that it is impossible, even in thought (i:n
€mvo~), to find duality in the intelligible world. But the duality mentioned here is
that between Intellect which thinks and Intellect which thinks that it thinks (lines 3334). There is surely the subject-object duality in the self-thinking Intellect (III 8
[30],9,7-11; III 9 [13],7,4-5; V 1 [10],4,31-33; V 3 [49],10,23; 10,45-46; 15,39; V 4
[7],2, 11; V 6 [24],1, 15-16; VI 9 [9],2,36-37). On the intellect-intellection duality, see
V 6 [24],6,12-13 and 6,26-27.
In terms of the multiplicity of the intelligible objects, Intellect is called
substantially many. The limitation of the intelligible objects by their own forms
exactly brings the plural ovalcxt (V 1 [10],7,23-24).
6G. J. P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (New York: Harper &
Row, 1973), p. 64. We cannot see why O'Daly expresses self-intellection as "the
paradox of unity-in-duality" (Zoe. cit.). If we keep in mind Plotinus' careful
distinction between unity in ovalcx and duality in A.6yrn; or voriat.<;, unity-in-duality
will no longer be the paradoxical expression.
This distinction applies also to the intellect-intellection duality. Two
genera, Being and Movement which is the activity of Being, namely intellection, are
said to be two only in our conception (€mvo~) (VI 2 [43],7,18-20).
70n Plotinus' full criticism of the Aristotelian or Peripatetic self-thinking
divine mind, see VI 7 [38],37,1-23. Plotinus here mentions the intellect-intellection
duality implied by the complete actuality of the divine mind (lines 10-13). Beutler
and Theiler explicate the force of oµw<; in line 12 "although OUO'Lcx VOOUO'CX seems to
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be one" (Plotins Schriften, 3b:513; see also the apparatus ad Zoe. in H-S2). But it is
not intuitively clear that the ovaia voovaa appears to be one. We must notice that
µ€v in line 11 is coupled with 8€ in line 15. As Beutler and Theiler note (Zoe. cit.),
€vEpyE~ A.€youatv in line 15, parallel with €v€pyEtaV A.€youat in lines 11-12,
presupposes that the €v€pyEta is simple as it has no other €v€pyEta. In fact, ovK &:v
ovaa v6T)au;; VOOL (lines 15-16) reminds us of v 6 [24],6,4-5 oAw<; µE:v yap OOOEµia
€v€pyEta EXEl a\I n<XAtv €v€pyEtaV and 6,9-10 ooo' T, v6T)au;; voEL. Therefore the
force of oµw<;; should rather be explicated "although €v€pyEta seems to be one."
Mizuchi follows this interpretation.
Rist maintains that the thinkers who Plotinus attacks in VI 7 [38],37 can
hardly be orthodox Aristotelians, since they subscribe to some kind of emanation
theory indicated by "T:@v €{ av"tov in line 2. See J.M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to
Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 39. But we cannot but
wonder how it is possible to get out of this phrase the fact that these thinkers
themselves entertain an emanation theory of some sort. Rather, the emanation
theory here seems to refer to Plotinus' own, which has been explained towards the
end of the last chapter (36,23-27). Plotinus here develops the law of undiminished
giving, the principal law in his theory of procession (see III 8 [30],8,46-48; 10, 18-19;
V 8 [31],9,18-19; VI 9 [9],5,36-37; 9,1-6). On the historical background of this
ontological principle, see M. Baltes, Die Weltentstehung des platonishen Timaios nach
den antiken lnterpreten, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976-78), 1:200; R. E. Witt,
"Plotinus and Posidonius," Classical Quarterly 24 (1930):206-207; A.H. Armstrong,
"'Emanation' in Plotinus," Mind 46 (1937):62-63.
8See note 45 in Chapter II of Part I.
9"fhere seems to be also the exegetical problem of the Timaeus concerning
the relation of the Demiurge to his exemplar in the scope of Plotinus' doctrine of
the vo\Jc;-vo'Tl'T:OV identity. This connection can easily be seen in his memo about the
interpretation of Tim. 39e7-9 (III 9 [13],1). Pepin, however, observes that the
exegetical problem of the Timaeus cannot be a principal stimulus to Plotinus'
doctrine:
"Mais il ne semble pas que cette identification ... provienne d'une
reflexion sur le Timee; Plotin l'a utilisee pour dirimer les controverses
suscitees par ce dialogue; mais il ne la devait qu'a lui-meme; plus
exactement, il y avait ete conduit par des meditations sans aucun caractere
cosmologique" ("Elements pour une Histoire de la Relation entre
l'Intelligence et l'Intelligible chez Platon et dans le N eoplatonisme," Revue
Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger 146 (1956):48).
This view would be correct. In III 9 [ 13], 1, as well as in other chapters, the
identity of Intellect and the intelligible object is maintained for the infallibility of
Intellect (lines 8-10), which is, as we shall see later, the fundamental motive of his
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doctrine. Plotinus might perhaps believe that the clues to the problem concerning
the cognitive intercommunication between soul or intellect and the Forms, which
has been raised and left unsolved in the Sophist, can be discovered in the figurative
language of the Timaeus. But it is difficult to imagine that the exigency of the
Timaeus interpretation is the motive of his doctrine. Hence we do not go into
details about how Plotinus tries to get the voV<;-vorrr6v identity out of this dialogue.
In addition, Armstrong also presents a view similar to Pepin's last point: "...
Plotinus' doctrine of the unity of Intellect and Intelligibles is not really 'demiurgic"'
(Les Sources de Plotin, p. 400).
lOSee also V 3 [40],10,23-26. Rist holds that qualitative difference of some
kind at least is involved in otherness between Intellect and Being. See J.M. Rist,
"The Problem of 'Otherness' in the Enneads," in Le Neoplatonisme (Paris: Centre
National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1971), pp. 80-81.
The ontological status of the Platonic genera in Plotinus' thought is
controversial. On the one hand, Atkinson (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, a Commentary
with Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 95-96) maintains that
they are not the intelligible objects or Platonic Forms:
"The Platonic genera ... are not Forms in the sense that they are included
among Intellect's objects; they rather illuminate the way in which Intellect
engages in its activity. They describe VOf1cru;, not i:o VOf11:0V."
According to Evangeliou, on the other hand, Plotinus considers the five
genera to be both predicable and generative principles of being; by virtue of their
predicability of other Forms, they are real being qua Forms in Plato's position. See
Ch. Evangeliou, "The Ontological Basis of Plotinus's Criticism of Aristotle's Theory
. of Categories," in The Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic Approach, ed. R. B. Harris
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), p. 76. Although we have to
leave the full consideration of this dispute for another occasion, we would like to
make one brief comment. Such locutions like i:a ... µEi:E:xovi:a aui:ou [sc. i:ou
ovi:0<;] (VI 2 [43],8,47) and E:v i:ot<; µEi:E:xoucrtv (12,13-14) would support
Evangeliou's position. For the present, it suffices to see Plotinus' appeal to the
Platonic genera for the purpose of his description of intellection.
llSee also VI 4 [22],4,25-26; VI 7 [38],39,8-9; VI 9 [9],8,31-33.
Corresponding to the two roles of otherness, sameness is also given two roles:
"There must be sameness, since Intellect is one with itself, and since something
common is one (Kmvov . .. i:t €v) among all the intelligible objects" (V 1 [10],4,40).
Sameness insures not only the identity of Intellect and Being but the unity
among the intelligible objects. The second roles of sameness and otherness thus
describe Intellect as one-many: "If Being is many, it is also otherness, and if it is
one-many, it is also sameness" (VI 2 [43), 15, 14-15).
In the above quoted passage (V 1 [10],4,40), we, with Atkinson (Plotinus:
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Ennead V.1, p. 98), take Kotvov ... 'tl as the subject of the second-half of the ETtEt-

clause. But we do not read Kirchhoff's EV for the second EV. Schwyzer defends the
manuscript reading as follows: "das Kotvov 0€ 'tl €v prazisiert das voher gennante
€v." See H. -R. Schwyzer, "Die pseudoaristotelische Theologie und die PlotinAusgabe der Porphyrios," Rheinisches Museum far Papyrologie 90 (1941):230. On
this construction, some sort of Kotvwvicx is brought into the notion of selfintellection. The conception of intellection as cognitive intercourse which has been
seen in Plato and Aristotle, however, is absent from Plotinus' thought. Schwyzer's
defense is not convincing enough. Atkinson, who reads Kirchhoff's EV, presents the
two advantages of this construction (Plotinus: Ennead V.l, pp. 98-99). First, the
reading of the second EV seems to be pleonastic, though it leaves the sense of the
passage unchanged. Second, Kotvov 'tl EV nacn can be aptly compared with II 4
[12],4,2-3 El ouv noUa 'ta E'iOri, Kotvov 'tl E:v o:u'tolc; O:vayKri Etvo:t (On this
comparison, see also R. Harder, Plotins Schriften, lb:499.) In turn, let us explain
why our reading is not in the least pleonastic. First of all, intelligible matter
denominated as the Kotv6v 'tl among the Ideas in II 4 [12],4,3 is later called €v in
lines 15-16. So Kotvov ... 'tl EV nacrl indicates not only the role of intelligible
matter as the common element in the intelligible world but the presence of many
forms in one intelligible matter, so that it can also be aptly compared with 'ta noUa
E:v E:vl oV'to: EV vA.n in II 4 [12],4,15. In other words, the grounding of Intellect's
being one-in-many through the limitation of one intelligible matter by plural forms
can be read into the present passage. But this is not the full force of the predicative
€v in our passage. In V 1 [10], indeed, the simplicity of Intellect's matter (3,23) and
the oneness of the inchoate Intellect (7,9) are mentioned. But we must notice that
the theme in the present context is not the simplicity of intelligible matter but the
explication of the structure of self-intellection by means of the Platonic genera. As
said in VI 2 [43],15,14-15, Intellect or Being can be one-many, not simply many, by
virtue of sameness, because unity entailed by sameness is complemented by
multiplicity entailed by otherness. Even if the common factors in the noetic
universe are said to be two or three, insofar as those two or three factors are exactly
common to all the intelligible objects, the role of sameness will hardly be
compromised. In this case, however, Intellect will be a two-many or a three-many
rather than a one-many. Plotinus, in V 1 [10], really wishes to describe Intellect as a
one-many (8,25-26). Thus the indication of the immanent unity in the intelligible
world by saying that the common element is one among all the intelligible objects
precisely supports the characterization of Intellect as one-many and so is hardly
pleonastic. Our reading not only prefigures this characterization but makes it
possible to read into the present passage the bearing of Intellect's being one-many
on the presence of many forms in one common intelligible matter. To this extent,
our reading seems to be more advantageous than Atkinson's.
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12Qn the connection between the multiplicity of intelligible objects and
oux4>opcX, see also II 4 [12],4,2-4; VI 2 [43],21,47-49; VI 7 [38],17,29-31. In VI 9
[9],8,32, €i:EpO'tfl<; and oux4>opa are juxtaposed. In II 4 [12],4,4-5, the shape proper
to each intelligible object is described as the oux4>opex ... xwpi~OVO'CX (see also VI 7
[38],10,11-12; 33,5-7).
While the intelligible objects are clearly distinguished from one another
by virtue of otherness, they are also described in Anaxagorean fashion as 6µou
navrcx (III 6 [26],6,23; V 3 [49],15,21; 17,10; V 8 [31],9,3; V 9 [5],6,3; 6,8; 7,11-12; VI
4 [22],14,4; 14,6; VI 5 [23],5,3-4; 6,3; VI 6 [34],7,4; VI 7 [38],33,8). In VI 5 [23],6,2-3,
this Anaxagorean phrase is associated with the multiplicity-in-unity and unity-inmultiplicity structure of Intellect. Rist thus points out that the problem here is how
we can counterbalance the individuality or discreteness of intelligible objects and
their togetherness:
"What he [i.e. Plotinus] seems to mean by this is that it is only possible to
grasp each intelligible object by placing it in an intelligible context. But
since we can name a particular Form, for example, the Form of Justice,
and, if we are philosophers, we shall always understand that Form as it is
without confusing it with the intelligible world at large, we must be able to
account for the fact that, although the Form of Justice implies the other
Forms, it is intelligible as and only as the Form of Justice, and is thus
appropriately described as just, presumably on some sort ofprinciple of
predominance" (Le Neoplatonisme, p. 81, (Italics mine.)).
By "some sort of principle of predominance" Rist seems to mean probably
what is said in V 8 [31],4,11 ( E~EXEl o' EV €Kaai:~ &A.Ao). Rist here refers to P.
Hadot, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 127 (ibid., p. 81, note 3). But Hadot there deals with
the notion of predominance in Marius Victorinus' triad of being, life, and
intelligence. Is the prominence of a certain character in the intelligible whole
conceptually formulated enough to be called "the principle of predominance"?
Again, how is this notion related to dialectic by virtue of which we can understand
the Form without confusing it with the others? In VI 7 [38] Plotinus stresses the
role of otcx<f>opa in describing each intelligible object. Intellect has ~uatv ... Enl nCiv
€i:Epotoua8cxt (13,25), so that one generic Form is divided into many specific Forms
and finally to the ElOO<; choµov (14,15-18). Thus, for example, the Form of Justice
can be understood as exactly different from the Form of Temperance in virtue of its
own shape or otcx<f>op6: (o1ov KCXt i:f}v [sc. µop~i}v] EV A.6y~ Otcx~€pnv &A.Ao &A.Aov
A.€yoµe:v, We; otKcxtoauvrw Kcxl a~poau11T1V clAA.fV..wv €i:e:pcx, 33,5- 7). To be sure,
the OlCXlpEO'l<; is clearly exhibited in the noetic world (14,18-19). It is such a world
with which dialectic must be concerned. Dialectic is the science (€~u;) which can
say about everything what it is and how it differs (otcx~€pn) from other things and
what is the character in common (ti Kotv6i:ri<;) with them (I 3 [20],4,2-4). Using
Plato's method of division, it distinguishes the specific Forms and determines what
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each thing is (4,12-13). Plotinus maintains that it is possible to say to what class
each Form belongs and where it stands in that class. Also as regards the Form of
Justice, its clear description is possible because each virtue is defined by i:o Kmv6v
or the genus and i:o 'iOtov or the difference (VI 7 (38], 10, 16). Virtues in general are
vcnEpcx yE:voc; Kcxl E'iOri (VI 2 [43],18,17). Rist would indeed be right in saying that
Plotinus has to sketch out a map of the world of Forms in order to describe
uniqueness of each of the Forms (Le Neoplatonisme, p. 81). But this uniqueness can
be appropriately understood by the dialectical endeavor to clarify the structure of
the intelligible world rather than by "some sort of principle of predominance." This
description of the uniqueness of the Form can be appropriate, precisely because the
Form thus defined is placed in the exact locus of its class and to this extent implies
other Forms within the intelligible whole from which it cannot be absent.
On the discreteness of the contents of Intellect, see also I 8 [51],2,19; III 8
[30],9,35-37; V 9 [5],6,3-9; VI 6 [34],7,7-10; VI 9 [9],5,16-20.
There still remains a problem. How should we explain the fact that the
Platonic characterization of the Idea as µov0Et0€c;;
cxui:o Kcx9' cxui:o (Phd.
78d5-6, 80b2; Symp. 211bl) is absent from the Enneads? The word µov0Et0€c;; is the
futcx~ AEy6µEvov hesitatingly applied to the One in VI 9 [9],3,43. Does this fact
indicate that Plotinus is reluctant to maintain the uniqueness of each Form? Maybe
not. Here we can attempt a counterargument. Does the uniformity of the Form
immediately point to its uniqueness? However carefully we may look at the
discreteness and invariability of the Form, we will not see why it is unique. It must
be noticed that uniqueness in general is always in a certain context. A given Form is
seen uniquely only within the structural complex of the intelligible world. For
instance, we can fully understand the uniqueness of the Form of Justice, only when
we compare it with other Forms belonging to the same genus, but not when we
concentrate on that Form alone. We can get a glimpse of Plotinus' conception of
the Form's uniqueness from Rist's remark that the description of the Form's
uniqueness may necessitate the inquiry into the structure of the world of Forms.
Moreover, the reason why Plotinus does not apply the word µov0Et0€c;; to the Form
would be that the Form, even individually (Kcxl €K6:cri:ri), is not one (VI 9 [9],2,2728), because each Form consists of many things and thereby is composite (EiOOc;; i:E
yap EKCXcr'tOV EK rcoU@v KCXL cruv9€'tOV, 2,30-31). The Platonic Form, on the
contrary, is categorized into 'tCx CxO"UV9€'tCX in the context where it is characterized as
µovo€t0Ec;; (Phd. 78c7).
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13Armstrong

views the visionary description of the life of Intellect in this
chapter, closely related to V 8 (31],3-4, as introducing the idea of intellectual travel
and exploration, which does not seem to be consistent with the non-durational
nature of Intellect (Le Neoplatonisme, pp. 72-73). He also supposes that Plotinus is
here inspired by the Phaedrns myth (Le Neoplatonisme, p. 73, note 1). So the
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reference to this chapter requires some circumspection. As regards the close
connection between intellection and otherness, however, Plotinus' emphasis upon
the role of otherness in this chapter does not deviate from his recurrent account for
the hypostatization of Intellect or the actualization of intellection by the
pluralization and articulation of its inchoate vision.
140n the absence of otherness from the One, see also VI 9 [9],8,33-34.
15Aristotle does not claim the simplicity of the prime mover in terms of
the intellect-intelligible identity. As already seen in note 14 in Chapter II, the prime
mover has no other knowable object than itself so that it can be free at least from
the multiplicity of intelligible objects.
16A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, an English Translation, 7 vols. (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966-88; London: William Heinemann, 1966-88),
5:284.
17We cannot see why Armstrong regards this passage as "an important
early indication of the sense in which Plotinus accepts the common Middle Platonist
doctrine that the forms are the 'thoughts of God"' (Plotinus, 5:305, note 1, (Italics
mine.)).
18See also VI 6 [34),8,17-20. Deck (Nature, Contemplation, and the One: A
Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), p.
27) writes: "His [i.e. Plotinus'] doctrine in many places is that, in the Nous, being is
prior to the knower." See also J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in
Plotinus, p. 230.
Of course, Intellect can also be said to precede beings in the sense that
it produces them in its contemplation of the One (see G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The
Experience of Unity, p. 262; and J.M. Rist, "The Indefinite Dyad and Intelligible
Matter in Plotinus," Classical Quarterly 12 (1962):102).
19See also the following passage: "... but the nature of the intellect (i:nv
... i:ou vou ~ucrtv) which sees that intellect which remains within itself is an activity
proceeding from it ( €v€pyEtaV nva arr' EK€lVOU ), which sees that [static] intellect"
(III 9 [13],1,17-18, tr. A.H. Armstrong). This passage suggests taking nap' aui:ou
Kat€~ aui:ou voEt in V 9 [5],5,6 as meaning the actualization of the thinking agent
by its object. But III 9 [13], 1,20-21 Kat vorii:ov &A.Awe; ELVat i:&> µEµtµf1cr9at can be
aberrant, when µEµtµf1cr9at is taken as the medial; because to say that the
intellective agent imitates its object abrogates the aforementioned unity of them
(lines 13-14).
20Jn Aristotle, self-intellection is not conceptually distinct from the
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intellect-intelligible identity. See Met. 1072b19-21oo'.rrov0€ voE'i vo\X; Kcxi:ex
µE"tcXAfllJ1lv "toll VOfl"tOV ... W<TtE "too'.rtov vo\X; Kat VOfl"tov; and De Anima 429b26430a4 E"tl 0' El VOfl"t(x;; Kat a\rr6c;; ... Ent µ€v yap "tWV CXV€V UAfl<; "tO av"t6 E<Ttl "tO
VOOUV Kat "tO voouµEVOV.
21See M. R. Alfino, "Plotinus and the Possibility of Non-Propositional
Thought," Ancient Philosophy 8 (1988):278.
Plotinus here seems to bear a definite adversary in mind. First of all, we
must keep in mind that III 8 [30], V 8 [31 ], V 5 [32], and II 9 [33] originally
constituted a long, single work before Porphyry's arrangement. See R. Harder,
"Eine neue Schrift Plotins," Hennes 71 (1936):5-8. In II 9 [33],1,25-30, Plotinus
attacks the Gnostic conception of one intellect at repose and another in motion.
This duplication or "telescoping" of the hierarchy of intellects is based on their
exegesis of Tim. 39e7-9 (6,16-24). In fact, it goes back to Numenius whose thought
bas some affinity with Gnosticism. See E. R. Dodds, "Numenius and Ammonius," in
Les Sources de Plotin (Geneva, Vandoevres: Fondation Hardt, 1957), p. 20; A.H.
Armstrong, Plotinus, 2:226-227, note 1. For the more detailed history of this
doctrine, see J. Dillon, "The Concept of Two Intellects: A Footnote to the History of
Platonism," Phronesis 18 (1973):176-185. In III 9 [13],1,6-8, Plotinus spells out two
implications of the Numenian interpretation of Tim. 39e7-9: (i) the Living Being is
not intellect but simply an intelligible object, and (ii) intellect may have its object
outside itself. On the duplication or triplication of intellect that Plotinus criticizes in
II 9 [33], 1,25££. and 6, 16-24, intellect at rest is identified as the Living Being of the
Timaeus and has the ontological status as "tO VOfl"tOV devoid of any intellective
agent. See E. R. Dodds, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 19; P. Hadot, Les Sources de
Plotin, pp. 143-149; G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 241, note 8.
· The fact that Plotinus considers intellect at repose to exercise no intellection can be
seen from 1,28, where he mentions its apyi.a:. This precisely means that the
intelligible object lies outside intellect in motion or intellect contemplating ("toV 0€
vo\Jv E"t€pov nap' aV"tOV [sc. "tOV ... EV i)crvxU;x EXOV"ta EV av"t4> TtcXV"ta "tCx OV"ta]
9cwpovv"ta, 6,20-21). Hence it is highly probable that Plotinus' argument in V 5
[32], 1 is directed at the Gnostic bifurcation of intellect.
Nevertheless it would not be right to say that V 5 [32],1 is exclusively
devoted to the criticism of the Gnostic position. In Plotinus' own word, this chapter
marks the beginning of his attempt "to lead to a clear understanding of the
intelligible region by another way ( clc; Evapyfl a\Jvcatv O:vayc'iv "tOV VOfl"tOV "tonou
... Ka"t' CXAAflV
(V 8 [31],13,23-24 ). But the clear understanding of the
intelligible world is not his final purpose in the anti-Gnostic treatises. The
contemplation of the intelligible beauty is said further to open up the way to the
One (III 8 [30], 11,36-38; V 8 [31],1, 1-4 ). , In V 5 [32], the One is abruptly introduced
in 3,4 after the account for "the intelligible region" by "another way," namely in
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terms of Intellect's infallibility in the first two chapters. It is not certain whether
Plotinus includes the One in "the intelligible region" or not, while it comprises the
Good in Plato (Rep. 508b13-cl). The necessity of the ascent to the One is explained
slightly later in 4,1-8; we long to know what the pure unity is. The point in and from
which the apprehension of the pure unity is eagerly aspired to is nothing else than
Intellect which is more one than all other things, most proximate to the One, but not
purely one (4,4-6). Such a one-many nature of Intellect is exactly indicated by the
fusion of Intellect with real beings (cruyKpcx0€vtcxc; oo'.rmtc; [sc. -rote; ovat], 2,8) and
its description as the foundation of real beings (€opcx ... -rote; ouat, 2,11). The latter
expression is taken over to the characterization of the One as 6 ... um~pKa0fl"tCXt Kcxl
une:pl.Opu-ro:t Ent KcxAflc; o\h:wc; OloV KpTtnlOoc; in 3,4-5. These two descriptions of
Intellect are based on the presence of the intelligible objects inside Intellect. Thus
we can see that Plotinus' defense of the intellect-intelligible identity in the first
chapter is a necessary step towards the search for and the ascent to the One. But
the fact that he here develops solely a negative argument for the defense of his
doctrine might perhaps reflect the polemic nature of the present treatise against the
Gnostics.
On the ascent from the comprehension of the intelligible world to the
One, Armstrong writes as follows:
"When we have completed our understanding of reality, we have to leave
it all behind in order to find what turns out to be the only thing we want,
the source of all values and the goal of all desire, which alone makes it
worth the effort to attain to NoUc; on the way, as it is the only reason why
Nouc; is there at all. I find the phrase ... "[Q EnEKEtVCX cxu-rou ovne:p XcXptv
Kcxl ol np6a0e:v A.6yot which marks the transition from Nouc; to the One in
Chapter 9 of the treatise On Contemplation (iii 8 [30]) rather significant.
Certainly in what the Germans now call the Grossschrift and in the closely
related treatise written a year or two later, On How the Multitude of the
Fonns came into being and One the Good, the great elaborate descriptions
of the intelligible world seem to be designed to lead us to a point from
which the indescribable One can be indicated" ("Elements in the Thought
of Plotinus at Variance with Classical Intellectualism," The Journal of
Hellenic Studies 93 (1973):13).
Also in III 8 [30], after the full account for the intellect-intelligible identity
and the plurality of intelligible objects in the eighth chapter, the duality of selfintellection is pointed out (9,5-11 ), and the discussion, appealing to the priority of
unity to plurality (9,3), moves to the apprehension of the One as the originative
principle of Intellect and its object ( €~ OU 6 VOU<; KCXt 1:0 auv cx\rrQ vorrrov, 9, 12-13).
22Jn the present treatise, Plotinus, following Plato's attempt in the Sophist,
thinks of the possibility of falsehood in terms of otherness and negativity. By µT\ -rO:
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ovta Plotinus would mean images ( E'i&.>A.a, 1,55-56) of the intelligible objects, which
are not the truth of them (µfrtE i:o cXAfl0E<; cx\Ji:@v, 1,52-53), rather than i:o µ,,00µ@<;
in Soph. 237b7-8 or i:o µit
cx\Ji:o Ka0' cx\Ji:6 in 238c9, which cannot be even
"believed."
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23See also II 9 [33],8,14, V 3 [49],8,28-29, 16,29, V 5 [32],2,15, VI 7
[38],7,31, and 30,39.
24Armstrong observes that Plotinus' argument against total confidence in
sense-perception here is Platonic rather than Sceptic (Plotinus, 5:156-157, note 1).
Although the sense in which he calls it "Platonic" is not clear, the argument will tum
out to be rather "un-Platonic" as soon as we compare it with the following remark
made by Socrates on Protagoras' identification of sense-perception and knowledge:
"But with regard to what the individual experiences at the moment--the
source of his sensations and the beliefs in accordance with them (i:o
mxpov EKcl01:~ na0oc;, €{ WV al ala0riaEic; Kat al Kai:a i:aui:a<; oo{at
yiyvovtm)--it is harder to assail the truth of these. Perhaps it is wrong to
say 'harder'; maybe they are unassailable, and those who assert that they
are transparently clear ( €vapyE'U;;) and are instances of knowledge may be
in the right, and Theaetetus was not beside the mark when he said that
perception and knowledge were the same thing" (Theaet. 179c2-dl, tr. F.
M. Cornford, adapted by A. Sumi).
Compare the first sentence with EV i:o'ic;; na0€0'lV EX€l 1:ftV OoKOUO'aV
un601:aatv (1,14-15). See also Comford's comment: "But within this narrower field
he [i.e. Plato] himself accepted the position (of Protagoras), and built it into his own
account for the nature of perception" (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 92). Plato's
lack of confidence in perception is not due to the relation of perceptive subject and
sensible object, but mainly due to the transiency of a sensible object (Phd. 79c2-8).
25Tue connection between the intellect-intelligible identity and the selfevidence of Intellect's knowledge is indicated by oui:ux; in 2,14.
Gurtler, following Bazan, observes that Plotinus in the first argument
attacks two Epicurean positions, the derivation of truth only from demonstration
(1,6-8) and the self-evidence of sense knowledge (1,12-19) (Plotinus: The Experience
of Unity, p. 167). This would be true. But we may notice that the argument is not
kept to the criticism of these positions. Plotinus' main target is a conception of the
intellect-intelligible relation that might compromise the self-evidence of intellectual
knowledge.
26Tue verb auvi:uyx6:vnv is not appropriate to the cognitive relation of
Intellect and its objects. In V 9 [5],7,17-18, we are told that Intellect does not grasp
its object by chance (ou ... Kai:a auv'!uxi.av ... €nE:J3aA.Ev).
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27In this argument, the exact meaning of O"\J~Euyv\Jvcxt is also open to
question. Plotinus himself describes the intellect-intelligible connection employing
this verb (III 8 [30],9,7; 9,11), by which their identity (9,5) is meant. The use of
O"\J~Euyv\Jvcxt reminds us of the yoke metaphor in the allegory of the sun (Rep.
508al).
28Tuis consequence is only implicit in this argument. The connection
between the knowing of images of objects and the possibility of being deceived
becomes explicit in the final argument.
29Jn this argument Plotinus seems to notice a problem implicit in Plato's
theory of Forms. The Platonic Form serves the role of standard by which ethical or
sensible characters are recognized (Euthy. 6e3-6; Phd. 74el-3). According to
Plotinus, however, for a judgment about particulars to be possible, ou:Xvo1.a must not
only react to the sense-data of a physical object but refer to the impressions (i:unot)
of the relevant Forms that she has received from Intellect (V 3 [49],2,7-11). These
impressions that the soul retains within herself are referred to as KCXVOVE<;; (3,8;
4,17). For the criteria, which discursive reason uses in its judgments, to arise within
the soul, first of all, and for those judgments to be possible, there must be Intellect
always possessing the Forms which those judgments concern (V 1 [10],11,1-7). This
suggests Plotinus' insight that the role of the Forms as the paradigmatic criteria is
not satisfactorily insured solely by their invariability, but necessarily calls for some
thinking agent that is always grasping them without any distortion. In other words,
we cannot avoid considering the cognitive relation of Intellect and Forms in order to
defend the role of Forms. In the Sophist, as already seen, the mode of the soul's
cognitive contact with the Forms is argued mainly in terms of the idealists' thesis of
the Forms' immutability. But Plotinus might suggest that the problem concerning
the relation of Intellect and its objects is inseparably related not only to the Forms'
immutability but to their role as the criteria of judgments about particulars.
30'fhe intelligible objects, without intellection and life, are neither
premises nor axioms nor expressions (1,38-39). Armstrong comments that here
"Plotinus is arguing against those who see the knowledge of Intellect in terms of
discursive logic" (Plotinus, 5: 158, note 1). In the present argument, however, it is not
pointed out that the placing of the intelligible objects outside Intellect entails that
intellection is discursive. As we shall see, this critical move appears in the next
argument. In the present argument, Plotinus is not "arguing" against those who
identify the intelligible objects as premises or axioms or expressions. He is simply
rejecting such a conception. The position against which he is precisely arguing is
nothing other than the view that the intelligible objects subsist outside Intellect.
Plotinus' own reply to the question, what the intelligible objects are, has
already been provided in III 8 [30],8. Insofar as Intellect's contemplation is "living
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contemplation (9€wpia ~@acx)" (8, 11 ), the intelligible object must "live in its own
right (cx\rto~wilv)" (8,13). On the presence of life in the intelligible objects, see also
III 6 (26],6,15; IV 7 [2],9,23-25; V 1 (10],4,7; V 4 [7],2,43-44; V 9 [5],10,10-12; VI 9
[9],2,24.
311..et us try to explicate Plotinus' argument further. The supposition that
the intelligible objects are lifeless would entail three formidable consequences.
First, on this supposition, intellection could not take place. In V 9 [5],5,410, as already seen, Plotinus gives an account of the intellect-intelligible identity by
invoking the thesis that the intellective subject is brought to activity by the
intelligible object. Then, to say that the intelligible objects are devoid of intellectual
life precisely implies the absence of €v€py€to: in them. If they possess no €v€pyE"to:,
they are not able to actualize the intellective subject, so that intellection does not
occur.
Second, on this supposition, self-intellection in its proper sense is
impossible, because self-intellection refers to the case where Intellect sees the self
that thinks, but not the self that does not think (6p@v o' E-mrrov ouK avorrrcxivovrcx,
cXA.AO: VOOUV't:CX op~ II 9 [33],1,49-50). When Intellect contemplates lifeless and
unthinking objects, it does not see them as contemplating but as merely
contemplated, not itself but another (V 3 [49],5,14-15).
Finally, on this supposition, the existence of the One is not necessary
beyond Intellect. Plotinus writes: "That is, also beyond Intellect; there is, then,
something beyond Intellect. For ( yO:p) being is not a dead thing, nor is it not life or
not thinking; Intellect and being are then (oil) the same thing (V 4 [7),2,42-44, tr. A.
H. Armstrong, adopted by A. Sumi). This passage is so significant as to tell that the
thesis that the intelligible objects are endowed with intellectual life points not only
to the intellect-intelligible identity but also to the existence of the One beyond
Intellect. As we shall see later, the intelligible objects are the pluralized images of
the One. If they are lifeless just like a corpse, such a question as, what is the cause
of the life and the activity of these objects, is meaningless. If the One is the cause of
lifeless entities, it will be called "the meanest of all realities" (Vita Plotini 17,23). But
the One is "the power responsible for thoughtful, intelligent life (<;.wT)c; ... €µ<j>povu;
KCXt VOEpac; cx'£-cto<; ouvcxµt<;)" (V 5 (32), 10, 12).
Let us here recall that "the friends of Forms" are compelled to admit the
introduction of some spiritual movement to i:o ncxvi:EA.@c;
in the Sophist. This
introduction, as already pointed out in note 69 in Chapter I, does not lead to the
representation of the Platonic Forms as living and thinking entities. Usually Plato
does not characterize the Ideas as living entities when he mentions them. Only in
the Timaeus does he speak of the world of Forms under the guise of the eternal
Living Being. Plotinus, however, adopts this latter characterization (see VI 6
[34],7,14-17). But we must notice that the description of the world of Forms as the
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eternal Living Being is viable in the Timaeus only because of the dialogue's
cosmological nature. So we may question why the Form, say, of the Equal is a
individual intelligible living being. To this extent, Plotinus seems to deviate from
Plato's usual representation of the Forms. His deviation, however, seems to be
philosophically unavoidable for the three aforementioned consequences to be
avoided. Plotinus is more than willing to diverge from Plato in order to safeguard
the satisfactory account for self-intellection and the point from which the
transcendent One is indicated. Again, he would perhaps envisage a similar case in
Plato's philosophy; for without (i) the possibility of intellection that at the same time
necessarily implies the knowability of the Forms, (ii) the Delphic command of selfknowledge, and (iii) the existence of the Idea of the Good as the cause of real
beings, Plato's philosophy would be almost coreless. But does Plotinus' conception
of the intelligible objects as living entities completely diverge from Plato's
conception of the Forms? Indeed, the Platonic Forms are not moving and thinking
entities. However, even if we are not allowed to refer to the Timaeus, is it really
impossible to conceive the Forms as living entities? Let us recall that immortality,
the hallmark of Greek deity, is ascribed to the Forms (see note 74 in Chapter I). It
is certainly not unreasonable to conclude from the Forms' immortality that they
have life. To this extent, we may say that Plato's usual position is that the Forms
live, though they neither move nor think. If so, "the friends of Forms" in the Sophist
could claim life or immortality as the criterion of being. But this possibility,
unfortunately, is not explored in that dialogue. In the Sophist, as already seen, Plato
is confronted with the problem how it is possible to integrate Forms, soul, and
intellect into the unified whole or i:o navi:EA.@<; ov. We can surely integrate them
into the unified whole in terms of the possession of life as the mark of being. The
philosophical merit of this is exactly present in Plotinus' conception of the
intelligible objects as living. In this respect, his position does not seem to be very far
from Plato's own conception of the Forms. Rather, the Plotinian thesis that the
intelligible objects have noetic life and thereby think will be a natural consequence
from the suggestion that the Platonic Forms are immortal and thereby live. In fact,
Plotinus' endeavor to read the intellect-intelligible identity in Plato's dialogues
precisely follows this reasoning. As mentioned in note 45 in Chapter II, Plotinus, in
III 9 [13],1,14-15, takes the all-inclusiveness of the Living Being mentioned in Tim.
30c7-8 as referring to the presence of the intelligible objects in Intellect. On
Plotinus' conception of the intelligible objects as living, hence, that each Form is an
individual living being means that it necessarily thinks and so has some intellective
agency in itself (VI 7 [38], 11,48; 12, 10). On the Timaeus' influence upon Plotinus'
doctrine, see M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 76: "Plotinus was no doubt
further influenced by what he read in the Timaeus where the napaonyµa is
described as a living being ... naturally 'associated with life and thought." On
Plotinus' association of immortality with life and awareness of the intelligible
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objects, see V 1 [10],4,6-12: ... KaKE'i n6:vra IBE-i:w vorii:ex Kai. nap' cxirt~ <Xi.Bux EV
olKEU;x O'\JVEO'El Kal ~wn ... n6:vra yap EV avi:~ i:O: a96:vcxi:a nEplEXEl [subiectum
Kp6voc;], vovv n6:vrcx, 9EOV n6:vrcx, "1uxf\v nacrav, €cri:@i:a aEi. This passage not
only clearly rejects the suggestion that the intelligible objects might be avatcr9rii:a
KCXl aµmpa ~wfy; KCXl vov (V 5 [32],1,32-33), but also seems to prepare Plotinus' own
answer to the problem concerning the criterion of being in the Sophist by indicating
that every Form, every Intellect, and every soul are immortal.
In VI 4 [22],10,28-30 and VI 9 [9],9,3-6, the immortality of Intellect, Being,
and soul is founded in the undiminished nature of the One's power. Thus we can
say that the problem which perplexed Plato in the Sophist, how it is possible to
integrate Form, intellect, and soul into a unified whole, is answered by Plotinus'
probable suggestion of immortality as the criterion of being; furthermore, the
immortality of Intellect, Being, and soul is insured by the incessant emanation from
the undiminished power of the One. The battle between idealists and materialists in
the Sophist precisely represents the conflict of two fundamental Weltanschauungen
in the Western philosophy. The basic position of the idealists, as already seen, is the
distinction between being and becoming. In order to defend this camp, however,
idealists are urged to present the criterion whereby all the entities that do not
belong to the realm of becoming can be consistently categorized into the realm of
being. The realm of being must not consist solely of the Ideas, but include all souls
and intellects to be 1:0 navt:EA@c;
rather than ovcricx. Hence the undiminished
power of the Plotinian One makes it possible to indicate the exact extent of the
realm of being, as distinguished from becoming, by ontologically insuring the
immortality of the members of that realm and thereby to defend the basic position
of idealists or Platonists. Here seems to be the real significance of Plotinus'
doctrine of the One's infinity in power, which is unmistakably based on the most
fundamental thesis of his philosophy, that is, the One's absolute simplicity (V 5
[32],10,20-11,5). See also L. Sweeney, "Infinity in Plotinus," Gregorianum 38
(1957):723, note 100.

ov

32Plotinus would partially admit the premise of the argument El o' cmA.a
... oiKalOV xwpic; Kal K<XA6v (1,41-42). This premise consists of two claims; (i) each
Form is distinct from the others and (ii) each Form is simple. If the word xwpic; had
no spatial implication, Plotinus would not be reluctant to accept (i). As seen in note
12, he subscribes to the distinctness of the contents of Intellect. I cannot see how
Alfino can regard the passage in 1,46-49 as confirming that "Plotinus does not
believe that Intellect apprehends discrete forms" (Ancient Philosophy 8 (1988):278).
In the present argument, however, it is seen from Ka-ca i:ivac; ... i:6nouc; in 1,44 that
xwpic; is taken spatially.
Plotinus would not accept (ii) since the Form, even individually, is not one
(VI 9 [9],2,27-28). The conception of the Form as simple may certainly be based not
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only on the discreteness of each Form but on its total isolation from the others, so
that a given Form cannot imply any other Form. Thus the conception of the Forms
as simple, discrete, and totally unrelated implies that they do not constitute the
unified whole and are not situated in a unity (V 5 [32],1,42-43). In turn, for the
Forms to be mutually connected and thereby to imply one another, they should be
situated in one intelligible matter that has the primordial force of contemplation.
Although Plotinus does not explicitly describe it, intelligible matter may naturally be
considered to have the role of supporting the togetherness and intercommunication
of the intelligible objects. This suggested conception of intelligible matter is
somehow similar to Whitehead's interpretation of the Platonic Receptacle as the
matrix of intercommunication of actual occasions.
33See also the following passage:
"... because Intellect is within, which is the actual primary realities, and
always keeps company with itself and exists in actuality and does not seek
to apprehend its objects as if it did not have them or was trying to obtain
them, or was going through them discursively as if they were not ready to
hand before any discursive process (fi OtE~oOEUwvou npoKEXEtptaµ€vcx)-these are experiences (na0fl) of soul--but it stands firm in itself, being all
things together ... " (V 9 [5],7,8-12, tr. A.H. Armstrong).
Here discursive reasoning is contrasted with the presence and
togetherness of the intelligible objects in Intellect and Intellect's being in actuality.
On the denial of 0t€~00o<; to Intellect, see IV 4 [28],1,15; V 8 [31],6,7; VI 2
[43],21,28. Compare also oµou navrcx in V 9 [5],7,11-12 with a0po6v in V 8 [31],
6,9. In VI 7 [38],13,47-48, however, 0t€~00o<; is associated with Intellect's
movement. On the uniqueness of this chapter, see note 13.
Thomas Aquinas differentiates two senses of discursivity of thinking; (i)
involving reasoning from premises to conclusions and (ii) involving transition from
one object to another (Summa Theologiae la,14,7). The present argument and V 9
[5],7,8-12 definitely deny discursive thinking to Intellect in the second sense.
Discursive thinking in the first sense is denied to Intellect in V 5 [32],1,38-39. Alfino
explains the denial of discursivity in the second sense in terms of Plotinus' anxieties
over language:
"The whole point of investigating Intellect was to find something which
guaranteed the reference of images in the discursive reasoning of the soul.
Language and discursive reasoning give the appearance that limitation is
ontologically basic, but language cannot guarantee the reference of its
own terms. The limitation of concepts cannot be ontically prior to their
intelligibility because then the model for Intellect will collapse into the
model for sense-perception. The solution therefore, is to place the
intelligible inside Intellect and to exclude any form of linguistic or logical
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discursivity from Intellect" (Ancient Philosophy 8 (1988):278).
This elucidation sounds somewhat modern. First of all, Plotinus' point of
investigating Intellect in the present context is not to insure the reference of images
in the soul's discursive reasoning. Indeed Plotinus elsewhere calls for the intellectintelligible identity to guarantee the possibility of the soul's reasoning (V 1 [10],11,17). In V 5 [32],1, however, he seems to deal almost exclusively with the defense of
the infallibility of Intellect. He here mentions only one limit of language, the point
that language refers to something else (1,39). Hence the reason is more simple why
he dismisses the conception of intellectual knowledge in terms of discursive logic.
Premises, axioms, and expressions only refer to other things and are not the real
beings themselves (1,39-40). On the contrary, truth says nothing other than itself
(2,18-20). Again, if Intellect believes µt1 i;6: ovi;cx, it is deceived (1,1-2). For
Intellect to be infallible and always to attain truth, therefore, i;a ovi;a themselves,
rather than language as OUK au"ta "ta OV"ta (1,40), must be inside Intellect. The
above consideration, of course, reveals Plotinus' departure from Plato who regards
A.6ycx; as the instrument of voUc;; (see note 36 in Chapter I).
34Tue passage in lines 46-49 is difficult, since the subject of €~Et in line 46
is not clear enough. Beutler and Theiler suggest a dispersed intelligible object (i;o
voni;ov . .. OtEanaaµ€vov €Kacri;ov, line 43) as the subject (Plotins Schriften,
3b:403). This reading has a weakness in involving the subject shift from 6 vovc; (line
45) which is the subject of µEVEt in line 46. In 2,1-2, we read ou i;otvuv OEt ... OU"CE
i;\mouc:;; €v i;~ v~ i;@v ovi;wv A.€yEtv Elvat. Here i;otvuv marks the summarizing of
the arguments in the preceding chapter. Therefore we may take 6 vovc; as the
subject of €~Et. If this reading is adopted, how can we explain the force of oAw<; in
line 46? The adverb seems to refer to the presupposition of the claim of the
separateness and simplicity of each intelligible object, that those objects are external
to Intellect. In lines 46-49, Plotinus reiterates the point already made in lines 24-27:
EnEL"ta Kat al voflcrEt<; i;\mot €crovi;m ... n@<; 0€ Kat i;um.l>crE"tat, ft i;l<; i;wv
"COlOU"CWOV fl µop~n; Kat fl VOflO"l<; "COV E~W wcrnEp fl afo0ncrt<;. If Intellect knows its
objects dispersed outside itself, intellection will be simply impression, so that
someone will ask whether the shape of that impression differs from the object itself.
In this case, again, intellection will be just like sense-perception. In lines 24-27
Plotinus does not deal with the i;unoc; or µop~n the intelligible object has. Also in
terms of the connection between lines 46-49 and 24-27, the reading of line 46
suggested by Beutler and Theiler is disadvantageous.
35Jn this argument, according to Armstrong, Plotinus "seems to have in
mind particularly a very literal interpretation of the vision of the Forms in his
favorite Phaedrus myth (Plotinus, 5:159, note 2). This observation is so suggestive as
to make us notice that nEpt0€wv in line 45 might reflect the nEpt6:yEtv of the
heavenly nEpt~p6: (Phdr. 247cl, d4-5, 248a3-4) and its nEpioO<><;; (247d5). Plotinus'
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own visionary description of Intellect's movement or "odyssey" in VI 7 [38], 13 is also
inspired by the Phaedms myth (see note 13). Here, however, Intellect is said to
travel within itself (EV cn'n:&J) (line 30), so that it is itself ubiquitous and its travel is
remaining (µ€vovcrcxv) (lines 33-34).
According to Plotinus' own exegesis, the Phaedms myth rather implicitly
suggests the intellect-intelligible identity. He writes: "... but about the knowledge
there--which Plato observed and said "that which is a knowledge different from that
in which it is (ova' fli:u; EO"ttV &u.Tlv EV~)," but how this is so, he left us to
investigate and discover" (V 8 [31],4,52-54, tr. A.H. Armstrong). It is clear that
ova' fli:u; Ecri:lv lXU.flV EV ~ is the paraphrase of ETttO"tiiµflV ... ova' fl EO"tlV
nov Ei:€pcx EV E1:Ep&l oucrcx tiiv tiµE'i<;; vDv ovi:wv KcxAouµEv (Phdr. 247d7-el). We
must notice that €i:€pcx EV E'tEp&l (d7-el) explains TI y€vEcru; np6crEcr'ttv (d7) and is
contrasted with EV i:&J EO"ttV ov (el-2) which characterizes Knowledge itself.
(Hackforth's translation of d7-el "knowledge that ... varies with the various objects"
overlooks the first EV in el.) Whereas there is some confrontation and
heterogeneity between sense knowledge and becoming, Knowledge itself, which is
itself ovi:wc; ( e2), is totally harmonious with real Being. Within the context of this
myth, we can read in the phrase EV i:&> Ecrnv ov at most the homogeneity and
concord between Knowledge itself and real Being, but not the presence of the Ideas
in Knowledge itself; for true Knowledge is simply about (nEpi) real Being (c6-8).
Plotinus further reads the unity of Knowledge or Wisdom and real Being (4,47-48;
5,15-16) into the phrase ova' ... €i:€pcx EV E'tEp&J. In 4,3-4, moreover, he contrasts
EmO"trlµflV, oux TI YEVEO'l.C; np6cr€0'1:lV ( d7) with op@at i:O: mxvi:cx ... olc;; ouaicx, KCXL
€cxvi:ovc; EV &u.ou;. Here he takes ova' ... €i:€pcx EV €i:Ep&l or ova' ... CiU.flV EV
~as €cxvi:o\Jc; EV &u.ou;.
In addition, Plotinus, after the vital description of Intellect's life in VI 7
[38],13, definitely denies the dispersedness of the intelligible objects by alluding to
the Empedoclean ~!Aux (14,18-22), with which he seems to ally implicitly the
Anaxagorean oµou navi:cx. On Plotinus' interpretation of the Empedoclean ~!Aux as
the unifying principle of the intelligible world, see III 2 [47],2,1-4 and V 1 [10],9,6
(also Aristotle, Met. 1001a12-15).

o

o

36Needless to say, Plotinus here follows the line of Plato's endeavor, in the
Sophist, to account for the possibility of deception by the notion of image and
further by negativity and otherness. As already seen, however, Plotinus himself
admits otherness within the self-thinking Intellect as the principle of distinction
which separates Intellect from its object. The reason why the Plotinian Intellect is
not fallible is due to the fact that the sameness of Intellect and its object
complements their otherness. Hence we may render, in terms of the scheme of the
Platonic genera, Plotinus' thesis of the intellect-intelligible identity as the position
which claims the mutual complementarity of sameness and otherness, while its
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antithesis criticized in the present chapter can be characterized as the position
which entertains solely the otherness of Intellect and its object. In fact otherness
seems to be a two-edged sword for Plotinus; it not only explains the possibility of
falsehood but awakens Intellect to life and activity. When he speaks of the
otherness of Intellect and its object, Plotinus needs to couple it with the sameness
that insures truth for Intellect, in order to prevent it from having the former
explanatory role.
37Tuis argument is prefigured in III 9 [13],1,6-9. So Plotinus seems to
consider this argument to provide the strongest reason against the doctrine of
duplicating or triplicating Intellect as mentioned in III 9 [13],1, II 9 [33],1,25ff. and
6,16-24. On the detail of this doctrine, see note 21.
38Plotinus moreover ascribes Intellect's honor and majesty (i:o i:iµtov Kcxl
aEµvov, 2,13) to its possession of all the intelligible objects. In this respect he

follows Aristotle's association of honor and majesty with the actuality of divine
intellect (Met. 1074b17-21; see also P. Hadot, Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 114-115).
On Intellect's being i:iµto<;, see V 6 [24),5,5-6 and VI 7 [38),29,26-27. On its being
aEµv&;, see III 8 [30),9,15-16, III 9 [13),9,10-12, V 3 [49),13,2-4, VI 7 [38),13,10-12,
and 35,27.
39See also III 9 [13),6,1-3.
40In II 9 [33),1,29-30, the perpetuity of Intellect's activity is briefly
mentioned (O:El wacxui:wc; EVEpyE((;x KEiµEv<><; €ai:wo-n). We will understand what
the paradoxical expression "static activity" means as soon as we look at the following
· passage: "But peace and quiet (i)auxl.cx) for Intellect is not going out (€Kai:cxau:;) of
Intellect, but the peace and quiet of Intellect is an activity taking its rest from all
other activities (axoA.fiv ayouacx O:no 'tWV CXAAWV €v€pyEtcx)" (V 3 [49),7,13-15, tr. A.
H. Armstrong). Such activity is surely self-intellection. Plotinus continues: "The
Being of Intellect, therefore, is activity, and there is nothing to which the activity is
directed; so it is self-directed (npOc; cxui:4>). Thinking itself, it is thus with itself and
holds its activity directed to itself (El<; €cxui:ov)" (7,18-20, tr. A.H. Armstrong). Thus
the "static activity" of Intellect in II 9 [33), 1,30 turns out to indicate self-intellection
which is not "ecstatic" but self-reversive (see also V 3 [49),6,5 €mai:p€cf>wv El<;
cxui:6v). O'Daly views this complete interiority as the guarantee of the characteristic
stability of Intellect (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, p. 108, note 63). As Beutler and
Theiler, following Millier, comment (Plotins Schriften, 5b:378), of course, this
stability is not quiescence without intellection but energetic activity. On the "static
activity" of Intellect, see also III 9 [13),6,~ v6T)atc;; o'lov f1auxoc;; and VI 9 [9),5,14-15
ilauxov KCXt O:i:pEµT1 KlVT)OtV.
The description of self-intellection as the static activity reminds us of
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God's activity of immobility in Aristotle (see note 41 in Chapter II). If we are
justified in applying the Parmenidian passage (V 1 [10],8,18-20) to Plotinus' own
system, the immobility of real being, though incompatible with physical motion,
accords with TO VOElV. Hence the contents of Intellect are described as the
tipEµovvta €v €vl v~ (V 9 [5],9,1-2). This description might suggest Plotinus'
possible exegesis of the Sophist that the characterization of the Idea or oucria as To
tipEµovv (248e4) would not be compromised by vo\X; which To navtEA@<; ov must
possess (249a4).
41Armstrong views that Plotinus in this chapter seems to assume without
discussion the identity of the Aristotelian VOTJ'tOV with the Platonic VOTJ'tcX and that
this identity further suggests the identification of the self which Intellect thinks with
the Platonic Forms (Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 408-409). This identification is surely
related to Plotinus' conception of the true self of the human person as np61:Epov
Ticr0a nfo;; (VI 5 [23],12,19). Needless to say, the identification of oneself and all
Being does not show the influence of oriental thought upon Plotinus, but is to some
extent prefigured by Plato in his description of the philosopher-king's endeavor to
assimilate himself to the ordered world of Forms. See Rep. 500c4-5 KOO'~ OE
n6:vta Kal Ka'ta A.6yov EXOV'ta, 'taVTa µtµE1cr0at 't€ Kal
µO:Atcr'ta a~µmovcr0at.
Campbell, in The Theaetetus of Plato, a Revised Text and English Notes (Oxford:
The University Press, 1861; reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1973), p. 112,
compares this passage with $vyil OE 6µoiwau; 0€~ Ka'ta 'tO ovva-r6v in Theaet.
176bl-2.

on

42Tue word aVOTJ'tOV in line 33 may be taken in its active sense just as is in
III 8 [30],9,14-15, V 5 [32],1,37, V 9 [5],5,8, and VI 7 [38],9,26-28.
43Tue similar argument is also developed in VI 7 [38),9,24-29, where
Plotinus explicitly mentions the necessity of the conception of the intelligible object
as thinking and living for self-knowledge to be possible.
O'Daly observes that V 3 [49],5 provides us with a proof of the thesis that
the object of intellection is knowing, the thesis that Plotinus does not seek to prove
in II 9 [33],1 (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, p. 76).
44As the intellective subject is designated Ti oucria vov in V 9 [5],5,7-8, -ro
OUO'tWOE<; aV'tOV (sc. vov) in lines 40-41 refers to the intellective subject. The
expression Ti oucria vov recurs in line 41.
45Q'Daly's remark would be right that "the key to the argument lies in the
linking concepts of €v€pyELCX and v6ricru;" (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, p. 77; see
also G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 279).
Someone might notice that the argument for the self-knowledge of
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Intellect begins with the premise of the intellection-intelligible identity (5,31-32),
while his preceding argument results in the intellect-intelligible identity (5,26-28).
The present argument rather seems to take over the identity, of contemplative
activity and its object, concluded in 5,21-22.
46In this argument, Plotinus presupposes such a conceptual link between
sameness and being-oneself that "If A is the same as B, then B is A itself." This link
seems to be indebted to Plato's conception that sameness as one of five genera is
always that with reference to itself (npOc; €cxu-rrw) (Soph. 256al2-bl; see also
254d15). It would also suggest the connection between sameness as representing
unity among the intelligible objects (see note 11) and the conception of the true self
of the human person as the intelligible whole (see note 41).
47Bussanich specifies three reasons why Plotinus considers the intellectintelligible unity to be necessary in V 3 [49],5 (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in
Plotinus, pp. 91-92). First, the identity can overcome the duality and imprecision of
sensation, imagination, and discursive reasoning. Second, it is necessary for true
thought to be self-intellection. Third, it is required by complete intellectual
actuality.

48J. Pepin, Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger 146 (1956):4849.
49Plotinus rather seems to use the passages from Plato's dialogues in
support of his own doctrine. We may here identify the passages where Plotinus
believes that Plato, explicitly or implicitly, mentions the intellect-intelligible identity.
They are Tim. 30c7-8 (see Chapter II) and Phdr. 247d7-e2 (see note 35).
50See also note 63 in Chapter I.
51See note 29.
52Q'Daly comments on V 1 [10],11,1-7 as follows: "... we might say ... a
faculty (i.e. of reasoning) [is] based ... no less on the Theory of Forms than on the
unicity of soul which is potentially all things" (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, p. 42).
We may here notice the unique nature of the treatise V 1 [10]. This
treatise has the character of the E~T)yri-rii<; (8, 12) of Plato's philosophy, while each of
other treatises is simply called the A.6yoc; (II 3 [52], 1,4; III 1 [3], 10, 1; IV 4 [28],23,48)
or the npo:yµo:-rda (VI 3 [44],1,26). As Atkinson writes, the role of exegete is "to
recover the hidden meaning from Plato's philosophy" (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 191).
But this "hidden meaning" could not be exhausted by Plotinus' attempt, in the eighth
chapter, to show the doctrine of three hypostases to have already been entertained
by Plato. As mentioned in note 31, V 1 [10],4,6-12 can be viewed as Plotinus' own
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reply to the problem with which Plato was confronted in the Sophist, what the
criterion of being is whereby we can integrate Forms, intellect, and souls into the
unified whole. Again, 11, 1-7 mentions the principal force of the theory of Forms
that the existence of the immutable Forms and their knowability, insured by their
always being possessed by Intellect, make possible a judgment about particulars and
subsequent discourse. As a matter of fact, these problems are not explicitly and
sufficiently worked out in Plato's dialogues. Insofar as Plotinus' metaphysical
scheme accords with Plato's own, he must deal with the problems, which Plato has
left unsolved, concerning the fundamental principles of the theory of Forms. Thus
seen, Plotinus' "exegesis" of Plato's philosophy would be not only to disclose the
meaning of Plato's doctrine, expressed in riddles, but to solve the problems left
unsolved in his dialogues in a purely philosophical manner. Of course, the objection
could be made that it is not fully clear whether or not i:ouc:; ... A.6youc:; in 8, 12 refers
to 4,6-12 and 11,1-7. But it is certain at least that 8,12 refers to 8,8-9 noUcxxou 5€
i:o ov Kcxt i:ov vouv i:ilv IB€cxv A.€yEi:m [subiectum 1TA.ai:wv]. While Plotinus
believes that the identity of Intellect and the Forms is implicit in Plato's dialogues,
the identity must be taken as his solution to the problem which has arisen in Plato's
works, more specifically, the Republic and the Sophist.
530n Plato's rejection, see note 66 in Chapter I.
54See also III 8 [30],9, 15-16. The present passage is the opposite to
Plotinus' ascription of honor and majesty to Intellect (see note 38). But Hadot views
the present passage as simply indicating Plotinus' transformation of Aristotle's
association of majesty with complete intellectual activity in Met. 1074b 17-21 but not
his rejection of Aristotle's formula (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 115).
The present passage suggests that Plotinus might understand i:o ncxvi:EA.@c:;
ov of the Sophist as oucricx VOOUO"CX. This interpretation would have a definite
bearing on his conception of the intelligible objects as living and thinking entities
(see note 30).

n

55p. Hadot, Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 108-120. Hadot moreover points out
two possible sources to which Plotinus referred in interpreting Soph. 248e6-249a2.
One is Metaphysics A where Aristotle describes intellectual activity of the prime
mover as the (.w'll apicri:n (1072b28) and associates majesty with it (1074b18) (ibid.,
pp. 112-115). This reference, according to Hadot, has led Plotinus to the
identification of divine vouc:; of the Metaphysics and 1:0 TtCXV1:€A@c:; ov of the Sophist
(ibid., p. 115). Another is Tim. 39e where the world of Forms is described as i:o
(,~v, which Plotinus has closely assimilated to the (,wf) of the Sophist (ibid., pp. 117119). On Plotinus' indebtedness to the Sophist and the Timaeus, see also M.
Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.l, pp. 76-77; J. N. Deck, Nature, Contemplation, and
the One, p. 27, note 7; R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London: Duckworth, 1972), p. 55.
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56See V 1 [10],4,36-37; V 6 [24],5,8-9; VI 1 [42],18,21-22; VI 2 [43],8,11-12;
VI 6 [34],6,30-33; VI 7 [38],13,40-41; 35,2-3.
57See III 8 [30],8,17-21 and VI 2 [43],8,8-9. On the identification of
intellectual life and noetic movement, see III 7 [45],3,9-10 and VI 2 [43],7,5.
58See note 30.
59See Puech's remark: "... le navtEA@<; ov de Plotin, c'est evidemment
... le 1tAilpwµa" (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 150).
60See also V 3 [49),16,28-30, V 9 [5],10,10-12, and VI 9 [9],2,24.
61See note 38.
There remains a problem. Does Plotinus call the noetic world i:o
navtEA@<; ov? He rather describes it as the ~~v nav-rEAE<; referring to Tim. 31bl
(VI 2 [43],21,57; 22,2; VI 6 [34],7,16; 15,8-9; 17,39; VI 7 [38],8,31; 12,3; 36,12),
because this phrase can at the same time express the presence of life in and the allinclusiveness of the intelligible world. If any, 1:0 OAOV ov nav-ra EV a\Ji:&> €xov,
which is said to possess life and intellect in itself (VI 9 [9],2,22-24 ), would be most
proximate to i:o navi:EA@<; ov. Another informative passage is VI 7 [38],36,12,
where the ~~v naV"tEAE<; is juxtaposed with oucria and VOV<;. This juxtaposition
tells us Plotinus' conception that oucria does not consist solely of the Platonic Forms,
but must include life and intellection in itself. In other words, the oucria must
always be the oucria voovcra (see note 54 ). The above consideration thus shows the
fact that Plotinus understood the implication of the move from the oucria of "the
friends of Forms" to i:o navi:EA.W<;; ov of the Stranger, though he did not use the
latter expression.
62Armstrong translates €va A.6yov in line 30 "a single definition." But
A.6ycx;; here would mean a rational formative principle. See Lexicon Plotinianum,
ed. J. H. Sleeman and G. Pollet (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980), p. 606. In this passage
the phrase Ka-rex i:aui:ex Kat ci.>craui:W<; represents the static phase of being, while €va
A.6yov the kinetic phase. On being as the single A.6ya<;, see also VI 2 [43],21,29-30
and VI 4 [22],11,16.
63The immutability of being is established in the outset of the treatise with
the sharp distinction between being and becoming. It is formulated as µr,0€no-rE
4'EooEcr8at i:f\v i:ov ov-ro<; ~uatv (1,29-30).
64See Volkmann-Schluck's remark on the present passage: "... so
bedeutet die Bewegung nicht die Aufhebung der Unveranderlichkeit, sondern
gerade das Verharren in der Gegenwartigkeit des Da-seins, Bleiben in dem Vollzug
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der Selbstverwirklichung" (Plotin als Interpret der Ontologie Platos, p. 109). Put into
Plotinus' own words, movement is rendered ~wi,v µevovaav Kat v6'rlatv ...
EVEpyovaav ... EU; 1:0 TlOfl, µfiUov OE "ilBTl KCXt aEt Tl0f1 KCXt 1:0 ncxpov aEi (8,9-10).
11

,

65Jn the intelligible world, rest cannot be regarded as the privation or
abolition of movement (VI 3 [44],27,28-29). Hence we can say that when movement
exists rest also exists.
Volkmann-Schluck elucidates the compatibility between rest and
movement, which is alleged to have been intended by Plato and to be systematically
interpreted by Plotinus, as follows:
"Plotin weiB, daB die 'Ideenlehre' in der Tat Veranlassung geben kann,
den Charakter der bleibenden Standigkeit einseitig in der Vordergrund zu
riicken. Aber nach Plotin wird Platos wahre Absicht dadurch verfehlt.
Keinesfalls darf die selbstverstandliche Verbindung der Idee des Seins mit
der Standigkeit des gleichbleibenden Anblicks zu ihrer Identifizierung
fiihren. Die Bewegung als die Selbstverwirklichung des Seienden hat
ebenso sehr Anspruch auf eine Gleichsetzung mit dem Sein" (Plotin als
Interpret der Ontologie Platos, p. 109).
But what Volkmann-Schluck means by "Plato's true intention" is not clear
enough from the above quotation. According to him, "Plato's true intention" is the
clarification of the presence of the mutually constitutive moments in rest and
movement as follows:
"Die Standigkeit bezeichnet primar nicht den Grundcharakter des
Gleichbleibens des im Logos faBbaren Gehaltes, sondern das Bleiben im
Denken seiner selbst als eines Bleibenden. Die Standigkeit wird eine
Form der Bewegtheit: die erfiillte Bewegtheit des Geistes" (ibid., pp. 111112).
Volkmann-Schluck's view is not cogent enough, despite his grasping of the
link between rest and self-intellection. First, in the Sophist, rest embodies constancy
and immutability in general (249bll-cl). Also in the position of "the friends of
Forms," the Form's being i:o iipEµoDv (248e4) precisely means its unchangeability
(248a12). Even if we are allowed to say that Plato simply associates immutability or
rest with the Idea but does not claim their identity, we cannot say that he can either
associate or identify movement with the Idea. As already seen in note 69 in Chapter
I, the introduction of spiritual movement into 'to ncxV'tEA@c; ov does not lead to the
conception of the Form as moving. Second, of course, the notion of rest as
movedness of intellect is found neither in Plato nor in Plotinus. This conception of
rest as movedness is based on the alleged unity of rest and movement, which
Volkmann-Schluck views as already implied in Soph. 256b6-7. But this
interpretation is not careful enough, because Heindorfs suspicion of a lacuna after
256b7 is accepted by many critics. Heindorf, in filling the lacuna, remarks that
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movement does not participate in rest (vDv 0€ ou µE'tMcxµ/3avn). Indeed several
critics explore a sense in which movement partakes of rest. But such an
interpretation, as Cornford points out (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 287, note 3),
is excluded by Plato's earlier rejection of the connectability between movement and
rest in 252d6-10 and 254d7-8. Volkmann-Schluck speaks of the "unity" of movement
and rest in so a rigid sense as to enable him to say that "die Standigkeit der Idee ...
wieder ist die Bewegung der ldee" (Plotin als Interpret der Ontologie Platas, p. 116).
Now he conceives rest as movedness. On Volkmann-Schluck's view, hence, we are
allowed to say that the rest of the Idea is the movedness of the Idea. The alleged
movedness of the Form, however, is obviously incompatible with the phrase
cXKlVT'l'tOV €a't0<; dvm (249a2) which the Stranger renders by 'tO tipEµouv of "the
friends of Forms." I cannot see how Volkmann-Schluck can defend from this
incompatibility his claim that the notion of rest as movedness is "Plato's true
intention" that Plotinus retrieved.
66See note 40.
670n this coherence, see also VI 6 [34],19,32-33 cXKlVT'l'tOV Elc;; µE'tcx/3oA.rw
... 'tTlV ~wiiv.
68Armstrong translates lines 25-26 ou yap Elc;; cxu'to 'tO voouµEvov, cXUO:
nEpl cxu'tou as follows: "it [i.e. thought] does not operate in the object of thought
itself, but is about it." But cxu'tou in line 27 must be taken as the reflexive, because
nEpl cxu'tou here is contrasted with nEpl &U.ov, in line 24-25, which implies the
aforementioned category of relation.
69In 21,9-10, 'tO VOELV, being juxtaposed with 'tO oo~a~ElV, is regarded as
the €v€pyEtcx which comes from oneself but is not directed to another.
70See also VI 1 [42],18,5-8, 22,3, and 22,21.
71See note 71 in Chapter I.
720n the comparison of Vof1m.c; to o~tc;, see III 8 [30],11,1-2, V 1 [10],5,18,
V 3 [49],11,10, and V 4 [7],2,6.
73We must distinguish the thesis that intellection or noetic activity must
not be taken in terms of action and passion from the thesis that there are action and
passion in some sense in the intelligible world. Plotinus admits that notfpEtc; 'tE Kcxl
nEiaEtc; cxl KCX'ta $\Jatv are present in the noetic realm (V 9 [5],10,7-8). In other
places, he hesitates to hold such a view:
"But 'acting' and 'being affected' are in movement--if being affected is
really in the intelligible world at all (El apex EK Et 'to mxaxnv )" (VI 2
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[43],16,10-11, tr. A.H. Armstrong).
"... and it is disputed whether there is passive affection in the intelligible
and if it is there (K<Xt 1:0 naaxEtV El EKEl 6:µ~talJf11:Eli:<Xt, K<Xt El KCxKEt),
passivity there is something different [from passivity in the sensible]" (VI 3
[44],5,6-7, tr. A.H. Armstrong, adopted by A. Sumi).
We must pay attention to the context of each of these passages. In V 9 [5],
Plotinus stresses that everything which exists in the world of sense, insofar as it is not
contrary to nature, exists in the intelligible world. He examines in VI 2 [43],16
whether action and passion can constitute the genera of being and explores in VI 3
[44 ],5 the analogy of being between the intelligible and the sensible. Hence these
passages by no means disclaim that intellection is free from action and passion. But
there remains a problem. The above considered passages show the slightly
unsettled attitude of Plotinus towards the presence of action and passion in the
intelligible realm. The discrepancy between his affirmative attitude in V 9 [5] and
his hesitation in VI 2-3 [43-44] seems to be mainly due to the difference of his
conception of relation in those treatises. In V 9 [5], on the one hand, Plotinus places
axE:aEu; in the intelligible world (10,7). In VI 2 [43], on the other, relation is
regarded as something like a sideshoot (ncxpa~vcrot €otKOc;;) attached to being (16,1).
Insofar as they always remain relational, action and passion are not in the
intelligible world and, even if they are there, still remain incidental to the noetic
being. To this extent, Plotinus seems to be dubious about the presence of passive
affection in the intelligible world in VI 3 [44],5,6. Again, the force of &pa in VI 2
[43],16,10 would be explicated such that although action and affection, insofar as
they always involve relation, are at most incidental to real being, even if they are
alleged to exist properly in the intelligible world, they will be subsumed under
movement. As already seen, moreover, notflau; is considered to be incidental to
€v€pyEta in VI 1 [42],22,29. But Plotinus' unsettled attitude would not be
exhausted by the difference in his conception of relation. In VI 3 [44] Plotinus
maintains that what is said about that which is called oval.a here below can be
analogously applied to the intelligible entity (5,1-3); action and passion occur
around that which is called oval.a in the sensible realm (4,36-37). If the analogy of
being holds, there will be in the intelligible world a type of passive affection that
differs from that in the world of sense (5,6-7). From the above consideration, we
can say at most that Plotinus in VI 2-3 [43-44] is somehow reluctant to accept his
earlier uncritical position in V 9 [5], 10. If the notion of relation and the analogy of
being must cohere, his position in later treatises will be that action and passion of
some sort exist in real being but remain incidental to it.
Considered in another context, however, the suggested incidentality of the
action-passion relation seems to have grave significance. In a word, without this
relation, the causal dependence of the sensible world on real being is no longer
explained. (By real being is meant Intellect and soul collectively in the subsequent
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discussion.) Plotinus often gives an account of the production of lower entities by
higher ones by means of the double activity theory; the internal activity constitutes
the ouaia of the higher entity, and the external activity which derives from that
entity entails the lower entity by becoming its internal activity. The external activity,
precisely as the one directed towards something else, unavoidably involves the
external relation to the generated entity (II 9 [33],8,23 -ri]v [sc. €v€pyEuxv] EU; &u.o;
IV 3 [27],10,31-32 -ro OE€~ c:xU-rrt<; El<; &u.o; V 1 [10],3,12 -ri]v OE CXAAflV
U<j>t<Tto:µ€Vf1v; V 3 [49],7,22 Eho: Ko:l EU; &u.o; V 4 [7],1,28 €-rEpov nmo\Jv). As seen
in V 4 [7],1,28, the external activity of real being is characterized as notEtV (see also
IV 3 [27], 10,29-30 -ri]v ouvo:µtv El<; "[Q notEtV; IV 8 [6],6, 8 "tO µE"t' cxU"ttlV notEtV; v
3 [49],7,24-25 'ixvoc; o:\rco\J ouVf19f1vo:t nmf1ao:t €v CXAA4>). In speaking of the
omnipresence of real being in the physical world, Plotinus maintains that the
external activity remains incidental to real being itself:
"There is nothing, therefore, surprising in its being in all things in this way,
because it is also in nature of them in such a way as to belong to them.
For this reason it is not perhaps inappropriate to say that the soul as well
runs along incidentally (Kma auµ/3E/3T1Kb<;) with the body in this way, if
she is said to be herself on her own (o:ui:i] ... €~' E:o:u-rrt<; ... Elvo:t), not
belonging to matter or body, but all body throughout the whole of itself is
in a way illuminated by her" (VI 4 [22],3,17-23, tr. A.H. Armstrong,
adapted by A. Sumi).
Here the soul's remaining in herself is contrasted with the incidental
exercise of her power towards matter and body. The production and sustenance of
the sensible world by the external activity of real being is of necessity as well as
incidental (II 9 [33],3,7-12; 8,20-21; IV 8 [6],6,1-18; V 1 [10],7,37-38; V 4 [7],1,37-39;
2,27-30). In this respect Plotinus seems to be indebted to Aristotle's notion of Ko:9'
o:u-ro auµl3E/3T1K6<;; with which eternity and necessity are associated (Met. 1025a3034). Because of the incidentality of the external activity, which involves the actionpassion relation, to real being itself, the following remark by Rist on the necessity of
the procession from the One would be applicable also to the case of real being: "
the necessity that the possibilities will be realized is not an extrinsic necessity
bringing pressure on the One" (Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 75). In sum, this incidentality, being
congruent with the double activity theory, illuminates the causal dependency of the
phenomenal world on real being.
74See note 48.
75See also note 48 in Chapter II of Part I.
76With Armstrong, the MSS o:frro is read for Harder's i:o:ui:o in line 13.
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77Warren, following Chaignet, elucidates the intimate connotation of the
term cruvo:icr0ricnc; as follows: "Sunaisthesis, however, is a relation of part to whole,
whole to part, and part to part. One might say that the particular "sunaisthetizing"
agent is a kind of unity that is consciousness or awareness always of that unity itself'
(Phronesis 9 (1964):90). The term in the present occurrence rather denotes the
identity, not relation, of indivisible whole with indivisible whole.
78G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, pp. 79-80.
79See also note 3.
80See note 41.
81See note 3.
82See A.H. Armstrong, Plotinus, 5:118, note 1; and G. M. Gurtler,
Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 90, note 15.
83Qn Intellect's self-reversion, see also VI 8 [39],6,33-34 and VI 9 [9],2,35.
Schwyzer observes that the cruvo:icr0ricrtc; in V 8 [31], 11,23 implies the deepest
internalization (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 376). (On the inaccuracy of his
interpretation of this passage, see note 95.) This implication of the word would
rather be seen more prominently in the present passage.
84See G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 80.
85See E.W. Warren, Phronesis 9 (1964):91.
86See also V 3 [49],10,42-44 illO: 8i(tc; Kat otov E:no:~T, µ6vov apprii:a<; Ko:l
npovooucro: ounw vo\J yEyovfrra<; KO:t 1:0U 8tyy6:vovi:a<; OU VOOUV1:Q<;.
Compare Plotinus' tactile metaphor with Aristotle's (see note 22 in Chapter II of
Part I).
CxVOT)1:0<;"

87As Gurtler points out (Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 75), 0€ in line
19, answering µ€v in line 15, marks the present passage to concern the fully
actualized Intellect, whereas the passage in lines 15-19 deals with the transition from
the inchoate Intellect to the fully formed one, from KiVT)crtc; µ6vov to KiVT)crtc;
oto:Kopfy; Kat nA.i\pric; (lines 18-19). The result of this transition is signaled by €(fl<;
in line 19.
88Schwyzer views the consciousness in the present passage as "das erste
dunkle Gefiihl von sich selbst" (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 377). Bussanich
appropriately dismisses this view by pointing out that it "unnecessarily introduces an
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imperfect state of knowledge prior to fully actual intellection" (The One and Its
Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 158). Notice that Intellect contemplates all the
objects µE'tcl ~'tix; (line 21).
89Jn 41,19-20, Plotinus briefly mentions that Intellect must always possess
J. Bussanich,
The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 158.

aVVEatc; oo'.rtou. On the synonymity of oiJvEatc; and O'\JVata9riatc;, see

90Bussanich maintains that Plotinus here speaks of the inchoate Intellect
(The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 56-57). But this interpretation
is untenable. First, he points out that Plotinus defines that which proceeds from the
One as 'to noA.v or 'to nA.fi9cx; in III 8 [30],8,33, V 1 [10],6,7, V 3 [49],11,19, and 12,110. In these passages, however, the multiplicity is hardly associated with the
inchoate Intellect. On the contrary, the inchoate Intellect is €v (III 8 [30],8,32; V 1
[10],7,9), just as intelligible matter is so called (see note 11). Second, Bussanich,
referring to V 1 [10],7,12 and VI 7 [38],16,19-20, notes that auvata9riaic; seems to
be typical of the inchoate Intellect. But otov auvata9riatc; in V 1 [10],7,12 does not
designate self-consciousness in its proper sense. As we shall see in the Chapter III
of Part II, the quasi-consciousness in V 1 [10],7,12 is attributed to the fully
actualized Intellect. Again, Bussanich's reference to VI 7 [38], 16, 19-20 contradicts
his own interpretation of that passage as seen in note 88. Even though one can say
that the inchoate Intellect seeks self-consciousness, but does not possess it, it is said
in the present passage that that which is multiple seeks self-consciousness.
Indeed, Plotinus' use of the verbs ~Tl'tOt and €9€A.m in line 1 suggests the
indefinite impulse of the inchoate Intellect. In V 3 [49],6,39-40, Intellect's self. reversion is closely associated with its self-sufficiency rather that with its aspiration.
In V 6 [24 ],5, on the contrary, Plotinus attempts to establish the absence of
intellection from the self-sufficient One, so that some deficiency in Intellect must be
revealed. It is not unusual that the deficiency of Intellect is emphasized in the
argument for the denial of intellection to the One (see III 9 [13],7,5; 9,21). The
present passage must be read in light of the following section: "So that which thinks
is double, even if it thinks itself, and defective, because it has its good in thinking,
not in its being" (III 9 [13],7,4-6, tr. A.H. Armstrong). On the defectiveness of the
multiple, see also VI 9 [9],6, 18-20.
Moreover, avvvEuau; seems to be apt to self-intellection (see III 8
[30], 11,26 O'VVVE\JO'tc; npoc; 'tO Elooc; a\rrou).
91G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, pp. 57-58.
92As we shall see later, the inchoate Intellect's desire of the Good never
vanishes after the occurrence of fully actual intellection, but eternally subsists. In
the context dealing with Intellect's wholeness and self-sufficiency, E~Eatc; is denied
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to Intellect (III 7 [45],4,31-37).
930n the perpetuity of intellection, see also V 8 [31 ],4,33-34 and VI 7
[38],35,29. This notion goes back to Aristotle (Met. 1074b29 i:o cruVVEXE<;; ... i:Tl<;
voT,oEW<;). See also note 21 in Chapter II of Part I.
94What does the phrase Kata cruµl3El3flK6<;; here mean? It would remind
us of incidental perception in Aristotle. Just as we do not perceive the son of Diares
unless we perceive the white thing (DeAnima 418a21-24), self-intellection is
causally dependent on Intellect's desire of the Good. The incidentality attributed to
intellection, different from that attributed to perception, is rather the notion of Kcx0 '
m'.rto cruµl3El3flK6<;; (see note 73); self-intellection necessarily and eternally follows
the desire of the Good. In sum, the phrase implies that self-intellection is secondary
to the primordial desire of the Good and that the causal dependency of the former
on the latter is necessary and eternal. This implication, of course, accords with the
necessity and eternity of the emanation from the One (see notes 31 and 73) and the
perpetuity of intellection (see note 93).
The thesis in the present passage is reiterated in VI 7 [38],40,50-51: Kcxt
oi:cxv cxui:il cxui:ftv, OloV Kcxi:cxµcxv0avEt a EO'XEV EK i:Tl<; CXAAOV 0€cxc;; EV cxui:fi. The
phrase EK i:Tl<; &A.Aov 0€cxc;; explicitly denotes the origination of self-intellection from
the contemplation of the One.
95See note 91. See also v 6 [24),4,20 i:ilv o\Jvcxµtv ... i:ou ElVcxt 0 EITTl.
We may here briefly touch also upon the soul's consciousness in her union
with Intellect. The soul in her union with Intellect possesses i:ilv ovvcxi.o0flotv
cxui:Tl<; concurrent with her intellection of intelligible objects (IV 4 [28),2,30-32).
The soul's ovvcxi.o0flotc;; here is not only based on the identity of soul and Intellect
but introduced to explain that this identity does not mean the abolition of the
existence of soul qua soul (lines 28-29) (see also G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The
Experience of Unity, pp. 63-64; H. -R. Schwyzer, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 376). In the
similar context dealing with the union of soul with Intellect (V 8 [31],11,23),
however, her ouvEatc;; and avvcxi.a0flatc;; are qualified by otov. (Schwyzer's
interpretation that this passage describes the union with the One (Les Sources de
Plotin, p. 376) is not accurate, because the 0€6<;; in this chapter is the intelligible
world of the previous chapter (see G. J.P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, p.
78; A. Smith, Phronesis 23 (1978):296; G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of
Unity, p. 74).) Smith observes that this qualification enables Plotinus to "explain
both empirical non-awareness and our intellectual awareness-in-total-unity"
(Phronesis 23 (1978):297). This view is correct, since the intelligible beauty, which is
truly of ourselves, is not apprehended by our empirical consciousness (lines 11-12,
31, and 34-36). Plotinus in the present chapter explains the reason why we are not
empirically aware of our union with Intellect. When we are not one with Intellect,
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we are empirically conscious of ourselves (apx6µEve><;; cxicr9av€'t'cxt cxu't'ov, €we;;
E't'Ep6<;; EO"t'l, line 10). Therefore, to describe the union with Intellect by
O'\JVcxtcr9flcru;:; without the qualifying otov suggests that our intellectual selfawareness may be empirical. As Smith remarks (op. cit. :296), in the present chapter,
"the area of self-consciousness par excellence is in nous." Hence Plotinus, in
describing the mode of intellectual self-awareness, employs crUVEcru;:; (line 28) and
O'\JV€'t'6<;; (line 32) rather than mJvcxtcr9flcru;:; or O'\JVcxtcr9avEcr9cxt.
96Jn III 9 [13],9, 12££., Plotinus argues for the absence of ncxpcxKoAou9flcru;:;
from the One. Here Intellect's ncxpcxKoA.ou9flcru;:; is linked with self-intellection,
€v€pyEu:x, cruvt€vcxt, and KCX't'CXVO€lV (lines 18-22). This passage will also be fully
considered in Chapter IV of Part II.
97See note 66 in Chapter I of Part I.
98See II 4 [12],4,14, III 8 (30],8,13, VI 7 [38],2,47, and 2,51.
99Porphyry's initial claim O't'l E~W 't'OU vov u<j>EO''t'flK€ 't'O VO~ (Vita
Plotini 18,11) suggests that the word VOflµCX can be used even of the Form outside
Intellect. In light of the original meaning of the word as that which is thought, his
claim may be taken to mean that the Form, though not in Intellect, is always thought
by Intellect, the case criticized in the third argument of V 5 (32], 1. Although two
groups of codex (wand x) have 'ta VOfl't'a instead of 'to v6Tlµcx, the original meaning
of v6TlµCX would allow us to understand this section without trouble.
The Sicilian Alcimus, referring to the Platonic Forms, says that EO"t'l oE:
't'WV EiOWV €v EKCXO"t'OV O:IBt6v 1:'€ Kcxl VOflµCX (Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Phil. III,13).
This statement, however, does not mean that the Form is a concept, either human or
divine. As Armstrong notes, "Alcimus may have meant no more by calling the Form
a VOflµCX than that it was immaterial, an object of thought" (Les Sources de Plotin, p.
399).
HX>See also A. H. Armstrong, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 395: "But I think
that Plotinian scholars would generally agree that it would be an inadequate and
unsatisfactory description of this relation [i.e. of Intelligibles to Intellect] to say that
for Plotinus the Ideas are the thoughts of Intellect."
101R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism, p. 54.
102By saying this I do not totally refuse the traditional view that the
Middle Platonic conception of the Forms lies in the historical background of
Plotinus' doctrine of Intellect. But I cannot agree with Wallis who characterizes
· Plotinus' doctrine as the reinterpretation of the Middle Platonic theory in light of
Aristotle's doctrine of the identity of intellection and its object (Neoplatonism, p.
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54 ); for Plotinus' attitude towards the Form-v6yVJ.CX theory is critical rather than
reinterpretative. Rather, Armstrong's observation of Plotinus' departure from
Middle Platonism would be accurate:
"These two characteristics [i.e. (i) vitality and activity and (ii) unity-indiversity] are obviously closely connected in his [i.e. Plotinus'] mind, and
nothing like them appears, as far as we know, in the speculations of his
Middle-Platonist predecessor for whom the Platonic Forms were 'thoughts
of God'" ("Plotinus," in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early
Medieval Philosophy, ed. A.H. Armstrong, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1967), p. 245).
In which aspect is Plotinus indebted to Middle Platonists? Merlan
observes that from the viewpoint of the presence of the Forms inside Intellect,
Antiochus, who might have initiated the doctrine of Ideas as God's thoughts, "seems
to provide us with an appropriate background." See Ph. Merlan, "Greek Philosophy
from Plato to Plotinus," in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval
Philosophy, ed. A.H. Armstrong, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967),
pp. 56-57. We must notice that Plotinus subscribes to Plato's rejection of the Form
as a v6yVJ.CX, which is opposed to the Middle Platonic doctrine. Hence the Plotinian
thesis that the Ideas are Intellect as well as Intellect is the Ideas seems to be his own
insight that can steer the clear course between the Scylla of Intellect's fallibility or
the incomplete intelligibility of the Forms and the Charybdis of the Idea-v6yVJ.CX
theory. Armstrong specifies that Plotinus' doctrine is stimulated by Albinus'
identification of the Peripatetic divine vorrr:6v with the vorrr:a of the "God's
thoughts" interpretation of Platonism (see note 43 in Chapter II of Part I). If this
view is right, we will be able to say that Plotinus is indebted to Middle Platonism at
least in this identification, that is, the view that the self-thinking divine Intellect
concerns the multiplicity of objects. But we cannot see how the doctrine of the
Forms as God's thoughts as such positively contributes to the formation and the
formulation of Plotinus' doctrine of Intellect. As regards his rejection of the FormVOllJ..LCX theory, Plotinus may be called purely Platonic, but not Middle-Platonic.

103See also V 1 [10],7,13-17 and VI 7 [38],15,17-24.
104Tue full consideration of the problem concerning the logical priority of
being and intellection will be left for another occasion. The problem is mentioned
in J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 229-230, J. N.
Deck, Nature, Contemplation, and the One, p. 27, note 9, and R. T. Wallis,
Neoplatonism, p. 67.
105We must also notice that Plotinus' account for Intellect's original
reversion in III 8 [30], 11 is devoted to the explication of the One as the ouvcxµu;; i:@v
navi:wv, presented in the previous chapter (10,1). Also in the eleventh chapter the
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One's creativity is elucidated (11,33-36). Bussanich takes €i:t OE Kat WOE (11,1) as
marking the "transition from discussion of hyper-noetic awareness of the One to
Intellect's original reversion," which he regards as being "extremely abrupt" (The
One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 116). But we do not need to feel it
abrupt, because the four words in 11, 1 mark the transition, in the way of clarifying
what the One is, from the account of the One as the emanative source of all things
in the tenth chapter to the account of it as that which fulfills the inchoate vision of
Intellect (11,7-8) by providing its pluralized images. As Armstrong remarks,
Plotinus' real intention in III 8 [30] lies in the disclosure of the One's existence and
power (see note 21).
1060n the inter-dependence of Intellect and the Ideas, see also M.
Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, pp. 93-94; R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism, p. 67.
107Buchner points out that the term €vE:pyEta in Plotinus has a double
sense, actuality (Wirklichkeit) and active power (Wirkkraft). See H. Buchner,
Plotins Moglichkeitslehre (Munich, Salzburg: Verlag Anton Pustet, 1970), p. 56.
What we mean by "intellectual activity" corresponds to the €vE:pyEta in the second
sense. We shall explore the compatibility between the immutability of being and
Intellect's €vE:pyEta in this sense. The conceptual distinction of the two senses of
€vE:pyEta is clearly seen in the interrogative sentence, ill' EVEpyEic;x µEV mxvi:a
Kat oun.x;, €vE:pyEta OE n6:vi:a (II 5 [25],3,34-35).
The pure actuality of Intellect is completely free from the Aristotelian
potency and so allows no vicissitude in the intelligible world. On the connection
between the immutability of being and Intellect's pure actuality, see II 5 [25],3,2231. On Intellect's pure actuality, see also V 9 [5],4,6-10, and 5,1-4.
108Plotinus normally denies otE:~OOoc;; to Intellect (see note 33). The
visionary description of Intellect's movement in this chapter, deeply influenced by
the Phaedrus myth, is quite unique (see note 13).
109In this passage Hadot sees Plotinus' understanding of i:o navi:EAW<;
of the Sophist (Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 109-110).
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110See also VI 7 [38],17,14-16. Compare ~wfl a6ptai:oc; there with
a6ptai:oc; olJ>tc; in v 4 [7],2,6.
111See V 1 [10],7,23-26, where 6ptaµ6c; is closely associated with µop~fl
and ai:6:atc;, and VI 2 [43],8,23-24, where a-r6:atc; and the nE:pac; vou are linked
together. On the close connection between definition and ouaia, see V 5 [32],6,5-6.
The unreceptivity of being mentioned in the above quoted passage may be
taken with Plotinus' refusal to see intelligible matter as the principle of change in II
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5 [25],3. The form does not come to intelligible matter afterwards (lines 15-16) and
each entity already received the form (line 24). The intelligible world, which has
been already completely structured, does not receive anything from outside.
112See note 12.
113Tue coherence between the immutability of being and intellectual
activity can be explained in another way. The immutability of being is closely linked
with its non-ecstatic mode (ovK €~icncnm cxVi:o ECX\ftov) in VI 5 [23],3,1-2 (see also
2,12-16). The non-ecstatic mode oflntellect in V 3 [49],7,13-20 is identified with
Intellect's ftCTUXUx and explained by its self-referential €v€pyEl.O'. or self-intellection.
Plotinian scholars agree that Plotinus in VI 4-5 [22-23] works out the
problem concerning the things' participation in the Form, presented in Parm. 13 la4cl 1. See G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, pp. 14-23; J. S. Lee,
"Omnipresence, Participation, and Eidetic Causation in Plotinus," in The Structure of
Being: A Neoplatonic Approach, ed. R. B. Harris (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1982), pp. 90-95. Although we have to leave the full consideration of
Plotinus' conception of participation for another occasion, it must be noticed that
his description of the non-ecstatic mode of being, ovo' cx\J Elcrl.Ov El<; oi:tovv (VI 5
[23],2,15) is the reminiscence of Tim. 52a3-4 OV1:E cxvi:o El<; MAO TtOl WV. ArcherHind not only takes this passage as "a perfectly unmistakable assertion of the solely
transcendental [sic] existence of ideas," but makes a cross-reference to "the
difficulties raised against the doctrine of immanent ideas in Parmenides 13 lA" (The
Timaeus of Plato, p. 182). The non-ecstatic mode of being in Plotinus, however,
does not solely indicate the transcendence of the Forms, but is inseparably linked
with the non-ecstatic, self-referential activity of Intellect. In the allegorical passage
referring to the myth of Cronus' devouring of his children (V 1 [10],7,30-32), the
presence of all the intelligible objects in Intellect is said to prevent them from falling
into matter (µrt0€ EKrtEcrE'iv El<; UAT\V) and from being brought up with Rhea (µrt0€
i:pcx~f1vm mxpa i:n 'P€Q'.), that is, impermanent flux.
11 4Plotinus takes €v€pyEl.O'. cX"tEAi)c; as EVEPYEl.O'. µE:v mxvi:wc;, EXEl OE KCXt
1:0 TtcXAlV KCXt TtcXAlV, OVX lVCX a~lKfll:CXl Et<; €v€pyEl.O'.V (VI 1 [42], 16,6-7). Compare
this interpretation with Skemp's interpretation (see note 41 in Chapter II of Part I).
115Jn VI 2 [43],8, intellectual activity is credited with the role of connecting
seeing and being or of identifying itself with being (lines 17-18). O'Daly views this
role of bridging the subject-object duality as insuring "logical coherence of a more
precise sort" than the argument for Intellect's self-knowledge in V 3 [49],5,31-48
does (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, p. 77).
116See also V 3 [49),7,20 El<; E-cxui:ov i:rw €v€pyEl.O'.V '(axn. On Intellect's
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self-reversion, see Section III and note 83. See also P. Hadot, Les Sources de Plotin,
p. 132: "Autrement, dit, l'Intelligence plotinienne est douee d'un mouvement
interieur qui n'est autre que la vie."
117See also III 9 [13],9,11-12 fl [SC. voriau;;] i:ou aya9ou.
118Harder observes that 2,35 VOElV 1:0 npo aui:ou tacitly claims the
correction of the thesis in 7,8-10 that the souls, possessing the image of the One,
cannot think it (tlx; ouK €ai:tv IDou €xovi:a €v i:n ljiuxn i:unov €KE1vo voflcrm
€vEpyouvi:0<;; i:ou i:unou) (Plotins Schriften, lb:470). We must notice that Plotinus
describes the contact of Intellect or soul with the One, using voEtV or its cognates in
the present treatise (8,26-27 TIE~UKE 1:0 VOOUV npoc;; 1:0 Kai:avoouµEVOV cruvan1:ELV;
9,14-15 Kal voEt €vi:au9a). This type of VOEtV does not involve any image of the
One (11,20-21). Hence we must say that Plotinus differentiates two levels of VOEtV
in VI 9 [9] rather than that 2,35 is the ad hoc correction of 7,8-10. But Harder
appropriately takes voEtV in 2,35 with €mai:p€~El (2,36) and napEtVat (2,41)
(Plotins Schriften, lb:470).
119See 8,31-33 QUO a~E01:T}KE 1:0lVUV illf0.wv i:6mp, E1:Ep6i:rin OE Kat
ouv fl E1:Ep6i:ric;; µi) napn, M.Af0.otc;; i:O: µi) E1:Epa napE01:lV. See also
V 1 [10],6,53, V 8 [31],13,8-9, and VI 4 [22],11,9-10. On otherness between the
second and the third hypostases, see V 1 [10],3,21-22.
I

Ota~op~· oi:av

120For the inter-dependence among these texts, see J. Bussanich, The One
and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 100, 146, 175, 219; idem, "Plotinus on the
Inner Life of the One," Ancient Philosophy 7 ( 1987): 172; J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The
Road to Reality, p. 267, note 43 to ch. 16; R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism, p. 88. Notice
that 6 EVOOV vouc;; in v 3 [49],14,14-15 is also referred to as vouv Ka9apov in line
14. O'Daly views that Plotinus in VI 9 [9],3,26-27 is thinking of the &v9oc;; of vouc;; of
the Chaldaean oracle (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, p. 86). In Later Neoplatonism
the "flower" of Intellect is ontologically higher than that Intellect (J. M. Rist,
Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 253, note 6 to ch. 5; idem, "Mysticism and
Transcendence in Later Neoplatonism," Hennes 92 (1964):215-217).
In III 8 [30],9,31, Intellect is said to have two sides (aµ~tai:oµov). This
complicated passage will be seriously considered later in Chapter V of Part II.
121Jn this passage the verb VOEtV is denied to Intellect's contemplation of
the One (lines 29-30). The verb is restricted to the contemplation of the Forms
within Intellect (line 32). On the dual activity of Intellect, see also P. Hadot,
"Neoplatonist Spirituality: Plotinus and Porphyry," in Classical Mediterranean
Spirituality, ed. A.H. Armstrong (New York: Crossroad, 1986), pp. 242-244.
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122Tuis passage is traditionally taken to mean the equivalence of the prenoetic phase of Intellect to its hyper-intellective phase (see A.H. Armstrong, The
Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, pp. 262-263).
Bussanich attempts to dismiss such interpretations by pointing out that the €pW<; is
not associated with the €cj>Ecru; of the inchoate Intellect whereas the €cj>Ecru;, with
rare exceptions, is absent from the €pW<; of the hyper-noetic phase (The One and Its
Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 176-179). But it must be noticed that "the hypernoetic phase of Intellect" has a double meaning; (i) the hyper-noetic phase which
always coexists with the self-intellective phase and (ii) the hyper-noetic phase which
operates alone in its union with the One by having surrendered the self-intellective
phase. As 35,7 n6:vco: TlOll acj>t11crtv and 35,24-25 Ol:O:V acj>pwv y€v,,i:o:t indicate,
Intellect, in order to become one with the One, must cease to think itself and the
Forms by giving up its self-thinking phase (see also III 8 [30],9,29-32). Hence
Bussanich's attempt is acceptable if he says that the pre-noetic phase is not identical
with the hyper-noetic phase in the sense of (ii). But it is the equivalence of the
inchoate Intellect to the hyper-noetic phase in the sense of (i) that we are
maintaining. Our claim is fully consistent with Bussanich's own view that the
inchoate factor eternally operates in the fully actualized Intellect (ibid., pp. 125-126,
179-180).
In the present context, the self-intellective and the hyper-noetic phases of
Intellect are designated respectively voU<;; €µcj>povwv and voU<;; €p@v (35,24 ).
Bussanich tries to establish that the inchoate Intellect cannot be described as voU<;;
€p@v because of the above mentioned reason (The One and Its Relation to Intellect
in Plotinus, pp. 178-179). But there still remains a problem whether the eternally
pre-noetic phase of the fully actualized Intellect, which is the hyper-noetic phase in
the sense of (i), can be denominated so or not. The answer is affirmative. First, as
Bussanich himself remarks (ibid., p. 178), €pW<;, as well as €cj>Ecru;, n60oc;, and
opE~u;. is applicable to the internal activity of the fully actualized Intellect or to
general statements of the desire to return to the One. Second, we must carefully
read 35,24-25 vouc;; €p@v, Ol:O:V acj>pwv y€v,,i:o:t µE0ua0El<; l:OU VEKl:o:poc;. The
crucial point is the subjunctive clause Ol:CXV acj>pwv y€v,,i:cxt, which adumbrates that
Intellect in love is not always a<j>pwv. As Theiler and Beutler point out, €µ<j>povoc;
and acj>pwv are opposed to one another (Plotins Schriften, 3b:509). To become
witless means to give up the vouc;; €µ<j>pov@v or self-thinking phase which has
coexisted with voU<;; €p@v. Notice that €p@v is not opposed to €µ<j>povwv. Hence
Bussanich's identification of vouc;; E:pwv and vouc;; a<j>pwv (ibid., p. 174) is not fully
accurate; since vouc;; €p@v can designate the hyper-intellective phase of Intellect in
the senses of both (i) and (ii), whereas vouc;; acj>pwv the hyper-noetic phase in the
sense of (ii) alone. Thus hyper-noetic phase in the sense of (i) would be described
as voU<;; €pwv and the one in the sense of (ii) as voU<;; €pwv Ko:l acj>pwv.
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1230n the eternity of the inchoate Intellect, see A. H. Armstrong, The
Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, p. 262; idem,
"Platonic Mirrors," Eranos 55 (1988):169; J. Bussanich. The One and Its Relation to
Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 125-126, 179-180. The eternal coexistence of two phases of
Intellect can be seen also in terms of the thesis that the one and the same original
reversion of Intellect has two objectives, towards the One and towards itself. See P.
Aubin, Le Probleme de la "Conversion" (Paris: Beauchesne et Ses Fils, 1963), p. 163.
124See also the following passage : "But if anyone is going to admit that
Intellect knows God [i.e. the One], he will be forced to agree that it also knows
itself' (V 3 [49],7,1-3).
125J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 59-60.
On the association of movement with the pre-noetic phase of Intellect, see VI 7
[38],16,18 KLVf\crtc;; ... µovov. On the association of desire with the pre-noetic
phase, see III 8 [30], 11,23 and V 3 [49], 11, 12. In the present passage the inchoate
Intellect is referred to as i:o yEvoµEvov (5,7). On the description as such, see V 2
[11],l,9.
126See note 117.
127See V 1[10],7,11,V4 [7],2,4, and VI 7 [38],40,10-11.
128We read 1:~ O:ya90Et0€c; ELV<Xl ... K<Xt oµotwµa EXElV npOc; 1:0 O:ya9ov
(lines 13-14) as the modal dative. On the application of O:ya90Et0tl<;; (Rep. 509a3) to
Intellect, see III 8 [30],11,16-18; V 3 [49],16,18-19; V 6 [24],4,5; VI 2 [43],17,28; VI 7
· [38],15,23 (see also VI 9 [9],5,26 €v0Et0tl<;;).
129'fhe implication of the phrase Kai:a cruµJ3El3flKoc; here is analyzed in
note 94. With H-S, Armstrong, Beutler-Theiler, and Bussanich, we take aui:ou (line
16) and aui:o (line 17) respectively as referring to the Good and to Intellect and
Kai:a auµJ3EJ3flK0c; as going with the following rather than the preceding pronoun.
O'Daly renders Plotinus' stress in the present passage as "the relative
nature of self-knowledge" (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, p. 79).
Our view that self-intellection is the unavoidable and eternal
epiphenomenon of the original intellection concerning the One, of course, conforms
to the widely expressed view that Intellect looks at the One, which results in selfthinking, or that Intellect, in its endeavor to see the One, sees the One as many since
it is unable to grasp the One in its absolute unity.
Rist elucidates the above mentioned widely expressed view in terms of the
connection between intellection and otherness: "The peculiar mark of intuitive
thought is that it is an attempt to think the One, but a failure to grasp the One
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without otherness; and otherness implies recognizable 'parts"' (Le Neoplatonisme, p.
83). We also remarked about the necessary connection between intellection and
otherness in note 13. It must be noticed that the intellection towards the One also
involves otherness (VI 9 [9],2,37-38 El 0€ npO<; €i:e:pov f3:\€ntt). In VI 9 [9],5,26-29,
Intellect's multiplicity (ouK ovi:oc; ... €v) is ascribed to its separateness from the
One (anoai:nvcxt 0€ nwc; i:ou €v0<; i:o:\µftcrcxc;). Bussani ch takes this passage closely
with III 8 [30],8,30-36, where Plotinus deals with the genesis of Intellect as the
consequence of its desire for self-expansion on a lower plane (The One and Its
Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 82; see also A. H. Armstrong, Le Neoplatonisme,
p. 71). Thus otherness, which characterizes the multiplicity of the Forms and is
involved in intellection, presupposes otherness which indicates the separateness of
Intellect from the absolute simplicity. For the i:6:\µcx as the desire for separation,
see M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 4; A.H. Armstrong, The Cambridge
History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, p. 242; E. R. Dodds, Pagan
and Christian in an Age ofAnxiety (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965),
pp. 24-25).
130We do not read Gollwitzer's emendation un€cri:flcr€ adopted by Cilento
and Mizuchi, but retain the MSS reading. The reason is that the One's subsistence
implied by the MSS reading, with the definition of intellection as a movement,
entails the absence of intellection from the One (5,10-11). Without the explicit
remark on the One's subsistence which implies its immobility, we cannot see the
force of ouv in 5, 10.
131Compare 5,7-8 EKtvft0Tl i:e: Kcxl e:IBe: with V 1 [10],7,5-6 ft oi:t i:n
E:mcri:po<Pn npO<; cxui:o (sc. 1:0 €v) E:wpcx· i) OE opcxcrtc; CXU1:fl vouc;. In the latter
passage, opcxcrtc; means fully actual intellection. In the former, €LOE is picked up by
opcxcru; in 5, 10.
132We cannot see why Bussanich, referring to 10,32-33 i:uxwv E:vi:O<;
avcxncxucraµe:voc; O'UVVOEl, can regard i:uyxavwv here as denoting also Intellect's
hyper-noetic contact with the Good (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus,
pp. 125-126). The transitive i:uyxavEtv in 11, 16 and 11,24-25 is obviously distinct
from its Attic usage in 10,32 as an auxiliary verb joined with the participle of
another verb (avcxncxucraµe:voc;).
133In 11,43-44, n:\ftpwcrtv ... Mf10tvrw and VOflcrtv are juxtaposed.
134Qn Plotinus' own definition of incomplete activity, see note 114. As the
passage EXEL OE Kcxl i:o n<XAtv Kcxl n<XAtv in VI 1 [42),16,6 indicates, incomplete
activity is successive. On the contrary, the phrase ae:l i:uyxavwv in the present
passage unmistakably implies the continuity of intellection. On the continuity of
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intellectual activity, see VI 2 [43],21,13-14 µEi:a 0€ i:otl 011vExoU<;; i:ll<;; €vEpyElro;
and VI 7 [38],35, 13-14 opcxµcx 13A€not i:&> 01JVEXE'i i:Tl<;; 0€cxc;;. Plotinus calls such
activity without intermittence fumvoc;; (I 4 [46],9,18-23; VI 2 [43],8,7) and Ciypvnvoc;;
(II 5 [25],3,36). See also note 93.
135Bussanich also takes these two passages together (The One and Its
Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 125).
l36J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 157.
On Plotinus' own conception of incomplete activity (see notes 114 and 134 ),
however, the actualization of the inchoate Intellect is not incomplete activity. While
incomplete activity is successive, the phrase €~t€µEvoc;; 6:El explicitly indicates the
continuity and perpetuity of that actualization, which embodies the thesis of the
eternity of the inchoate Intellect (see note 123). On the continuity of Intellect's
desire for the One, see also A.H. Armstrong, Le Neoplatonisme, p. 72: "... a finite
mind endlessly exploring the riches of the infinite with a desire ever stimulated by
new revelations of the unbounded good into which it penetrates ever more deeply."
Bussanich, on the other hand, would be right in noting that the Platonic
KlVT\O'l<;;, closely associated with life, finds a place in Plotinus' actualized Intellect.

137For the satiety oflntellect, see III 5 [50],9, 18; III 8 [30], 11,39; V 1
[10],4,9-10; 7,35; V 8 [31],13,4,; V 9 [5],8,8; VI 7 [38],35,26.
Intellect's life, when considered without reference to its relation to the
One, is described as involving no desire because of its own satiety (III 7 [45],4,33-37;
v 3 [49],6,39-40).
138See also III 8 [30],11,42, VI 7 [38],23,7-8 and VI 9 [9],6,18.
139Some critics take€~ ou €cri:tv (40,7) as "from the One" and regards
intellection in discussion as attached to or coming from the One. See G. M. Gurtler,
Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, pp. 275-276; A. C. Lloyd, "Plotinus on the Genesis
of Thought and Existence," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 5 (1987):172. On
this interpretation, however, the passage ti µ€v crvvoucrcx i:&> €~ ou €crnv
unavoidably leads to the ascription of intellection to the One. Taking the
connection of crvvotlcrcx (40,6) and EXEt (40, 7) into consideration, we may
understand 1:0 €~OU EO'LlV as referring to the unoKEtµEVOV (40,7). This
construction entails the identity of i:o €~ ou €cri:tv and i:o ou €cri:t v6T)crtc;; (40,7),
that is, the intellect-intelligible identity.
From the counter-factual protasis El 0' flV . .. µf) an' EKEtVOV (40,21) it
can be inferred that the second intellection mentioned in 40, 10-19 is from (6:n6) the
One. The preposition 6:n6, coupled with €~' E:cxvi:Tl<; (40,22), implies the
intellection's independence of and separateness from the One. But the preposition
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EK in the present passage does not have such an implication.
140See II 6 [17],1,55-57, V 6 [24],6,17-23, and VI 2 [43],7,25-26. See also
III 8 [30],11,6-8 and 11,43-44.
In the present passage, intellection is characterized as resting upon the
Form which is the substrate. This characterization is appropriate to intellection
proper. Compare 40,8 otov 0€ ETtlK€lµ€VOV afrtt1 yiv€-rat €v€py€ta ooi-roll ovaa
with V 9 [5],8,13-14 otov €nl nllp TlOT'I -rt1v -roll nvpOc; €v€py€tav.
But the phrase nAf'IPOllO'a 1:0 ovvaµn EK€lVO (40,9) would sound unusual,
because Plotinus, in defining intellectual movement as the activity of real being,
does not represent being as in potentiality (VI 2 [43],7,20; 8,16-19). Perhaps being
here may be considered in total abstraction from its activity.
141We must keep in mind that the phrase€~' €avi:Tl<; (40,14) does not
exclude the role of the One's causation from the genesis of real being. The very
cause of real being is the One, but not the inchoate Intellect ( 16,22-24 ). This point
will be further discussed in note 142. The phrase rather seems to be employed to
indicate the separateness of the second intellection from the One, which is really
pointing to the thesis to be defended in the present chapter.
142J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 229.
On this interpretation, the passage OVO'a ovvaµu; -roll Y€VVCXV €~' €av-rllc;; €y€vva
(40,13-14) is explained by v 1 [10],7,13-14opi~€t1:0 €lVat au-r&J -rn nap' EK€lVOV
ovv6:µn and 7,15-17 pwvvv-rat nap' EK€lVOV Kat 1:€A€tolli:at €l<;; OUO'laV nap'
EK€ivov Kat€~ EK€ivov. It is thus concluded that Plotinus thinks of both the One's
causation and the autonomy of the generative power given to the inchoate Intellect
from the One in the genesis of real being.
In addition, we cannot see why Buchner interprets Plotinus as contrasting
productive intellection with human non-productive thinking in the present passage
(Plotins Moglichkeitslehre, p. 57).
143We must not confuse this primary activity and Ti €v€py€ta au-rllc;; (sc.
ovv6:µ€W<;;) (40,14) which is OUO'la. The latter €v€py€ta means actualization or
realization rather than activity. It must also be noted that the passage aAA.' ovaa
ovvaµu;; -roll Y€VVCXV €~' E:av-rllc;; €y€vva, Kat Ti €v€pyEta au-rfy; EO'LtV OUO'la
( 40, 13-15) is sharply contrasted with the passage about the first intellection
€v€py€ta au-roll ouaa Kat nAf'IPOllaa 1:0 ovv6:µn EK€lVO (40,8-9). The former
passage can certainly be taken with the description of two phases of Intellect,
ovvaµu; ... €l<;; €v€py€taV €A.0ouaa (III 8 [30], 11,2).
144See Beutler' and Theiler's comment on 40,6ff. (Plotins Schriften,
3b:516).
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145Jn I 7 [54],1,13, the desire for the Good and the activity towards it are
juxtaposed (€~Ecru; Kal €vE:pyE1.CX npCx; 'tO CXplO"tov).
The passage €vEpyovvra yap <XV E<XtJ'tOV voEt (V 6 [24],5,17-18)
represents self-intellection as the intellection of the self that thinks the Good. This
passage expands the notion of self-intellection as formulated in II 9 [33], 1,49-50 and
III 9 [13],6, 1-3 by relating it to the doctrine of Intellect's relation to the One.
On the continuity of intellectual activity, see note 134.
146We may also consider the following passage:
"So this Intellect had an immediate apprehension of the One, but by
grasping it became the Intellect, perpetually in need [of the One] (6:El oE:
€voE6µEv<><;;) and having become at once Intellect and real being and
intellection when it thought" (V 3 [49],11,12-15, tr. A.H. Armstrong,
adapted by A. Sumi).
With Armstrong and Bussanich, !gal's €voE6µEv<><;; is read for €vol.6:µEv<><;;
in line 13. In this section, the perpetual desire joined with the eternally pre-noetic
apprehension is closely related to the genesis of oucri.a.
147See note 94. The incidentality of self-intellection seems to be implicitly
stated also in VI 7 [38],40, 15-18, especially in 40, 16 Kal au EalJ'tftV VO€l fl ~ucru;.

n

148Corrigan comments on V 6 [24],2 as follows:
"Starting therefore, from a world of intellectuality ... Plotinus reaches his
own Transcendent principle, and the need for an hypothesis of an ultimate
VOf1'tOV disappears in the course of the argument itself. Here too, then, it
is clear that the One is not, in any simple sense, an object of thought"
("Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5,4 [7],2 and Related Passages," Hennes 114
(1986):199, (Italics mine.)).
This observation is inadequate. First, Plotinus' argument does not end in
the disclosure of the transcendent principle. Rather, it consistently concerns the
necessity of the One for intellection to arise satisfactorily. Hence it is not accurate
to say, with Corrigan, that "the argument is concerned with ascent" (Hennes 114
(1986):199). This basic observation seems to underlie the inadequacy of Corrigan's
view. Second, it is not clear in what sense Corrigan calls the description of the One
as 'tO VOf1'tOV an "hypothesis." It becomes manifest that the role of the One as the
transcendent object of intellection never disappears in the present treatise as soon
as we read that Intellect is said to think itself incidentally in thinking the Good (V 6
[24],5,16-17). It is clear that the status of the One as 'tO VOf1'tOV is not hypothetical.
Finally, as we shall see later, the One as 'to VOf1'tOV is correlative to the pre-noetic
activity of Intellect described as v6f1cru;. The One is called the intelligible object in
this simple sense. In V 6 [24], VOf10'1'; has two senses, the intellection towards the
One and self-intellection. Corrigan's view, unless he is fully aware of these two
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senses of intellection, is prone to blur the necessary distinction of two senses of
vorrr6v, one applied to the One and another to the complex of the Forms.
Given two senses of intellection, both the One and the complex of the
Forms can properly be called -ro vrni-r6v. Nevertheless we can distinguish them in
terms of the first sense of intellection, by calling the One the "pure" (2,8) object of
intellection and the Forms the "incidental" (5,16) object.
149See V 6 [24],2,10 -r6 "t€ yap vrni-rov €-r€p~ and VI 9 [9],6,54 al-ria -rov
VO€lV~.

150J. M. Rist, "The Indefinite Dyad and Intelligible Matter in Plotinus,"
Classical Quarterly 12 (1962):103. Rist's distinction between the real and the
second-best objects of intellection coincides with our distinction between the pure
and the incidental objects (see note 148).
151Tuis passage may be taken with the description of the One as ovaia<;
Ka0ap@<; VOfl"tOV (2,8), which would be contrasted with the phrase Ka-ra
O'UµJ3E/3flK6<;.

152Jn VI 7 [38], 16,29-30 the Good is regarded as the cause of both vo\J<;
and ov-ra. By this expression, however, Plotinus means that the Good is the cause of
the intelligibility of the ovaia (16,23-24), which is compared to sunlight providing
thinking to Intellect and being-thought to beings (16,30-31). The One plays such a
role also in V 5 [32],7,16-18. Needless to say, this role of the One is the same as the
role of the Good in the analogy of the sun in the Republic. When the One is given
this role, it cannot be the transcendent object of intellection. In this case, the hyper. noetic phase of Intellect does not come to the fore and the meaning of intellection is
confined to self-intellection.
That the One is the "transcendent" cause of intellection is explained by the
fact that Intellect sees the "trace" of the One, but not the One itself and the
aforementioned causal principle that the cause is not the same as that which is
caused. Henry stresses that the One as -ro VOfl"tOV, though it means the One grasped
by Intellect, remains transcendent (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 421).
153p. Henry, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 421.
154Jn light of 2,5-6 we can also demarcate the One as µ6vov VOf'l"t'OV from
Intellect as VOf'l"t'OV Kat voovv.
The fact that Plotinus was aware of the ambiguity can be recognized from
the following passage:
"Intellect, on the one hand (µ€\/ ), is surely also an intelligible (Kat av-rO<;
VOfl"tOV), but it thinks as well: so it is already two. It, on the other, is also
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a different intelligible by being posterior to the One itself (€au 0€ Kat
&A.Ao i:~ µEL' oo'.n:o vorii:6v)" (V 4 [7],2,10-12, tr. A.H. Armstrong,
adapted by A. Sumi).
The final sentence has been variously construed. Armstrong's translation,
based on the H-S text, follows the same line as !gal's: "est etiam intellegibile diversum
ab Illa, quia post Illud" ("Adnotatiunculae in Plotinum," Mnemosyne 22 (1969):363).
Bussanich also accepts the H-S text but translates: "And it is also an intelligible
object to something else, that which comes after it." He takes a\n:o in line 12 as
referring to Intellect qua vorii:ov (J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect
in Plotinus, p. 18).
Bussanich stresses the merit of his construction as eliminating the
redundancy of other translations (Zoe. cit.). But Armstrong's translation is not
redundant. The clue to the interpretation of the passage is the binary particles µ€v
(2,10) and OE (2,11). The first sentence signaled by the former particle (2,10-11)
simply mentions the duality of Intellect, but not its difference from the One. Insofar
as the One is also referred to as i:o vorii:6v in 2,4, it is highly possible in the present
passage that i:o vorii:6v as the One and i:o vorii:6v as Intellect are confused. The
section Kat &A.Ao ... vorii:6v in the third sentence signaled by OE (2, 11-12) definitely
dismisses the possibility of confusion. Without the remark on the difference in the
level of intelligible object, i:ou vorii:ou in the immediately following interrogative
sentence (2, 12) will be taken as the same as vorii:6v in 2, 11, namely as Intellect.
The point made in 2,11-12 is exactly reiterated in 2,25 &A.Ao o'lov vorii:ov. By the
remark that Intellect is a different vorii:6v, moreover, the One as i:o vorii:6v (2,13)
which is E:v . .. voficrEt €i:EpW<; ft Kai:O: i:f\v vo\J v6ricrtv (2, 18-19) can be fully distinct
from Intellect as vorii:6v and vo@v (2, 11 ). Hence the third sentence, only when it is
construed in the manner of Armstrong's translation, makes the necessary remark for
the thesis that the transcendent vorii:ov has the hyper-noetic intellection.
155Tue aforementioned v6ricrtc; in VI 7 [38],40, 10-11 is an exception to
this.
156See V 3 [49],10,42-44, VI 7 [38],35,44-45, and VI 9 [9],4,2.
Bussanich observes that Plotinus, in V 6 [24],2,7-9, suggests the denial of
intelligibility to the One: "... Plotinus does not mean ... that Intellect in its
processive state, any more than its fully actualized state, understands the reality of
the One." See J. Bussanich,Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):165. But it seems to
difficult to read the One's unintelligibility from this passage. The binary particles
µ€v and OE go with the contrast between npo<; ... i:ov vo\Jv and Ka0' E:aui:o. If
Plotinus were to suggest the One's unintelligibility, he should say that it is not
vorii:ov Kupiwc;; in relation to Intellect. It is Ka0' €aui:o that the One is said to be not
vorii:ov Kuplwc;;. The One, in turn, is in relation to Intellect "a reality which is purely
an object of intellection" (2,8). The second-half of the a-clause simply reiterates the
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point made in 2,4-5 to deny the duality to the One. Hence the passage in V 6
[24],2,7-9 cannot be regarded as a textual warrant for the One's unintelligibility.
From the statement that the One is in itself neither a thinker nor an object of
thought in the proper sense, someone might infer that it is the thinker and its object
in some transcendent sense. Although this reasoning, unless it compromises the
One's simplicity, would never be umeasonable, it seems unnatural to read the
unique cognitive state of the One into the context of V 6 [24 ],2.
157Rist, construing V 4 [7],2 in light of III 9 [13],1, observes as follows:
"What can be deduced from this except that in the early period of his life,
quite probably under Numenian influence, Plotinus toyed with the idea of
a double votk;;, one active and the other static, the static and the higher
also being a vorrc6v, but that he later came to reject such ideas? There is
evidence then that at some time Plotinus might speak of a vorrr6v which
itself, though inactive, had some kind of intellection. This is almost what
we have in 5.4.2" (Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 42).
This view is inaccurate. First, as Bussanich points out (The One and Its
Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 20), "the intelligible object at rest" in III 9
[13], 1, 15-17, in spite of the verbal similarity, bears little relation to the transcendent
VOf\'tOV "at eternal rest" in V 4 [7],2, 18. Second, more importantly, the transcendent
vorrr6v in V 4 [7],2, though it is said to be at eternal rest, is not inactive. It
possesses life in itself (2, 16-17) and is not OloV clVata9fl'tOV (2, 15). If it were
designated as being inactive, the problem of the One's knowledge would not occur.
158Jn Rep. 507e6-508al the relation between the sense of sight and the
power of being seen is described in yoke language (i:tµtw'tEpq> ~uy[i> E:~uYTlaav).
But Plotinus would be reluctant to apply yoke language to the relation of the powers
of thinking and of being thought, because, as already seen, he regards the verb
auvE~Eux9m as incompatible with the intellect-intelligible identity in V 5 [32], 1,2328.
159See note 30.
Bussanich, in his comment on the above cited passage, refers to II 4
[12],5, 15-18 as "the splendid description of intelligible matter as a 'decorated corpse'
before it is defined by turning back to the One" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect
in Plotinus, p. 32). But his interpretation of that passage is inaccurate. Plotinus
there contrasts intelligible matter with sensible matter; the contrast is marked by the
binary particles µ€:v (5,15) and 0€ (5,16). The binary particles occur again in 5,1718, and, from 5,18 Kat µop~n 0€ E'iOwA.ov, it turns out that the passage in 5,17-18 (ou
µnv ~wv 000€ vooOv, illa VEKpov KEKoaµTl}J.€vov) refers to sensible matter, but
not to intelligible matter. (In III 6 [26],7,24-25, the sensible shapes in sensible
matter is called E'iOwA.a E:v EiDWAq> Cx'tEXV@c;;. Sensible matter can be appropriately
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compared to a corpse because it is Epriµi.cx n6:vrwv (15,26; see also II 4 [12],8,14, III
6 [26],9,37, and 14,12). Atkinson rightly interprets that Plotinus, in II 4 [12],5,15-18,
speaks of sensible matter as a decorated corpse (op. cit., p. 35).) Intelligible matter
prior to its limitation is rather called ii ~wfi croplcn:<><;; (VI 7 [38],17,13-15) or ii ~wit
... "'tATt 9Ewpouµ€Vl1 KCXt anoyEyuµvwµEVTl (18,16-17). On the indefiniteness of
intelligible matter, see II 4 [12],4,19-20, 15,17-18, and VI 7 [38],17,20.
l60See also µlµE1cr9m in 1,26 and anoµlµouµEVCX in 1,33.
161J. N. Deck, op. cit., p. 20.
162Henry takes this passage with VI 8 [39],15,28-29 \m6ai:cxm.c;; 0€ npwu1
OUK EV a"'ux~ 000. EV ~wn cXA.6y~ (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 142). As Anton notes,
however, we may not conclude from that passage that the first hypostasis "is to be
found in something animate and in instances of rational life ("Some Logical Aspects
of the Concept of Hypostasis in Plotinus," in The Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic
Approach, ed. R. B. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), p.
28).
163See also III 8 [30],9,38-39; 10,2-3; 10,10-13; VI 7 [38],23,19-24; 32,1-2;
VI 8 [39],15,34-35.
Wallis briefly mentions the locus of the Plotinian One in the history of
ideas: "A consequence of the One's infinite power is that emanation exemplifies
what Arthur Lovejoy, in The Great Chain of Being, calls the 'Principle of Plenitude'"
(Neoplatonism, p. 64). The close connection between the super-abundance of the
One's power and the continuity of procession from it is clearly recognized in IV 8
[6],6, 10-18.
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INlRODUCTION

It was pointed out in Part I that Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge

is closely related to his doctrines of self-intellection and of Intellect's relation to the
One; the conception of the intelligible objects as living and thinking, which serves
as the copestone of the doctrine of self-intellection, necessarily demands the
existence of the originative source, of those objects, which itself has inner activity
and life. The One's knowledge exactly represents the cognitive specification of its
inner activity and life. The One's inner activity can really be specified in two ways,
positively and negatively. Plotinus, on the one hand, inquires what kind of
knowledge and consciousness the One possesses positively. He attempts, on the
other, to clarify why the One must not or need not have intellection.1 As Bussanich
summarizes,2 there are three views of Plotinus' positive and negative specifications
. of the One's inner activity. The first view admits such chronological change that
Plotinus ascribes noetic or quasi-noetic activities to the One in earlier treatises, but
denies these activities to it in later treatises.3 The second view simply claims that
Plotinus contradicts himself.4 According to the final view, Plotinus is very careful in
making his affirmations about the One's knowledge, so that we must consider his
use of language with sufficient sensitivity.5 The first view turns out to be intuitively
untenable as soon as we look at the fact that Plotinus attributes some sort of
cognitive activity to the One in such later treatises as VI 7 [38] and VI 8 [39]. The
. second view, as Bussanich estimates it,6 is nothing more than an evasion of the
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problem. Even if it were seen as an attack on Plotinus himself, the second view
would be at best question-begging.
There will still remain several problems, even though it may be clarified
that Plotinus successfully distinguishes, by employing highly technical terms and
qualifications, the unique knowledge of the One from the cognitive activity of
Intellect. In what way can the negation of intellection and the ascription of hyperintellective activity to the One be coherent with one another? If they are coherent,
what doctrine mediates them? What ontological status of the One really serves as
the ground for an affirmation about the One's knowledge? Is that ontological status
coherent with the absence of intellection from the One? How does Plotinus attempt
to undercut any possible distortion of his own doctrine, that is, the jump from the
denial of intellection to the One to the ascription of some pejorative terms to it? In
addition to these questions regarding the systematic structure of Plotinus' doctrine
of the One's knowledge, we must inquire whether the chronological change, if any,
in his terminology to describe the One's cognitive activity has great significance in
terms of its systematic relation to the doctrines of self-intellection and of Intellect's
relation to the One or in terms of the chronological change, if any, in his use of the
word VOT)atc;;.
For our inquiry to be the full study of Plotinus' doctrine of the One's
knowledge, we must consider not only the internal structure of his doctrine of the
One's knowledge but also the systematic relation of that doctrine to other doctrines
belonging to his system and the interplay between the terminology for the One's
knowledge and his use of the term VOT)at<;; in their chronological change. Although
the relevant texts from the Enneads will be read in Porphyry's chronological order
for Plotinus' treatises, it is necessary to pay enough attention to the context in which
a given text falls. Since his metaphysical system emerged before the early period of
his writing and does not undergo substantial transformation, it is certain that
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Plotinus, in each section of his treatises, always presupposes his already emerged
system. Hence the contextual reading of the relevant passages reveals the
systematic relation of the doctrine of the One's knowledge to other doctrines.
Without considering this systematic relation, we can only look on the simply
superficial, chronological change in Plotinus' terminology for the One's knowledge
and cannot understand why such changes, if any, have really occurred. As
mentioned in the Introduction, therefore, the relevant texts must be analyzed from
two viewpoints, chronological and systematic.
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NOTES

lRist regards these problems as the basic ones concerning the One's
knowledge in Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1967), p. 38.
2J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, a
Commentary on Selected Texts (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), pp. 57-58.
3For the first view, see T. A. Szlezak, Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre
Plotins (Basel, Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1979), p. 87.
4For the second view, see E. F. Bales, "Plotinus' Theory of the One," in
The Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic Approach, ed. R. B. Harris (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1982), pp. 40-50.
5For the final view, see J.M. Rist, op. cit., pp. 38-52; J. N. Deck, Nature,
Contemplation, and the One: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1967), pp. 17-21; G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The
Experience of Unity (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), pp. 52-58, 271-272; J. Bussanich,
"Plotinus on the Inner Life of the One," Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987): 163-189; W.
Beierwaltes, "Die Metaphysik des Lichtes in der Philosophie Plotins," Zeitschrift far
Philosophische Forschung 15 (1961):348-349.
6J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 58.

CHAPTER I
V 4 [7],2,13-19: THE ONE'S KNOWLEDGE AND CONSCIOUSNESS

The second chapter of V 4 [7], as many commentators remark, stands
alone in the entire Enneads in the clarity with which Plotinus ascribes a kind of
intellection and consciousness to the One. Some critics, considering the position of
the treatise in Porphyry's chronological list, acknowledge Plotinus' reflection on
Numenius.1 The influence by Numenius, however, does not explain the systematic
reason why Plotinus himself is here forced to attribute a sort of consciousness and
intellection to the One. We first attempt to spell out this very reason by carefully
analyzing his own text. This attempt will further articulate how the doctrine of the
One's consciousness and knowledge is related to his other doctrines. Then, we shall
consider another problem, to which extent Plotinus succeeds in demarcating the
unique hyper-intellection and consciousness of the One from the cognitive activity
of Intellect.
The main issue considered in V 4 [7] is definitely how Intellect, which is
the one-many (1,21),2 comes from the absolutely simple One. In the first chapter
Plotinus tries to explain the procession of Intellect from the One in terms of an
analogy from an empirical fact that that which is perfect--e.g. fire, snow, and drugs-cannot but produce something other than itself.3 He then employs several
superlative adjectives to describe the perfection of the One; it is the cx\.rmpKE:ai:cxi:ov
(1,12), the 'tEAEW'tcxi:ov (1,24; 1,34), and the ovvcxi:wi:cxi:ov of all entities (1,25). The
One cannot but engender something else. It is thus called the productive power of
all things (ii navi:wv ouvcxµtc;, 1,36).4
The second chapter begins with the elucidation of the reason why the
generator of Intellect must be beyond Intellect itself, by means of stressing the
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multiplicity oflntellect (2, 1-12). In 2,4ff., the One is referred to as -ro von-r6v.5
Then, our text in discussion follows. It is a portion of Plotinus' reply to the question
raised in 2, 12: "But how does this Intellect come from the Intelligible [i.e. the
One]?" He writes:
The Intelligible remains by itself and is not deficient, like that which sees
and thinks--! call that which thinks deficient as compared with the
Intelligible, but it is not like something senseless (ouK ... o1ov
avo:ia9ri-rov); all things belong to it and are in it and with it (EITTtV CXU"tOU
mxv-ro: EV O:U"t~ KO:t auv O:U"t~). It is completely able to discern itself
(mxv-rri Oto:Kpt-rtKov Eo:u-rou); it has life in itself and all things in itself, and
its thinking of itself is itself by a kind of immediate self-consciousness and
is in everlasting rest and in manner of intellection different from the
thinking of Intellect (Ko:l T1 Ko:-ro:v6riau;; o:\J-rou o:\J-ro olovtt auvcxta9f\att
ouao: EV a-r6:a€t atO~ KO:t vof\aEt E"tEpW<; ft KO:"tCx "tflV vou v6riatv) (2, 1319, tr. A.H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).6
In the ensuing passage, Plotinus mentions the One's repose in itself and
elucidates the emergence of Intellect in terms of the contemplation of the One by
intellection, namely by the inchoate Intellect (2, 19-26).7 In order to defend the
One's immobility in its production of Intellect, Plotinus invokes the double. Ev€pyEto: doctrine, in which the relationship between the One and Intellect is
viewed as that between the inner and complete activity and the external activity
proceeding from it and acquiring substantial existence (2,26-37).8
First of all, we must notice that the One is described as -ro vori-r6v. As
already pointed out,9 the problem of the One's knowledge unavoidably arises when
the One is referred to as -ro

VOf11:0V

correlative to the pre-noetic voriau;;. As already

seen, 10 again, unless the transcendent vori-rov, which is the cause and archetype of
being, possesses life and activity, the intelligible being will be lifeless and unthinking
so that the intellect-intelligible identity will be compromised. Hence Plotinus
ascribes life to the One in 2, 16-17. Moreover, the positive account for the One's
inner life in 2, 13-19 is unmistakably linked with its internal EVEpyEto: of the double-
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activity theory developed in 2,26-37.11 When its systematic coherence with the
doctrines of Intellect's relation to the One and of self-intellection is carefully
considered, Plotinus' positive description of the One's cognitive activity is by no
means aberrant.
Plotinus explicitly ascribes Ko:i:o:v6r\O'u;; to the One in 2,17. In III 9
[13],9,22, on the contrary, i:o Ko:i:o:voEtV is denied to the One. But this does not bear
real inconsistency with V 4 [7],2. In III 9 [13],9, on the one hand, it is evident, from
the force of CXpO: in line 22, that K0:1:0:VO€tV is used synonymously with V0f10'1.C; Or
voEtv.12 In V 4 [7],2, on the other, Plotinus carefully mentions the difference of the
One's super-intellection from the intellection of Intellect in lines 18-19. The use of
Ko:"to:v6nau;; seems to be intended to make this demarcation prominent. As Rist
remarks, hence, it is clear that Plotinus "might understand Ko:"to:v6nau;; differently in
5.4.2. and 3.9.9."13 Moreover, the distinction intended in V 4 [7],2, as Bussanich
notes, 14 defeats the claims that Plotinus has here made the One some sort of
Intellect and that the One's Ko:i:o:v6nau;; may compromise its unity. He rather
ascribes to the One the hyper-intellection which is totally distinct from intellection
proper or the activity of Intellect.15
The One's super-intellection is also said to be in eternal rest (ii
K0:1:0:VOf10'1.C; O:U1:0U ... OUO'O: EV O'"t'cXO'El at.Oicp, 2,17-18). As already seen in Chapter
III of Part I, intellection is always associated with movement. Hence the phrase EV
a"taaEt at.Oicp indicates Plotinus' careful dissociation of the One's Ko:"to:v6nau;; from
any movement. This dissociation unmistakably confirms his following remark that
the One's Ko:-ro:v6natc; is EV vofian E"t'Epwc; fi Ko:"ta -ri)v vou vonatv (2, 18-19).
Moreover, the phrase seems to be closely related to 2, 13

E~'

€o:u"tou µ€vov. Hence

the One's Ko:i:o:v6nau;; can be taken to specify its self-abiding Ev€pyno: in the
double-activity theory developed in 2,26-37. The phrase EV ai:aan at.Oicp thus
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denotes that the One's self-remaining €vE:pyEta specified by its Kcx'tcxv611crt.c;; has no
implication of noetic movement.16

It is evident that the One's possession of cruvcxicr011crt.c;; explains that it is
never senseless. Notice that both cruvcxicr011crt.c;; and 6:vcxicr011"tov are qualified by

o'tov. The force of o'tov might be taken to mean that the ascription of a unique kind
of consciousness affects the intended distinction between being-conscious and beingunconscious to be not usual. As already seen, the term cruvcxicr011crt.c;; normally
pertains to unity as well as to multiplicity. Warren writes: "the particular
'sunaisthetizing' agent is a kind of unity such that its consciousness or awareness is
always of that unity itself."17 So the cruvcxicr011crt.c;; of Intellect is always of itself
being gathered into unity (V 3 [49],13,13; VI 7 [38],16,19-20; 35,30-32).18 Plotinus in
the present passage seems to stress the bearing of the term upon unity.19 The
qualifying o'tov in the present text precisely distinguishes the One's self-awareness
from Intellect's.20 The unique consciousness of the One, thus demarcated from
Intellect's self-awareness, surpasses the self-reflexivity proper to Intellect21 and
thereby exhibits the highest degree of concentration into absolute unity, which
Bussanich renders as "the undifferentiated self-awareness which is the One itself."22
How is the One's cruvcxicr011crt<; related to its KCX'tcxv611crt<;? Is the One's
awareness concomitant to its hyper-intellection? The answer is negative. Then, is
the One's super-intellection based on its consciousness? This question, first of all,
presupposes the distinction between the One's self-consciousness and selfknowledge. Henry insists on the necessity of this distinction.23 The main line of his
claim is as follows. While self-knowledge is proper to Intellect, self-consciousness is
applied to diverse levels of life. While cruvcxicr0ricrt<; in V 4 [7],2, 18 and €ypilyopcrt.c;;
in VI 8 [39], 16,31 are both qualified by ofov, KCX'tav6f1crl<; in V 4 [7],2, 17 and
unEpv611crt<; in VI 8 [39], 16,32 are not. Hence it seems to be more plausible to
attribute to the One the terms designating consciousness rather than the terms
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designating knowledge. Let us return to V 4 [7],2. In 2,17-18, we are told that the
One's thinking of itself is itself by its self-awareness

(ii Km:cxv611cru; cx\Jtou cx\Jto

oiovEl cruvcxtcr0f)cr€t). The dative oiovEl cruvcxtcr0f)cr€t denotes that the identity of
the One itself and its hyper-intellection is in virtue of its unique consciousness. In V
6 [24],5,4-5, where Plotinus speaks of the One's transcendence over selfconsciousness and intellection, we are told that that which is better than
cruvcxtcr0ncrtc; is also better than v611crtc;. Insofar as he does not mention the unique
cognitive state of the One in V 6 [24], we may not conclude inadvertently from this
statement that that which has a self-consciousness different from Intellect's has a
hyper-intellection. V 6 [24],5,4-5 cannot be a relevant clue to the interpretation of
the present passage. On the relationship between the One's KCX'tcxv611cru; and
cruvcxtcr0ncrtc;, therefore, we can say no more than that the identity of the One itself
and its hyper-intellection is in virtue of its unique self-awareness which is so
concentrated into unity as to annihilate the distinction, even conceptual, between
the One itself and its cruvcxtcr0ncru;, and also between the One itself and its
KCX'tCXVOT\O'u;.
Furthermore, we are told that the One completely discerns itself (naV'tT\
OtcxKpt'tlKOV €cxu'tou, 2, 16). In light of V 3 [49], 15,27-31, Rist observes that this
passage is "little more than an absolute affirmation of the One's simplicity."24 But
his view is not convincing, because he mistakenly believes that Plotinus in V 3

[49], 15 rejects the thesis that all intelligible objects are indistinctly included in the
One.25 Even if the present passage is considered separately from V 3 [49],15, as
Bussanich views,26 it does not confirm the One's simplicity. Bussanich, contrary to
Rist, holds that two relevant texts, VI 9 [9], 10, 14-15 and VI 7 [38],34, 14, suggest that
Plotinus' use of OtcxKpt'ttK6v in the present passage is "inappropriate for his
purpose."27 Although he does not explain what Plotinus' purpose here is, Bussanich
appears to mean the elucidation of the One's simplicity by it. Plotinus' purpose,
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however, seems to be rather the explication of the One's self-sufficiency, more
specifically, of its being not OloV O:vaia9Tl1:0V. The phrase naV1:Tl OUXKpl1:lKOV
€cxvi:ou exactly explains the One's being OUK o'lov O:vaia9Tli:ov. Hence Plotinus' use
of the term is not inappropriate for his purpose of revealing that the One is not
senseless, though it does not really confirm its simplicity.28
The section navi:Tl ouxKpti:tKov €aui:ou neither confirms nor denies the
One's absolute simplicity. Plotinus' use of such terms like Kai:av6Tlau;,
auvaia9Tlau;, and VOTlau; indicates that his conception of the One's knowledge is
somewhat analogous to Intellect's.29 Nevertheless, he elaborately precludes any
implication of duality from his characterization of the One's knowledge. The
passage i\ Kai:aVOTlCYl<; aui:ou aui:o seems to be very appropriate to the One's hyperintellection for two reasons. First, we must notice that the copula €cri:tv, probably
on purpose, is omitted. Second, as soon as we compare this passage with his
expression of the intellect-intelligible identity in 2,43-44, VOU<; of) Kat

ov i:aui:6v, it

turns out that the One's hyper-intellection is characterized by more intensified unity
than Intellect's self-intellection is. The One's self, which is undifferentiated from its
Kai:av6Tlau;, is neither subject nor object.30 Whereas Intellect is the same as the
Form, the Kai:av6Tlal<; of the One does not represent the sameness of Kai:avoouv
and Kai:avouµEvov. We are simply allowed to say that the One's Kai:av6Tlau; is the
One itself, but not that the One is the Kai:avoouv identical with the Kai:avouµEvov.
Although the One's hyper-intellection is exactly directed to the One itself, it is
clearly distinguished from Intellect's self-intellection by virtue of its being beyond
the subject-object duality.
In summary, the following three points must be noticed. First, we can
roughly say that the reason why Plotinus is compelled to ascribe a sort of
consciousness and intellection to the One in V 4 [7],2 is as follows. Plotinus, in V 4
[7], attempts to give an account of the necessity of the procession of Intellect from
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the One in terms of the One's self-sufficiency. In order to be not deficient in any
respect, the One must not be senseless. In order to be not senseless, hence, the One
is naturally conceived to have a kind of awareness and knowledge. In a word, the
attribution of hyper-consciousness and hyper-intellection to the One is more
appropriate for the One's self-sufficiency, which is thematically discussed here, than
Plotinus' usual denial of intellection to the One is. As repeatedly mentioned,
moreover, the conception of the intelligible objects as living and thinking is the very
copestone of Plotinus' doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity or selfintellection. In V 4 [7],2, the One is recurrently referred to as 'to VOfl'tOV. In so far
as the One is the archetype of Intellect qua 'to vo11't6v, it is absurd to consider the
One to be lifeless or inactive. Hence Plotinus is forced to specify the internal life
and activity of the One by hyper-consciousness and hyper-intellection. It would be
no exaggeration to say that his description of the One here is a sort of via eminentia
in spite of his reference to Pann. 142a3-4 in 1,9.31 Second, the hyper-consciousness
and hyper-intellection of the One specify its self-abiding €v€pyEtcX. Since the One is
ETIEKElVa oucri.ac; (2,38), its self-remaining activity does not coexist with oucri.a. Such
· transcendent activity is distinct from intellection which is the €v€pyEtcX necessarily
accompanied with oucri.a. Hence the hyper-consciousness and hyper-intellection are
viewed as specifications of this unique €v€pyEtcX beyond oucri.a. Finally, although
Plotinus, in describing the One's cognitive activity, employs such terms like v611crtc;,
Ka'taVOflcrtc;, and cruvcxtcr811crtc;, he distinguishes it from Intellect's activity and
dissociates any implication of duality, multiplicity and movement from the One's
knowledge with enough sensitivity.
The core of the problem of the One's knowledge has thus been revealed
from our analysis of V 4 [7],2, which belongs to the group of early treatises. The
problem imposed on Plotinus is precisely how it is possible to describe positively
such unique EVEpyEtcX that is beyond oucri.a, without bringing to that description any
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implication of duality, multiplicity and movement, which characterize intellection
proper. We shall see later how Plotinus tackles this problem again in his middle
treatises, VI 7 [38],39 and VI 8 [39],16.
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NOTES

lSee E. R. Dodds, "Numenius and Ammonius," in Les Sources de Plotin
(Geneva, Vandoevres: Fondation Hardt, 1957), pp. 20, 59; A.H. Armstrong,
Plotinus, Text with an English Translation, 7 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1966-1988; London: William Heinemann, 1966-1988), 5:146, note
1; J.M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1967), p. 43. This observation seems to be based on the comparison of V 4 [7],2, 18
EV CTtclO"El ai.O~ with two Numenian passages, III 9 [13],1,16-17 vouv EV CTtclO"El Kat
€v6i:rrn Kat i)a\JxlQ: and II 9 [33],1,26-27 nva vo\Jv EV i\a\JxlQ: i:tvt (e.g., J.M. Rist,
Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 42). The appeal to the Numenian influence in V 4
[7],2 by comparing it with the allegedly Numenian exegesis of Tim. 39e in III 9
[13], 1, prima facie, faces the difficulty manifested in the inconsistency between the
ascription of Kai:aVOf\O"l<; to the One at V 4 [7],2, 17 and the denial of i:o Ka-cavoEtV
to it at III 9 [13],9,22. Rist attempts to solve this problem by saying that Plotinus
"might understand Kai:aVOT\O"l<; differently in 5.4.2 and 3.9.9" (Plotinus: The Road to
Reality, p. 43). Even though, as we shall see later, the meaning of Ka-caVOf\O"l<;
differs in V 4 [7],2 and III 9 [13],9, this remark cannot be a cogent solution, for the
difficulty in question seems to arise from an inaccurate observation that III 9 [13] as
a whole is "the Ennead with the most obviously Numenian interpretation of the
Timaeus" (Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 43). As several critics note (e.g., A.H.
Armstrong, Plotinus, 3:404), III 9 [13] is not a single treatise but a collection of
Plotinus' notes gathered by Porphyry. Hence the superficial incongruity between V
4 [7],2,17 and III 9 [13],9,22 has no bearing on the terminological resemblance
between V 4 [7],2,18 and III 9 [13],1,16-17. For a further critique of Rist's position,
see J. Bussanich, "Plotinus on the Inner Life of the One," Ancient Philosophy 7
(1987):164-165; The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, A Commentary on
Selected Texts, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), p. 20; G. J.P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy
of the Self (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 108-109, note 63 to ch. 3.

2In V 4 [7], the multiplicity of Intellect is revealed in two ways. First, there
is a duality in the self-intellection oflntellect (2, 10). Second, Plotinus contrasts
Intellect which "manifests a composition ( auv8Eaiv "LE €µ~aivwv)" (2,9) with the
One which is €(w ... a\Jv8€aEw<; (1,11). On Intellect's compositeness, see also VI 7
[38], 10,9-10 and VI 9 [9],2,31. The passage Kat no:U.a opwv TlOT\ (2, 10) also indicates
the compositeness of Intellect. As Atkinson, following Theiler, remarks, in Plotinus:
Ennead V.1, a Commentary with Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1983), p. 166, VOT\O"l<; (2,4) refers to the inchoate Intellect as does V 1 [10],7,11 and
VI 7 [38],40,10-11: the inchoate Intellect sees (opwaa, 2,4) the One as
VOT\"LOV.
The use of TlOT\ in 2, 10 clearly indicates that that which manifests a composition is a

'to
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fully formed Intellect rather than the inchoate one. For the similar use of TlOTl. see
y 3 [49], 11, 11. The internal compositeness oflntellect points to its internal
complexity. In the treatise written before V 4 [7], Plotinus has already entertained
the all-inclusiveness and mutual-inclusiveness of Intellect (V 9 [5],6,7-10; 10,9-10),
which is fully developed in later treatises (III 8 [30],8,40-48; V 8 [31],4,3-11; 9,14-18).
The compositeness of Intellect, prima facie, seems to mark Plotinus'
departure from Plato for whom the separate Form, a counterpart of the Plotinian
Intellect, is categorized into 'tcX acn'JV9€'tCX (Phd. 78c7). Plotinus' proviso VOfl'tftV
µE:v-rm in V 4 [7],2, 10 would be well illuminated by VI 7 [38], 10, 10-11 Kcxl
a~(.oµE:vwv €K6:a-rwv, otcxt Kcxl cxl µop~cxl Kcxl ol A.6ym. Plotinus definitely
distinguishes the intelligible compositeness from the sensible one which admits
destruction. Hence his departure from Plato does not mean that he applies the
sensible compositeness to the intelligible world. As Cornford notes in Plato's Theory
of Knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1935; reprint ed., Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), pp. 268-273, the internal complexity of the generic and the
specific Forms is implicit in Soph. 253d5-9. But, since this remains one of the
possible interpretations of that difficult passage, we cannot conclude that Plotinus'
view of the intelligible compositeness is prefigured by Plato. For an argument for
the internal multiplicity of the Platonic Form, see R. M. Dancy, "The One, the
Many, and the Forms: Philebus l5bl-8,"Ancient Philosophy 4 (1984):179-183.
3See also V 1 [10],6,36-37. For the necessity of procession in general, see
note 73 in Chapter III of Part I.
4See also III 8 [30],10,1; V 1[10],7,9-10;V3 [49],15,33; V 4 [7],2,38. For
the meaning of this characterization, see M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 165.
Armstrong comments on the occurrence of this term at III 8 [30], 10, 1 and
refers to IV 8 [6],6,11 and VI 9 [9],5,36 (Plotinus, 3:394, note 1). But it is difficult to
regard ouv6:µEW<; cl~'tO\J, 0011 EV EK€lVOl<; in IV 8 [6],6, 11-12 as referring solely to
the One, because of the plural dative EKEivotc;. Vitringa's EKE iv~, accepted by
Brehier, makes it possible to ascribe this ineffable power to the One. But
Armstrong, with Henry and Schwyzer, does not accept Vitringa's emendation.
Although Rist attributes this power to the One (Plotinus: The Road to Reality, pp.
74-75), whether he accepts Vitringa's emendation is not fully clear. Indeed the
reading of the original text EKEtVOl<; does not necessarily exclude the One from the
referents of the ineffable power. It is at least evident that the power in question is
not attributed solely to the One.
In VI 7 [38], 17,32-34, Plotinus speaks of three stages of the emergent
process of the manifoldly articulated Intellect; (1) the indefinite life, namely the
inchoate Intellect, as the whole ability (f1v ouv Ti µE:v (,wi) ouvcxµt<; ncxacx), (2) the
vision, namely the Intellect in the midst of the process of self-formation, as the
ability of becoming all things (Ti OE opcxat<; Ti EKE'i8EV ouvcxµt<; n6:vi:wv), (3) the fully
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formed Intellect manifested in all things (6 OE YEVOµEvoc; vouc; cx\.11:0: avE<fxlVll i:O:
navi:cx). What does the ouvcxµtc;; navi:wv here mean? In order to answer this, we
need to clarify the referent of EKE10Ev in line 33. According to Lexicon Plotinianum,
ed. J. H. Sleeman and G. Pollet (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980; Leuven: Leuven
University Press, 1980), p. 350, the referent is the One. In terms of the continuity
between the inchoate Intellect and the fully actualized Intellect in the emergent
process, rather, we may take EKE10Ev to mean "from the indefinite life." Thus fl
EKEl0EV ouvcxµtc;; navi:wv designates the ability which arises from the indefinite life
as ouvcxµtc;; nCicrcx and tends towards the hypostatization of the all-inclusive, fully
formed Intellect; it is already involved in the process of articulation of multiple
forms. The inchoate Intellect is the ouvcxµtc;; nCicrcx which lies before that process.
The contrast between ouvcxµtc;; TCCXO"CX and fl EKEl0EV ouvcxµtc;; navi:wv, with the
binary particles µ€v and 0€, seems to describe effectively the nature of the process
in question, that is, the articulation of multiple forms. For the application of the
word ouvo:µtc;; to the inchoate Intellect, see also III 8 [30],11,2. In V 1 [10],5,18-19,
intellection of the fully formed Intellect, rather than the aspiration of the Intellect in
its emergent process, is compared to opcxcrtc;; 6pwcrcx (see also v 3 [49], 10, 12).
VI 7 [38], 17 will be considered again in the third chapter.
In addition, Beierwaltes sees the ouvcxµtc; n6:vi:wv in terms of the One's
presence in and transcendence over all things with his reference to VI 4 [22],11,2021. See W. Beierwaltes, "Metaphysik des Lichtes in der Philosophie Plotins,"
Zeitschrift far Philosophische Forschung 15 (1961):354. This view can be further
explicated in terms of the One's perfect stability in Intellect's procession from it (see
V 1 [10],6,25-27). In VI 4 [22],11,20-21, however, the One's creativity is not
mentioned.
5Corrigan believes that the discourse in V 4 [7],2,4-19 is confined to an
intellectual or pre-intellectual sphere. So he claims that to regard i:o VOf'\"t:OV in 2,4
as the One is
"a mistaken identification for the simple reason that the question Plotinus
asks already supposes a fully formed vouc;. The question, then, concerns
Intellect, not the One, and this makes a difference to the universe of
discourse" ("Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5,4 [7],2 and Related Passages," Hennes
114 (1986):196).
This view is totally untenable. The question Plotinus raises in 2,3-4 definitely
concerns the One. Armstrong and Brehier accurately render it:
"But why is the generator not Intellect, whose active actuality is thinking?"
(Armstrong).
"Mais pourquoi le generateur n'est-il pas l'Intelligence?" (Brehier).
Mizuchi also follows the same line. Corrigan's interpretation is based on
MacKenna's translation, which he cites: "But why is the Intellectual-Principle not
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the generating source?" Harder follows the same line: "Aber warum ist nicht der
Geist das Zeugende?" The sentence directly preceding the question (2,2-3)
mentions the transcendence of the generator of Intellect over Intellect itself and the
necessity that the product of that generator is Intellect (ErtEt 0€ ErtEKEtva vov 'tO
YEVVWV, vovv dvat exvayKn). The generator's transcendence can imply that it is
not Intellect itself. Here the ontological status of the generator, rather than that of
Intellect, is questioned. Hence Armstrong's, Brehier's, and Mizuchi's translations
better fit the context. The question in 2,3-4 exactly deals with the nature of the One.
Even though MacKenna's translation is accepted by Corrigan, it is rash to consider
the sphere of Plotinus' question in his translation to be restricted solely to Intellect.
For a further critique of Corrigan's position, see J. Bussanich, Ancient Philosophy 7
(1987):184, notes 9, 11, and 12; idem, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in
Plotinus, pp. 12-13.
6Corrigan maintains that auvaia0ncru; and Km:av6nau; here refer to "the
internal genesis of intellectual plurality" rather than to the cognitive activity of the
One (Hennes 114 (1986):199, note 8). But we cannot follow his view for the reason
mentioned in note 5.
7Tue phrase EV 't(ij oiKEi4> fl9tt in 2,21 is from Tim. 42e5-6. Here, as well
as in V 3 [49],12,33-34, it is applied to the One, while to the immaterial generators
in general in IV 8 [6],6,10 and V 2 [11),2,2. Baltes observes that this passage is
employed to deny that the generation of Intellect is based upon the One's desire of
production in Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken
Interpreten, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), 1:200.
8for the double-activity theory in general, see II 9 [33],8,22-23; IV 3
[27],10,30-37; IV 5 [27],7,17-20; V 1[10],3,7-12;V2 [11],1,16-18; V 3 [49],7,21-26.
Bussanich maintains that the double-activity theory must be seen in
conjunction with the notion of the One as the ouvaµtc; naV'tWV (The One and Its
Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 30). His view would be warranted by the phrase
EK 'tTl<; napouanc; ouvaµEwc; in v 1 [10],6,32, where Atkinson views that the doubleactivity theory is in play (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 145).

9See Section VII of Chapter III in Part I.
lOSee Section VIII of Chapter III in Part I.
llBussanich also follows the same line of interpretation:
"The double-EvE-pytta theory has important implications for the proper
understanding of lines 15-19 w.bere Plotinus speaks of the One in such
positive terms. Generally, the One's self-consciousness and super-
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intellection are specifications of the One's inner life and activity" (The One
and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 31).
See also G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity (New York: Peter Lang,
1988), p. 53. Rist regards the One as the inactive vorrr:ov (see note 157 in Chapter
III of Part I). We cannot see how the alleged inactivity of the One can go well with
its life, self-consciousness, and hyper-intellection.
12For this synonymy, see J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect
inPlotinus, pp. 26-27; idem,Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):167.
13J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 43.
14J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 27;
Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):167. See also G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of
Unity, p. 58. Bussanich maintains also that this distinction defeats the view that
regards Plotinus' account for the One in V 4 [7],2 as his early aberration.
15Armstrong correctly holds that Plotinus, in the present text, stresses the
inadequacy of expressing the absolute simplicity of the One by means of the identity
of divine thought with its object (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 410). Schwyzer likewise
takes unEpv6riau;; in VI 8 [39],16,32 as locking out the thinking of the object (Les
Sources de Plotin, p. 389). Many critics consider unEpv6riau;; there to be equivalent
to Km:av6riau;; in our present passage (see J.M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality,
p. 49; J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect, p. 27;Ancient Philosophy 7
(1987):182; P. Henry, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 59).
Some might object that the phrase €-r:€pw<;; f\ Ka-r:a -r:i\v voG voriatv marks
the distinction between the One's hyper-intellection and the pre-noetic intellection
of the inchoate Intellect, since voriau;; in 2,4 refers to the inchoate Intellect (see
note 2) and its correlative object, -r:o vori-r:ov, still refers to the One in the present
passage. This construction is not convincing, because the genitive voG in 2,19
definitely refers to the fully formed Intellect as explicitly as it does in 2,3 and 2, 12.
160n the dissociation of movement from the One's hyper-intellection, see
G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 58; J. Bussanich, The One and Its
Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 25-26;Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):167, and 185,
note 15.
17E. W. Warren, "Consciousness in Plotinus," Phronesis 9 (1964):90.
180n the connection between Intellect's auvaia9riat<;; and its interior
multiplicity gathered into its own unity, see note 3 in Chapter III of Part I.
19See G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 58.
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20See J. Bussanich,Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):168; and G. M. Gurtler,
Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 58. Schwyzer maintains that the addition of
o'lov is due to the indeterminacy of the term cruvexicr0flcru;. See H. -R. Schwyzer,
"'BewuBt' und 'UnbewuBt' bei Plotin," in Les Sources de Plotin (Geneva,
Vandoevres: Fondation Hardt, 1957), p. 375. Again, Warren views that it is due to
the metaphysical categories which prevent Plotinus from predicating the term of the
One (Phronesis 9 (1964):91), which, however, Warren does not specify. In terms of
the present context, Bussanich's view seems to be cogent. Moreover, Henry objects
to Dodds' claim of influence by Numenius in V 4 [7],2 by remarking that the
addition of o'tov rather denies the influence (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 59).
In V 8 [31],11,23, the cruvexicr0f1cru; of the soul who is one with Intellect is
also qualified by o'tov. The reason of this qualification is discussed in note 95 in
Chapter III of Part I.
21See J. Bussanich,Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):167-168. For the selfreflexivity of Intellect's self-consciousness, see A. Graeser, Plotinus and the Stoics
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), p. 130.
22J. Bussanich,Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):168.
23P. Henry, Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 386-387.
24J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 44.
25As Bussanich supposes in The One and Its Relation to Intellect in
Plotinus, pp. 22-23 and Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):185-186, note 25, Rist's
misconstruction seems to be due to his reading apex accepted by Kirchhoff and
Brehier instead of the MSS apex. Bussanich rightly remarks that V 4 [7],2,16 and V 3
[49],15,31 do not run counter to one another in The One and Its Relation to Intellect
in Plotinus, p. 22 and Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):169.
26J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 22;
Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):168.
27J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 23;
Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):169.
28Bussanich's reference to VI 9 [9], 10, 14-15 and VI 7 [38],34, 14 does not
seem to be cogent enough. He explains the reason why these texts are relevant to
the present text: "... the soul's awareness in the mystical union is not distinguished
from the One's." See J. Bussanich,Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):169. In both
passages, however, Plotinus speaks of nothing more than the disappearance of the
distinction between the contemplator and the contemplated One in the soul's
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awareness at the time of the mystical union, and the One's awareness itself is
nowhere mentioned. Therefore these passages are not as relevant as Bussanich
supposes.
29See J.M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 51: "It [i.e. the manner of
the One's knowing] is analogous to vouc; if vouc; is not conceived in the Aristotelian
fashion."
30We cannot see what Rist, in his comment on the self-directed nature of
the One's knowledge, means by saying that "the self is seen not as object but as
subject" (op. cit., p. 52).
31Henry remarks that V 4 [7],2 is equivalent to VI 8 [39],16 and that in the
latter chapter, there is a recovery from the classical theme of the via negativa and of
the absolute transcendence (Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 59-60).

CHAP'IERII
VI 9 [9],9, 13-22: TIIE HYPER-NOETIC INTEILECTION OF TIIE SOUL
UNITED WITH TIIE ONE

Plotinus often stresses that the sphere of intelligible realities cannot be
known by conjecture or syllogistic reasoning, 1 but solely by intuitive intellection.
Now the One is beyond the noetic universe and so cannot be apprehended even by
intellection. In fact, Intellect's inability to apprehend the One is reiterated
throughout the Enneads.2 A parallel is thus supposed to lie between the One and
the soul in union with the One in regard to their being free from intellection.3 In VI
9 [9],9,14-17, however, Plotinus appears to ascribe intellection to the soul united
with the One. Here we come across several problems. Is the intellection attributed
to her intellection proper, namely that activity which is oriented to the multiplicity
of intelligible objects? If not, how does it differ from intellection proper? May we
regard this ascription to be in parallel with the attribution of Kcxrav6riau; to the One
in V 4 [7],2? If so, is the parallel between the One and the soul united with the One
with respect to their having some cognitive activity different from intellection
coherent with the parallel between them with respect to their being free from
intellection? These queries precisely have definite bearings on the problem of the
One's knowledge. Hence we must not avoid taking VI 9 [9],9 into account.
The ninth chapter of VI 9 [9] begins with the elucidation of the One's
undiminishedness in creativity and the indestructibility of its products (9,1-7); since
the One, even when something else emanates from it, remains the same, those
entities which come from it are eternal. 4 This doctrine would be formulated such
that the One's undiminishedness in creativity is necessary for the indestructibility of
all other immaterial entities. In other words, those entities, in order to be
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indestructible or immortal, must be preserved by the outflow from the One.
Plotinus applies this general principle to the relationship of the soul to the One (9,711 ), and then associates degrees of the soul's well-being ("to EV) with degrees of her

orientation towards the One (9,11-13). Now we come to the text in question, where
Plotinus, however descriptively, talks about the soul's well-being found solely in her
orientation to the One:
There a soul takes a rest and, returning to the place immune from the evil,
is free from the evil. She also thinks there (Kat voE'i €v"tau9a), and is
there also free from suffering. The true life is also there. Because the
present life and the life without God are a trace of life imitating that true
life, while the life there is an activity of Intellect ( €v€pyEt.o: ... vou). With
this activity,5 the true life, in the calm contact with That [i.e. the One],
bears gods, beauty, justice, and virtue. Because the soul, when filled with
God, conceives them, it [i.e. the One] is the beginning and end for her. It
is the beginning because she comes from there, and the end because the
Good is there (9, 13-22).
In the rest of chapter, Plotinus gives an account of the soul's love for the
One.
In the above passage, Plotinus explicitly ascribes

VOElV

to the soul, though

. we, at this stage, cannot see whether it is intellection proper or not. If it is
intellection proper, the present text will be evidently at variance with Plotinus'
frequent assertion that the One is beyond the reach of intellection.6 In order to
answer this question, first of all, we need to reaffirm that the present context deals
exactly with the soul's union with the One.
The opposing view that the

VOELV

of the soul here mentioned is

intellection proper, in order to be textually warranted, must be based upon the
construction that the present context concerns the soul united with Intellect rather
than with the One. This construction, prima facie, appears to be tenable, because
there are at least three sections suggesting it. First, as Harder points out,7 the
passage, Kat voE'i €v"tau9a, Kat O:na9t1c; €v"tau9a (9, 14-15), approximates I 2
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[19],3,20, VO€l 't€ KCXt ancx0il<; OV'tW«; EO"'tlV. The latter text definitely deals with the
likening to god, that is, to Intellect. Second, the passage 'to 0€ EKE'i (,f1v EV€pyEta
µ€v votl (9, 17), as several critics note, 8 refers to Aristotle's doctrine oflntellect.
Finally, as for Tt'tEpoppUr,au; in 9,24,9 Plotinus usually employs this term for
describing the soul's divergence from the noetic world or the hypostasis Soul, rather
than from the One.10 It would not be unreasonable to conclude, from these
sections, that Plotinus here speaks of the soul which has ascended to the level of
Intellect rather than the soul which has attained the One in the apex of the mystical
ascent. According to this view, of course, we are forced to take EV'tcxtl9cx in 9,15 as
"in the noetic realm" and the soul's voE'iv as intellection proper.
Nevertheless it would be more natural and convincing to regard the
present text as dealing with the soul's union with the One. As already seen, the
present text presupposes the undiminishedness of the One's productivity mentioned
at the beginning of the chapter. So EV'tcxtl0cx in 9,15 might be taken to refer to EV
'tCXV'tTI 'tTI xopE~ in 9, 1. This reading is not unfounded because xopf'\yotlv'toc; in
9, 10 suggests that Plotinus, in the present passage, still keeps the metaphor of the
chorus in mind. The metaphor of the chorus at the end of the preceding chapter, as
the phrase 'tEAoc; KCXt av6:ncxuA.cx (8,43-44)11 indicates, is of the soul's union with the
One. If we further consider the phrase EV i)aux41 'tTI npoc; EKE'ivo Encx~n (9,18-19),12
it will be clear that the present passage unmistakably deals with the soul's union
with the One. But we must bear in mind that this fact does not necessarily entail the
purge of Intellect from the universe of discourse.13
We should like to return to the problem of voE'iv ascribed to the soul
united with the One. How does it differ from intellection proper? There seem to
be two instructive passages in VI 9 [9]. The first passage is VI 9 [9],3,26-27: " ... the
purest [i.e. the One] is seen with the pure Intellect, and with its primary part
(Kcx9cxp~ 't~ v~

. .. Kat 'toll vou 't~ npw't41)." This "primary part of pure Intellect"
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refers to the hyper-noetic state of Intellect, which is variously denominated "that of
Intellect which is not Intellect (-rti> E:cxu-rou µit vti>)" (V 5 [32],8,22-23), "Intellect
loving (vouc;; €p@v)" (VI 7 [38],35,24), and "the inner Intellect (6 €voov vo\Jc;)" (V 3

[49],14,14-15).14 Intellect in the hyper-noetic phase, as Bussanich notes, "in its

normal sense, ceases to exist and think."15 It is possible to see the present text in
terms of the hyper-noetic activity of Intellect. The "activity of Intellect' (VI 9

[9],9, 17) as the life of the soul united with the One would indicate this state since it
involves contact with the One (9, 18-19), and so intellection is here not ascribed to
the soul in its normal sense.16 Hence her VOEtV is surely hyper-noetic. If this is the
case, the present text is not at variance with the denial of intellection to the soul
united with the One or that of the possibility of attaining the One with intellection in
other passages. Moreover, the E:vE:pyEtcx vo\J in 9, 17 is not an inappropriate
reference to the hyper-intellective activity. As mentioned at Section VI of Chapter
III in Part I, the original intellection directed towards the Good is called the
€v€pyEtcx (V 6 [24],5,18-19; VI 7 [38],40, 18-19).
How may we call this hyper-intellective activity? The second passage
provides some information. In VI 9 [9],8,25-27, after reaffirming the One's
transcendence over Intellect, Plotinus writes that the soul's union with the One is
"due to other powers by which that which thinks [i.e. the soul] by nature unites with
that which is thought [i.e. the One] (ouv6:µEalV &A.Ao.u;;,

nTIE~UKE '[0 voo\Jv npOc; -ro

Kcx-rcxvom'.iµEvov auv6:m:Etv)." Here we must notice the correlation between -ro
voo\Jv and -ro Ka-ravoouµEvov. The One, grasped by the soul through the hyper-

noetic activity of Intellect, is -ro Ka-ravoouµEvov. In other words, i:o voo\Jv is here
i:o Kcxi:avoo\Jv. This unique and intimate relationship between the soul and the One
is totally distinct from that between i:o voo\Jv and i:o voouµEvov, which represents
intellection proper. Nothing may prevent us from calling this hyper-noetic activity
Kai:av6rptc;; or Kai:avoEtV. Considering these passages, we can thus conclude about
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voE'iV ascribed to the soul united with the One as follows. First, it refers to the

soul's engagement in the hyper-noetic state of Intellect and so is essentially distinct
from intellection in its normal sense. Second, it may be supposedly called
Kcxi:av6flal.<; or Kcxi:avoE'iv.17 If the above consideration is correct, it is possible to
establish the striking similarity between the hyper-intellective Km:av6flau; of the
soul united with the One in VI 9 [9],9 and the One's Kai:av6flau; that is said to differ
from intellection proper in V 4 [7],2.18
Bussanich, as already mentioned, 19 remarks the parallel between the One
and the soul united with the One with regard to their being free from intellection. Is
the above assumed parallel between them with respect to their having hyper-noetic
1<m:av6fla1.<; coherent with this parallel? For them to be coherent with one another,
Plotinus' position concerning the One's cognitive activity in VI 9 [9], first of all,
needs to be consistent with his position in V 4 [7]. Before examining the coherence
of two parallels, we must, therefore, explore Plotinus' view of the One's cognitive
activity in VI 9 [9].
In VI 9 [9], as well as in other treatises, intellection in its normal sense is
denied of the One (6,42; 6,49-51). Although Plotinus does not speak of the One's
hyper-intellective activity itself in this treatise, two passages should not be
overlooked. The first passage reads:
Although the Good neither knows nor thinks itself, nonetheless, ignorance
will not be around it. Because ignorance arises when there is another
thing, or whenever one is ignorant of another. That which stands alone
neither knows nor has anything of which it is ignorant. Since it, as one is
united with itself, does not need to think itself (6,46-50).
The argument here proceeds as follows. Ignorance presupposes duality.
But there is no duality in the One, so that it does not need to think itself and has
nothing of which it may be ignorant. Hence it is not justified to move from the
One's having no self-intellection to its being ignorant of itself. Can we further infer
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from the denial of the One's being surrounded by ignorance its possession of some
hyper-intellective activity? Since the present context is totally immersed in the via

negativa, this inference would not be recommended here. But the present passage is
not inconsistent with the One's hyper-noetic KCX'tcxv611crtc; in V 4 [7],2, where
Plotinus, as already seen, develops a sort of via eminentia.20 Rather, the denial of
ignorance to the One has some proximity to the definite statement that the One is
not OloV clVCXl0'0fl'tOV in V 4 [7],2,15.
The second passage, immediately following the first, reads:
For in order to observe carefully the One you should not add the beingunited-with-itself, but take away intellection and being-united and
intellection of its elf and of the others. Because (yap) the One must not be
placed on the side of the thinking subject ('tov voouv'tcx), but rather on the
side of intellection ('tftV v611crtv). Intellection does not think, but is the
cause of thinking for the other. The cause is not the same as the caused
(6,52-55).
This passage is slightly subtle. The statement that the One must be placed
on the side of intellection (6,52-53), prima facie, is not easy to reconcile with the
explicit denial of intellection to the One in 6,51-52. Harder remarks the transition
in the sense of v611crtc; from intellective activity to the voouµE:vov or

VOfl'tOV

in

6,5321 and renders Kcx'tc'x 'tftV v611crtv (6,53) "mit dem Denkinhalt." Harder's
interpretation, indeed, has the merit of conforming to V 4 [7],2,4-7 and V 6 [24],2,712, where Plotinus speaks of the transcendent

VOfl'tOV

or the One as the cause of

intellection. But it is unnatural and difficult to read the meaning of the intelligible
object into the word v611crtc;. Hence we cannot but feel reluctant to follow Harder's
interpretation. When we pay attention to yap in 6,52, it will be seen that to place
the One on the side of intellection which itself does not think (6,53-54) really
explains the preceding denial of intellection of any sort to it (6,51-52).22 It is
appropriate to place the One on the side of v611crtc; which does not think rather than
on the side of 6 vo@v which does think. In a word, Plotinus explains the absence of
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intellection from the One in terms of the fact that intellection, considered in
abstraction from substantiality, does not think. Since the tenor in the present
passage is persistently the absence of intellection from the One, VOflau; in 6,53
cannot be taken to refer to the hyper-noetic activity of the One.23 If Plotinus here
were to describe the One's inner life positively by noetic terminology, he should
carefully put some qualification as he did actually in V 4 [7],2,18-19 €v vDl1crEt

€i:€pW<; ft Kai:a i:i\v vou VOflatv. In the present passage, therefore, we find no
positive characterization of the One's inner life.24 The two passages above
considered do not violate Plotinus' positive description of the One's knowledge in V
4 [7],2.

Plotinus' view of the One's transcendence of intellection in VI 9 [9] is
coherent with his view of the One's knowledge in V 4 [7]. This consistency, as
already mentioned, is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the consistency of
the parallel between the One and the soul united with the One with regard to their
being free form intellection proper with another parallel between them with regard
to their possessing some hyper-noetic activity. Then, are these parallels themselves
· coherent with one another? First of all, when they are viewed systematically in
terms of the entire Enneads, we can see that the hyper-noetic activity of Intellect by
virtue of which the soul can attain the One is clearly demarcated from intellection
proper and so conclude that those parallels are consistent with one another. Then,
let us consider them solely within the doctrines in VI 9 [9] and its preceding
treatises. Although, in this case, we cannot rely on several relevant, instructive
passages in the middle and late treatises, we can see, by carefully analyzing the text,
that intellection proper is not attributed to the soul united with the One. 1 a this
extent, those parallels are coherent with one another. Plotinus, however, applies the

verb

VOEtV

to that soul and does not fully spell out the difference of her hyper-noetic

intellection from intellection proper in VI 9 [9]. Moreover, he does not actually
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specify what we may call the activity of the primary part of Intellect with which
alone the soul can contemplate the One. So the hyper-noetic intellection of the soul
united with the One is prone to be terminologically indistinguishable from
intellection proper. Because of this tendency, the two parallels above mentioned
are consequently prone to be regarded as inconsistent with one another. In other
words, such terminological immaturity, when the text of VI 9 [9] is read without
enough circumspection and sensitivity, is inclined to bring into question the
systematic consistency of those parallels.
Taking V 4 [7] and VI 9 [9] conjunctively, we can see not only that
Plotinus attributes the hyper-noetic activity to both the One and the soul united with
it, but also that the terms VOT\O't<; and voE'iV, though in V 4 [7],2 he adds the proviso
that the One's VOT\O't<; differs from intellection proper, are applied to their cognitive
states. The inchoate Intellect, furthermore, is also referred to as VOT\O't<; in the early
treatises.25 In the middle and late treatises, however, Plotinus, in describing the
hyper-noetic or pre-noetic activities of the One, the higher phase of Intellect, the
inchoate Intellect, and the soul united with the One, shifts from the tendency to
employ VOT\O't<; and Km:cxv6T\crtt; to the tendency to employ €ntJ3oA.fl and its cognates.
This shift and its effect on the coherence between the above considered parallels,
and the coherence of Plotinus' metaphysical scheme will be gradually disclosed in
our analysis of the middle and late treatises.
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NOTES

lSee IV 4 [28],5,5-6. On the sharp distinction between intuitive
intellection and discursive reasoning, see V 1 [10],10,12-13.
2See VI 7 [38],35,2-3; 35,44-45; VI 9 [9],4,2; 11, 11.
3See J. Bussanich,Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):166-167.
4Harder (Plotins Schriften, iibersetzt von R. Harder, Neubearbeitung mit
griechischem Lesetext und Anmerkungen forgefiihrt von R. Beutler und W. Theiler,
6 vols. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1960-1971), lb:484) holds that the referent of ou
yap oyKO<;; (9,3-4) is not the One, but those entities which proceed from it. But this
reading does not fit the context, where Plotinus thematically deals with the One's
undiminishedness in the procession of its products. If Harder's reading were
accepted, not only the next counterfactual apodosis fl <j>8cxpi:a av T)v i:a yEvvwµEva
(9,4) would sound somewhat redundant, but also the sequence of these two
sentences would obscure the present theme, the dependence of the eternal entities
on the One remaining the same. To take the One as the referent of ou yap oyKO<;;
thus seems to fit the present context better. Moreover, our reading is supported by
the phrase OU µe:µe:ptcrµEVT"\ El<; aui:a (9,5-6) reaffirming OU yap oyKrn;;.
5Kirchhoffs emendation €ve:pye:ic;x, which is accepted by Harder, Brehier,
and Tanaka, is read for H-S2 €v€pye:ta.
6See note 2.
7R. Harder, Plotins Schriften, lb:484.

8See R. Harder, Plotins Schriften, lb:484; P. Hadot, "Etre, Vie, Pensee
chez Plotin et avant Plotin," in Les Sources de Plotin (Geneva, Vandoevres:
Fondation Hardt, 1957), p. 112.
9See Phdr. 246c2, 248c9.
lOSee IV 8 [6],1,37 and 4,32. It might be claimed that Plotinus' talk about
the soul's escape from evils (9,13-14) confirms this opposing interpretation since the
intelligible world, as Plotinus reiterates, is immune from evils (I 8 [51],2,26-27; V 9
[5],10,17-18; VI 7 [38],19,15-16). In VI 9 [9], rather, the release from evils is
associated with the soul's ascent to the One (3,19-20).
llSee Rep. 532e3. For the One as the goal, see V 3 [49],17,34, V 5
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[32],12,20, and VI 9 [9],11,45. In I 4 [46], however, the well-being or life according
to Intellect is regarded as the goal (6,10-11; 6,32; 7,5; 7,13; 16,13).
12For the soul's €ncx~f} with the One, see V 1[10],11,14;V3 [49],17,25-26;
17,34-35; V 6 [24],6,35; VI 7 [38),30,3; 36,4; VI 9 [9],7,25; 9,55. Atkinson mentions
VI 5 [23],10,41 €~cxm:6µE0cx cx\.11:0\J (sc. i:aycx0ov) as an instance of €~ni:Ea0cxt used
of "touching the One" (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 238). But it is quite difficult and
unnatural to read the hyper-ontic Good into the context of VI 5 [23], 10.
13Plotinus usually differentiates the ascent from the sensible world to the
intelligible and that from the noetic realm to the One as "two stages of the journey
(ti nopEicx Bti:i:T))" (I 3 [20], 1, 12). In VI 9 [9], however, they are not fully
differentiated, but appear to be treated as one unbroken journey. This fact is quite
natural in terms of the theme in VI [9], that is, the metaphysical exposition of the
One and the soul's union with it. The ascent from the sensible world to the
intelligible is characterized by the release from materiality, while the ascent from
the intelligible world to the One is marked by the abandonment of all the
intelligible objects and so has nothing to do with the release from materiality except
for presupposing it as a necessary pre-stage. In VI 9 [9], Plotinus, on the contrary,
contrasts the soul's union with the One and her decline to materiality (3,6-10; 3, 1820; 10,1-3). A similar contrast is observed in one of the early treatises (I 6 [1],7,3639). Such a contrast, though it appears to be slightly awkward, would be acceptable
in terms of the fact that the two stages of the soul's ascent are not fully demarcated
from one another in VI 9 [9].
14For the inter-dependence of these texts, see note 12 in Chapter III of
Part I. Notice that 6 EVOOV vovc; in v 3 [49],14,14-15 is otherwise called VOUV
Kcx0cxpov (line 14). This would confirm the inter-dependence at least between VI 9
[9],3,26-27 and V 3 [49],14,14-15.
15J. Bussanich,Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):172, italics mine. What
Bussanich means by saying this is not fully clear. But there seem to be some clues.
In VI 7 [38],35,21-22, we read that Intellect, with a kind of intuition and reception
( €n$oA.n i:tvt Kcxl ncxpcxooxn) which belong to Intellect loving, "simply saw also
before (Kcxt np6i:Epov E:wpcx µ6vov)." This passage, in terms of the adverbial Kcxl
npfrrEpov and the imperfect E:wpcx, seems to refer to the inchoate Intellect, to which
the adverb µ6vov, which signifies the pre-cognitive state destitute of definite
objects, is sometimes applied (V 3 [49],11,12 E~Eatc; µ6vov; VI 7 [38],16,18 KLVT)atc;
... µ6vov). Further, Plotinus' attribution of €n$oA.f} to the inchoate Intellect (V 3
[49],11,12-13 oui:oc; ouv 6 vouc; €n€13o:AE µEv EKELV4>) would confirm this. Notice
that €ntJ3illnv is ascribed also to the fully formed Intellect in V 3 [49], 11,2. For
the One as i:o E:ntJ3illov, see V 6 [24],2,10. Now the soul, in order to unite with the
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One through the activity of the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect, must herself become
formless (VI 7 [38],34,1-4; VI 9 [9],7,14-16). See also VI 7 [38],32,24-29, where
Plotinus describes the unlimitedness of the soul's love for the One. Likewise, the
inchoate Intellect, being sheer intelligible matter, is formless. Hence that Intellect
in its hyper-noetic state ceases to exist in its nonnal sense would mean that it
becomes formless for the apprehension of the One. As mentioned in note 122 in
Chapter III of Part I, Intellect must become formless when its hyper-noetic phase
ceases to coexist with its self-thinking phase which inevitably concerns the
multiplicity of the Forms. By surrendering its self-thinking phase Intellect's original
intellection of the One is liberated from its necessary consequence, self-intellection
or contemplation of the pluralized images of the One. The above consideration
would reveal the dynamicity of intelligible matter and its crucial role in the soul's
union with the One. By "the dynamicity of intelligible matter" is meant its
possession of some sort of contemplative force. See J.M. Rist, "The Indefinite Dyad
and Intelligible Matter in Plotinus," Classical Quarterly 12 (1962):101-102. This
issue, however, is also beyond the scope of our present discussion.
Bussanich, moreover, observes the correspondence of the hyper-noetic
Intellect to "something like Intellect in the One which is not Intellect" in VI 8
[39],18,21-22 (Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):172). But we cannot see why the former
corresponds to the latter.
16In VI 9 [9], "intellection in its normal sense" is expressed as the
apprehension ( auv€atc;;) of the intelligible objects (4,2-3 ).
17As already mentioned in Chapter I, i:o K0'.1:0'.VOEtV in III 9 [13],9,22 is
synonymous with v6riatc;; in its normal sense. As its meaning differs is V 4 [7],2 and
III 9 [13],9 (see J.M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 43), it does so in VI 9
[9],8 and III 9 [13],9.
Our discussion would confirm the following remark by Bussanich: "In any
case we can be certain that the sort of vision [i.e. the vision of the One] he [i.e.
Plotinus] has in mind transcends intellection (Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):171,
(Italics mine.)).
18Bussanich is not aware of this proposed parallel, though he articulates
the similarity between the soul's and Intellect's hyper-noetic states and the unique
cognitive state of the One in terms of €ntJ3oA.fi-terminology (Ancient Philosophy 7
(1987):169-170).
Again, nEptv6riatc;; npoc;; €~apµoyr1v (VI 9 [9], 11,24) would also be
regarded as suggesting the hyper-noetic state of the soul. But the prefix nEpt-, as
well as the prefix K0'.1:0'.-, would at best imply the intensity of her cognitive effort. See
J. M. Rist, "The One of Plotinus and the God of Aristotle," Review of Metaphysics 27
(1963):81.
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19See note 3. For the similarity between the One and the hyper-noetic
phase of Intellect, see J. Bussanich, Ancient Philosophy 7 ( 1987): 170.
20Rist takes V 3 [49], 13,6-9 to mean that one must not jump from the view
that the One "has no v611cru; to the conclusion that it is av611i:ov" (Plotinus: The
Road to Reality, p. 41). If this exegesis were correct, this passage would be clearly
consistent with the present tex:. But V 3 [49],13,6-9, as we shall see in the seventh
chapter, is more complicated than Rist imagines.
In III 8 [30],9, 15, Plotinus considers the consequences of two disjunctive
hypostases that the One is either thinking or unthinking: "Well, if it is thinking it
will be an intellect, but if it is unthinking, it will be ignorant even of itself (av611i:ov
6€ ayvof\crEl Kat €aui:6)" (tr. A.H. Armstrong). He later explicitly denies
intellection to the One (11,13-14). Does Plotinus here affirmatively infer the One's
ignorance from its unthinking and so violate his own statement in the present text?
III 8 [30],9, 15 will also be seriously considered later.
21R. Harder, Plotins Schriften, lb:478.
22AJso in V 6 [24 ],6,3-10 and VI 7 [38],37, 15-16, the absence of intellection
from the One is elucidated in such manner that v611cru; and €v€pyEt.a, tentatively
identified with the One, possess neither v611cru; nor €v€pytta. The distinction
between 6 vo@v and v611cru; in the present passage is equivalent to that between i:o
€xov i:i)v v611crtv and 'fl v611cru; in V 6 [24],6,9-10. Wallis takes the present passage
with VI 7 [38],37,15-16 and comments: "... we may describe the One ... as a pure
Intellectual Act prior to the emergence of subject and object" in Neoplatonism
. (London: Duckworth, 1972), p. 59. It is clear, at least in the present passage, that
Plotinus employs the word v611au; in the sense of pure activity in abstraction from
its subject and object. But this fact would not immediately allow us to describe the
One as the pure intellectual act, because Plotinus aims at giving no positive
characterization of the One's inner life in the present passage. With Bussanich, we
can say at best that the One is analogous to v611au; as €v€pyEta (The One and Its
Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 69).
23Corrigan, comparing the present passage with V 4 [7],2,18-19, observes
that Plotinus is here "more careful to avoid speaking of a v611m.c; which surpasses
the v611atc; of vouc;" (Hennes 114 (1986):201). Although this view is correct as
regards the present passage, we cannot see his intention to take Kai:O: i:i)v v611crtv in
line 53 with nEptv611atc; npoc; €~apµoyf}v in 11,24-25 (ibid.:201, note 16). This
appears to be partially due to his rendering Kai:O: i:i)v v611atv as "in accordance with
intellection." But, insofar as Plotinus he.re stresses the role of the One as the cause
of intellection, we may take Kai:6: as meaning place rather than fitness.
It would not, however, be totally correct to say that Plotinus tries to avoid
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speaking of a v6nau; which surpasses the v6nau; of Intellect throughout VI 9 [9].
NoEtV ascribed to the soul united with the One (9,14-15), as already seen, definitely
surpasses intellection proper.
24We subscribe to Bussanich's observation that to place the One on the
side of intellection does not mean that the One is v6nau;, but suggests that it is an
€v€pyEux (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 69).
25See V 4 [7],2,4 and V 1 [10],7,11. The similar reference to the inchoate
Intellect occurs still in the middle treatises (VI 7 [38],40, 10-11 ). Here, however, the
binary particles µE:v (line 7) and 0€ (line 10) distinguish ti vonau; (lines 10-11) as
the inchoate Intellect from v6nau; (line 7) as intellection proper.

CHAYfERID
V 1 [10],7,4-17: TIIE ONE'S QUASI-CONSOOUSNESS?

The words otov auvaia9llalv occur in V 1 [10],7,12. Whether the subject
of EX€l in 7,12, the object of which is otov auvaia9llalv, is the One or Intellect is
highly disputed. If it is the One, the present passage will afford us some information
about the One's self-consciousness. But another serious controversy about the
subject of €wpa in 7,6, in addition to the probable lacuna in 7,7-8, further
complicates this problem, and therefore the section in question as a whole is usually
considered to be one of the most difficult passages in the Enneads.1 Thus, even
though our main concern is the identification of the subject of EXEL in 7, 12, we
cannot avoid the elaborate analysis of the entire passage.
We may begin our analysis with 7,4-6. The text reads:

MA. ' ou vouc;; EKEtvo. nwc;; ovv vo\Jv yEvv~; ft frn -rn E:ma-rpo<j>n npOc;;
au-ro €wpa· it 0€ opaatc;; au-rll vouc;;.
The beginning part of the seventh chapter of V 1 [10] takes over the
discussion of the relationship between Intellect and the One at the sixth chapter;
Intellect is an image of the One and the former is similar to the latter (7, 1-4 ). The
conjunction of MA.a and fl, as several commentators point out,2 indicates the
objection by an imaginative interlocutor and Plotinus' own response. The point of
the objection is as follows: even though Intellect is in many respects like the One,
the image is not that of which it is the image, so that Plotinus is forced to explain the
way in which the One begets Intellect and provides it with some similarity with the
One while it is distinct from the One. This objection captures the separateness of
Intellect from the One by otherness (6,53)3 and adumbrates the weak point in the
explanation of the genesis of Intellect by the doctrine of emanation, which cannot
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fully articulate the very otherness between Intellect and the One (6,30-40).4 In a
word, the imaginary interlocutor asks Plotinus to spell out the derivation of the
multiplicity of Intellect from the absolutely simple One by counterbalancing their
similarity and their explicit otherness.
Now in the interrogative sentence (7,5), the word vouv lies in the
emphatic position. O'Daly notes that this emphatic position radically changes the
meaning of the question; it deals with the fact that what is created is Intellect rather
than with the creative act of the One itself.5 Then those commentators who regard
the subject of €wpcx as the One usually raise an objection that the opposing reading
entails the abrupt shift in the subject of the verb. But the objection-response
structure of the present passage, together with O'Daly's remark, would justify the
subject change.6 We, however, do not wish to conclude hastily that Intellect is the
subject of €wpcx.
It seems possible to defend the view that the subject of €wpcx is the One by

the alleged parallel between 7,5-6 and 6, 17-19. But the exegesis of 6, 17-19 is also
highly disputed with regard to the referents of EKEivou and m'..rr6 in 6,18. Two ways
of reading are possible; either (i) EKEivou refers to the One and cx\n:6 is reflexive, or
(ii) EKEivou refers to 'to µE'ta 1:0 €v and cxu1:6 non-reflexively to the One.7 Igal
presents two reasons for (i). First, the pronoun EKEtvo and its cognates consistently
refer to the One in that context. Second, the meaning of €ma1:po<J>T1 differs in 6, 18
and 7,5; it is closely associated with the denial of movement to the One and refers to
the One's introversion in the former section, whereas it denotes the conversion of the
inchoate Intellect towards the One in the latter. Igal thus points out the contextual
difference between 6,17-19 and 7,5-6; the former concerns the procession of
Intellect without damaging the self-repose of the One, while the latter the
pluralization of the vision of Intellect as the result of its conversion towards the
One.8 !gal's first point is cogent enough. But his second reason presupposes not
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only (i) but also the view that the subject of €wpa in 7,6 is Intellect. Hadot
moreover raises two objections to (ii). First, the context of 6, 17-19 deals with the
One's immobility so that mention of Intellect's reversion would be otiose. Second,
(ii) presupposes the absurdity that Intellect must be engendered before its
emergence.9 The first objection is indeed sound. Atkinson attempts to dismiss the
second objection by showing that what turns towards the One is the inchoate
Intellect rather than the fully actualized one.to But Atkinson's counter-objection
involves the abrupt appearance of the inchoate Intellect in the present context.11 In
conclusion, it would be unanimously affirmed that 6,17-19 thematically deals with
the One's unmovedness. Hadot treats the alleged self-reversion of the One here as
synonymous with its self-repose as mentioned in v 4 [7],2, 19 (µ€voV'tO<; aui;ou EV
aui;Q).12 Atkinson considers the alleged synonymy to be paradoxical.13 Aubin,
against Hadot, claims that the self-reversion is denied of the One, in light of V 3
[49],1,3-4.14 Aubin's claim is totally untenable. As Atkinson points out,15 i;ou
anXov in V 3 [49], 1,3 is associated with Intellect rather than with the One, and
thereby Aubin's argument is based on a supposition that what is said of Intellect
should be denied of the One. This supposition would indeed be right. But V 3

[49],1,3-4 is an interrogative sentence and so does not establish the denial of the
self-reversion to Intellect. In V 3 [49],6,5, rather, self-reversion is explicitly ascribed
to Intellect (Kat €mai;p€<j>ov El<; aui;6v).16 Thus we have now reached the crux of
the problem; whether €mai;po~i) can be used with no implication of motion, so that
self-reversion can be consistently ascribed to the One. Throughout the Enneads
there is no passage in which the One's €mai;po~i) towards itself is associated with its
self-repose. But there is a relevant passage (VI 8 [39], 16,24-25), where the selfinclination of the One towards itself is identified with its self-repose

(ii 'tOtaU'tfl

VE\Jau; npoc; aui;ov ... ouao: ... µovi) EV aui;Q). The use of the word VEVat<; here
is quite unusual, since the term is sometimes used to describe the Gnostic doctrine
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of the creation of the universe by the cosmic souJ.17 Here the One's inclination
towards itself, contrasted with the inclination towards what is outside of itself (npCx;

i:o €~w vEvatv m'.rrov, 16,26-27), is said to keep its own ontological status.18

In V 1

[10], likewise, an extroverted inclination is denied of the One (mi npoavEvacxvi:0<;,
6,26).19 If both EKEtvou and cxfrt6 in 6,18 were to refer to the One, V 1 [10],6,17-18
and VI 8 [39],16,24-28 would be to some extent parallel to each other,20 though they
differ contextually in that the genesis of Intellect is not thematically discussed in the
latter. Needless to say, unless the referents of EKEtvou and m'.rt6 are exactly
identified, we cannot count this supposed parallel as a reason for the proposed
reading. Nevertheless, it seems textually warranted that to think of the One's selfreversion or self-inclination and its self-repose as synonymous is not paradoxical.21
To recapitulate, it would be more reasonable to regard EKEtvou and cxui:6
in 6, 18 as both referring to the One because of the three following reasons. First,
the pronoun EKE'lvo, as Igal points out, consistently refers to the One in the present
context. Second, to think of the reversion of the inchoate Intellect towards the One
in this passage would involve the abrupt mention of it. Finally, Plotinus admits the
·motionless self-reversion of the One. Then, is 6,17-19 relevant to 7,5-6? Their
contexts do not definitely differ, since both concern the genesis of Intellect. But this
fact does not necessarily allow us to take 7,5-6 in light of 6,17-19. We may not take
i:n €mai:pO<j>n in 7,5 as the One's self-reversion, because it has not yet been
established that the meaning of €mcri:po~T, is the same in 6, 18 and 7,5. Hence we
must consider 7,5-6 separately from 6,17-19, until the meaning of 7,5-6 is fully
discussed and articulated.
Let us return to 7,5-6. We have no other means of identifying the subject
of €wpcx than to compare the consequences of the suppositions either that the
subject is the One or that it is Intellect. First, let us suppose that the subject is the
One. This supposition requires the reading of either the reflexive cxui:6 or
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l(irchhoff s emendation a\n:6. The reading of the non-reflexive a\n:6 and
associating it with i:o yEvoµEvov in 7,3 are at variance with the One's €mcn:pa<J>fl.
This supposition, first of all, refers to the One's self-vision. Although it is qualified
by oiov and not linked with the genesis of Intellect in VI 8 [39],16,19-21, the One's
self-vision is conceivable. Given that the demonstrative aui:fl in 7,6 picks up the
subject of €wpa,22 then, the present supposition is to identify Intellect with nothing
else than the self-envisagement of the One and so to make it internal to the One. If
this be the case, the entailed consequence violates the formula that each of three
hypostases is distinct from its cause or offspring,23 blurs the necessary distinction
between the activity constitutive of the One and the activity from it,24 and infiltrates
a multiplicity into the absolutely simple One.25 Several absurdities are thus
involved in this supposition.26
What about the other supposition that the subject of €wpa is Intellect?
This supposition forces us to read avi:6 as non-reflexive, because the reading of
either the reflexive avi:6 or Kirchhoff s avi:6 eliminates the role of the One in the
genesis of Intellect. The problem of the abrupt change of subject, as already shown,
is solved in terms of the present passage's structure as objection and response. The
adherents to this supposition remark that the contrast between the imperfect €wpa
and the word opacru; indicates the transition from the inchoate Intellect to the fully
actualized one, from the indefinite and vague vision to the articulated and
pluralized one.27 They maintain that this interpretation has the advantage of
conforming to Plotinus' frequent account for the hypostatization of Intellect by the
reversion of the inchoate Intellect towards the One.28 On this reading, moreover,

i:n €mcri:po~n in 7,5 means precisely the reversion of the inchoate Intellect towards
the One. The meaning of €mcri:po~fl is hence different in 6, 18 and 7,5.29
Bussanich points out two difficulties in this construction.30 First, the
proposed reading requires a shift in the meaning of

i:o yEvoµEvov; it refers to the
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fully actualized Intellect in 7,3, whereas it must mean the inchoate Intellect in 7,5.3 1
Second, opwcrcx attributed to the inchoate Intellect in V 4 [7],2,4-5 undermines
Atkinson's assertion that opcxcru;; must be attributed to the actualized Intellect.
Bussanich's charge, however, does not prove a fatal blow to the proposed reading.
First, the subject of E:wpcx is not the inchoate Intellect but the fully
actualized Intellect. The laconic sentence (i) -rn bncri:po<j>n npOc;; oo'.Ji:o (ii) E:wpcx is
exactly parallel with v 2 [11),1,9-10 1:0 5€ YEVOµEVOV (i) Eic;; cxvi:o ETIEITTp6:~l1 ...
KCXL (ii) E:y€v€1:0 npoc; cxvi:o J3A.€nov and v 6 [24),5,7-8 1:0 YEVOµEVOV (i) EKlVflO'E
npOc; cxui:6, 1:0 0' EKtvf)9fl 1:€ KCXL (ii) ElOE. Just as cxihn picks up the subject of E:wpcx
in v 1 [10],7,6, oui:oc; picks up npOc;; cxvi:o J3A.€nov in v 2 [11),1,10-11, where vo\X;
unmistakably means the fully actualized Intellect. When it "saw" the One, Intellect
was no longer in the inchoate state. The inchoate Intellect "never saw the One
(000€ E:wpcx nwnoi:E)" (VI 7 [38),16,14), but "simply saw (E:wpcx µ6vov)" (35,22). As
already seen, the fully actualized Intellect has its activity directed towards the
One,32 the activity to which self-intellection is incidental. Plotinus, in the present
passage, refers solely to the original contemplating activity of Intellect without
mentioning self-intellection as the pluralized vision. On the other hand, the phrase
i:n €mcri:po~n npo<; o:vi:o, being in parallel with Eic;; O:Vl:O ETI€0'1:p6:~l1inv2 [11),1,910 and EKlVflcrE npoc; o:ui:6 in V 6 [24],5,7, refers to the reversion of the inchoate
Intellect. The phrase, exactly as a causal dative, indicates that the hypostatization of
Intellect as that which sees the One is logically dependent on the inchoate Intellect's
reversion. Thus construed, the sentence -rn E-mcri:po~n npoc; o:vi:o E:wpo: turns out to
be the extremely concise statement about the hypostatization of Intellect by the
reversion of the inchoate Intellect towards the One. The two stages of Intellect are
noticed in this sentence rather than in the suggested contrast between €wpo: and
opo:crtc;. Therefore vo\Jv in v 1 [10),7,5 as 1:0 YEVOµEVOV refers to the fully formed
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Intellect, which is the subject of €wpa in 7,6. There is a shift neither in the sense of

'tO yEv6µEvov nor in the sense of vouc;. Both words consistently mean the
actualized Intellect. Atkinson, referring to V 3 [49], 11, 12-13, tries to show that vo\J<;;
can refer not only to the fully actualized Intellect but to the inchoate one.33 Our
proposed interpretation, however, does not need such justification. In addition, to
take V 1 [10],7,5-6 with V 6 [24],5,7-8 leads to the association of movement with the
inchoate Intellect's reversion. This association would be sharply contrasted with the
aforementioned a-kinetic nature of the One's self-reversion.
Second, as Bussanich points out, indeed, we need not follow Atkinson's
view that opacnc; is a code for the actualized Intellect. But, insofar as the fully
formed Intellect is regarded as the subject of €wpa, which is picked up by afrr11, T,
opcxau; must refer to the actualized Intellect. Notice that opcxau; is not contrasted
with €wpcx. Both words refer to the actualized Intellect. Our comparison of the
present passage with V 2 [11],1,9-10 and V 6 [24],5,7-8 shows that the very code for
the fully actualized Intellect is a verb which expresses Intellect's seeing of the One,
rather than the specific word opcxau;. Therefore, although Bussanich's attack on
Atkinson's reliance on the word opcxatc; is reasonable, it does not undermine our
proposed construction that T, opcxatc; refers to the actualized Intellect.34 The
sentence

r, 0€ opcxatc; cxfrr11 vouc;, thus construed, emphasizes the dependency of

Intellect's substantiality on its relation to the One. The opaau; here does not mean
the pluralized vision of Intellect but simply Intellect's seeing of the One,35 so that
the sentence says nothing about intellection of the Forms or self-intellection.
Although Intellect's relation to the One calls for the explicit mention of the dual
activity of Intellect or of its two phases, the present passage describes Intellect as if
the fully actualized Intellect consists solely of its eternally pre-noetic or hyper-noetic
phase, precisely because the sentence in discussion mentions neither self-intellection
nor pluralized intellectual vision. This point would possibly justify Bussanich's
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observation that Plotinus, throughout the present chapter, "oscillates back and forth
between the two aspects of Intellect or is unclear as to which he is referring to."36
In sum, the comparison of two suppositions shows us that to regard the
subject of €wpa as Intellect involves far less difficulties than to regard it as the One.
But our construction that the subject is the fully actualized Intellect rather than the
inchoate Intellect slightly deviates from the interpretation by Atkinson, Igal, and
other critics. Nevertheless, our construction agrees with theirs in that Plotinus'
response to the objection by the imaginary interlocutor briefly mentions the
transition from the inchoate Intellect to the fully formed one by the former's
reversion towards the One.
In 7,6-7, Plotinus proceeds to Intellect's apprehension. The text reads:
1:0 yap Kai:cxA.aµf3avov CXAAO ft afo8T\O"tc; fi vouc;.
Except for Harder and Schroeder, all translators and commentators
construe CXU.o as accusative. That which apprehends something else is either senseperception or intellect. Harder takes the referent of i:o Kai:cxA.aµf3avov as the One
and construes CXU.o as nominative.37 But, because this construction is based on the
view that the subject of €wpa in 7,6 is the One,38 we cannot follow it. Schroeder
proposes an alternative reading; the referent of i:o Kai:cxA.aµf3avov is the inchoate
Intellect and CXU.o is nominative.39 The passage thus construed means that the
inchoate Intellect is other than sense-perception or intellect.
It is obvious that Schroeder's interpretation has the advantage of keeping
the contextual continuity. The particle

yap expects a detailed account for the

transition from the inchoate Intellect to the fully formed one, which is laconically
mentioned in 7,5-6. And the kernel of this account is explicitly taken over in 7,1011,40 where i) VOT\O"l<; (7,11) refers to the inchoate Intellect.41 Hence to bring the
inchoate Intellect into 7,6-7 would make the bridging between the preceding
discussion and 7, 10-11 easy and smooth.

232

Schroeder's construction, however, seems to involve several difficulties. In
addition to the redundance in saying that the inchoate Intellect is other than senseperception, the entailed implication that it is other than Intellect appears to be at
variance with the reference to it by the word v611cru; in 7,11. Schroeder follows
Igal's rendering of the putative sense of 7,7-8; sense-perception is a straight line,
while intellect is a circle whose center is the One.42 On Schroeder's exegesis,
insofar as the inchoate Intellect is regarded as other than vo\X;, it occupies no
position in the metaphor employed in 7,7-8. This consequence rather injures the
contextual continuity.
As the particle yap marks, the present sentence explains the immediately
preceding sentence, so that vouc; in 7,7 refers to the fully formed Intellect meant by
vouc; in 7,6. Moreover, ii opacrtc;, specified by 1:0 Kai:aA.aµJ36:vov OA.Ao, means the
contemplation of the One rather than self-intellection. This meaning perfectly
coincides with the prefigured sense of ii opam.c; in 6,42 that op~ 0 vouc; EK€lVOV. In
the present sentence, as well as in its preceding sentence, Intellect is primarily
conceived as that which sees and apprehends the One. In other words, the
· pluralization of Intellect's vision of the One is not yet on the scene. Although
Schroeder finds the accusative OA.Ao redundant,43 it exactly functions as marking the
difference of Intellect from the One. The comparison of i:o Kai:aA.aµJ36:vov &AAo
with npOc; €i:Epov J3A.€n€l in VI 9 [9],2,38 would indicate that the present sentence is
highlighting only the hyper-noetic aspect of Intellect.
Then the short sentence follows in 7,7-8:
afo811crtv ypaµµilv Kal i:a &AAa.
Among all commentators after Creuzer, only Harder and Igal maintain
that the words may stand in the text without emendation. Harder claims that the
words constitute a memo for Plotinus' own use.44 This view is sufficiently criticized
by both Igal and Atkinson.45 Igal attempts to reconstruct the putative sense of the
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words in light of VI 9 [9],8; sense-perception is compared to a line, intellection to
the circle, and the One to the center of the circle.46 Atkinson and Schroeder,
though they recognize a corruption here, follow !gal's reconstruction.47 Atkinson,
however, observes that the line does not well fit either with the circle or with the
center.48 Bussanich therefore suggests that the distinction is made in the present
passage between sense-perception/line and intellection/ circle and that the One as
center should be excluded from !gal's reconstruction.49 But we can see no reason
why the One as center must be excluded from the geometric imagery. To place the
center in the geometric imagery enables the present passage to be closely related to
the preceding sentence (7,6-7). The line or linear motion expresses the activity of
sense-perception as 'to Ko:'tcxA.o:µJ3avov M.Ao in such a way that one terminus of the
line represents sense-organ and another a sensible object which is "other" than that
sense-organ. Likewise, if the apprehension of the other is to be expressed in
geometric imagery, Intellect's seeing of the One must be inevitably compared to the
relation between circle and center. If the center is excluded, the "other" that
Intellect must apprehend will be absent from the imagery. Notice that Plotinus'
theme in the present context is persistently the relation between the One and
Intellect rather than the mere contrast between sense-perception and intellection.
The ambiguous passage ensues in 7,8-10:

o

<UA' KuKA.oc;; 'tOlOU'toc;; ofoc;; µEpi~Ecr9m· 'tOU'tO 0€ oux ou'twc;;. fi Ko:l
EV'tO:U9o: EV µE:v, <UAO: 1:0 EV ouvo:µu; naV'tWV.
The conjunction of particles <UAa and fi indicates that the present passage
consists of an objection by the imaginary opponent and the reply by Plotinus himself
as in 7,4-5.50 Then what is the referent of i:oui:o? A couple of commentators note
that it directly refers to the center of the circle and indirectly to the One so that the
opponent implicitly raises the query about the derivation of plurality from the
unity.51 This exegesis, prima fade, has the merit of conforming to the theme in the
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present context, the hypostatization of Intellect by the pluralization of its inchoate
vision. But it appears to involve several difficulties, too. On this reading, i:o\Jto
must refer to K€vi:pov in either the putative reconstruction of Kat i:O: llicx in 7,7-8
or the supposed lacuna. Since i:ovi:o has no apparent reference in the text, this
reading is compelled to presuppose that the text in 7,7-8 is corrupt. But this is not a
genuine difficulty. The real difficulty is that even though the implication of the
objection appears to conform to the present theme, that objection, on its surface
level, deals with the allegory alone. Since its point becomes explicit only when its
nuance is understood, it is not a well articulated objection. Moreover, this
construction forces the geometric center to be the referent of €v.52 To call the
geometric center one, however, sounds really redundant.
Schroeder proposes an alternative reading: i:ovi:o refers to the inchoate
Intellect.53 Bussanich, following the same line, takes i:ovi:o as potential Intellect.
This is grammatically possible; the neuter i:ovi:o can refer to i:o Kcxi:cxA.cxµf36:vov in
7,6-7.54 Although we have rejected Schroeder's view that i:o Km:cxA.cxµf36:vov is
identified as the inchoate Intellect, i:ovi:o can refer to the actualized Intellect
because the mention of the geometric circle in 7,8 specifies the referent as i:o
Kcxi:cxA.cxµf36:vov that is compared to the circle, namely the actualized Intellect.
Slightly different from Schroeder's and Bussanich's interpretation, our construction
that i:oui:o refers to i:o Kcxi:cxA.cxµf36:vov and thereby to the actualized Intellect is fully
consistent with our understanding of vouc; in 7,7 as the actualized Intellect. On this
construction, the objection by the imaginary interlocutor mentions the indivisibility
of Intellect, and then Plotinus' reply renders it as the unity of Intellect and contrasts
this unity with the One's unity.55 The indivisibility or unity of Intellect mentioned in
the present passage, prima facie, appears to be at variance with the description of
Intellect as being otov µEptai:4'> (7, 17). But this description does not affirm
Intellect's divisibility.56 In terms of contextual continuity, therefore, we, with
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Armstrong, may take i:ofrro as intellectual apprehension and specify it as the fully
actualized Intellect.
Our proposed interpretation of the sentence i:ovi:o oux oui:trJ<; would
allow two ways of construing the immediately ensuing KCXt €vtcxv0cx EV µ€v. One
possibility is to take €vtcxv0cx as referring to i:ovi:o or Intellect and EV with oux
o\h:W<;, namely Intellect's indivisibility.57 The sentence is rendered such that "also in
the fully formed Intellect there is a unity." Another possibility is to read EV as the
predicate of the hidden subject i:ovi:o58 and €vi:cxv0cx as referring to oux oui:trJ<;. On
this construction, the sentence means that Intellect is one also in its being not
divisible. The latter reading seems to be preferable because it makes the force of
KCXt in 7,9 more definite. In the preceding chapters, we must notice, Plotinus speaks
of the unity of the actualized Intellect; the unity oflntellect and its object (4,31-32;
4,40) and of Intellect and intellection (5,19).59 Since the unity of Intellect has
already been repeatedly mentioned, the first reading makes the force of Kcxt slightly
ambiguous. Of course, it is possible to take Kcxl €vi:cxv0cx as "also in Intellect besides
in the One." But this interpretation asks us to notice the implication by reading
back from i:o EV in 7,9. In the second reading, on the contrary, Kcxt can definitely
imply "also in Intellect's being indivisible as well as in the aforementioned sense of
its unity." This implication allows us to notice that Intellect can be called one from
diverse viewpoints. To this extent, the proposed reading has another advantage of
stressing the similarity between the One and Intellect as i:o yEvoµEvov.60
Finally, since we have regarded the referent of the first EV in 7,9 as
Intellect, but not as the geometric center, we cannot follow Igal's way of taking
ouvcxµtc; navi:wv in apposition to 1:0 Ev.61 As for the sentence illO: 1:0 EV ouvcxµtc;
navi:wv, the following two points must be remarked.

First, Plotinus' reference to the One as i:o €v rather than as EKEtVO or i:o

&AA.a is felt very abrupt. But this reference is inevitable. By remarking that the One

236

is the productive power of all things, Plotinus begins his serious consideration of the
problem regarding the derivation of multiplicity from the absolute unity. It is
certain that the present context takes over the account of Intellect's relation to the
One from the sixth chapter. As Plotinus' presentation of problems in 6,1-8 indicates,
however, the relation between the One and Intellect must be considered primarily
in terms of the derivation of multiplicity from unity. In the sixth chapter, Plotinus
gives an account of the genesis of Intellect, but does not seriously discuss the very
derivation of multiplicity from unity, which is the question repeatedly discussed also
by the ancient philosophers and which our soul really longs to know ( 6,3-4 ). The
statement that the One is the productive power of all things reminds us of the
earlier statement that

ocmA.ouc; is oolnoc; -rou noA.uv e:lvm (5,4-5) and of the claim

that the multiplicity must be referred back to the One (6,8).62 Hence it marks the
very beginning of Plotinus' answer to the problem of the derivation of multiplicity
from unity.
Second, the force of ill6: can be fully understood with our construction of
the whole sentence in 7,9-10. The sentence KCXL €v-rcxu9cx EV µ€v would certainly
evoke our expectation that the transcendent One is responsible for Intellect's unity
as explicated in diverse ways. But the ensuing sentence TO EV ouvcxµtc; n6:v-rwv
marks prominently the role of the One as the cause of multiplicity rather than as the
cause of Intellect's unity. Hence

ilia in 7,9 seems to turn aside the reader's

expectation that the One may be described as the cause of Intellect's unity and
thereby to mark the introduction of the new aspect of the One as the cause of
multiplicity. Thus construed, the entire passage in 7,9-10 is explicated as follows:
Yes, also in respect of its indivisibility as well as in respect of the unity of Intellect
and its object and of Intellect and intellection, Intellect as that which apprehends
the One is one, but the One, besides being responsible for Intellect's unity, is the
productive power of all things or the very cause of multiplicity.63 In the ensuing
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lines (10-17), Plotinus gives a detailed account of the genesis of Intellect through the
pluralization of its inchoate vision. The sentence cXAAcX 1:0 EV ovvaµu;; mxvi:wv not
only definitely mentions the One's causal role in this pluralization process but
indicates that the ensuing account for the genesis of Intellect must be seen primarily
as Plotinus' own reply to the problem of the derivation of multiplicity from unity.
Plotinus never forgets the problem which he raised in the preceding chapter.
Plotinus now explains how the inchoate Intellect is pluralized by its vision
of the One. The text in 7, 10-11 reads:

WV o\Jv EO""tl ovvaµtc;, i:aui:a ano i:llc; ovvaµEwc; otov crxt~oµEVl1 ti VOflO"t<;;
Ka8op~· fi OUK av ?lv vouc;.
Here ti voriau;; refers to the inchoate Intellect as it does in V 4 [7],2,4ff..64
The plural i:aui:a referring to navi:a, given that Ka8op~ denotes the actual vision,65
marks the pluralization of the vision of the inchoate Intellect; the inchoate Intellect,
in attempting to see the One, cannot grasp the One in unity but pluralizes itself.66
The question arises, whether the participle

crxt~oµ€Vl1

is middle or

passive. Atkinson, Igal, and Schroeder take it as middle.67 Atkinson's view is based
. on the conformity of 7, 10-11 to VI 7 [38], 15,20-21, where the genesis oflntellect is
said to take place by a splitting up of the One's power.68 To the objection that the
verb

crxi~EtV

has no attested middle, Igal replies that anocrxi~Etv has a middle and

that crxt~oµ€Vl1 here is taken with the preceding ano.69 Besides these remarks,
there is a decisive reason for the middle

crxt~oµ€Vl1.

As explicitly mentioned in

7,28-30, the hypostatization of Intellect exactly means the genesis of the multiplicity
of beings. The reading of the participle as middle implies that the inchoate Intellect
takes upon itself the consequence of its own act of separating out the plural items
('taui:a) from the One. The reading of the participle as passive, however, does not
fully describe the pluralization of the inchoate Intellect itself. The present passage,
thus construed, means that the inchoate Intellect separates out its objects from the
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One rather than that it is separated from the One when it sees its pluralizing objects.
Then the objection could possibly be raised that our proposed construction
presupposes the separation of Intellect from the One prior to the pluralization of its
vision. We may reply: this is not a genuine difficulty, since Plotinus affirms the
otherness of the inchoate Intellect from the One.70
Moreover, VOflcrtc; and vov<; in 7,11 are regarded respectively as the
inchoate Intellect and the fully actualized one. It would be quite likely that Plotinus
in the present context consciously differentiates two stages of Intellect by these
terms. This supposition is fully compatible with our interpretation that vo\J<; in 7,5-7
consistently means the fully hypostatized Intellect. The advantage of our
construction of the preceding lines (6-10) lies in our faithfully abiding by Plotinus'
intentional distinction between vo\J<; and Voflcrtc;.71 The occurrence of VOflcrtc; in

7,11 indicates that the inchoate Intellect, which was still implicit in 7,5 i:n
€mcri:po~n.

is now explicitly on the scene.

Eventually, we arrive at the crucial passage that contains otov

O'\JVO:tcr9flcrtv (7,12):
ETI€t KO:t no:p o:ui:ov EX€l Tl0Tl OloV cruvo:icr9flcrlV i:fl<; ouv6:µEwc;;, oi:t
ouvo:i:o:t ouaio:v (7,11-13).
I

This passage is extremely difficult. The first problem that we encounter is
whether the subject of EX€l in 7,12 is Intellect or the One. It is evident that the
subject is not the One. First, given that €n€l in 7, 11 is retrospective in its force and
marks the start of Plotinus' account for his preceding statement, to regard the
subject of EX€t as the One is to commit the double abrupt shift in the subject; the
subject of Ko:9op~ in 7, 11 is Intellect and o:ui:6<; in 7, 13 also refers to Intellect.72
Second, if the One were the subject, iloTl in 7, 12 would lose its force. Henry
supposes that the addition of otov to crvvo:icr9flcrtv allows the One to be the
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subject.73 But this point is not decisive. For these reasons, therefore, we cannot
regard the One as the subject.

If the One must not be the subject of €xEt, another problem naturally
occurs whether the subject is voriau; (7,11) as the inchoate Intellect or vo\X; (7,11)
as the fully actualized Intellect. The reflexive a\rrov in 7, 1274 does not allow the
feminine voriau; to be the subject of the verb. Moreover, it would sound a little
awkward to say that the non-substantial voriau; possesses o'lov auvata0riau;. In
light of the perfect consistency in Plotinus' usage of vov<;; and voriau; in the present
context, vov<;;, which is the subject of €XE't, must be the fully actualized Intellect.
There still remains another problem whether the subject of ouvai:at in
7, 13 is the One or Intellect. It is at least certain that 1:fl<;; ouvaµEux;; in 7, 12 and
ouvai:at in 7, 13 refers to the same subject. Atkinson and Igal, on the one hand,
think that they refer to the inchoate Intellect.75 Armstrong follows this line. Rist,
Schroeder, and Bussanich, on the other, regard the One as their referent.76 The
latter interpretation seems to be more plausible. The crucial point is that the article
i:Tl<;; in 7,12 is demonstrative just as 1:fl<;; in 7,10 is. Hence it is appropriate to take
i:fl<;; OUVaµE'W<;; in 7,12, with 1:fl<;; OUVaµEW<;; in 7,10, as referring to o\Jvaµu:; naV'l:WV
in 7,9-10, namely the One's power. To regard Intellect as the referent of i:Tl<;;
OUVaµEW<;; in 7,12 inevitably involves an abrupt change of referent for ouvaµu:;.77
Schroeder and Bussanich consider the present passage to be parallel to V 3 (49],7,3-

5, where the actualized Intellect is said to know what the One can cause ( yvwaEi:at

... aouvai:at EKE'lV0<;;).78

This parallel would confirm our proposed interpretations

that the referent of 1:fl<;; ovvaµEw<;; and the subject of ouvai:at are the One and that
the subject of €XE't is the fully actualized Intellect rather than the inchoate one.
Since vou<;; is regarded as the subject of €XEl, otov avvata0riat<;; is to be
ascribed to the fully formed Intellect. Several critics, who take the inchoate Intellect
as the subject, maintain that the addition of otov is due to the fact that avvaia0riau:;
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is only properly ascribed to the fully actualized Intellect.79 The attribution of oTov
crvvcxia9nat.c; to the inchoate Intellect, however, involves a serious difficulty. The

hypostatization of ovaicx is logically posterior to the reversion of the inchoate
Intellect. Hence the question naturally occurs how the inchoate Intellect in its
processive state can possess some sort of awareness about the One's power that can
engender the ovaicx which has not been fully hypostatized yet. 80 This difficulty will
evaporate when otov auval.a9nau; is attributed to the fully formed Intellect. Of
course, the objection will be raised that the qualifying oTov may be unnecessary
since auvataenau; properly belongs to the actualized Intellect. This objection is
not fatal to our interpretation. Even though auvata8nat.c; is proper to the
actualized Intellect, the qualifying oTov seems to be necessary in the present
passage. As already seen,8 1 the auvata8nat.c; of the fully actualized Intellect
normally represents the prominent aspect of self-intellection, namely the unifying of
its own interior multiplicity. Intellect's auvata8nat<; properly concerns the
multiplicity of the intelligible objects, but not the causal power of the One. Insofar
as the prefix auv- of auvata8riat<; implies some multiplicity, the word is not fully
appropriate to Intellect's consciousness of the One's power. Also in V 3 [49],7,3-5,
which has been regarded as being parallel to the present passage, Plotinus employs
the very general verb ytyvwaKELV for Intellect's knowledge of the One's power.
This point would be due to the fact that Plotinus, even in his later treatises, did not
find any appropriate term for Intellect's knowledge and awareness of the One's
power. Therefore, the qualifying ofov seems to mark that Intellect's awareness of
the One's causal power is not its auvata8nat<; proper. The addition of the
qualification is not due to the attribution of auvaia8nat<; to the inchoate Intellect.
Moreover, flon refers to the moment when Intellect completely sees the pluralized
items separated from the One's power, that is, the very moment of the
hypostatization of Intellect. The adverb nicely fits the start of the actualized
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Intellect.82 Thus construed, o'lov auvcxia811au;;, attributed to the actualized
Intellect, would not be a vague quasi-consciousness.83 In light of the parallel
between the present passage and V 3 [49],7,3-5, o'lov auvcxia811au;; must rather be
clear yv@au;;. 84
Two more points must be noticed. First, the phrase ncxp ' cxv'tou, of
course, marks the independence of the fully actualized Intellect vis-a-vis the One.85
Second, €nEi is retrospective in force and extends to 7, 10-11. The €nEi-clause as a
whole explains that Intellect, when it fully sees the pluralized items from the One's
power, has a kind of awareness of the One's power considered in terms of its effects,
the awareness which explicitly marks the hypostatization and independence of
Intellect. Thus seen, Intellect's consciousness of the One's power turns out to be
closely related to its seeing of the pluralized objects ('tCXU'tcx ...

Kcx0op~

7,10-11). In

V 3 [49], 7, 1-6, Intellect's self-knowledge is considered to be logically dependent on
its knowledge of the One's power. In the present context, however, how Intellect's
consciousness of the One's power is related to its intellection of the intelligible
objects is not fully clear.
By identifying Intellect as the subject of EXEL and the One as the referent
of i:fl<; ouvaµEw<;, roughly speaking, we follow the line of interpretation in
Schroeder and Bussanich. But our view that o'lov auvcxia811au;; must be attributed
to the fully actualized Intellect rather than to the inchoate one surely diverges from
theirs. Our construction, of course, is based on the correspondence of the masculine
reflexive cxvi:ou to the subject of EXEL and on the observation of the consistency in
Plotinus' use of vouc; and v611atc; in the present context. Moreover, it has the
advantage of being parallel to V 3 [49],7,3-5. In addition to these advantages, the
proposed interpretation does not leave the qualification of auvcxia011au;; by o'lov
unexplained.
The final passage to be considered (7, 13-17) reads:
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a\rtO<;; yovv Ol <XtrtOV K<Xl opi~El 'tO ElV<Xl <XU't~ i:n ncxp EK€lVOV ovv6:µn
K<Xl O'tl otov µ€pm; EV 'tl 'tWV EK€LVOV Kal E~ EKELVOV T, oucria, K<Xl
pwvvvi:<Xl ncxp EK€lVOV K<Xl 't€A€lOV't<Xl EU;; oucricxv ncxp EK€LVOV K<Xl E~
EK€lVOV.
1

I

I

I

Here two points must be noticed. The first problem concerns the
punctuation of the passage. Igal and Atkinson take the oi:l-clause, respectively in
7,14-15 and in 7,14-17, as parallel to the on-clause in 7,13.86 In this reading, the
second O'tl-clause must describe the content of Intellect's awareness of the One's
power. Bussanich presents two reasons against this construction.87 First, this
reading "invests inchoate Intellect with a remarkable degree of awareness of how it
derives from the One, which is unparalleled in both early and late discussions of the
problem." Second, the interpretation of the O'tl-clause in 7,14-15 as a result-clause
instead of the causal-clause "assumes that the entire passage is much more elliptical
than it seems to be." Since we attribute otov cruvaicr8f'\crl<; to the fully actualized
Intellect, we cannot appeal to the first reason. Ironically enough, Atkinson's
reading, insuring the remarkable degree of awareness, would rather support our
attribution of otov cruvcxicr8rial<; to the fully formed Intellect. In addition to
· Bussanich's second reason, Atkinson's reading has such difficulty that we cannot see
why the passage otov µ€po<; ... Ti oucricx is the explanation of the One's power (i:fy;
ouv6:µEwc;, 7, 12) about which otov cruvaicr8f'\crl<; is. Both Atkinson and lgal
maintain that i:T\c; ouv6:µEw<; in 7, 12 refers to Intellect's power. Whichever
construction is accepted as for the extent of the second on-clause, the passage otov
µ€poc; ... Ti oucricx does not seem to explain appropriately Intellect's power. First of
all, to take i:T\c; ouv6:µEw<; in 7, 12 as Intellect's power neglects the demonstrative
force of the article i:T\c;. Hence the second O'tl-clause must not be understood with

o'lov cruvo:icr8T'\O'l<;.

.

Second, the self-constitution of Intellect expressed by Ol o:U-cov opt~n
1

and the supervening causality of the One expressed by -rl] no:p' EKEivou ouv6:µn are
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well counterbalanced in the present passage.88 This point would further illuminate
an aspect of o'lov cruvata9nau;;; as Schroeder puts, "voD<; is autonomous in that the
consciousness which it has of the One's power is self-constituting within the
framework of its continuity with its source in the One."89
To recapitulate, o'lov auvata9nau;; in 7, 12 is not attributed to the One but
to the actualized Intellect. Nevertheless the above consideration has revealed two
aspects of the One's inner life. First, some self-reversion is ascribed to the One.
The self-reversion of the One, being different from the kinetic reversion of Intellect
towards the One, is totally motionless. The a-kinetic nature of the One's selfreversion is fully congruent with the characterization of its hyper-noetic 1<ai;av6nau;;
as being €v a'taaE."l ai.Otcp in V 4 [7],2, 18. Second, as Schroeder aptly compares, "the
One might have a consciousness of its ouvaµu;; as the equivalent of its primary act,
but hardly of this in terms of its effect," whereas

OloV

O'UVaia9nau;; 'tfy; OUVaµEW<; in

7, 12 is Intellect's consciousness of the One's power considered in terms of its
effects.90 If the One's consciousness of itself as ouvaµt<;

naV'tWV

must be perfectly

consistent with its simplicity,91 its ouvaµt<; must be understood without reference to
any externs.92 In fact, the One's awareness of its power without reference to its
effects can be positively envisioned as its motionless self-reversion. In the context
dealing with the One's self-reversion, we are told that the One "neither inclined its
attention nor exercised its will nor moved in any sense (ou npoavEuavai;oc; 000€
f3ouA.n9€vi;o<; ouo€ oA.w<; Ktvn8€v'to<;)" (6,26-27). The involuntary nature of the
One's productive activity is adroitly spelled out in V 5 [32], 12,40-45; the One would
not have cared even if Intellect had not come to being, that is, even if its effect had
not been entailed. As Schroeder notes, therefore, "the One need not address itself
to any extern to produce voD<;."93 Thus the One's supposed consciousness of its own
power can be closely taken with its motionless self-reversion. In the late treatise, VI
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8 [39],16, as we shall see, the One's self-inclination is exactly specified as its hyperintellection and unique awareness.
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NOIBS

lAJthough these two controversies are interrelated, those critics who take
the subject of €wpo: as Intellect do not necessarily maintain that it is also the subject
of EXEt. Igal, who himself takes the subjects of both verbs as Intellect, collects
various interpretations in "La Genesis de la Inteligencia en un Pasaje de las Eneadas
de Plotino (V 1.7.4-35)," Emerita 39 (1971):131-132, 149-150. See also M. Atkinson,
Plotinus: Ennead V. 1, a Commentary with Translation (Oxford, 1983), p. 167. To
this list may be added G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity (New York:
Peter Lang, 1988), pp. 86-87, note 4, F. M. Schroeder, "Conversion and
Consciousness in Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5.1 [10),7," Hermes 114 (1986):187, 191, J.
Bussanich, (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 34-35, and M.
Tanaka, one of the Japanese co-translators of the Enneads. Gurtler and Schroeder
maintain the same view as !gal's. Bussanich regards the One as the subject of €wpo:
and Intellect as that of EXEL. In Tanaka's translation, as usually in Japanese
literature, the subject of €wpo: is not explicitly mentioned, though the subject of EXEL
is regarded as Intellect. From his reading of the reflexive cx\rro in 7,6, he would
perhaps take the subject of E-wpcx as the One.
2J. Igal, Emen'ta 39 (1971):130-131; M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.J, p.
157; F. M. Schroeder, Hermes 114 (1986):187; G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The
Experience of Unity, p. 86, note 4.
30n this separateness, see V 8 [31],13,8-9 -rn ... €-rEp6n1-rL i:Tl<;; npi><; -ro
&vw O:no-roµf\c;. See also Bussanich's comment on the present passage: "The
relation of the One and Intellect involves the dialectical oscillation between
presence and absence, similarity and difference" (The One and Its Relation to
Intellect in Plotinus, p. 37).
4This explanation consists of two parts; (i) the account by means of the
double-activity theory (6,30-37), and (ii) the account by means of the spontaneous
production by that which is supremely perfect (6,37-40).
For the double activity theory, see IV 3 [27),10,30-37; V 1 [10),3,7-12; V 3
[49),7,21-26; V 4 [7),1,31-36; 2,27-37. In IV 3 [27),10,30-37, Plotinus differentiates
the activity constitutive of soul-less things from the one constitutive of the soul; the
former "so to speak, lies asleep (otov Euon)" (line 33), whereas the latter is
"something awake ( €yp11yop6c; n)" (line 36). The One's €ypT,yopatc; in VI 8
[39),16,31-34, which is definitely associated with its €v€pyncx (line 31), might be
illustrated also in terms of the above mentioned distinction in IV 3 [27), 10,30-37.
For the superlative perfection of the One, see V 1 [10),6,39-40; V 4
[7], 1,24.
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5G. J. P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (New York: Harper &
Row, 1973), p. 72; see also F. M. Schroeder, Hennes 114 (1986):187.
6See M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 159; J. Igal, Emerita 39
(1971):137; F. M. Schroeder, Hennes 114 (1986):187.
7For the list of the adherents of those two views, see M. Atkinson,
Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 135: and the addenda ad textum to V 1 [10],6,18 in H-Sl,
vol. 3.
8J. Igal, Emerita 39 (1971):135-136.
9P. Hadot, "Review of H-Sl, vol. 2," Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 164
(1963):94.
lOM. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, pp. 138-139.
llAtkinson is himself aware of this difficulty: "What is surprising about
our passage is that the E:mai:po~T, is mentioned before the undefined emanation"
(Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 139). He tries to dismiss this difficulty by appealing to the
involvement of the concept of motion in the concept of genesis (Zoe. cit.). But this
remark definitely presupposes the view, not yet established, that any E:mai:pocpf,
whatsoever involves a movement.
12P. Hadot, Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 164 (1963):94.
BM. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 137.
14P. Aubin, Le Probleme de la "Conversion" (Paris: Beauchesne et Ses Fils,
1963), pp. 162-163.
15M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 137.
I6See also v 3 [49],6,40 r1 E:mai:po~fi npoc; o:ui:ov; 13,23 Eic; o:ui:ov
€mai:p€~€l; VI 8 [39],6,33-34 ilia nae; €n€ai:po:ni:m npoc; o:ui:ov.
17See II 9 [33],4,6ff.
18It could be objected that VI 8 [39],15,24-26 is not relevant to V 1
[10],6,17-19 because Plotinus, in VI 8 [39],13,1-5, explicitly mentions his departure
from the usual enforcement of negative theology in talking about the One and
therefore VI 8 [39], 13-21 does not contain Plotinus' explicit view. This objection is
not convincing enough, since i:t in VI 8 [39], 13,4 implies that his departure is not allout and that he tries to abide by his own position as much as possible in the
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following chapters.
19In V 3 [49],3,43, we read that Intellect is separate (xwpun:6<;) because it
does not incline ( -r&l µi} npoaVEVELV) towards us. This section shows that the verb
npoaVEVELV is properly used of an outward movement. From this usage, it can be
supposed that the use of the verb in V 1 [10],6,26 represents Plotinus' wish to
describe the One's transcendence beyond and separation from Intellect. Atkinson
writes: "Plotinus' use of npoaVEVELV here may reflect a wish to avoid the
application of the Gnostic theories to the One" (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 142).
20Bussanich considers these passages to be consistent with one another
(The One and Its Relation to Intellect ~n Plotinus, p. 217). See also P. Hadot,
Porphyre et Victorinus, 2 vols. (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1968), 1:320-321, note
4. Hadot regards V 1 [10],6,17-18 as parallel to V 3 [49],12,33-34 µ€vov-roc;; EKELVou
EV LW au-r@ tl9EL.

.

.

21Atkinson tries to solve the difficulty of the abrupt mention of the
inchoate Intellect entailed by (ii) in terms of the involvement of the concept of
motion in the concept of genesis (see note 11). Our discussion can defeat the view,
presupposed by this remark, that any E:ma-rpo~t1 whatsoever involves some motion.
Atkinson, in fact, does not make a distinction between inward motion and outward
motion. Of course, the One's self-reversion may not be taken even with inward
motion. If, on the one hand, Atkinson were to say that the genesis involves inward
motion, he would be compelled to introduce the inchoate Intellect into the present
context so that his argument would be circular, since the notion of inward motion
becomes first intelligible by the introduction of the inchoate Intellect. On the other
hand, the view that the genesis involves outward motion does not go with (ii).
22See M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 158; F. M. Schroeder, Hermes
114 (1986):187; J. Igal, Emerita 39 (1971):132.
23See M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.J, p. 158. See also note 3.
By saying that the identification of the actual self-vision of the One with
Intellect would imply that "Intellect is something internal to the One" (Plotinus:
Ennead V.J, p. 158), Atkinson would mean nothing more than that the present
supposition abrogates the necessary demarcation of Intellect from the One.
Bussanich maintains that the view that Intellect is internal to the One is supported
by the Plotinian formula, as presented in V 2 [11],2,13, V 5 [32],9,5-7, and 9,33, that
the lower entities are in their principle; this formula, he thinks, provides a possible
foundation for his claim of the One's seeing (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in
Plotinus, p. 42). Bussanich's objection to Atkinson, however, is not convincing.
First, as explicitly remarked in V 5 [32],9,1-4 and 9,31-32, the above-mentioned
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Plotinian formula presupposes otherness between Intellect and the One. Hence
Bussanich's reference to these passages, against his intention, takes the side of
Atkinson. Atkinson's statement that "Intellect is something internal to the One" has
no bearing on the Plotinian formula regarding the presence of the cause in that
which is caused. The Plotinian formula expresses nothing more than the presence of
the cause in what is caused and the dependency of the latter on the former. It
cannot be a possible foundation for the alleged identification of the One's self-vision
with Intellect.
Moreover, Bussanich holds that the passages in VI 8 [39],18,21-22 and
18,32-34 are most relevant to the present passage (The One and Its Relation to
Intellect in Plotinus, p. 43). But these passages simply mention the causal
dependency of Intellect on the One and do not support the identification of the
One's self-vision with Intellect. Rather, the section -rov otov €v E:vl vouv o\J vouv
ov-rcx (18,21-22) does not allow this identification.
24See J. Igal, Emerita 39 (1971):132-133. See also note 4.
25See A.H. Armstrong, Plotinus, 5:34-35, note 1.
26We have identified €ma-rpcx~€v-rrn:; in 6, 18 as the One's self-reversion.
But none of the above mentioned absurdities is involved in 6, 17-19, insofar as 1:l
µE-r' cxu-ro, on the proposed construction, is not equated with the One's selfrevers10n.
27See M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 158; J. Igal, Emerita 39
(1971):132-134; F. M. Schroeder, Hennes 114 (1986):187. For the opcxau; as the
fully actualized Intellect, see V 1 [10],5,18-19. Igal equates the fully actualized
vision with the activity constitutive of the essence of Intellect (Emerita 39
(1971):132). In VI 7 [38],16,10-16, however, Plotinus hesitates to use the imperfect
€wpcx to describe the vision of the inchoate Intellect (see also F. M. Schroeder,
Hennes 114 (1986):189-190).
Corrigan proposes that the subject of E:wpcx is ambiguous on the ground
that the inchoate Intellect and the One are not properly distinct until Intellect is
fully hypostatized; that is, the duality between the One and Intellect is still implicit in
the sentence fi ou ... €wpcx. See K. Corrigan, "Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5,4 [7],2 and
Related Passages," Hennes 114 (1986):198. But this observation is not well founded.
In V 2 [11],1,9, -ro yEv6µEvov as the indefinite emanation from the One is said to
be &AA.o. For the identification of -ro yEv6µEvov as the undefined overflow from
the One, see M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.J, p. 139. On the otherness between
the inchoate Intellect and the One, see also J. F. Phillips, "Plotinus and the 'Eye' of
Intellect," Dionysius 14 (1990):97. So the otherness between the One and Intellect is
already explicit at the stage of the procession of the inchoate Intellect. This
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distinctness would be more fully elucidated by the thesis that the intelligible
otherness and the primary movement are the principle of intelligible matter (II 4
[12],5,28-37). Rist points out that otherness is closely linked with motion, especially
motion away from the One. See J.M. Rist, "The Problem of 'Otherness' in the
Enneads," in Le Neoplatonisme (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique, 1971 ), pp. 81-82. The intelligible otherness here precisely represents
the separateness from the One rather than the distinctness between Intellect and its
object or between noetic objects. Hence Deck's remark that intelligible matter is
the gauge of Intellect's separation from the One is correct. See J. N. Deck, Nature,
Contemplation, and the One (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), pp. 115116. Moreover, the distinctness of intelligible matter from the One is explicitly
mentioned also in II 4 [12],5,37.
28See III 8 [30],11,lff.; V 2 [11],1,10-13; V 3 [49],11,1-6; V 4 [7],2,4-7; VI 7
[38],16,13ff.; 17,14-18. See also M. Atkinson,Plotinus: Ennead V.J, p. 158; G. M.
Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 86, note 4; A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus,
5:34-35, note 1.
29'fhis difference, as we shall see, would be clearly explained by the fact
that the One's self-reversion is completely motionless, whereas the inchoate
Intellect's reversion towards the One involves some movement.
30J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 40.
31 Atkinson frankly admits this difficulty (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 159).
32Compare V 2 [11],1,10-11 npo<; m'.rro /3A.€nov with VI 9 [9],2,38-39
/3AEnEL ... npo<; 1:0 KpEl1:1:ov Ko:l npo o:u1:ou. Although the verb /3A.€nELV is
attributed to the inchoate Intellect prior to its reversion, the modification of the
attribution is clearly different in the inchoate Intellect and the actualized one. See
the description of the inchoate Intellect in VI 7 [38], 16, 14 €/3AEnEv O:vofl1:W<;.
Bussanich, referring to V 4 [7],2,4-5 and V 2 [11],1,9, claims that the
synonymy of the inchoate Intellect's reversion with seeing is prominent in the early
treatises (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 155). It is true that
6pwao: in V 4 [7],2,4 is predicated of the inchoate Intellect. But /3A.€nov in V 2
[l l],1,10, insofar as ou1:o<; in line 11 is taken into consideration, must be attributed
to the fully actualized Intellect. Bussanich overlooks the fact that ou1:o<; refers to
€y€vE1:o npo<; o:u1:o /3A.€nov.
33M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.J, p. 159.
34Bussanich also attacks the proposed construction itself as follows: "But
if the fully actualized Intellect is not on the scene, then why do lines 10-19 seem to
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provide significant detail on different aspects of the transition from potential to
actualized Intellect?" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 40, (Italics
mine.)). This objection can be readily dismissed. The passage in 7,5-6 simply
remarks the occurrence of the transition itself, but does not give a detailed account
of that transition. Hence the word "different" in Bussanich's critical query is
confusing. As the foundation for the detailed account for several aspects of the
transition from potential to actualized Intellect, the occurrence of that transition
itself must be mentioned beforehand. The verb E:wpcx in 7,6 certainly prefigures
1m9op~ in 7, 11.
35Tue meaning of opcxau; here is clearly prefigured in 6,42 op~ 0 vovc;
€KE'ivov. Atkinson associates this section with the activity of vouc; E:p@v in VI 7
[38],35,25 (Plotinus: Ennead V.l, p. 149). The connection among the verbs \m€ai:ri,
y€voµEvov, and op~ in V 1 [10],6,1-2 would also suggest that seeing is the code
word for the actualized Intellect.
36J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 40.
37R. Harder, Plotins Schriften, lb:503.
38For the full critique of Harder's interpretation, see J. Igal, Emerita 39
(1971):138; and M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.l, p. 160.
Bussanich, though he regards the One as the subject of E:wpcx, rejects
Harder's interpretation by referring to IV 7 [2],8,5, where Ko:i:cxA.cxµl3avEtv is a
variant for intellection, to show that Plotinus would be unlikely to refer to the One
as i:o Ko:i:cxA.o:µl3avov (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 43).
39F. M. Schroeder, Hennes 114 (1986):188.
40See J. Igal, Emerita 114 (1971):137.
41See M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.l, p. 166; J. Igal, Emerita 39
(1971):148; F. M. Schroeder, Hennes 114 (1986):190.
42F. M. Schroeder, Hennes 114 (1986):188.
43F. M. Schroeder, Hennes 114 (1986):188.
44R. Harder, Plotins Schriften, lb:503.
45J. Igal, Emerita 39 (1971):141; M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.l, pp.
161-162.
46J. Igal, Emerita 39 (1971):140-142. The circle usually represents the fully
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formed Intellect (III 8 [30],8,36-37; IV 3 [27],17,13-14; IV 4 [28],16,24-25; VI 8
[39],l8passim; see also II 2 [14],l,1 and III 2 [47],3,30).
47M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, pp. 162-163; F. M. Schroeder,
Hermes 114(1986):188; see also G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p.
86, note 4.
48M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 162.
49J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 45.
50See M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 163; J. Igal, Emerita 39
(1971):142.
51See M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, pp. 163-164; G. M. Gurtler,
Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 86, note 4; J. Igal, Emerita 114 (1986):142-144.
52See M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 165; J. Igal, Emerita 39
(1971):146. Of the commentators following this reading, Gurtler alone associates
€v with the inchoate intellectual apprehension (Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p.
86, note 4 ). As Atkinson notes (loc. cit.), it is natural to take EVrau9a as referring to
the same context as 1:ofrro.
53F. M. Schroeder, Hennes 114 (1986):189.
54See R. Harder, Plotins Sclzriften, 1b:503.
55Schroeder takes 1:0V1:0 5€ oux ov1:w<; to denote the denial of divisibility
and circularity to the inchoate Intellect (Hennes 114 (1986):189). But Plotinus does
not deny the circularity of the inchoate Intellect (see VI 7 [38],16,17 KlVEta9at ...
TIEpl EKEtvo ). On our construction that 1:0V1:0 refers to the actualized Intellect, we
may take oux OV1:W<; as simply denoting the denial of divisibility.
56This section seems to be the same case as µEpta1:0V ... 6nwaovv in II 4
[12],4,12 which actually means noA.Aa
6:µ€pta1:6v (line 14); the noetic universe is
many but not divisible. For the indivisibility of the intelligible world, see I 1 [53],8,5;
III 9 [13],1,32; IV 2 [4],lpassim; 2,49-52; IV 3 [27],4,11; 5,11-12; IV 9 [8],2,28; V 7
[18],1,26; V 9 [5],8,26; VI 4 [22],8,19; 13,19; VI 5 [23],9,6-7.
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570n the unity and indivisibility of the actualized Intellect, see V 3
[49],5,7-21, V 9 [5],8,21-9,2 and 9,14-16. Bussanich, though envisaging the possibility
that EV1:o:u9o: refers to the actualized Intellect, maintains that it is more likely to
refer to the inchoate Intellect (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp.
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47-48). His view is based on two points. First, in 7,10-17, the potential Intellect is
quite prominent. This point, however, is not fully convincing. As we shall see,
Plotinus carefully refers to the actualized Intellect and to the inchoate one
respectively by the words vol)(; and VO'flcrt.c;, and the inchoate Intellect is first
explicitly introduced with f1 VO'flcrt.c; in 7, 11. For the contextual continuity to be
retained, moreover, Bussanich's interpretation would force himself to take the circle
in the geometric imagery as representing the inchoate Intellect rather than the
actualized one. But he does not take it so. Second, Bussanich stresses that in 7,1617 Intellect is divided while the One is undivided. Bussanich's interpretation, prima
fade, seems to have the advantage of contrasting the unity and indivisibility of the
inchoate Intellect with the plurality and divisibility of the actualized Intellect. As
noticed in note 56, however, otov µEptcri:4> in 7, 17 must not be taken to mean the
divisibility of the fully formed Intellect. Therefore, Bussanich does not succeed in
defending his interpretation.
58Jgal reads the first EV in 7,9 as the predicate and regards i:oui:o as its
subject (Emerita 39 (1971):146-147). In his construction, however, i:oui:o refers to
the geometric circle.
59Here we follow Atkinson's interpretation (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 123).
60Jn V 1 [10),2,37-38, Plotinus speaks of the similarity of the soul with
Intellect in her unity and ubiquity (Kai:ex i:o EV Kat Kai:ex i:o n6:vi:f1). The similarity in
unity would also apply to the case of the One and Intellect.
61J. Igal, Emerita 39 (1971):146.
62Jn Ill 8 [30), 10, the description of the One as ouvaµtc;: i:wv n6:vi:wv (line
1) has the definite bearing on its role as apxil i:f1c;: no:U.f1c;: (line 14).
63Another interpretation would be possible. The sentence Kat €vi:u8a EV
µE:v is also likely to lead us to the supposition that Intellect whose unity is explained
from diverse viewpoints may itself be the source of multiplicity. On this
construction, the O:AA.6:-clause is paraphrased as follows: but it is not Intellect which
is one but the One itself that is the productive power of all things. In this case,
however, Plotinus intends to stress that the cause of multiplicity is something else
than Intellect, so that he must naturally refer to the One as i:o &AAo or EKE'ivo rather
than i:o EV. As regards the reason why Plotinus here abruptly refers to the One as
€v, however, this interpretation is less plausible than our proposed interpretation

:o

IS.

64See M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 166; J. Igal, Emerita 39
(1971):148; F. M. Schroeder, Hennes 114 (1986):190; J. Bussanich, The One and Its
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Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 48.

65See J. Igal, Emerita 39 (1971):148.
66Tue similar idea is reiterated elsewhere (III 8 [30],8,32-36; V 3 [49],11,18; VI 7 [38],15,13-14; 16,13-22). Atkinson aptly compares the present passage with
III 8 [30],8,3 lff. (Plotinus: Ennead V.l, p. 167).
67M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.J, pp. 166-167; J. Igal, Emerita 39
(1971):147-148; F. M. Schroeder, Hennes 114 (1986):196. The bibliographical list of
various translations is presented in J. Igal, op. cit.:147, note 3. To this list may be
added Armstrong and Tanaka who both take oxt~oµ€VT1 as passive. Bussanich
takes the verb as middle (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 48).
Notice that when it is construed as middle, i:cxfrm becomes the object of not only
Kcx9op~ but also oxt~oµEVT\.
68M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.J, p. 167.
69J. Igal, Emerita 39 (1971):147.
70Qn this otherness, see note 27.
71Jt is possible to read the inchoate Intellect into each sentence in 7,6-10,
by regarding vouc; in 7,7, the circle in the geometric imagery, i:oui:o in 7,8, and
€vi:cxu9cx in 7,9 as all referring to the inchoate Intellect. But this interpretation, of
course, has the difficulty in that it admits the change in the sense of vouc; from the
fully formed Intellect in 7,6 to the inchoate Intellect in 7,7. Although the word voDc;
elsewhere refers to the inchoate Intellect (V 3 [49], 11, 12), the present context seems
to show a perfect consistency in usage of vouc; qua the actualized Intellect and
v611crtc; qua the inchoate Intellect.

72Bussanich thinks that this point is decisive against the view that the One
is the subject (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 50).
73P. Henry, Les Sources de Plotin (Geneva, Vandoevres: Fondation Hardt,
1957), p. 387.
74We read Creuzer's emendation m'.n:ou accepted by H-S2. Even if the
mss. cxvi:ou is read, the pronoun does not go with the feminine v611crtc;.
75M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.l, p. 168; J. Igal, Emerita 39 (1971):150,
152-153.
76J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, pp. 45-46; F. M. Schroeder,
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Hermes 114 (1986):192; J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in
Plotinus, p. 50.
77See F. M. Schroeder, Hennes 114 (1986):192-193; J. Bussanich, The One
and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 50.
78F. M. Schroeder, Hennes 114 (1986):193; J. Bussanich, The One and Its
Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 50.
79See M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 168; J. Igal, Emerita 39
(1971):152; F. M. Schroeder, Hennes 114 (1986):191.
80Since the O'tl-clause describes the content of OloV cruvatcr9ricru;;, ouva'tm
must not be subjunctive, but indicative. Hence o'lov auval.a9riau;; concerns the very
fact, but not the expectation, that the One can cause oval.a. This point certainly
confirms our proposed attribution of the consciousness about the One's power to
the actualized Intellect.
81See Section III of Chapter III in Part I.
82The similar use of T18ri is noticed in V 3 [49], 11, 10-11, where T18ri vouc;
refers to the moment when the inchoate Intellect became actual vision (1:01:€
E:ye:vE'to IBoucra o~u;;). Also in V 4 [7],2,10-11, the adverb is used of the actualized
Intellect (Kat noUO: op@v i18ri ... ot.0 ouo i18ri).
Igal compares the present passage with III 8 [30],10,5-10, where the
emanation of Intellect from the One is metaphorized into the flow of rivers from a
spring and each of river is said to know already, in a way, the direction in which it is
. going to let its stream flow (flori 8€ OloV EKaO''tOU<; ElOO'ta<; Ol a~f,O'OUO'lV av't@V 1:0:
pEuµa'ta); and he observes that the use of flori and o'lov here signifies subconscious
knowledge in the preliminary existence (Emerita 39 (1971):152, note 5). Bussanich,
in his comment on this passage, views that the addition of o'lov is due to the peculiar
view that "the pre-Intellect knows how it will develop into actualized Intellect, or
how the latter will generate the soul" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in
Plotinus, p. 109). But it would be difficult to read the inchoate Intellect into this
passage. First, the adverb flori refers to nplv &AA.av &A.An pEtV (line 8), that is, the
state of the One prior to the start of the emanation from itself. In this passage,
Plotinus does not speak of the reversion of the inchoate Intellect. Second, this
context is essentially metaphorical. Hence we cannot specify ofov Elo61:a<; as some
subconscious knowledge of the inchoate Intellect or of the primary efflux from the
One.
83Jgal, attributing otov auvc:xtcr9ricru; to the inchoate Intellect, regards it as
a vague consciousness, quasi-consciousness or subconsciousness (Emerita 39
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(1971):152-153).
84Tue conditional clause El OE 6:ouvcxLncrEt i.OE'iv acx~iik; EKE'ivov (V 3
[49],7,9-10) does not characterize Intellect's knowledge of the One's power as
unclear. This clause is distinct from lines 3-5.
85Atkinson, who regards the inchoate Intellect as the subject of EXEL,
considers the phrase ncxp' CXVLOU to emphasize the independence of v611au; vis-a-vis
the One (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 168). But the feminine v611au; goes neither with
the reflexive CXULOU nor with the intensive CXVLOU. The construction that vo\Jc;, being
the subject of EXEL, means the inchoate Intellect must involve the change in the
sense of vouc:;. But the word consistently means the actualized Intellect in 7,5-7 and
7,11.
86J. Igal, Emerita 39 (1971):154; M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, pp.
170-171.
87J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 51-52.
88Schroeder elucidates the coherence of Intellect's self-formation with the
One's causality as follows:
"... the shaping of vouc:; by the One is accomplished by the One acting
simply as power which contains the possibility of creating essence to be
realized by vouc:; in its self-constituting act of vision. This is to say that the
action of the One (which consists simply in its being what it is) is prior to
the self-constitution of vouc;" (Hennes 114 (1986):194-195).
The double-causality in the hypostatization of Intellect is expressed in 5, 17-18;
µop~ouLcxt OE illov µEv Lp6nov ncxpa LOU €v6c:;, illov OE ncxp ' CXULOU. Atkinson
regards LOU vou as the subject of µop~oULCXl and accounts for the double-causality
as follows: "The One is the formal cause of Intellect, its own undefined state, the
Indefinite Dyad, the material cause" (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 120). Combining
Schroeder's and Atkinson's views, we can suppose that the priority of the One's
causal power to Intellect's self-constitution may be seen in terms of the Aristotelian
thesis of the priority of the formal cause to the material cause. But is it legitimate to
consider Plotinus' metaphysics in terms of the Aristotelian scheme of four causes?
It would be more appropriate to see the double-causality in discussion in terms of
the Platonic distinction between the true cause and the accessory cause or sine qua
non (Phd. 99b2-4; Tim. 46c7ff., 68el-69a5). The accessory cause is employed by the
Demiurge or divine cause as subservient in achieving the best possible result (Tim.
46c7-dl; see also Aristotle's association of the achievement of the good result with
necessity in Met. 1015a22-24 ). We must recall that in Plotinus' account for the
genesis of Intellect by means of the inchoate Intellect's reversion, the Good, but not
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the inchoate Intellect, is called the cause of ouaia (VI 7 [38],16,22-24) and that the
generation of Intellect exactly expresses the realization of the good in a lower plane
(III 8 [30],11,16-19; V 6 [24],5,12-15; VI 7 [38],15,23-24). Although Plotinus
nowhere calls the inchoate Intellect or intelligible matter auvab:tov, the relation
between the One's causal power and Intellect's self-constituting act and the priority
of the former to the latter seem to be more aptly viewed in terms of the Platonic
scheme of the divine, true cause and the accessory cause and of the claim of the
subordination of the latter to the former.
89F. M. Schroeder, Hermes 114 (1986):194.
90F. M. Schroeder, Hermes 114 (1986):192. See also P. Henry, Les Sources
de Plotin, p. 387.
91See J.M. Rist, P/otinus: The Road to Reality, p. 51.
92See F. M. Schroeder, Hermes 114 (1986):191.
93F. M. Schroeder, Hermes 114 (1986):191.

CHAYfERIV

TIIE DENIAL OF INTEILECilON AND CONSCIOUSNESS TO 1HE ONE IN
VI 9 [9], ill 9 [13] AND V 6 [24]

Introduction

In the treatise named "On the Fact that That Which is beyond Being does
not think, and on What is the Primary and What the Secondary Thinking Principle"
(V 6 [24]), Plotinus elaborately argues for the absence of intellection and
consciousness from the One. This thesis, however, is not for the first time presented
in V 6 [24], but, with various arguments supporting it, has already been claimed in
earlier treatises, VI 9 [9] and III 9 [13].1 Almost all of the arguments in V 6 [24]
have already been developed in VI 9 [9] and III 9 [13]. Hence we may concluded
that the thesis has already been established in earlier treatises.
In the following, we shall explore Plotinus' arguments for the denial of (i)
intellection and (ii) consciousness to the One by clarifying their logical connection.
Since almost all of the arguments in V 6 [24] are also seen in VI 9 [9] and III 9 [13],
we shall treat these three treatises en bloc. But our exploration will not simply result
in the clarification of the grounds for Plotinus' negative conception of the One. One
argument for the absence of intellection from the One, as we shall see, is based on
the positive conception of the One as a unique €v€pyEt.a. Our consideration will
therefore eventually reveal the systematic coherence between the absence of
intellection from the One and its ontological status as the unique activity, between
the negative way of comprehending the One and the ontological ground for the
positive descriptions of the One's inner life.

257

258

1. The Denial of Intellection to the One

The arguments supporting the denial of intellection to the One in VI 9 [9],
III 9 [13], and V 6 [24 ], prima facie, can be classified into two groups; the arguments
from the absolute simplicity of the One and those from its self-sufficiency. But the
One's simplicity and its self-sufficiency are not isolated conceptually from one
another. Plotinus writes: "By the self-sufficiency someone would also ponder its [i.e.
the One's] one-ness" (VI 9 [9],6, 16-17). Whereas every multiple entity aspires to be
one (6,18-20), the One does not strive for itself (6,20). Again, while the multiple
entity wants its constituent multiplicity (6,20-24 ), "if, therefore, something must be
the most self-sufficient, the One must be the only such being that is deficient in
relation neither to itself nor to other" ( 6,24-26). The One, being absolutely simple,
aspires after neither the unity unifying the multiplicity nor the unity constituent of
some entity. The One's self-sufficiency is grounded in its absolute simplicity.2
Therefore Plotinus' arguments for the absence of intellection from the One seem to
be ultimately based on the absolute unity of the One.
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2. The Arguments from the Absolute Simplicity of the One

Since the One is totally simple, it has no otherness with regard to itself (VI
7 [38],39,3; VI 9 [9],8,33-34).3 From the absence of otherness from the One derives
the absence of intellection from it: "The One has no intellection because there is no
otherness in it" (VI 9 [9],6,42). This claim first becomes intelligible when it is
explained by the thesis that intellection presupposes otherness between the thinker
and its object. As already seen at Section II of Chapter III in Part I, otherness has
two roles as the principle of distinction between the thinking subject and the object
thought and that of distinction among the Forms. To this extent, intellection is
inseparable from otherness. Sameness, at the same time, represents the unity of
thinking subject and object of thought. Intellect is then said to be one by virtue of
sameness and two by virtue of otherness. In V 6 (24 ], therefore, Plotinus attempts to
show that the primary thinking principle must be both one and two ( 1,6-7) instead of
saying that it includes both sameness and otherness. 4 If, on the one hand, Intellect
were not one but simply two, it would not think itself ( 1, 7-12). If, on the other, it
·were simply one but not two, it would have no object and thereby no thinking (1,1213). That which is beyond the first thinking principle, Plotinus concludes, has no
intellection (2,2).
The arguments from the duality in Intellect are not exhausted by those
from the subject-object duality. Plotinus presents another type of argument. The
primary entity is one and two because there are always that entity itself and the
intellection that it exercises (V 6 [24],6 24-27).5 The One, however, is neither one of
the primary beings nor the product of some primary entity and its intellection nor is
it two at all, but beyond being, hence beyond intellection (6,28-30). Thus the
arguments from Intellect's duality are classified into two groups; one from the vouc;;vorrr6v duality and another from the vouc;;-v6'11atc;; duality.
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As already mentioned, there are two levels of otherness within Intellect;

not only otherness in virtue of which Intellect is distinct from its object, but also
otherness which demarcates one intelligible object from another.6 By virtue of
otherness multiplicity arises in the intelligible world. In V 6 [24],3, Plotinus
endeavors to show the priority of the unity itself to the unity that underlies 7 or
constitutes the multiplicity, and then concludes that intellection, involving
multiplicity, must be absent from the One. The presupposition of this argument is
that "there is multiplicity in the thinking principle" (3,22-23). For this argument to
be systematically coherent, it must be shown that the objects of intellection must not
be one but many, in other words, that Intellect, in its effort to apprehend the One,
cannot think the One in its simplicity but inevitably in the diverse, articulated
content from the One. This point, however, is not fully explained in V 6 [24] except
for the view that the One as

i:o VOT\1:0V is indispensable for intellection to take place

satisfactorily (2,7-12). Nevertheless it is, though not exhaustively, already
established in the early treatises (V 4 [7],2,4-12; V 1 [10], 7,4-17). Hence this
argument, even when viewed within the framework of Plotinus' philosophy as it has
emerged up to V 6 [24], seems to be systematically coherent. But it would surely
call for a more elaborate account for the self-pluralization of Intellect in its
hypostatization as is later developed in III 8 [30], 11, VI 7 [38], 15-17, and V 3 [49], 11.
The absolute simplicity of the One entails that it does not know even
itself:
It is not then absurd that he [i.e. the One] does not know (µii oIBcv)
himself; for he has nothing by the side of himself which he learns (µ<l9n),
because he is one (V 6 [24 ],6,31-32).
From this statement, however, we may not conclude that the One is
ignorant of himself (VI 9 [9],6,46-50).8 The One's simplicity makes it impossible to
speak not only of something which it knows but also of something of which it might
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be ignorant, since ignorance in general presupposes otherness and duality. The selfthinking principle, contrary to the One, "must have been unacquainted with itself
(aKcrtaµa0rrr:ov 'tE'tUXflKEVat Elvat aui:ou)" (III 9 [13],9,20-21). The present perfect
i;E'tUXflKEVat appears to suggest the case of the inchoate Intellect. The inchoate

Intellect "saw (the One) in a manner different from intellection (€/3AETt€V
(xvofi-rW<;)" (VI 7 [38],16,14).9 Since it has not yet received the pluralized content
from the One into itself, it may be said to "have been unacquainted with itself." In
the already mentioned passage where we are told not to consider the One to be
ignorant of itself, the One is said to be "united with itself (O'UVOV aui:fi3)" (VI 9
(9],6,49).10 Even if the locution O'UVElVal aui:fi3 is synonymous with the locution
EXEtV €aui:6, according to Plotinus, the possession of the self does not fall under the

conception of intellection (III 9 [13],9,6-7).
As is well known, the first hypothesis in the second part of Plato's

Parmenides is a locus classicus of Plotinus' doctrine of the One. Whereas Plato tries
to explicate the absolute unity exclusively in Eleatic terms, Plotinus' explication of it,
as the above discussion shows, goes far beyond Plato's "laborious game" (Parm.
137b2).
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3. The Arguments from the Self-Sufficiency of the Good

As already seen, the One's self-sufficiency is grounded in its simplicity.

Whereas a unique sort of consciousness and hyper-intellection are attributed to the
One because of its self-sufficiency in V 4 [7],2, 13-19, its self-sufficiency is also the
reason why intellection and consciousness must be denied to the One. But this fact
would not be contradictory, insofar as Plotinus carefully qualifies the One's
cruvcxta9riat.c; by o'lov and remarks that its Kcxi:cxv6riat.c; is different from intellection
proper.
Plotinus sometimes directly infers the absence of intellection from the
One from its self-sufficiency or perfection by simply saying that the ascriptiuil of
intellection to the One might make it aspire for something else and so compromise
its self-sufficiency (VI 9 [9],6,44-46; V 6 [24],2,13-16; 4,1-4).11 This reasoning first
becomes sound when intellection is regarded as that which brings something
deficient into completion and associated with some desire. In virtue of intellection
that which has been deficient in its own nature is completed and has its good (III 9
[13],7,5-6; 9,20-22; V 6 [24],4,5; 5,12-15). In other words, the deficient entity aspires

for and moves towards the One for its being completed or limited by exercising
intellection. Thus intellection is defined as "a movement towards the Good in its
desire of that Good" (V 6 [24 ],5,8-9).12 There seem to be two ways of reasoning
from this definition of intellection to the denial of intellection to the One. First, as
the self-sufficient One has no desire, 13 it is not in movement and so has no
intellection (VI 9 [9],6,42-44; III 9 [13],7,1-4; 9,1-5; V 6 [24],5,10-12).14 Second,
since the One is that towards which intellection is directed, it is something different
from the thinking principle (V 6 [24],6,1-3); the One is i:o vorii:6v to that principle,
but it is not necessary for every vorrr6v to have intellection (2,4-5).
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In III 9 [13],9,6-12, Plotinus tries to show that the One does not even think
itself, in terms of the conception of intellection as the primary activity. As well as in

v 6 [24],5,8-9, intellection is here conceived as the looking at the First (line 7).
Since intellection is the primary activity, the One prior to and beyond it has no
activity. But this argument is not fully convincing because Plotinus does not explain
why intellection must be the first activity. The argument with recourse to the
conception of €vE:pyEu:x in V 6 [24 ],6,3-9 is more elaborate. As the First is said to be
that which provides the activity in III 9 [13],9,9, it is also here stated that the activity
of all things is directed towards the Good (V 6 [24],5,18-19).15 Plotinus continues:
So the Good is without activity (avEvE:pyrrrov). And why should activity
act? For in general, on the one hand (µ€v), no activity has yet another
activity. Even if, on the other, they can at least attribute [something] to
the other activities directed to something else (Et oE: YE i:atc;; CXA.Aau; i:atc;;
Elc;; &A.Ao €xouatv E:navEVEYKEtv),16 yet the primary activity of all, on
which the other activities depend, we must let be what it is, adding nothing
further to it. So such activity (ri ... i:ou:xui:T\ €vE:pyEu:x) is not intellection;
for it has nothing that it will think: because it is itself the first (V 6
[24 ],6,3-9).
Plotinus here, invoking the notion of €vE:pyEu:x, attempts to make the One
free from intellection in two ways. Notice that in each case it is tacitly presupposed
that the One is itself an €vE:pyEu:x.17 First, just as intellection itself does not think
(6,9-10),18 no activity in general has another activity. Second, Plotinus, on the basis
of his aforementioned doctrine that the activity of all things is oriented towards the
Good, appeals to the hierarchy of activities and clarifies what the One as an
€v€pyEu:x is like. The One, as the primary activity, depends on nothing and so has
no orientation towards anything else. Since we are not allowed to add anything to
the primary activity, that activity must be envisioned neither as the activity "towards
something else" nor as the actualization "of some entity." In III 9 [13],9,8, on the
contrary, intellection is called the primary activity. The discrepancy between two
passages is merely verbal. The orientation towards the One (line 7, npo<; i:o npwi:ov
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J}A.€nEtV) is there associated with intellection, so that that passage is congruent with
the present one. Since intellection, as a movement towards the Good, is directed
towards something else, the primary activity that depends on nothing must not be
called intellection. Hence the One is avEVEPY111:'0V precisely in two senses that it,
as an €v€pyEtcx, does not have another activity and that it is not the activity directed
towards something else.19 The argument with recourse to the conception of
€v€pyEta in V 6 [24],6,3-9 reveals that the One is the highest €v€pyEta devoid of
any external relation (np6c:;; i;t) and orientation (de:;; i;t).20 We may call it also an
oval.a-less €v€pyEta.21 This characterization of the One entails even such a positive
consequence that Un€pV6flatc:;; and €ypi)yopatc:;; are attributed to the One on the
basis of its being identified as the eternal €v€pyEta (VI 8 [39], 16,30ff.). The status
of the One as the unique activity seems to be able to serve as a link between the
positive description of the One's inner life and the negation of intellection to it.
This point will be further explored in the sixth chapter.

265

4. The Denial of Consciousness to the One

Plotinus claims that the absence of consciousness from the One is also due
to its self-sufficiency and simplicity. In the treatises in discussion there are two
relevant passages.
In III 9 [13],9,12ff., ncxpcxKoA.ou811au;; is denied to the One. Plotinus
develops three arguments, the first two of which constitute a disjunction. First, if the
Good is per se good and consciousness does not make it good, the Good is already
prior to the consciousness (9, 14-15). Second, if consciousness makes the Good
good, the Good does not exist before it, so that the consciousness itself does not
exist (9, 15-17). Third, since by the consciousness the entity which has been
unacquainted with itself understands itself, the consciousness assumes some
deficiency (9,18-22). The first and the third arguments appeal to the One's selfsufficiency and perfection, and the second to its being the first (9,1; 9,3; 9,7) and the
highest (9,5). The denial of consciousness to the One seems to be also due to the
implication of the term which Plotinus here consistently uses for the consciousness,
ncxpcxKoA.ou811au;;. As Warren points out,22 this word is properly applied to human
knowing, derives from the notion of "following along with," and stresses the subjectobject duality. It is obvious that this term is inappropriate to describe the cognitive
state of the One. 23
In V 6 [24],5,1-5, the auvcxicr8rJO"u; is denied to the One. Plotinus writes:
Moreover, the multiple would seek itself and wish to converge on and be
conscious of itself ( auvve:ue:tv Kcxl auvcxta8ave:a8cxt cx\n:ou). But in what
manner will that which is completely one go to itself? At what point will it
need self-consciousness? But it is the same thing which is better than selfconsciousness and better than every intellection.
Although Plotinus here appeals to the absolute simplicity of the One, it is
not fully clear, from this passage alone, why cruvcxicr811atc; is not appropriate to the
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one. First of all, what does it mean that the multiple wishes to converge on itself

(auvvEvnv ... o:\.rrou) for seeking itself? In V 3 [49],13,19-21, we are told that
Intellect attains self-sufficiency by inclining to itself. Here to incline to itself ( Eic;;

cxirco VEOOV, 13,21) and to become the sufficient entity consisting of all things
(lKo:vov €~ O:navi:wv yEvoµEvov, 13,20), which further explains the causal dative i:4>

oA4> in 13,19, are juxtaposed.

The crucial point lies in the ensuing lines (21-24):

€nEl Ko:l ii crvvo:tcr0ncru;; noUou i:tvoc;; cx'(cr0ncrl<;; €crn· Ko:l µcxpi:vpE1 Ko:l
i:ouvoµo:. Ko:l ii v6ncrtc;; np6i:Epo: oucro: E'lcrw Elc;; o:ui:ov €mcri:p€~n
onA.ov6i:t noA.uv ovi:o:.
The particle €nEi is exactly retrospective in force. But we may not
immediately associate Intellect's self-inclination with the crvvo:icr0ncru;; as
perception of something which is many. The interpretation of the above passage
requires some caution. As np6i:Epo: in 13,23 indicates, ii crvvo:icr0ncru;; in 13,21 is
not attributed to Intellect but to the soul. The root meaning of the word as unifying
sensations is not appropriate to Intellect's consciousness which concerns its own selfunity.24 But the definition of intellection as crvvo:icr0ncru;; i:ou oA.ov (13,13) implies
the interior complexity of Intellect. Hence Plotinus' mention of crvvo:icr0ncru;; in
13,21 is not to apply the root meaning of the term to Intellect's consciousness but to
remark that Intellect's interior multiplicity is adumbrated by its crvvo:icr0ncru;;.
Moreover, we must here remember that Plotinus thematically attempts to define
self-knowledge in the first-half of V 3 [49] and that intellection as true selfknowledge is characterized as self-reversion (6,5; 6,40). In the context of V 3
[49], 13, thus seen, two aspects of intellection, as self-reversion or self-inclination and
as crvvo:icr0ncrtc;; unifying the interior multiplicity, meet in a focus. In III 8
[30], 11,25-26, moreover, we read that the primordial desire of the inchoate Intellect
towards the Good is eternally preserved in the fully actualized Intellect as desire
and convergence with its form (E~Ecrtc;; ... Ko:l crvvvEvcrtc;; npoc;; i:o Effioc;; o:ui:ou),
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which is the pluralized copy of the Good. Also in V 6 [24],5,1-2, two aspects of selfintellection as self-convergence and as self-consciousness are closely connected.25
These aspects precisely denote that self-intellection inevitably concerns the interior
multiplicity of Intellect's own. Therefore the statement that the multiple wishes to
be conscious of itself seems to imply that it seeks to be unified by its own act of

CJ\JVcxta8nau;. Insofar as avvcxta8nau; necessarily concerns Intellect's inner
multiplicity, it proves to be obviously incompatible with the simplicity of the One.
All the arguments for the absence of intellection and consciousness from
the One are based on the incompatibility of either the multiplicity or deficiency
found in those activities with either the simplicity or the self-sufficiency of the One.
Of course, this denial is never incongruent with the view that the One has a unique
sort of avvcxta8nau; and Km:cxv6natc;; different from intellection in the proper sense
at V 4 [7],2, 17-19.26 Rather, we may say that this denial makes the cognitive state of
the One more conspicuously unique. Again, to make the cognitive activity of the
One more unique would necessitate more thoroughgoing denial of intellection and
self-consciousness to the One. Plotinus' positive description of the One's inner life
and his denial of intellection to it thus seem to support one another and to be
systematically coherent with one another. As already seen, Plotinus' argument for
the absence of intellection from the Good in V 6 [24],6,3-9 starts from the tacit view
that the One is the primary evE:pyEtcx. As repeatedly remarked, the ontological
status of the One as the unique €vE:pyEtcx can serve as the foundation for the
positive specification of the One's inner life. The systematic coherence between the
positive and the negative descriptions of the One's cognitive state seems
considerably due to the ontological status of the One as such.

to

be
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NOTES

lAs many critics point out, the numbering of III 9 [13] in Porphyry's
chronological order is arbitrary. The problem concerning the knowledge and
consciousness of the One is thematically treated only in the seventh and the ninth
chapters of III 9 [13]. Insofar as III 9 [13],9 can be regarded as a gloss to V 4 [7],2,
we would be justified in treating it as one of the early treatises. Moreover, the brief
argument for the absence of intellection from the One in III 9 [13],7 does not go
beyond the arguments in III 9 [13], VI 9 [9], and V 6 [24], so that we may refer to
this chapter in exploring Plotinus' doctrine in his early treatises. In addition, the
absence of intellection from the One, without any supporting argument, is briefly
mentioned also in I 2 [19],3,25.
2Qn the connection between simplicity and self-sufficiency, see also I 1
[53],2,22, IV 4 [28],18,21-22, V 3 [49],13,16-17, and V 4 [7],1,12-13.
3See also VI 9 [9],11,8-9.
4For the duality of the thinker and its object within Intellect, see note 5 in
Chapter III of Part I.
5Tue passage av9pwnrn; KCXl VOT\O'l<; av9pwnou K"LA. would not mention
the duality of the intelligible entity and intellection whose object is that entity.
Plotinus here speaks of the primary being that is said to have the form of thinking
(6,20-21). It is associated with thinking or intellective exercise rather than with
being-thought or intelligibility. Hence Plotinus continues: "If, therefore, it is being,
it is also Intellect ... " (6,21-22).
6See V 1 [10],4,39-40 and V 3 [49],10,26-28. In the latter passage, each
intelligible object is called an internally multiple A.6yoc;. For the multiplicity of
A.6yoc;, see III 2 [47],16,52-53.
7See lines 1-2 €v ... unoKEiµEvov. Intelligible matter has a role as a unity
underlying a multiplicity in the intelligible world (II 4 [12],4,7; 4,14-16). Although
the discussion in V 6 [24],3,1-10 is completely consonant with the idea developed in
II 4 [12],4-5 and 15, it is not fully certain that Plotinus here thinks of intelligible
matter.
8Tuis passage was already analyzed in the second chapter.
9In the early treatises there is no passage in which the ignorant state of the
inchoate Intellect is explicitly mentioned. Intelligible matter destitute of light from
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the One (II 4 [12],5,34-37), if any, would insinuate it.
lO'fhis expression is also applied to Intellect (V 6 [24],1,5; V 3 [49],13,20).
See also III 8 [30],11,11 ow OUOEV ECJ'tlV [sc. 1:0 aycx96v] cxui:q> ft cxui:6.

lllf Kcxl ... aA.Ao in V 6 [24],4,4 were to be rendered such that "and it
thinks nothing, because nothing else is present with it," this passage would belong to
the arguments from the One's simplicity. As Henry and Schwyzer point out (H-S2,
apparatus ad Zoe.), however, this section might be collapsed, thus it was not referred
to in our consideration of the arguments from the One's simplicity.
12In the preceding passage (V 6 [24],5,6-8), Plotinus gives an account of
the process of intellection to take place by invoking the reversion of the inchoate
Intellect towards the One. Notice Plotinus' consistent use of the aorist tense. For
the reference to the inchoate Intellect as i:o yEv6µEvov (line 7), see V 2 [11],1,9.
But we may not confine this definition of intellection to the apprehension of the
inchoate Intellect, since desire for the One is eternally operative in the fully formed
Intellect (III 8 [30], 11,25-26). As already seen at Section VI of Chapter III in Part I,
the definition of intellection is appropriate to the eternally pre-noetic phase of
Intellect.
In contrasting the self-sufficiency of the One with the deficiency in
intellection, Plotinus appears to invoke Plato's distinction between being and
becoming as 1:0 cxui:o Kcx9 cxui:6 which is crEµv6i:o:i:ov and 1:0 cXEt E~tEµEVOV aA.Aou
which is €A.Am€c; (Phlb. 53d3-7). Plotinus employs the word €AA.mile; to mark the
inferiority of Intellect (III 9 [13],7,5; 9,21), whereas intellection is said to be crEµv6v
only insofar as it is about the Good (9,10-12).
I

13For the equation of desire with movement, see III 9 [13],9,4.
14See also V 1 [10],6,27, V 4 [7],2,18, and V 3 [49],10,16-23. Bussanich
writes: "It is precisely this kinetic aspect of Intellect which leads Plotinus to
associate rest and non-thinking in the One ("Plotinus on the Inner Life of the One,"
Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):166).
15See also I 7 [54],1,7-10 and III 8 [30],11,9-10.
16This conditional clause is variously rendered. So our own construction
needs to be explained.
First, Henry and Schwyzer render the text as follows: "quodsi actibus
aliis in aliud agentibus actum rursus possunt quidam attribuere." Armstrong and
Mizuchi follow the same line. In this re~ding, i:o:lc;; &A.A.me; i:o:lc; Eic; aA.Ao is taken as
the indirect object of E-ncxvEVEYKEtV, whose direct object is the omitted E-vE:pyEtcxv
(agentibus actum). The weakness of this interpretation lies not only in the need of
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supplying the word but also in its violating of the previously mentioned principle
that no activity has another activity (6,4-5). The alternative readings are suggested
by Theiler and Cilento. Their translations respectively read:
"... und wenn schon irgendwelche Philosophen die anderen
[Wirkungskrafte] auf anderes zuriickzufiihren fiir moglich halten ...."
"... che se, a dir vero, le rimanenti attiva, che si lascian riferire ad alto,
hanno una loro nuova azione ...."
Theiler proposes to emend 't'cxl<;; CXAA.cxu;; 't'cxl<;; to 'tac; CXAA.cxc;. In Cilento's translation,
not only "a dir vero" is unnecessary, but "una loro nuova azione" does not make
sense in the present context. Bussanich, following the line of Theiler's translation,
specifies the meaning of the sentence: "they attribute the other actualities [i.e.
Intellect's] to something else [i.e. the One]" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in
Plotinus, p. 68). Our construction, roughly speaking, follows the line of Henry and
Schwyzer. The point which Plotinus makes in the present passage is that nothing
can be added to the primary activity (ouoE:v cxu't'n €1:L npoa't'L9€v1:€<;, 6,7-8). Such
primary activity is contrasted with the other activities directed to and dependent on
something else. Hence it suffices to remark that we can at any rate ( yE, 6,5)
attribute something to those activities, so that it is not necessary to specify what can
be exactly attributed to them. It is no wonder that Plotinus does not mention the
direct object of €ncxV€VEYK€tV. Our construction can avoid not only supplying the
word but also violating the principle that no activity has another activity. The
alternative reading followed by Theiler and Bussanich is weak in proposing
emending the text. In this reading, moreover, the force of YE becomes obscure.
Second, as the majority of translators take it, the subject of €xouaLV (6,5) is the
editorial "they." Armstrong renders the subject as "some philosophers" and points
out the reference to the Aristotelian doctrine of the first and second actualities in
De Anima 412a22ff. (Plotinus, 5:212, note 2). If this be the case, "some
philosophers" will be specified as the Peripatetics. First of all, does Plotinus here
mention the Aristotelian distinction of disposition and activity? Notice that the
directionality (€le; illo, 6,5) of the lower activities is here stressed, whereas
Aristotle's distinction has nothing to do with such directionality. For the further
criticism of Armstrong's observation, see J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to
Intellect in Plotinus, p. 67. This passage may therefore be related to Plotinus'
previous statement that the activity of all things is directed towards the Good (5,1819) rather than to the Aristotelian doctrine. Bussanich views that Plotinus in the
present clause criticizes Aristotelian philosophers who regard the first principle as a
thinking Intellect (ibid., p. 68). In his view, the attribution of the other actualities to
something else precisely means that of Intellect's activities to the Good. This
interpretation is totally impossible. First, €xouaLv will be unnecessary since we
cannot see why the criticized philosophers are said to be able to attribute actualities
to the One. It is almost impossible to read Plotinus' critical attitude into this short
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sentence. Second, the protasis-apodosis connection will be totally unintelligible.
Finally, Bussanich's specification of Theiler's -ra<; <XU.ex<; as "the other actualities of
Intellect" seems to be rash. The plural -ra<; <XU.ex<; does not necessarily imply the
difference of Intellect's activities from the One's activity, the singular -rf}v npcirtriv
(6,6). The plural -rcxU:; <XU.au; -rcxU:; seems to refer to the activities directed to
something else in general, namely all the activities other than the primary activity or
the One.
17See Bussanich's comment on the present passage: "Activity with respect
to something besides itself, e.g. intellection, must be rejected in the case of the
Good. This leaves the door open for Plotinus to characterize the Good as an
€v€pyEtcx that is not directed to other things" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in
Plotinus, pp. 66-67).
18See VI 7 [38],37,15-16 OUK av ouacx v611au; vool, wanEp OUOE KlVllO"t<;
KlVOLLO av and VI 9 [9],6,53-54 v611at<; OE OU VOE'l.
19'fhis point is explicitly stated in V 3 [49],10,16-17 ouo€ yap EXE't -ro €v
nav-r11 Elc; -rt EVEpyilan. Needless to say, the One has no activity towards anything
lower than itself (V 1 [10],6,26).
2DWhether the One is an €v€pyEtcx or not is really controversial. But we
must notice that Plotinus, whenever he denies €v€pyEtcx to the One, speaks of the
activity as intellection or some noetic movement (I 7 [54],1,16-20; V 3 [49],10,16-18;
l2passim; VI 7 [38],37,lOff.; 40,29-30; see also VI 7 [38],17,9-10). This denial is
totally compatible with the present passage. The attempt to deny that the One is an
€v€pyEtcx would destroy the ground for the explanation of the procession of Intellect
by means of the double-activity theory which is persistently maintained through all
the periods of Plotinus' writing (V 4 [7],1,31-36; 2,27-37; V 1[10],3,7-12;V2
[ll],1,16-18; IV 3 [27],10,30-37; IV 5 [29],7,17-20; II 9 [33],8,22-23; V 3 [49],7,21-26).
Bussanich also holds the consistency of the view that the One is activity (Ancient
Philosophy 7 (1987):178).
21See VI 8 [39],20,9-10 €v€pyEtcxV -ri)v npw-r11v ... CTVE'U ouaicx<;.
Bussanich elucidates the sense in which the One is identified as an €v€pyEtcx as
follows:
"Thus, the Good is clearly an actuality, but unlike Intellect its reality does
not comprise an actualization of something else: it does not have a
substrate, it is not an actualization of a prior potentiality, and, of course,
its actuality involves no duality" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in
Plotinus, p. 69).
He also suggests that the freedom and self-mastery of the Good "would be
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compromised if the Good's €v€pyEtcX were an actualization of its substance, as is the
case with Intellect" (Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):178, (Italics mine.)).
22E. W. Warren, "Consciousness in Plotinus," Phronesis 9 (1964):90.
23See G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 151: "The
purpose of the contrast, ... between the unity of the One and the duality of
Intellect, is served perfectly by mxpaKoA.ou0ricrtc;, which emphasizes the following
along of one part by another." For the denial of napaKoA.ou0ricrtc; to the One, see
also V 3 [49],13,7. This difficult passage will be carefully analyzed in the seventh
chapter.
24See G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 80.
25In V 6 [24 ],5, Plotinus differentiates two levels of intellection, the
original intellection towards the Good and self-intellection incidental to the original
one (lines 16-17). As pointed out at Section VI of Chapter III in Part I, these two
levels of intellection correspond respectively to the activity towards the Good and
that towards itself in VI 9 [9],2,33-43. Self-convergence and self-consciousness in
the present passage seem to mean the latter activity.
26The discrepancy between the denial and the ascription of Km:av6ricrtc; in
V 4 [7],2, 17 and III 9 [13],9,22 is merely verbal. As Rist points out in Plotinus: The
Road to Reality, p. 42, the meaning of the term differs in both sections.

CHAPfERV

VI 7 [38],39,1-4: TIIE ONE'S INTUITION

Introduction

The gigantic treatise, VI 7 [38], deals with diverse issues. In its final part
(chs. 37-42), Plotinus painstakingly tackles the problem concerning the cognitive
state of the One. But the substantial portion of these chapters is in fact devoted to
the extensive arguments for the absence of intellection from the One. The brief
positive description of the One's cognitive activity (39,1-4) appears in such a context.
In this chapter we shall first carefully analyze the passage in question and compare it
with Plotinus' earlier position in V 4 [7],2. Second, we shall clarify the implication
of the word €nt/3oA.il ascribed to the One in the present treatise by investigating
Plotinus' usage of the word in other passages.
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1. The One's Intuition

Plotinus positively, but briefly, describes the One's cognitive activity in the
midst of the long train of arguments for the absence of intellection from the One. It
would be instructive to review the passage immediately preceding the affirmation
about the One's knowledge. Plotinus makes one supposition: if we have to admit
that the One is not that which neither perceives nor knows itself, the content of its
self-intellection will be "I am the Good" rather than "I am" (38, 10-18). This
supposition allows two possibilities. In the first possibility, in which intellection
itself is identified with the Good, intellection does not need to have the One as its
object so that the One is no longer the Good (38,18-20); because intellection,
insofar as it is itself the Good, attains the knowledge that "I am the Good" without
concerning the One.1 In the second possibility, where intellection directed to the
Good is different from the Good itself, the Good is already prior to intellection and
self-sufficient so that it has no need of intellection concerning itself (38,21-24). In
short, the supposition of the Good's self-intellection either makes the One valueless
or entails the One's transcendence beyond self-intellection. Thus the supposition
itself turns out to be untenable: "hence That does not think itself as good" (38,24-

25).
Here arises a problem. Even if it is demonstrated that the Good has no
self-intellection, we are reluctant to admit that the One is something which is
senseless and ignorant of itself. Plotinus is thus forced to describe positively the
One's cognitive state:
But as what? Nothing else is present to tne Good, but a sort of simple
intuition towards itself (O:nA.fi i:tc; E:mf3oA.T) ... npoc; aui:ov) will belong to
it. But since there is neither a" sort of extension nor difference towards
itself, what would the intuition towards itself (i:o E:ntf3aA.Anv €aui:~) be
other than itself? (39,1-4).
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This is an unmistakably positive description of the One's knowledge. We
should like to comment on four aspects of this passage.
First, it must be noticed that the present passage adequately replies to the
query in 38,10-11: "But who will admit the nature which is not in perception and
knowledge of itself (ilia 'tic; mxpao€~E'tat ~vatv OUK ouaav EV ala0t1aEt Kat
yvwaEl au'tf1<;)?"2 This point is prima facie parallel to the case in V 4 (7],2, 15-19,

where Plotinus spells out the fact that the One is never oiov avata011'tov, by
ascribing Ka'tav611atc; and oiov auvata011at<;; to it. But these passages differ in
context. In V 4 [7],2, on the one hand, Plotinus remarks that the One is not
senseless in order to emphasize its self-sufficiency. In VI 7 [38],38, on the other, he
seems to be fully aware that the denial of intellection to the One in the preceding
chapter may lead to an interpretation that the One does not have any cognitive
activity.3 The ascription of simple intuition to the One definitely undermines the
misinterpretation. Moreover, as already seen, the One's inner life, which is to be
specified by its hyper-intellective knowledge and unique awareness, is in V 4 [7],2
indissolubly related to the living conception of the intelligible object, which is the
very copestone of the doctrine of self-intellection. In VI 7 [38],38-39, on the other
hand, the affirmation about the One's simple intuition proves to be fully coherent
with the denial of intellection to the One by abrogating the aforementioned
misinterpretation which the denial is prone to cause. In other words, Plotinus in the
present treatise notices not only that the positive and the negative descriptions of
the One's inner activity must be consistent with one another, but also that for this
consistency to be safeguarded, it is necessary to eliminate some pejorative
conception of the One, which the negative description is likely to entail, by nothing
less than a positive description.4 In the present passage, therefore, we see that (i)
the affirmation about the One's knowledge, (ii) the absence of intellection from the
One, and (iii) the exigency of dismissing some misconception that (ii) is prone to
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entail first come within a single scope of inquiry. This fact would exactly indicate
Plotinus' endeavor to systematize his doctrine of the One.
Second, the One's intuition is free from otherness, the very hallmark of
intellection. The absence of intellection towards itself from the One precisely
means that no subject-object duality is imposed on its intuition. The One's intuition
is hence sharply contrasted with intellection.5 As for the undifferentiatedness of the
intuition from the One itself, the present passage is exactly parallel to V 4 [7],2, 17, it
Kcx-rcxv6riatc; cxu-rou cxu-r6. The thesis that the One itself and its cognitive activity
cannot be differentiated, even conceptually, from one another is consistently
maintained in the early and the late treatises. In addition, Plotinus mentions
otherness as the principle of distinction among the Forms in 39,7-9. It is needless to
say that the One is also free from otherness in this sense. In light of 39, 11-12, the
simplicity (anA.f1, 39, 1) of the One's intuition proves the absence of any otherness
whatsoever from it. Unlike intellection, which is awakened to life by otherness
( 13, 11-12), the One's intuition is completely simple in the sense that it is entirely
indistinguishable from the One itself and that it is not a pluralized vision.
Third, although Plotinus in the present passage faithfully abides by the
basic traits of the One's hyper-noetic knowledge in V 4 [7],2 as regards the first and
the second points, the tone of the present passage sharply differs from that of V 4
[7],2. Despite stressing the One's self-sufficiency in 38,22-23, we are told that
nothing is present to the One (ouo€v illo napEa-ttv o:frri~), 39,1). As we shall see
later, however, this sentence does not imply that the One's intuition is vacuous. The
contrast in tone between these two passages will turn out to be obvious as soon as
this sentence is compared with

v 4 [7],2, 15-16, EO"'tlV O:U'tOU n6:v-ro: EV o:frr~ KO:t auv

o:\J-r~.6 It must be noticed that Plotinus here associates the One's self-sufficiency

with its having no inte!lection (38,22-24) rather than with its having intuition. The
One's intuition is related closely to its simplicity.? In V 4 [7],2, on the contrary, it is
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insinuated that the Kcrrav6T)crtc;; and o'lov cruvaicr9T)crtc;; must not be absent from the
self-sufficient One. In the present passage, furthermore, Plotinus entirely refuses to
apply to the One such noetic terminology as is employed in V 4 [7],2,18-19 (€v ...
voflcr€l €i=€pux;; fi Kai=O: i=ilv vou VOT)atv), because the application of noetic
terminology to the One may be unavoidably confusing in the present context, where
the absence of intellection from the One is thematically discussed. As seen in the
first chapter, indeed, we can see clearly Plotinus' endeavor, in V 4 [7],2, to exclude
any implication of duality and multiplicity from the One's knowledge. But his effort
in the present treatise is to conform the One's intuition to its unity.
Finally, anA.11 i=u;; €nt/3oA.f1 npoc; aui=ov seems to have already been
prefigured in v 1 [10],6, 18 €mcri=pa~€vi=oc; cX€l EKELVO\J npoc; aui=o, the phrase which
we attributed to the One in the third chapter. The kinship between the words
€ntf3oA.n and

€mcri=p~T1

is clear in that they originally mean "throwing-on" and

"turning-towards" respectively. The phrase npoc; aui=6v surely signifies that the
One's €nt/3oA.T1 turns inward. The One's intuition is thus viewed as the casting of
attention inward upon itself.8 In other words, it represents the One's self-reversion.
The word €nt130A.T1 in the present passage is efficient enough to be able to specify the
One's self-reversion as its intuitive knowledge. On the contrary, Kai=av6T)crtc;; in V 4

[7],2, 17 has no implication of reversion and expresses the intuitive nature of the
One's knowledge less directly than €nt/3oA.T1. Thus seen, it turns out that Plotinus
already envisioned the self-reversion of the One, but could not find any appropriate
cognitional term to imply it in his early treatises. Now he employs the appropriate
term.9
In VI 7 [38],39-41, Plotinus briefly describes the One's cognitive state in at
least four sections other than 39, 1-4. The consideration of these sections further
illuminates the modalities of the One's hyper-noetic intuition. In the first passage

(39, 18-20), where Plotinus stresses the absence of intellection from the One, the
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One is expressed as 'tO CXV'tO nav OloV KlV111.J.CX and 'tOlOV'tOV OloV €ncx$i1. The One's
self-contact is unparalleled in the Enneads. From the fact that Plotinus frequently
describes the soul's union with the One in tactile metaphor, it can be supposed that
the absolute unity and the incomparable immediacy of the One's knowledge are
meant by this expression.IO Moreover, -ro cxv-ro ncxv otov KtV111.J.CX, comparing the
One to a movement, expresses its simple wholeness, which is contrasted with the
multiplicity of Intellect (39, 18). This expression would invite the question whether
the One's intuition can be associated with some movement or not. This question is
answered in the second relevant passage (39,28-34 ), where Plotinus considers Soph.
249al-2 aEµvov E:a-rCx;; to be the only possible description of the One's intuition.
The verb '(a-rcxa8m (39,29-32) explicitly indicates that the One's intuition must be
rather viewed in terms of rest. As already seen in the first chapter, the One's
Kcx-rcxv611au; is said to be €v a-raaEt cxIBicp in V 4 [7],2, 18. As considered in the third
chapter, again, the self-directed reversion of the One in V 1 [10],6, 18 is totally
motionless. Accordingly, the static or a-kinetic nature of the One's cognitive activity
is consistently maintained in the early treatises and the present one.11 We must not
be misled by KtV111.J.CX in 39,19.
In the third relevant section (39,24-26), Plotinus explains the reason why
the Good would be multiple even if it were to think stable things:
For it is not the case that the latter things, on the one hand (µ€v), will also
have real being with intellection, and the intellections of the Good, on the
other (8€), will be only empty contemplations.12
From this passage, however, we cannot conclude that the cognitive activity
of the Good is vacuous. By saying that intellections of lower entities, allegedly
attributed to the Good, Plotinus seems to adumbrate rather that the Good's
intuition is not vacuous, though it transcends the subject-object duality and thereby
does not have ovaicx as its object.13 Although we are told that nothing is present to
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the Good (39,1), its cognitive state must not be regarded as empty. As i:ot0frtov
0 tov €na~f\

(39, 19) insinuates, rather unrivaled immediacy or intensity would be

suitable for the One's intuition. In 41,3-4, finally, we read that the Good, compared
to the eye which is light itself (6 ... 6<f>9apµoc; ... cf>@<; aui:Oc; wv), would not need to
see real being. The comparison of the Good to the eye is also unparalleled in the

Enneads. But this comparison seems to be laden with less significance. In 41,31,
self-vision is denied to the Good. The tactile metaphor, as already remarked, would
be more appropriate to the incomparable immediacy of the One's intuition than the
ocular metaphor. The emphasis is rather on the comparison to light; as light does
not seek after light, the Good as ii cxuyf\ does not need intellection compared to
light (41,5-7).14 In the present treatise, unfortunately, we cannot fully understand
how this comparison is related to the Good's intuition. Nevertheless, it is not
difficult to find a common characteristic between light and the One's knowledge,
which is transparency. Light is transparent to light (V 8 [31 ],4,6). The lightmetaphor would hence be appropriate to the characterization of the One's
knowledge as n6:vi:T\ oto:Kpti:tKOV E:cxui:ou in V 4 [7],2, 16. Furthermore, the One's
light is elsewhere specified as simple light (~we; ... O:nA.ouv, V 6 [24],4,19).15 This
comparison clearly implies the One's simplicity.16
In conclusion, Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge culminates in VI
7 [38]. Its culmination is mainly due to his effort to systematize the doctrine of the
One. Now the affirmation about the One's knowledge and the denial of intellection
to the One cohere in Plotinus' doctrine of the One; not only are the affirmation and
the denial mediated by the One's simplicity and self-sufficiency, but also the
affirmation can satisfactorily undermine some pejorative conception of the One that
the denial is prone to cause. Here arise several problems. Plotinus also applies the
word €nt130A.f\ and its cognates to the hyper-noetic cognition of Intellect. In which
aspects does the One's E:m/3oA.f\ differ from Intellect's? In which aspects are they
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parallel to one another? Hence we have to investigate Plotinus' usage of €mJ)oA'fl
and its cognates applied to Intellect. This investigation may further reveal other
aspects of the One's €m{3oA'fl.
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2. The One's Intuition and the Hyper-Noetic Phase of Intellect

Plotinus' use of €mJ3oA.ft and €n$illEtv for the One's knowledge in VI 7
[38],39, 1-4, prima facie, appears to indicate his departure from his earlier position in

v 4 [7],2,15-19, where the One's knowledge is described in noetic terminology.

But

the word €n$oA.ft and its cognates are not privileged to the One alone. Already in
V 6 [24],2,10-11, where the One as "to VOT\"tOV is said to be necessary for intellection
to occur satisfactorily, the verb €nt/3illEtv is used synonymously with the hypernoetic VOElV:
For the intelligible object ["to ... VOT\"tOV, i.e. the One] is for the other, and
Intellect, without grasping and catching the intelligible object which it
thinks, has a graspable object ("to €n$illov) emptily by intellection.
The One is here described not only as "to VOf'\"tOV but as "tO €n$illov.
Plotinus also elsewhere applies €n$illEtv and its cognates to the relation of
Intellect to the One.
We may first look at III 8 [30],9. After the "imagination" about the nature
of the One, Plotinus asks why the One is grand, the Good, and the most simple
(9,16-19). Then, he raises a question about the mode of our apprehension of the

One:
... by what sort of simple intuition ( €nt130A.u 0:8p6crx) could one grasp this
which transcends the nature of Intellect? (9,21-22).
The immediate answer is "by the likeness in ourselves" (9,22-23). What is
the likeness in us? Plotinus slightly later elucidates the contemplation of the One in
terms of the self-transcendence of Intellect:
Rather, Intellect must, as it were, return backwards, and, since it has two
sides (O:µ~iai:oµov ), it must give, as it were, itself up to what is behind it,
and there,17 if it wishes to see the One, it must not be altogether Intellect
(9,29-32).
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As seen at Section VI of Chapter III in Part I, Intellect has the hypernoetic and the self-intellective phases, the original intellection directed towards the
One and self-intellection incidental to it. Hence Intellect must give up its selfintellective phase, if it wishes to contemplate the One.18 The "likeness in us" seems
to mean the hyper-noetic side of Intellect that is stripped by surrendering its selfthinking phase; it is exactly "like" the One in the sense that it is free from multiplicity
always involved in self-intellection.19 Without exercising self-thinking activity, it
would not be properly called Intellect. In V 5 [32],8,23-24, we are thus told that
Intellect sees the One "by the non-intellect of Intellect itself (i:4> €o:vi:ou µii v4>),"
which can be identified as the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect.20 Therefore it would
be natural to ascribe the €nt130A.fl a8p6o:, by virtue of which we can apprehend the
Good, to the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect.
In another passage Plotinus gives an account of what happens when the
soul grasps the One:
But if you grasp [the One] taking away being from it, you will be filled with
wonder (So:uµo:).21 And, throwing (J3o:Awv) yourself upon it and coming to
repose within it, you meditate ( crvvv6n)22 more intimately, knowing by
intuition (i:n npocrJ3oA.n crvvEU;) and seeing (crvvopwv) its greatness by the
things which exist after it and through it (III 8 [30], 10,31-35).
The most striking aspect of this passage may be the use of crvv-compounds
which is devised for characterizing the intimate awareness of the presence of the
One.23 Another prominent aspect is the occurrence of the instrumental dative i:n
npocrJ3oA.n and its verbal cognate J3o:Awv. Both the words €nt130A.fl and npocrJ3oA.fl
have the root meaning of "throwing."24 The use of npocrJ3oA.fl in the context
concerning the apprehension of the One recurs in V 5 [32]. In V 5 [32],7,8, we read
that the eye, when there is nothing but the medium or light, sees it by an immediate
perception (a8p6<;x ... npocrJ3oA.TI). Since the One is here metaphorized into light
(&AA.ov ~wi:oc;, 7,17), the npocrJ3oA.fl a8p6o: can be applied also to the apprehension
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of the One. Plotinus later actually does so: "But when you concentrate on the One,
you will do so at a single stroke (aAA.a npocr/30'.AE'i<; µE:v a9p6w<;; 6 npocrf3clU.wv)"

(10,7-8). From these passages it would be clear that €mJ3oA.i) and npocrf3oA.i) are
used synonymously in the context dealing with the apprehension of the One.
What modes of the apprehension of the One does Plotinus intend to
picture by the €mf3oA.i) a9p6a? That €mf3oA.i) has the root meaning of "throwing" or
"casting on" has already been remarked. Rist specifies two basic traits of the word;
(i) a comprehensive view of the data provided by the senses of the mind and (ii) a
casting back of the mind on itself and on whatever impressions it has.25 Does his
observation fit the above considered passages dealing with the soul's grasp of the
One? Can we not discover other connotations of the word? We should like to
investigate Plotinus' use of €nt130A.i), npocrf3oA.i), and their cognates more
comprehensively.
Several critics26 refer to IV 4 [28], 1, 19-20, where Plotinus speaks of the
soul's apprehension of the intelligible objects, as a parallel passage to II 8 [35], 1,3943: "What then prevents the soul too from having a unified intuition of all its objects
in one (i:m'.rtflV i:i)v €nt130A.i)v a9p6av a9p6wv)?"27 But this intuition clearly differs
from Intellect's apprehension of the One in that the former is said to be just like an
activity unifying all intellections that concern the multiplicity of the intelligible
objects (IV 4 [28],1,21). Nevertheless, it is obvious that comprehensiveness is here
associated with the soul's €nt130A.i) a9p6a. In the immediately ensuing chapter,
Plotinus employing the word in discussion, more fully describes the self-intellection
of the soul uniting with Intellect:
Therefore such a person [that is himself in such a way as to be everything],
on the one hand (µE:v), has all things included in himself by seeing himself
by intuition and activity towards himself (i:n ... Et<;; E:avi:ov ... €nt130A.n
Kal €vEpyEiQ:), and, on the other (oE:), has himself included in all things by
intuition and activity directed to all things (i:n ... npo<;; i:a n6:vi:a) (2,1214).
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The association of comprehensiveness with the €nt130A.il is also striking.
But can we not glean more instruction concerning the connotation of the term from
the above cited passage? Slightly after this passage, Plotinus considers the
possibility of the soul's intellection undergoing a change (2,14-20) and dismisses it:
We must not say that a change arises, when the soul moves from its
constituents to itself, and from itself to the rest of its constituents; because
he himself is all things, and both are one (2,20-22).
Plotinus here would still be thinking of the previously mentioned €nt130A.il
towards itself and towards all things. The word thus seems to imply not only the
comprehensiveness of the intuition but the unity of that which comprehends and
those which are comprehended. Plotinus further spells out the modes of this unity.
The soul in the noetic realm (i) turns to ( €nEai:p6:~11.

ai:pa~Etaa,

2,27) Intellect, (ii)

has nothing between Intellect and herself (2,27-28), and (iii) comes into Intellect

(E'l<; 'tE vouv €A.9ouaa, 2,28), and (iv) adapts (T1pµoai:at, apµoa9Etaa, 2,28) herself
to Intellect. Hence the soul's comprehension, €nt130A.il, of the intelligible objects
seems to be characterized by more implications: (i) the reversion to higher
. hypostasis, (ii) the immediacy between that which apprehends and that which is
apprehended, (iii) the absorption of the apprehending subject into the object
apprehended, and (iv) the assimilation of the subject to the object. These
implications, except for the fact that the soul's apprehension consists of the
multiplicity of intellections, seem to apply also to Intellect's comprehensive
apprehension of the One.28
Let us move to the description of Intellect's apprehension of the One in V
5 [32], 10 and see what this apprehension is exactly like. Plotinus writes:
But when you concentrate on the One, you will do so at a single stroke
(ilia npoaJ3aA.Etc;; µ€v 6:9p6<i>c;; 6 npoaJ3illwv), but you will not tell the
whole: otherwise, you will be [only] Intellect thinking ( vouc;; vo@v) ... But
when you see the One, look at him as a whole; but when you think (voTI<;;)
him, think that he is the Good, whatever [portion] of him you remember
(µVTl}J.OVEUOlJ<;;) ... (10,7-11).
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Two points must be noticed. First, the apprehension of the One
transcends language; we cannot declare the One as a whole. The One is essentially
ineffable.29 This point is more clearly restated later in V 3 [49],10,31-32: "For if
Intellect directed its gaze (npocr{Jillm) to the one and partless [i.e. the One], it
would be without word (t;Aoyi10ri); for what could it say about it, or understand?"30
In the above passage, hence, the purely intuitive character of the apprehension is
stressed.31 Second the comprehensive apprehension is contrasted with intellection,
which is ascribed to the vouc;; vo@v, being perhaps equivalent to vouc;; €µ~pov@v
distinct from vouc;; €p@v in VI 7 [38],35,24.32 That intellection is not purely
comprehensive with respect to the grasp of the One is mentioned in another
treatise:
On earth, when Intellect looked to the Good, did it think that the One as
many, being itself one, think it as many by dividing it at hand since it
cannot think it as a whole at once (oA.ov oµou)? But when it looked at the
One, it was not Intellect yet, but saw in a manner different from
intellection (avofrrwc;;) (VI 7 [38],16,10-14).
Whereas the inchoate Intellect at the very beginning of its reversion, has
not divided the One into many yet, the fully actualized Intellect cannot retain the
power from the One as it is and so breaks it into pieces; the latter is said to carry the
power from the One successively (Kcx-ra µ€poc;;) (15,20-22). Therefore the
comprehensive apprehension of the One must be seen as the apprehension of unity
in unity.33 To this extent it is as approximate to the One's intuition as the former is
called "the likeness (to the One) in us" or "something of the One in us" in III 8
[30],9,22-23.

Rist remarks that "an €n$oA.f) can be ... a casting of the mind on itself
and on whatever impressions it has."34 According to the above investigation,
however, this remark would not apply adequately to the comprehensive
apprehension of the One. The apprehension is rather the casting back of the soul
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on that which is beyond herself without involving any impression. In this case, the
apprehended object lies beyond and outside the apprehending subject. Plotinus
often employs €nt130A.i\ and its cognates in order to describe the sensory intuition
directed to the object outside the soul.35 Even when they are employed for the
description of the soul's apprehension of the intelligible objects, it is stressed that
those objects lie outside the soul herself. This point is clearly seen in V 9 [5],7,9-11,
where the €nt/3ill€tV, juxtaposed with the acquiring of, and discursive thinking
about, that which has not yet been possessed, is regarded as the soul's affection

(rnx911) and contrasted with the self-thinking of Intellect. Hence the €nt/3illttv is
denied to Intellect (7,9; 7, 18). In VI 6 [34 ],6,25, again, the €nt130A.ft towards the
thing is contrasted with the non-discursive thinking of Intellect. The word €nt130A.i\
and its cognates are sometimes employed for describing cognitive movement
towards that which is outside or beyond the subject. In this respect, they are suitable
for the self-transcending movement of Intellect or soul towards the assimilation of
the self to the One.
In sum, on the comprehensive €nt/3oA.i\ or npocr/3oA.ft of the One in III 8

[30],9-10, V 5 [32],7, and 10, we may conclude roughly as follows. First, the
comprehensive apprehension is the grasp of the One as a whole at a single stroke,
but not a successive intellection of the One in multiplicity. Second, the word
€nt/3oA.ft and its cognates are based on the root meaning of "throwing" and thereby
imply the throwing back of the mind upon that which is transcendent. These terms
have a sense very similar to

€mcr-tpo~i\,

the turning of the mind towards that which

is transcendent. Third, the apprehension is oriented to the unity of that which
apprehends and of that which is apprehended through the grasp of the One's unity
in the unity of the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect. Thus its mode is purely
immediate and intuitive and involves neither image of the apprehended object nor
language about it. Finally, the apprehension is oriented to the grasp of the interior
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content of the object, but not of its mere surface. Hence the apprehending subject
must make an effort to assimilate himself to the object. Some of these basic traits of
Intellect's €nlf3oA.i\ of the One would nicely apply to the One's intuition. First, as
regards the comprehensiveness and immediacy implied by the word €nlf3oA.i\ and its
cognates, we must recall that the expression i:o cxui:o nav o'tov Kivriµa and the
tactile metaphor i:owvi:ov o'tov €ncx~i\ in VI 7 (39],39, 19 echo the One's €nlf3oA.i\ in
39,1-4.36 Second, the close connection between €nlf3oA.i\ and bnai:p~i\ is
recognized not only in Intellect's apprehension of the One but in the One's cognitive
activity. We have already seen that anA.f1 'tl<; btlf3oA.i\ npOc; CXU'tOV in 39,1-2 is a
cognitive specification of the One's motionless self-reversion in V 1 (10],6, 18.
Also in VI 7 (38], Plotinus attributes the power to see the One by some
intuition and reception (€nlf3oA.n i:tvt Kcxl ncxpcxooxn. 35,21-22) to the hyper-noetic
phase of Intellect, which is designated "Intellect loving (vovc; €p@v)" (35,24).37 As
Kcxt np6n:pov in 35,22 suggests, this power is also ascribed to the inchoate Intellect.
In V 3 [49], 11, the reversion of the inchoate Intellect towards the One is described
by the verb €n$CxA.A.Etv (11,2; 11, 13).38 From the terminological point of view,
therefore, the One's €nlf3oA.i\ in VI 7 [38],39,1-4 and the hyper-noetic cognition of
Intellect in 35,21-22 are very akin to one another.39 We must recall that the
€nt130A.i\ a8p6cx of the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect is called "the likeness (to the
One) in us" and "something of the One in us" (III 8 [30],9,22-23). The close kinship
between the One's and Intellect's €nlf3oA.i\ is really confirmed by this passage.40 But
close scrutiny reveals the sharp difference of the One's €nt130A.i\ from Intellect's.
First, the One's €nlf3oA.i\ is directed to the One itself (npoc; cxui:ov, VI 7 [38],39,2),
whereas Intellect's is directed to those things which are beyond itself (i:O: €n€KEtVcx
cxui:ov, 35,21). The One and its intuition are entirely undifferentiated from one
another, whereas the object to which Intellect's intuition is directed transcends
Intellect. In a word, the One's intuition is completely free from otherness (39,2-3),
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while Intellect's intuition presupposes otherness as the principle of demarcation
between hypostases.41 Second, Intellect at the same time thinks itself and
contemplates the One (35,29-30). As repeatedly mentioned, self-intellection is
incidental to the eternally pre-noetic contemplation of the One. Intellect's €n$oA.f)
entails self-intellection as its necessary consequence. To this extent, Intellect's
intuition cannot be entirely free from multiplicity. On the contrary, the One's
intuition entails no consequence that may involve multiplicity. Third, Intellect's
€n$oA.f) can be expressed as a kind of seeing (E:wpa, 35,22).42 But any vision is
denied to the One (41,31). It is the tactile metaphor (39,19) that would be more
appropriate to the incomparable immediacy of the One's intuition. Finally, the
One's €n$oA.f), as already remarked, must be seen in terms of rest. On the contrary,
Intellect's E:nij)oA.f), insofar as it is of vouc; E:p@v, seems to be vehemently dynamic.43
Also in V 3 [49],11,4, the E:n$MA.Etv of the inchoate Intellect towards the One is
closely related to the opµCiv. On the one hand, therefore, the One's and Intellect's
€ml3oA.f) share several common characteristics, and to this extent Plotinus' use of the
term for the One's knowledge can be viewed as parallel to his use of it for the hypernoetic cognition of Intellect. On the other hand, the uniqueness of the One's
intuition is apparent in its being clearly distinguished from the hyper-noetic intuition
of Intellect in the above mentioned aspects. We must not be misled by the
superficial similarity in terminology.
The above investigation reveals the terminological parallelism among the
One's knowledge, the pre-noetic and the hyper-noetic cognition of Intellect, and the
soul's apprehension of the One, in the middle and the late treatises. Plotinus
ascribes E:ntl)oA.f) and E:n$MA.Etv to the One (VI 7 [38],39,1-4), €n$oA.f) to the
hyper-noetic phase of Intellect (VI 7 [38],35,21), €n$MA.Etv to the inchoate
Intellect (V 3 [49], 11,2; 11, 13), and employs €n$oA.f) (III 8 [30],9,21-22), npocrf3oA.f)
(III 8 [30],10,33; V 5 [32],7,8), and npocrf3MA.Etv (V 5 [32],10,7-8; V 3 [49],10,31) in

289

the general contexts dealing with the apprehension of the One. In the early
treatises, the parallelism is dominated by noetic terminology. Plotinus attributes
Kcrrav6nau;; or higher v611au;; to the One (V 4 [7],2,17-19), refers to the inchoate
Intellect as v611au;; (V 4 [7],2,4; V 1 [10],7,11), and describes the cognitive activity of
the soul uniting with the One as

VOElV

(VI 9 [9],8,26; 9,14) and nEptv6nau;; (11,24).

The terminology which governs the parallelism has thus shifted from vbnau;; and its
cognates in the early treatises to €mJ3oA.i\ and its cognates in the middle and the late
treatises. This tendency is confirmed by Plotinus' application of a-noetic
terminology to the inchoate Intellect (avofrrwc;, VI 7 [38],16,14) and to the hypernoetic contact with the One (av6n1:oc;, V 3 [49], 10,43 )44 in the middle and the late
treatises.45
Why has such terminological shift occurred? The above consideration
suggests at least two reasons. First, the application of the word €m/3oA.n to the One
has several advantages implying the One's

€ma1:po~n

to itself and demarcating the

One's knowledge from intellection especially in the context where the absence of
intellection from the One is thematically argued. In such a context it would be
· unnecessarily confusing to employ noetic terminology for the One. Second, as
already shown, €nt/3oA.n and its cognates are very suitable for expressing
intuitiveness and immediacy not only of the One's knowledge but of the hypernoetic apprehension of the One. In addition to these reasons, we may consider
some weakness in noetic terminology which is dominant in the early treatises. An
obvious weakness is that v6naic; and

VOElV

are equivocal by referring not only to

self-intellection but to the hyper-noetic activity of Intellect towards the One.
Corresponding to the double meaning of intellection, 1:0 VO'fl"l:OV is also equivocal;
as already seen, it means not only the complex of the Forms but also the One. It
would not be impossible to suppose that the shift in Plotinus' terminology is partly
due to his having become aware of this weakness in noetic terminology; because it
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can be supported by the fact that the One is no longer described as i:o

VOfl'tOV

after

V 6 [24],2,6ff. and the original, hyper-noetic activity of Intellect towards the Good is
no longer called VOflCTt.c; after V 6 [24],5,16.46 If this supposition is correct, we can
conclude that Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge has reflected the
terminological shift in his doctrine of Intellect's relation to the One. To this extent
the former doctrine, with the latter doctrine, has surely developed. As already
remarked, moreover, the fact that Plotinus, in VI 7 [38],38-39, pays enough attention
to the coherence between the One's intuition and its having no intellection by
refraining from the use of noetic terminology for the One, when compared with his
description of the One's knowledge in V 4 [7],2, turns out to indicate considerable
development, sustained by his endeavor to systematize his doctrine of the One in
more coherent fashion. Therefore Rist's thesis that "Plotinus' doctrine of the One's
'knowledge' has not developed"47 is tenable solely in the sense that the
characterization of the One's knowledge in VI 7 [38],39 inherits several basic theses
of the One's knowledge, presented in V 4 [7],2.
Finally, we may touch upon the chronologically preceding instances of
Plotinus' use of €nt130A.f) and its cognates for the apprehension of the One in the
middle treatises. His use of those terms in III 8 [30] and V 5 [32] seems to be almost
in line with his use in the treatises right before them; the application of €nt130A.i\ for
the soul's grasp of the intelligible objects in IV 4 [28], 1-2 and the reference to the

i:o €ntl3illov in V 6 [24],2,10. The fact that the One in V 6 [24 ],2 is
described not only as i:o VOfl'tOV but as i:o €nt136:A.Aov would suggest that this

One as

treatise is written in the transitional period from one epoch when Plotinus applies
noetic terminology to the One's knowledge and to cognitive activities, of Intellect
and the soul, directed to the One, to another epoch when he uses €nt130A.f) and its
cognates for them. But we must note that the verb €nt13ill€lv is not for the first
time employed in describing the soul's apprehension of the One in the middle
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treatises. It is already used of the contemplation of the ultimate Beauty in one of
the earliest treatises: "The person who sees, made akin to what is seen, must pay
attention ( E:m/3ill€tv) to the sight" (I 6 [1 ],9,29-30). The verb used here is
definitely based upon its root meaning of "throwing" and implies the contemplator's
endeavor to assimilate himself to the contemplated Beauty. Therefore, E:mf)oA.f) and
its cognates are not for the first time introduced in the middle treatises in order to
describe the soul's apprehension of the One, but seem to be prefigured by the nontechnical use of E:m/3ill€tV in I 6 [1 ],9,29-30.
Plotinus no longer gives a formal account of the One's cognitive state in
the treatises after VI 7 [38]. But these treatises contain several significant passages
that we must not overlook for our inquiry into Plotinus' doctrine of the One's
knowledge. Unless these passages are seriously considered, our inquiry has not yet
come to an end.
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NOTES

lWe do not follow the reading suggested in the apparatus of H-S2. We
take cxfrrou in 38, 19 and cx\J't6<; in 38,20 as indicating the subject to which cxfrt6<;; in
38, 17 refers, namely the One. Moreover, O:ycx0ou in 38,20 means intellection itself
as identified with the Good. In a word, Plotinus here points out that the
identification of intellection with the ultimate Good is to rob the One of its status as
the supreme Good. The identification surely leads to the idea that the One may be
honorable because of intellection. As indicated in 37,8, however, this idea invests
the One with either no or less value. Plotinus' own position is that the One makes
intellection majestic (37,7). Hence the present sentence may be taken with 37,8.
As seen at Chapter I in Part I, Plato, in the metaphor of the sun, claims
not only that the sun itself is not sight (Rep. 508b9) but that the eye is not the sun
(508all-bl). The denial of intellection to the Good represents the first claim. The
second claim must embody the refusal to regard intellection as the ultimate Good.
Plotinus here seems to develop the second claim in the metaphor of the sun.
2Schwyzer takes this section as indicating the absence of selfconsciousness from the One in '"BewuBt' und 'UnbewuBt' bei Plotin," in Les Sources
de Plotin (Geneva, Vandoevres: Fondation Hardt, 1957), p. 374. But it would be
impossible to read from this interrogative sentence the absence of self-consciousness
from the One. By employing such general terms like cxfo0T\crtc; and yv@at.c;, Plotinus
here seems to remark that nobody would admit such a <f>ucrtc; that has no cognitive
activity. In other words, everyone naturally supposes that the highest "nature" or the
One must possess some cognitive activity.
3In VI 9 [9],6,44-50, as seen in the second chapter, Plotinus is already
aware of the possibility of the illicit move from the One's having no intellection to
its ignorance. This possibility is mentioned also in III 8 [30],9, 14-16. In these
treatises, however, Plotinus does not try to dismiss the illegitimate inference by
giving a positive account of the One's knowledge. The significance of the present
passage would be in his purport to give that positive account.
4We must notice that Plotinus' affirmation about the One's knowledge in
V 4 [7],2 does not assume the role of dismissing any pejorative conception that the
absence of intellection to the One is prone to cause, but has simply the role of
denying the deficiency, expressed by otov O:vcxicr0T\"COV (line 15), to the One. In V 4
[7] Plotinus nowhere mentions the absence of intellection from the One.
Even a modern critic can carelessly jump from the One's having no
intellection to the pejorative conception that it is unintelligent. Ravaisson regards
the Plotinian One "comme vegete une plante inintelligente, insensible et inerte," in
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Essai sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, 2 vols. (Paris: L'Imprimerie Royale, Joubert,
1837-1846; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), 2:465. Mosse-Bastide views
Plotinus' affirmations about the One's knowledge in V 4 [7],2,15-19 and VI 7
[38],39,1-2 as dismissing such a misconception in La Pensee Philosophique de P/otin
(Paris: Bordas, 1972), p. 134. See also R. Arnou, Le Desir de Dieu dans la
Philosophie de Plotin, 2nd ed. (Rome: Presses de l'Universite Gregorienne, 1967), p.
256; J. Moreau, Plotin ou la Gloire de la Philosophie Antique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1970),
pp. 84-85.
50'Daly aptly points out the non-reflexive nature of the One's €nt/3oAT,
(Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, p. 93). See also J. Moreau, Plotin ou la Gloire de la
Philosophie Antique, p. 88. Intellection is of course self-reflexive.
Gandillac observes the One's €nt130Af, without 6t.acr"tftµa and 6t.acj>op6: as
follows: "Et cependant Plotin ne peut eviter lui-meme de suggerer une forme de
presence a soi qui ne doit pas etre si eloignee de ce que le Stagirite avait voulu
suggerer .... " See M. de Gandillac, "Plotin et la Metaphysique d' Aristote," in Etudes
sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, ed. P. Aubenque (Paris: J. Vrin, 1979), p. 258. But we
cannot see why the One's intuition is said to be not so far from what Aristotle
wished to suggest. Indeed Aristotle himself would have claimed that no otherness is
present in the self-intellection of the prime mover. But Plotinus views the
Aristotelian God, though it has only one object, as not free from the otherness
between subject and object. Intellect is distinguished from the intelligible object "by
the relation of the other to itself ("tTI npo<; av"to €"t€pov crx€crEt)" (39,7), while the
One has no 6t.a~op6: towards itself (39,3).

a

6See also VI 7 [38], 15, 19-20 YEVVT1J.J.cX"tWV µT, ELXEV O'.V"tO<; and 17, 1-2
i:av"ta ... ovK ov"twv €KEt €v "t4) nA.11pwcrav"tt. Compare also 17, 10-11 wcr"tE Kat
ETtEKEtVO'. Cwfl<; with v 4 [7],2, 16-17 Cwii EV avi:4).
7Tuis point does not imply that the One's intuition is incongruent with its
self-sufficiency. As seen in the second chapter, the One's self-sufficiency is
grounded on its absolute unity. As seen also in the fourth chapter, the absence of
intellection from the One is in several places ascribed to its self-sufficiency. The
One's intuition, thus mediated by its simplicity and self-sufficiency, is systematically
coherent with its having no intellection.
8Bussanich translates anA.11 "tt<; €nt/3oA.T, ... npo<; avi:ov "a simple
concentration of attention on itself' (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus,
p. 95).
9As we shall see in the next chapter, Plotinus specifies the One's self-

inclination as its hyper-intellection in VI 8 [39], 16. It would be certain that the
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One's knowledge and its self-reversion entered into a single scope during the period
when VI 7 [38] and VI 8 [39] were written.
lOOn the contrast between intellection and hyper-noetic contact with the
One, see V 3 [49],10,42-44. On the immediacy of the One's knowledge, see A.H.
Armstrong, "Plotinus," in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval
Philosophy, ed. A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p.
238: "... it [i.e. the One] has a special kind of transcendent thinking of its own,
more immediate even than that of Intellect, with no duality of subject and object."
As several critics point out, Plotinus subordinates vision to contact. See J.
M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 222; J. Bussanich,Ancient Philosophy 7
(1987): 171. But Bussanich's observation that "contact-language is not used to define
the One's relationship to itself' (ibid.: 172) overlooks the present section, which he
wrongly takes as expressing the soul's union with the One (ibid.: 186, note 29).
llSee J.M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 48: "... the
apprehension ( €m{3oA.T,) of the One is somehow associated with absolute
immobility." Rist views the present passage as confirming the phrase €v ITT:acrn
cxiO~ in V 4 [7],2,18 (ibid., p. 49).
In Plotinus' speculative reading, Soph. 249al-2 MA.ex cre:µvov KCXl aytov,
vo\Jv ouK €xov, 6:Kivrrrnv €cri:oc;; e:tvcxt proves to fit well the majesty and immobility
of the One, from which intellection or noetic movement is absent. But this
speculative reading would not undermine our observation, concluded in Chapter III
of Part I, that Plotinus seems to find in this context of the Sophist the problem that
the relation we must think between intellect and the Forms not only insures the
presence of life and noetic movement in i:o ncxvi:e:A.@c;;
but also safeguards the
Forms' immutability. Interestingly enough, the passage €A.e:ye: µ€v ovv TIAai:wv
ne:pl i:fy; oucriac;; A.E:ywv, oi:t voT,an (39,29-30) suggests that Plotinus believes that
Plato himself ascribed intellection to the Ideas. For Plotinus, the oucria must be i:o
ncxvi:e:A.@<;
that comprises both movement and rest. In Chapter III of Part I it
was seen how he tries to reconcile noetic movement with the unchangeability of real
being.
As mentioned at note 38 in Chapter III of Part I, Plotinus, following
Aristotle, characterizes actual intellection as majestic. Insofar as the One does not
have intellection, the question is naturally raised whether the hyper-noetic One can
be called majestic or not. The comparative cre:µv6i:e:pov in 39,33 insinuates that
Plotinus would believe that his association, based on Soph. 249al-2, of majesty with
the One's non-thinking is consistent with the majesty of actual intellection. He also
here seems to be afraid that the absence of intellection from the One may lead to
some pejorative conception of the One," for example, the misconception that it lacks
in majesty. In fact, Plotinus elsewhere envisages this sort of possibility:
"Well, if it [i.e. that which is beyond Intellect] is thinking it will be an

ov

ov

o
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intellect, but if it is unthinking (av6rrrov) it will be ignorant of itself; so
what will be grand (aEµv6v) about it" (III 8 [30],9,15-16, tr. A.H.
Armstrong).
Plotinus is here explicitly aware that the absence of intellection from the One is
prone to cause a misconstruction that the One may be ignorant of itself and thereby
to rob it of majesty. It is highly disputed whether the absence of intellection from
the One can be expressed by the word av6rrrov. As already seen, moreover, this
absence does not entail the One's ignorance (VI 9 [9],6,46-50). The supposition that
that which is beyond Intellect may not be grand is definitely rejected in the present
passage. But the ascription of a higher majesty to the One would not be possible by
virtue of the denial of intellection to the One but by virtue of some affirmation
about the One's cognitive activity, namely its having simple intuition. The present
passage can therefore be viewed as the formal reply to the query raised in III 8
[30],9, 15-16.
12As noted in the apparatus of H-S2, i:m'.rr:ou in 39,26 refers to the Good.

Unless we take al ... i:oui:ou voilaEtc; as the intellections allegedly ascribed to the
Good rather than as the intellections directed to the Good, the present section will
not explain the sentence KO:v i:a EO''t'Ciha 0€ van, noA.u<; EO''t'tv (39,26). The plural al
vofiaEtc; indicates that intellection allegedly attributed to the Good would be
pluralized by its objects, 't'a €a't'@i:a. The present passage is consequently explicated
such that since each intellection of Intellect always has its object and so is not
vacuous, so each intellection, allegedly attributed to the Good and directed to each
of stable objects, must not be empty contemplations, thus unavoidably associating
multiplicity with the Good. Thus construed, we can understand the force of yap in
39,24.
13The present passage is a part of the reply to the query, raised in 39,2021, whether the Good will know neither other things nor itself. Hence the
conditional sentence KO:v i:a EO'l:Wl:a 0€ van reflects the supposition that the Good
will know other things. Of course, this supposition is definitely rejected in 39,26-27
(T\ 0€ np6vota apKEL EV 1:~ avi:ov €LVal, nap' OU i:a navi:a). On the denial of
knowledge of other things to the One, see also V 6 [24 ],6,32-33, VI 7 [38],37,2-3, and
VI 9 [9],6,51-52. It was pointed out in the third chapter that the One might have a
consciousness of its own power, which has no relation to its effects. Moreover, the
One's np6v01.a of other things is perhaps unparalleled ir :he Enneads. This section
would be sharply contrasted with V 5 [32], 12,40-45, where we are told that the One
would not have cared even if Intellect had not come into being, though these
passages are not really inconsistent.
The absence of self-knowledge from the One is briefly mentioned in 39,28
Ei µi) av't'6v. On this absence, see V 6 [24],6,31-32, VI 7 [38],41,25-27, and VI 9
[9],6,52-52. As already seen, however, Plotinus associates rest and majesty, but
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neither ignorance nor dishonor, with the absence of self-knowledge or intellection
from the Good (39,29-34).
14Tue similar argument is developed in V 6 [24],4,18-22. On the One as
cx\Jyil, see VI 7 [38],36,22-24 and VI 8 [39], 16, 13.
15See also VI 7 [38],16,24 auyi\ µ6vov. Gandillac associates the~
(mAovv with the description of the One's knowledge in V 4 [7],2, 15-19 in La Sagesse
de Plotin (Paris: Hachette, 1952), pp. 188-189.
16In the analysis of the actualization of sight, light always serves as the
medium, which is neither subject nor object. This neutrality seems to fit well the
One's knowlerlge which transcends the subject-object duality. But this point is not
fully explicit in Plotinus' metaphorization of the One into light.
17With H-Sl, Brehier, Cilento, Armstrong, Tanogashira, and Bussanich,
Kirchhoff s emendation KCxKEt is read.
18Jt is difficult to specify the referent of aµ~tai:oµov with precision, since
the word occurs solely here in the Enneads. We may first consider the views of
Dodds and Bussanich.
Dodds, in light of E:v€pyEto: ... E:v OtEE6041 (9,33) identified with Intellect,
takes aµ~tai:oµov as Intellect's two phases, one looking towards the cosmos and the
other looking towards the One (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 21 ). The advantage of this
interpretation lies in the force of yap in 9,33 that marks the explanation of 9,29-32
by 9,32-34. But Dodds' exegesis is inadequate in two points. First, the textual
evidence for his view is found only in the obscure passage in VI 9 [9],3,33-34. The
MSS text, which is printed by Brehier and Harder, reads: ouvo:i:at OE 6pCiv 6 VOV<;; ft
i:a npo o:ui:ou ft i:a o:ui:ou ft i:a nap' o:ui:ou. In H-S2, ft i:a npo o:ui:ou is deleted and
nap' is replaced by np6. It seems to me that the deletion and the emendation of the
MSS text are not necessary, because Plotinus here simply talks about the conceivable
cases of Intellect's envisagement, but not about its actual contemplation. For this
reason, we need not be perplexed by the plural i:a npo o:ui:ou. Again, Intellect's
looking towards the cosmos is here treated as a mere possibility. From the MSS
text, moreover, are derived three, rather than two, phases of Intellect. Dodds needs
to explain why he omits the self-contemplating phase of Intellect. Second, to read
Intellect's looking towards the universe into the present passage seriously injures the
important theme in III 8 [30] that the lower entity aspires to contemplate the higher
one.
Bussanich suggests, as a likely interpretation, that aµ~iai:oµov might refer
to Intellect's awareness of i:a npo o:ui:ou ft i:a o:ui:ou (VI 9 [9],3,34 ), that is,
Intellect's mystical vision of the One and its self-intellection (The One and Its
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Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 101). Although this interpretation appears to be
more likely than Dodds' view, it is textually supported only by a passage that is
slightly obscure.
Nevertheless Bussanich's interpretation can be confirmed by the following
consideration. Let us return to the passage in question. First, we must notice that
aµ~(cn:oµov ovi:a (III 8 [30],9,31) explains Kat otov €aui:ov 6:~E:V-ta i:oll; e:U;
oma0EV cxU1:0U (9,30-31). The first step towards the specification of the referents of
6:µ~(ai:oµov is to clarify the sense of Intellect's surrender of itself. In light of V 5
[32],6,20 and 7,20, where the apprehension of the One is thematically described, the
surrender of itself seems to mean the abandonment of the intelligible objects. But
the surrender of the intelligible objects would not mean that of the objective side of
Intellect. In this case, the subjective side still remains so that we cannot see why this
is a case of giving up the self. We must here recall that self-intellection is for
Plotinus the contemplation of the interior intelligible objects. Hence the surrender
of the self-intellective phase can at the same time indicate the surrender of the
intelligible objects and that of the self. As discussed in note 94 in Chapter III of
Part I, the incidentality of self-intellection to the original intellection directed to the
One means that the former is the necessary consequence of the latter. Therefore, if
Intellect wishes to see the One without seeing its pluralized images, it must abandon
its self-thinking phase and become the purely hyper-noetic phase alone, the phase
which is free from the multiplicity of the intelligible objects. Consequently, the
interpretation suggested by Bussanich is supported by VI 9 [9],2,33-43, where
Plotinus deals with the dual nature of Intellect's activity, directed to the Good and
to Intellect itself. Intellect's two-facedness is adumbrated especially by 2,41-42 o'lov
nape:1vm µ€v i:~ 6:ya0~ Kali:~ npwi:41 ... auvE1VaL 5€ Kal €aui:ou. The present
passage may be taken with VI 9 [9],2,41-42 rather than with 3,34. In conclusion,
6:µ~iai:oµov seems to refer to the hyper-noetic and the self-intellective phases of
Intellect. Kuhn follows the line of our interpretation in "Le Desir Ambigu: Un Point
de Depart de l'Axiologie Plotinienne," Dionysius 14 (1990):62.
19Phillips holds that the One's simple intuition corresponds to what
Plotinus regards, in V 3 [49], 11,2-3, as the goal of Intellect's desire "to apprehend
the One as simple ( €mJ3illELV w<; O:nA.~)" ("Plotinus and the 'Eye' of Intellect,"
Dionysius 14 (1990):100, note 39). This view would illuminate the archetypelikeness relationship of the One's €mJ3oA.T, and Intellect's.
20See J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp.
100, 146; J.M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 267, note 43 to chapter 16. But
Rist's reference to V 3 [49),6,39 in this note is not appropriate. In 6,39-42, selfreversion and self-knowledge are attributed to "the pure Intellect (i:~ Ka0ap~ v~)."
21For the One as a marvel, see V 5 [32],8,23-26, VI 7 [38],40,27, and VI 9
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[9],5,30.

22In light of the second person €~Etc; (10,32), auvv6Et (10,32), which is
accompanied by no object, must be read as the middle.
Compare €vr0<;; oo'.n:ov ... auvv6Et with Kat voEt €vraD8a (VI 9 [9],9,14-15).
The former not only emphasizes the intimacy or intensity of the soul's awareness of
the One, but also adumbrates the difference of this awareness from VOEtV.
23See J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 116;
A.H. Armstrong, Plotinus, 3:397, note 1.
24See J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 95,
115, 136.

25J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 50.
26See J.M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 51; J. Bussanich, The One
and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 94.
27Jn this chapter, the soul's €ntJ3oA.fi precisely indicates her grasp of some
object by intellection ( €n$illEL ... -rn vofiaEt, 9,6), which is equivalent to
intellection and contemplation of that object (9, 7).
Both the words €ntJ3oA.fi and npoaJ3oXf), in the tradition of Hellenistic
philosophy, indicate the visual thrust of the eye outward towards the visible objects.
Phillips points out that Plotinus' theory of sensual vision in II 8 [35], 1,39-43 is
indebted to Epicurus' distinction between a comprehensive view (0:8p6a €ntJ3oXf))
and partial apprehensions ('tntat €ntJ3oA.ai) (Dionysius 14 (1990):81-84). He views
the parallel between II 8 [35], 1,39-43 and IV 4 [28], 1,20-25 in terms of Plotinus'
employing of the Epicurean comprehensive apprehension as an analogue of
intellection, which is the apprehension of all the intelligible objects as many, rather
than one, at the same time (op. cit.:84).
28For more uses of €ntJ3oA.fi, npoaJ3oA.fi, and their cognates about the
apprehension of the intelligible objects, see I 2 [ 19],4,23; III 7 [45],5, 1; 5,6; VI 2
[43],8,27; 21,14-15; VI 3 [44],18,11-12.
29See V 3 [49],13,1-4; V 5 [32],6,1-15; VI 8 [39],9,39-44; VI 9 [9],4,11-12.
30See also 10,42-43 ofov €na~i\ µovov app11-roc;.
31Jn IV 3 [27), 18, 11-13, furthermore, we read that Intellect, in its simple
intuition (EV -rate; au-rou €ntJ3oA.atc; O:nA.atc;), does not employ any language.
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32See J. F. Phillips' comment on V 5 [32],10,6-12: " ... VOf'latc; and a0p6a
npoa{3oA.t1 are, respectively, Intellect's 'partial' and 'whole' views of the One"
(Dionysius 14 (1990):88).
33In V 5 [32], 10,7-11, moreover, the comprehensive apprehension of the
One is contrasted with the memory of the portion of the One. Although what this
memory exactly indicates is not fully clear, this contrast may give us some
instruction. In VI 9 [9],11,6-7, Plotinus talks about the soul's "memory" of the One
in her mystical union: "If the seer had a memory (µEµV~'to) about whom he had
become when he had united with that [i.e. the One], he would have an image
(ElK6va) of that by himself." Whereas there is such a discrepancy that Intellect's
memory in the former text concerns the portion of the One (n ... au'tov) and the
soul's memory in the latter text concerns whom she had become, both passages deal
with the grasp of the One. Thus seen, the comprehensive apprehension of the One
would be considered to be characterized by such immediacy that it involves no
image of that which is apprehended. In V 5 [32], 10, 1-2, therefore, Plotinus writes:
"But do not, I beg you, look at it [i.e. the One] through other things: otherwise, you
will see a trace ('ixvoc;) of it, not itself." The contrast between the comprehensive
apprehension of the One and the memory seems to make the former's immediacy
more prominent.

34J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 50.
35£m{3oA.t1, II 8 [35], 1,40; IV 4 [28],8,6: €n:l[3illnv, IV 4 [28],23, 14:
n:poa{3oA.t1, II 8 [35],2,9; 2,13; VI 6 [34],18,27: n:poa{3illnv, IV 6 [41],1,16; V 9

[5], 1,2.
360n the close connection between these passages, see G. M. Gurtler,
Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 274.
370'Daly observes that Plotinus' notion of vouc; ep@v is unsatisfactory
because the power whereby the One is seen is no longer really Intellect (Plotinus'
Philosophy of the Self, pp. 88-89). But this view seems a bit too rash. As mentioned
at note 122 in Chapter III of Part I, vouc; €p@v can equivocally mean (i) the hypernoetic phase which coexists with the self-thinking phase (simply vouc; €p@v) and (ii)
the hyper-noetic phase which has ceased to coexist with the self-thinking phase
(vovc; €p@v Kat a~p@v). In the ensuing lines (28-33), Plotinus remarks that vouc;
€p@v eternally coexists with vouc; €µ~pov@v or the self-intellective phase. As
repeatedly noticed, self-intellection persistently remains incidental to the original
contemplation of the One, so that the hyper-noetic phase must be primordially
Intellect. Since Plotinus' emphasis in this context is placed on the eternal
coexistence of the hyper-noetic and self-thinking phases of Intellect, vouc; €p@v is
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not inappropriate to the hyper-noetic phase. O'Daly seems to overlook Plotinus'
remark on the eternal coexistence of two phases of Intellect. Indeed the hypernoetic phase of Intellect is elsewhere denominated "that of Intellect which is not
Intellect (i:4> E:crui:ov µi) v4>)" (V 5 [32],8,22-23). Even in this section, the hypernoetic phase, however called non-Intellect, belongs to Intellect itself (€crui:ov).
38With the majority of editors, we read €n$6:AAEtv in 11,2 instead of the
better attested MSS reading €m96:AAEtV. See also A.H. Armstrong, Plotinus, 5:108109; J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 223; J. F.
Phillips, Dionysius 14 (1990):95, note 30.
39'fhe indefinite pronoun i:u;; is added not only to the One's €nt130A.ft
(39,2) but to Intellect's (35,21). Hence the addition does not seem to be intended
for the demarcation of the One's intuition from Intellect's.
40See J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 9596. Bussanich here also compared napo:ooxft of Intellect loving in VI 7 [38],35,22
with o€xEa9at in VI 9 [9],4,25, where Plotinus deals with the mystical apprehension
of the One. But it would be difficult to associate any receptivity with the One's
intuition.
41For the otherness between the One and Intellect, see V 1 [10],6,53 and
VI 9 [9],8,31-33. Atkinson views that Plotinus, in V 1 [10],6,51-53, deals with the
activity of vo\X; €p@v, defined with the expression auvEanv o:\rr4> (Plotinus: Ennead
V.1, p. 153). On the otherness between the hyper-noetic €nt130A.ft and the One, see
also J. F. Phillips, Dionysius 14 (1990):99.
42We must also notice that the verb J3A.€nEt is omitted in then-clause
(35,21-22).
43Rist attributes "something like the crest of wave of Intellect itself (i:4>
o:ui:oD i:oD voD olov Kuµo:i:t)" (36, 17-18) to Intellect loving (Plotinus: The Road to
Reality, p. 267, note 43 to ch. 16). Bussanich observes that the hyper-noetic phase of
Intellect is consistently characterized by "the upward driving force of mystical eros"
(Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):172).
44See also 14,2-3 ouo€ yv@atv ouo€ v6T)atv £xoµEv o:frrov. In 17,25, the
mystical contact with the One is described voEp@c; €~6:lJio:a9o:t. But this section does
not establish that the One can be grasped by the activity denominated v6T)crtc;; or
VO€tV.

45For the a-noetic nature of the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect, see V 5
[32],8,22-23 i:4> €o:vi:oD µi) v41. In one of the middle treatises the inchoate Intellect
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is only once referred to as t1 v6ricru; (VI 7 [38],40, 10-11 ). Plotinus here defines the
pre-noetic intellection as the primary activity and concludes the absence of any
intellectual activity from the One which is prior to the primary activity (40,22-32).
As be mentions at the very beginning of the chapter, however, this passage is not a
formal argument for the One's having no intellection, but "a kind of encouragement"
(rnxpcxµv9ux a-r-rcx) (40,3) and "a persuasion" (nn9w) (40,4). Hence this reference to
the pre-noetic Intellect must be regarded as exceptional. On ncxpcxµv0 ux, see also
VI 5 [23],11,6.

46See note 117 in Chapter III of Part I. In III 8 [30],9, 11-12, Plotinus
definitely rejects that the One can be -ro vori-r6v. Bussanich views that this section
has no bearing on the description of the One as such in V 4 [7],2,4ff. and V 4
[24],2,6ff. See J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 92.
But this view cannot be a strong point against our supposition that the One may no
longer be referred to as -ro vori-r6v. In VI 7 [38],39,13-14, we are told that no
intellection concerns the Good. In light of 39,14 E:l illov cxu-rov €0D..ot i.OE:tV, we
may take -rov-rou [sc. -roll 6:ycx0ou] as the objective genitive rather than as the
possessive genitive. As already pointed out, -rofrrnu in 39,26 is the possessive
genitive. In 35,32, again, Plotinus restricts the sense of voE:tV solely to the
contemplation of the Forms within Intellect itself. Also in V 3 [49),10,40-42, it is
stressed that intellection always concerns that which contains variety. In these
treatises, therefore, there is no room for the One to be described as -ro vori-r6v. It
seems to be highly probable that the reference to the One as such actually
disappears not only from Plotinus' writing but from his own system, which lies
behind his treatises after V 6 (24).
But the section oux on µfi €crn vofjcrCXL TO 6:yo:06v---rou-ro yap EO"TW in
VI 7 [38],40,34-35 would run counter to the above supposition. The intellection
which is said to concern the Good is the pre-noetic activity designated as v6ricru;
(see note 45). Since the context is exceptional, the knowability of the Good by
intellection can be regarded as a kind of ad hoc stipulation.
47J.

M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 49.

CHAPTER VI
VI 8 [39),16: TIIE ONE'S HYPER-INTELLECTION AND ACTIVE

ACIUALITY
Introduction

In the treatise "On Free Will and the Will of the One" (VI 8 [39]), Plotinus
gives the most positive and striking account of the One's cognitive activity. As we
shall see later, his account for the One's inner life in this treatise is not formal.
Nevertheless to pass by VI 8 [39] would be unprofitable to our inquiry because we
can find out the systematic nexus consisting of the already mentioned modalities of
the One's knowledge, behind Plotinus' informal account for the inner life of the One
in this treatise. In order to read this treatise from the systematic point of view, it is
necessary for us to take a different attitude from that of reading V 4 [7],2 and VI 7
[38],39. Before analyzing the relevant text, therefore, the way of interpreting VI 8
[39] must be carefully worked out.
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1. The Modus Interpretandi of VI 8 [39]

The treatise VI 8 [39] can be roughly divided into three parts. The first
part ( chs. 1-6) deals with the definition of free will in terms of intellectual activity,
the second part (chs. 7-12) with the One's being beyond compulsion and chance, and
the final part (chs. 13-21) with the One's inner activity. In the second and the third
parts, Plotinus persistently tries to refute "a kind of daring opinion ('tu;; i:oA.µTlf>Cx;
A.6yoc;;)" that the nature of the Good happens to be as it is and does not have any
freedom (7,11-15). 1 His attempt, against this opinion, to show that the Good is even
beyond freedom forces himself to speak of its inner life in the most positive terms
not employed for the Good in other treatises. Plotinus hence does not forget to give
a caveat about his presentation:
But if one must bring in these names about that into which is inquired, let
it be said again that they were not correctly used, because one must not
make it two even for the sake of having an idea of it; but now we must
depart a little from correct thinking (i:l napavofli:€ov) in our discourse for
the sake of persuasion (13,1-5, tr. J. Bussanich, adapted by A. Sumi).
Plotinus' warning is repeated again in the same chapter:
But one must go along with the words, if one in speaking of that Good
uses, of necessity to indicate it, expressions which we do not strictly allow
to be used; but one should understand "as if (otov)" with each of them
(13,47-50, tr. J. Bussanich, adapted by A. Sumi).
Plotinus' account of the One's inner life in the final part of the treatise is
not a formal and strict presentation, but a "persuasion (nEL8w)" (13,4) and a "specific
indication (€voEL~u;;)" (13,48). As Bussanich views it, Plotinus here announces his
intention to "depart from the usually strict enforcement of the negative theology in
talking about the One."2 In fact, as we shall see, he attributes to the One
intelligence, love, self-causation, and active actuality. Nevertheless we must not
pass by the present treatise. As 1:l in 13,4 insinuates, Plotinus, even in VI 8 [39],
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eagerly tries to minimize the necessary divergence from his formal doctrine as much
as possible. He endeavors to persuade those who present the "daring opinion" in
order to defend his own doctrine of the One.
Therefore we can refer to passages of the present treatise as a key text for
our inquiry. In order to do so, we must work out an appropriate procedure of
interpretation. First, we shall ascertain Plotinus' divergence from his formal
doctrine of the One's knowledge by comparing the relevant passages in VI 8 [39), 16
with such texts as V 4 [7),2 and VI 7 [38),39. Then, we shall find out the specific
terms, in other treatises, to which the terms employed in VI 8 [39), 16 seem to be
really approximate. Finally, we shall see how these terms and concepts are related
to one another in VI 8 [39), 16. This procedure enables us to comprehend the
systematic structure of Plotinus' formal doctrine of the One's knowledge, which
stands behind his description in the present treatise. The proposed way of
interpretation will thus reveal the systematic picture of his doctrine of the One's
knowledge, which emerged when the treatises VI 7 [39) and VI 8 [39) were written.
The comparison of this systematic picture with the description in V 4 [7),2 will
certainly answer the question whether Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge has
developed or not.
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2. The One's Inner Activity

In VI 8 [39],16, Plotinus attempts to consider the One's nature in terms of
the thesis that the One is everywhere and nowhere (lines 1-4).3 That the One is
nowhere denotes its absolute transcendence. The absolutely transcendent One does
not aspire to contemplate other things that have derived from itself. Such a
transcendent mode of the One's cognitive state is elucidated in 16,24-36. The
passage in 16,24-30 reads:
But that such an inclination of him to himself (ii i:otm'.ri:ri VEDau; aui:ou
n:po<; aui:ov), which is, as it were, his activity (otov €v€pyEta ... aui:oD)
and abiding in himself (µovf, E-v aui:@), makes his being what he is, is
evident if one supposes the opposite case; because if he inclined
(vEuaELv) to what is outside himself, he would utterly lose his being what
he is; so his being what he is is his self-directed activity (ii €v€pyEta ii
n:pO<; aui:ov), and these are one and himself. Therefore, he has brought
himself into existence, while his activity is brought forth with himself (tr. J.
Bussanich, adapted by A. Sumi).
The self-creation of the One, mentioned here, would be definitely rejected
in other treatises of the Enneads. But this passage, if read with enough
circumspection, will give some instruction about the One's inner activity.
We must first go into detail about the One's self-inclination. As Atkinson
points out,4 the word VEuau; is used to describe the Gnostic doctrine of creation by
the soul (II 9 [33],4,6ff.). Plotinus himself uses VEUELV and VEuau; in the passage
dealing with the descent of the individual soul or of ~vat<; as the image of the
cosmic soul.5 Hence he denies n:poaVEVEtV to the One in V 1 [10],6,26. Although
the word VEuat<; seems to be quite inappropriate to the One, the self-inclination of
the One in the present passage is perhaps equivalent to its self-reversion mentioned
in V 1 [10],6,18.6 As i:otaui:ri in VI 8 [39],16,24 indicates, the One's inclination
towards itself is to be taken with its penetration into its own interior (6 o' Elc; i:o
E'iaw otov ~EpEi:at aui:ov, 16, 12-13 ), its holding fast to itself (n:po<; aui:ov otov
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crrnptl;,Et, 16,19), and its self-vision (otov npD<; o:\rcov 13A.€rt€l, 16,19-20). The One is
thus identified with its own interiority.7 Its interiority is again explicitly expressed in
18,3 Efow €v 13a0€l. The One's interiority thus goes well with its eternal self-

reversion. But what this interiority means exactly is not fully apparent.
The One's inclination to itself is associated with its self-vision and is
dissociated from the seeing of other things. 8 As seen in the last chapter, the seeing
of other things is rejected of the One in VI 7 [38],39,21-27. In the third chapter,
again, it was pointed out that whatever awareness the One may have of its own
power, it cannot be aware of any extrinsic effect of that power. With regard to this
dissociation, Plotinus faithfully abides by his formal doctrine. But the attribution of
self-vision to the One is problematic. In VI 7 [38],41,31, as already seen, self-vision
is definitely denied to the One (ouo€ 13A.€rt€l oil €o:ui:6).9 In the last chapter,
moreover, we saw that the unique immediacy of the One's intuition is more
effectively expressed by the tactile metaphor (39, 19) than by any ocular-language.
In this respect, hence, the present passage diverges from Plotinus' formal doctrine.

The divergence is explicitly marked by the qualification of the One's self-vision by
otov (VI 8 [39],16,19-20).10

Furthermore, the One's self-inclination is identified with its abiding in
itself. This identification is exactly prefigured by the One's self-reversion (V 1
[10],6,18) which is completely motionless (6,26-27). As already seen, the One's

Ko:i:o:v6nau;; is said to be in eternal rest (V 4 [7],2, 17-18) and its €nlf3oA.f\, which has
an implication of reversion, is taken with aEµvov '(ai:o:a8m (VI 7 [38],39,31-32).
Through the present passage, therefore, we can see that immobility is inseparably
associated with the One's self-reversion in Plotinus' formal system.11
The One's self-inclination is its €vE:pyEta directed to itself. His activity is
also characterized as €vE:pyEta µE:vouao: (16,15).12 The One's €vE:pyEta, which is
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even conceptually undifferentiated from the One itself, thus proves to be absolutely
static and self-directed. The activity is cognitively specified in 16,30-36:
If, then, he did not come to be, but his activity (ti €v€pyEux cx\n:ov) was
eternal and like waking being not different from the awakener (otov
€ypnyopat<; ouK &A.Aov ovi:<><; i:ov €yp11yop6i:oc;), being an eternal
awaking and hyper-intellection (€ypflyopat<; KCXt un€pVOf10't<;), he is thus
as he awakened. And his waking is beyond real being and Intellect and
intelligent life: but these [awaking and hyper-intellection] are himself.
Therefore he is an activity ( €v€pyEux) above Intellect and prudence and
life (tr. J. Bussanich, adapted by A. Sumi).13
New terms describe the One's knowledge and awareness. Henry points
out the close parallel between the present passage and V 4 [7],2,17-19 as follows: (i)
\mEpv611atc; corresponds to KCX1:CXVOf10'lc;, (ii) the prefix un€p- of vnEpv611au; to EV

vonan €i:€pwc; ft KCX1:Cx i:f)v vou VOf10'lV, (iii) OloV €ypnyopatc; to otov avvcxta811au;,
and (iv)

OloV

€ypnyopau; OUK &A.Aov ovi:oc; 1:0V €yp11yop6i:oc; to

ti KCX1:CXVOf10't<;

cxui:ov cxui:6.14 In addition, (iv) would also correspond to i:o €ml3aAA.EtV €cxvi:4> i:t

cxv E'lll ft cxui:6; in VI 7 [38],39,3-4.

Also in the present passage, Plotinus does not

forget to remark the consistency of the One's cognitive activity with its absolute
unity. From these close parallels, however, we cannot conclude that Plotinus'
position about the One's knowledge is the same in V 4 [7],2 and VI 8 [39], 16.
Guided by Henry's remark, we must search for Plotinus' formal position behind the
present passage.

As mentioned in Chapter II of Part I, Aristotle identifies the €v€pyEux of
the prime mover with its €ypnyopatc; (Met. 1072b 16-17). Plotinus' identification of
the One's activity with its awaking is indebted to Aristotle. Although Plotinus does
not characterize intellection as €ypnyopatc;, intellection is often characterized as
sleepless because of its perpetuity.15 So the word €ypT,yopatc; would be appropriate
to intellection. The qualification of the word by otov would be due to this fact, as is
the case in which the One's avvo:ta811atc; is qualified by ofov in V 4 [7],2, 18.
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Whereas the One's cn1vaia6ricru:;;, as seen in the first chapter, has an implication of
the One's concentration into unity, its €ypt1yopau:;; in the present passage is not
credited with such implication. In light of the parallel of 16,33 €a-rtv o\J-twc;,
€ypny6pnaEv with 16,38-39 &pa ... We; T,6€)1.naEv a\.11:6<; €ai:tv, the €ypflyopau:;;
seems to mean simply the One's awareness underlying the will tentatively attributed
to the One.
In the last chapter it was pointed out that Plotinus in the middle treatises
usually employs €n$oA.fl and its cognates rather than noetic terminology in order to
describe the cognitive activities of the One, the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect, and
the inchoate Intellect. The vnEpv6nau:;; in the present passage deviates from such a
general tendency.16 Bussanich maintains that the description of the One as otov

vo\X; (16,15-16) must be reckoned with the vnEpv6natc;.17 But the One's hyperintellection would rather be understood as an €v€pyna vnE:p vouv (16,35).18 The
prefix \mE:p- of vnEpv6natc; exactly denotes the transcendence of the One's
cognitive activity beyond intellection, that is, its difference from intellection, just as
remarked in V 4 [7],2, 18-19 ,19 But the application of the word to the One would no
longer be viable in Plotinus' formal doctrine of the middle period. If Intellect's
€n$oA.fl or npoaf3oA.fl must be the likeness to the One's €nij3oA.fl (III 8 [30],9,22-23),
we are urged to use some similar terms for the One and the hyper-noetic phase of
Intellect. It is impossible to employ vnEpv6ricrtc; for both the One and Intellect; the
hyper-noetic activity of Intellect cannot be called vnEpv6ricrtc;, because the word
exactly means the activity beyond Intellect, though that hyper-noetic activity belongs
to Intellect itself.

How are €ypflyopatc; and vnEpv6-11atc; of the One related to one another?
In V 4 [7],2, 17-18, we are told that the One's Kai:av6T)atc; is the One itself by virtue
of its otov auvaiaSnatc;. With this statement we pointed out in the first chapter that
the One's awareness is so concentrated into unity as to abrogate the conceptual
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distinction between the One's Kcrccxv6riau:; and the One itself. In the present
treatise, however, €ypt1yopau:; and \mEpv6riau:; are simply juxtaposed (16,32-33). In
16,35, these activities are totally identified with the One itself. The

undifferentiatedness of the One's knowledge from the One itself has been
repeatedly remarked. The total identity of the One's €ypt1yopau:; with the One
would surely suggest that its o'lov auvcxia8riau:; is considered to be entirely
undifferentiated from the One itself in Plotinus' formal system. In terms of the
One's absolute simplicity, we ought to think that the One itself, its knowledge, and
its consciousness are altogether one. The One's knowledge and consciousness seem
to represent simply two aspects of one and the same inner activity of the One,
considered from different points of view.
The above analysis reveals that Plotinus' formal doctrine of the One's
knowledge, persistently in the early and the middle treatises, consists of the
following basic theses. First, the One's knowledge and consciousness are totally
indistinguishable from the One itself by virtue of the absence of any otherness
whatsoever from the One. Second, the One's knowledge is always at rest. Finally,
the One's knowledge is the specification of its self-directed reversion. These theses
precisely express the uniqueness of the One's cognitive activity. Contrary to the first
thesis, Intellect is always in the duality of the thinking agent and intellection.20
Contrary to the second thesis, as already seen, intellection is defined as a movement
towards the One or towards the Form. Contrary to the third thesis, while selfintellection is self-directed, the eternally pre-noetic activity of Intellect is
characterized as El<; apxi)v

€mai:p€~Etv

(VI [9],2,36); the One, of course, does not

turn to anything else than itself.
Furthermore, all the above mentioned theses are based on the ontological
status of the One as an €v€pyEtcx; the first and the third theses are based on fl
E:v€pyEtcx fl npo<; aui:6v which is entirely identified with the One itself (16,28-29),
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and the second thesis on €v€pyE1.cx µ€vouacx (16,15). The passage

n'totcx\rtfl VEvau;

cx\rtov npOc; au'tov otov €v€pyEtcx ouaa au'tov Kal µovi\ €v au't4) (16,24-25)
apparently indicates the close connection between the second and the third theses,
between €v€pyEtcx µ€vouaa and €v€pyEtcx npOc; au't6v. Hence the One's
ontological status as the €v€pyEtcx seems to serve as the ground for the affirmation
about the One's knowledge. We shall further inquire into the ontological status of
the One as such.
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3. The One as the 'Ev€pyEta

We have now understood that the One itself is the self-directed and selfabiding €v€pyEta. The One's €ypt1yopau;; is €n€KELVa oval.a<; Kat vou Kat ~wfy;;
€µ~pova<; (16,34) and its €vE:pyEta is \m€p

vouv Kat ~p6VT)atv Kat ~wflv (16,35-36).

This point unmistakably suggests that there can be an €v€pyEta even apart from
oval.a. Plotinus writes:
We must not be afraid of positing the primary activity without real being
( €vE:pyEtaV i;fiv npW"tT)V ... CXVEU oval.a<;), but must posit this itself as a
kind of hypostasis. If someone were to posit a hypostasis without activity
(vn6ai;aatv avEu €vEpyEi.a<;), the originative principle would be deficient
and the most perfect of all would be imperfect. And if he added activity
(to the hypostasis), he would not preserve unity. If, then (ouv), activity (ri
€v€pyEta) is more perfect than real being ("tfl<; ovala<;), and the First is
the most perfect, he [i.e. the One] will be in the first place activity
( EVEpyEta) (20,9-15).
This passage comprises the significant principle of Plotinus' philosophy,
the ontological primacy of €v€pyEta over oval.a. The ontological status of the One
as the oval.a-less €vE:pyEt.a is totally consistent with its absolute simplicity. For
Plotinus, oval.a is coextensive with VOT)O"I.<;; and thereby is always ovai.o: voouaa (VI 7
[38],37, 11; 39,30-31 ). Again, intellection is inseparable from oval.a. Self-intellection
is the €v€pyEta of the vnoKEtµEVOV, that is, of being (40,8). Even the pre-noetic
activity coexists with and in real being ( auvEa"tt Kat €v "tTI ovai<;x, 40, 15). Intellect is
always oval.a and v6T)at<; so that it cannot be absolutely one (37,12).21 The One's
status as the €v€pyEt.a CXVEU Kat €nEKELVa ouai.a<; and the €v€pyEt.a vn€p vouv is
therefore fully coherent not only with the absence of intellection from the One but
with the absolute unity of the One, the fundamental thesis in Plotinus' philosophy.22
But here arises a problem. Plotinus in some places of VI 8 [39] adds o'tov
to the €v€pyEt.a which is the One and in other places not. So we must ascertain
whether Plotinus identifies the One as the unique activity in his formal doctrine, if
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we wish to defend our view that the One's ontological status as the ouai.cx-less
€v€pyEt.a serves as the foundation for the affirmation about the One's knowledge.
We have textual evidence for Plotinus' formal identification of the One as activity.
In the argument for the absence of intellection from the One in V 6 [24],6,3-9, as
seen in the fourth chapter, it is assured that the One is the primary €v€pyEux that is
completely free from any attribution and external relation (Eic; CXAA.o). The urge not
to add anything to the primary activity (ouo€v cxfrtn €i:i npoan0€vi:m;, lines 7-8)
would definitely point to the identification of the One as the primary activity without
being.23 But Plotinus elsewhere (V 5 [32],3,23-24) calls the One "a kind of activity
which establishes real being ("CT\V ... OloV EVEpyEt.aV Eic; \Jnoa"CCXO"lV ouai.cxc;),"
which is imitated by Zeus or the cosmic soul. The addition of ofov to €v€pyEt.a in
this section seems to be unavoidable for the following reason. We must keep in
mind that III 8 [30], V 8 [31 ], V 5 [32], and II 9 [33] originally constitute a long,
single treatise.24 In III 8 [30],9,32-34, Intellect is regarded as the primary activity so
that activity is denied to the One in 11,9-1 I.25 The qualifying otov in V 5 [32],3,23
would reflect this fact. Therefore this section does not disprove the One's status as
the primary activity without and beyond being.
The identification of the One as the primary activity without real being is
not only consistent with the One's unity and immobility, but is closely related to
Plotinus' doctrine of emanation. As seen in the first chapter, Plotinus, persistently
in all the periods of his writing, gives an account of the genesis of the intelligible
world from the One in terms of the double-€v€pyEux theory, in which the One is
defined as the primary and internal activity. If the One is not defined as the primary
activity, the double-activity theory loses its ground.26 Hence Plotinus' system really
calls for the identification of the One as the primary activity.27
Finally, Plotinus' claim that €v€pyEt.a is ontologically prior to ouai.cx marks
a remarkable revolution in ancient Greek metaphysics. The locution 000€ ...
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4><J/3ni:€ov in VI 8 [39],20,9 would insinuate Plotinus' own awareness that his claim
may be a bold challenge to the tradition of Greek philosophy, especially to the
Aristotelian tradition. Perhaps nobody before him explicitly stated the ontological
priority of €v€pyncx to oucrio:. As seen in Chapter II of Part I, the internal structure
of self-intellection of the Aristotelian prime mover is explained such that the divine
capacity of thinking is brought to activity by the divine object of thought. In
Aristotle, God's €v€pyEto: cannot be apart from oucrio: as the divine intelligible
object. As already seen,28 therefore, definiteness serves as the criterion of actuality.
But the Plotinian thesis that there can be €v€pyEto: without oucrio: eliminates the
Aristotelian identification of definiteness with actuality; the One's €v€pyEto: must
rather be associated with unlimitedness and formlessness. Moreover, the activity of
the Aristotelian God is the €v€pyEto: aKlVflcrio:c;;.29 This notion is briefly mentioned
in Eth. Nie. 1154b27-28, but is not fully unfolded by Aristotle himself. The activity
of immobility, though not occurring in the Enneads, nicely describes the static
activity of the One. According to Plotinus, however, the association of absolute
immobility with activity would be possible only if that activity is not accompanied
with oucrio:; for the Plotinian oucrio:, just like 1:0 TICXVL'EAW<; OV in the Sophist, must
always have noetic movement. It would not be impossible to regard Plotinus' notion
of the One's static activity as embodying his critical inheritance of Aristotle's notion
of the activity of immobility. In sum, Plotinus has Aristotle as his predecessor with
regard to the notion of the activity of immobility, in spite of his decisive divergence
from Aristotle with regard to the ontological primacy of €v€pyEto: over oucrio:.
As already seen, several critics observes that Plotinus' account for the
One's knowledge in V 4 [7],2 is influenced by Numenius.30 But Plotinus' notion of
the activity without being indicates the radical difference of his position from
Numenius'. The First God of Numenius is intellect at rest which is identified with
the Living Being of the Timaeus.31 The First God is simply the complex of the
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Forms devoid of an intellective agent32 and is called inactive (apy6v) (Fr. 21,
Leemans).33 From his inactivity, however, we cannot infer that the First God has no
distinctive €vE:pyEux. It is not fully apparent whether he has some €vE:pyEux.
Whether he has activity or not, the First God, unlike the Plotinian One, is Being.34
The First God of Numenius is definite Being that has the downward tendency to
make use of the Second God to think, whereas the Plotinian One is the hyper-ontic
activity always remaining in itself. Although the entire picture of Numenius'
philosophy is not available to us, Plotinus himself seems to be aware that the
ontological status and activity of his ultimate principle are apparently different from
those of Numenius' highest deity. With the conclusion of our inquiry into the
ontological status of the One and the modalities of its knowledge, we can now
answer the problem mentioned in the first chapter. Plotinus' doctrine of the One's
knowledge is scarcely influenced by Numenius.
Plotinus' doctrine of the One's hyper-noetic activity, as already seen, is
systematically related to his doctrines of the One's simplicity, of Intellect's selfthinking and of emanation. The doctrine surely meets several exigencies arising
from his own philosophical system. Nevertheless it can be seen as representing
Plotinus' reply to a problem left in Plato's dialogue. In the passage dealing with the
hyper-noetic and hyper-ontic activity of the One, Plotinus refers to Rep. 509b9
EllEKElVCX ouaio:c;; (VI 8 [39], 16,34 ). Let us return to the locus classicus of Plotinus'
doctrine of the One: OUK ouaio:c;; ovi:oc;; 1:0U aya9ou, ill' EllEKElVCX i:Tl<; ouaio:c;; i:n
npEaI3E~

Kat ouvaµEt Ull€p€xovi:oc;; (Rep. 509b8-9). In terms of the phraseology

OUK ... ilia ... , the second half of this section can be taken as the kataphatic
statement about the Good. Nevertheless the phrase EllEKElVCX i:flc;; ouaio:c;; reveals
nothing positive about the ontological status of the Good. The phrase is apophatic
to the extent that it remarks the separateness of the Good from the Forms. What is
the ontological status of the Good exactly? Plotinus persistently and seriously
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tackles this problem, regarding the transcendence of the Good, left unanswered in
Plato's dialogues. He might regard the €v€pyEta €n€K€tVO: i:Tl<; oucricxc; as
appropriate to the causal power of the Good from which the totality of the Forms
are derived.35 The Idea of the Good transcends the oucricx with regard to its
5\Jvaµu;;. The power in question is precisely that of providing the oucricx with the

Elvat. The 5\Jcxvµu;; is represented by the €v€pyEta, when it is viewed without
reference to its effects.
In brief summary, Plotinus' affirmations about the One's knowledge are
based on the ontological status of the One as the self-directed, static e:vE.-pyEta
without and beyond oucri.a.36 By virtue of the mediation by this status of the One,
the positive description of the One's cognitive activity can be coherent with the
denial of intellection and €v€pyEta-accompanied-with-oucricx to the One.
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NOTES

lWe do not go into the problem regarding the identification of the
proponent of the i;oAµllPOc; A.6yoc;;. Brehier regards certain Gnostics as the
proponent. See Plotin: Enneades, text etabli et traduit, 6 vols. in 7 (Paris: Societe
d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", 1924-1938), 6.2:119-122. Cilento follows Brehier's
view (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 186). Armstrong identifies the proponent as
Christians who espoused an indeterminate or voluntarist language about the divine
will in "Two Views of Freedom: A Christian Objection in Plotinus Enneads VI.8
[39],7,11-15?" Studia Patristica 18 (1982):397-406. But Beutler and Theiler regard
the opinion as Plotinus' own thought-experiment (Plotins Schriften, 4b:372).

2J. Bussanich,Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):173. As for VI 8 [39],16, Henry
makes a similar observation: "... il y a la reprise du theme classique de la via
negativa et de !'absolute transcendence" (Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 59-60).
30n the view that the One is everywhere and nowhere, see III 9 [13],4,1-6
and V 5 [32],8,24.
4M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.J, p. 142.
5See I 1 [54],12,23-27, I 6 [l],5,49, and I 8 [51],4,19.
6For the attempt to read the One's self-reversion into the context of VI 8
[39),16, see J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 41-43;
C. J. de Vogel, Etudes sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, ed. P. Aubenque (Paris: J. Vrin,
1979), p. 264. As seen in the third chapter, Bussanich takes the referent of TTI
€mcri;po~n in V 1 [10],7,5 as the One. But since we take the referent as the inchoate
Intellect, our textual warrant for the One's self-reversion must be solely 6,18.
7Bussanich pays attention to the fact that the phrases Eic; i;o Efow and
npOc,; i;o Efow are used in the passages dealing with the soul's mystical union with
the One (V 5 [32],7,32; VI 9 [9],7,17-18) and remarks that the One's reversion into
itself represents an absolutizing moment in the lives of Intellect and the soul. See J.
Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 208; Ancient
Philosophy 7 (1987):176.
Bon the denial of the seeing of other things to the One, see 16, 11-12 ou
npOc,; aui;a /3A.€noV'tO<;; aui;ou. The alleged inclination of the One towards those

which are external (16,26-27) would be taken with the seeing of other things.
9Buchner (Plotins Moglichkeitslehre (Munich, Salzburg: Verlag Anton
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Pustet, 1970), p. 101, note 8) sees the self-directed activity of the One in the present
passage in terms of VI 7 [38],41,31 and remarks that such activity is free from the
subject-object separation.
lOBussanich tries to defend the viability of the One's self-vision by
referring to the passages where Plotinus mentions the hyper-noetic vision of the soul
and by stressing the close link between seeing and €pW<; which he regards as
equivalent to the One's ayanCiv in 16,13-14. See J. Bussanich, The One and Its
Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 214-215. Of course, he is fully aware that
Plotinus on countless occasions claims that the One transcends any sort of vision.
But, first of all, Bussanich's modus interpretandi of VI 8 [39] is not fully clear.
Insofar as we intend to discover Plotinus' formal doctrine behind the present
treatise, we cannot follow Bussanich's claim.
As mentioned in the third chapter, Bussanich regards the One as the
subject of €wpa in V 1 [10],7,6, while we regard Intellect as the subject. Hence we
have no textual evidence for the One's self-vision.
In VI 8 [39], 16, furthermore, the One itself is identified with pure radiance
( €avi:ov ... a\ryrw Ka9ap6:v, line 13; see also Phdr. 250c4 ). As seen in the last
chapter, the One is described as i\ auyi\ in VI 7 [38],41,6. This identification can be
considered to belong to Plotinus' formal doctrine.
11Hadot takes the self-directed inclination of the One in 16,24 with its selfdirected reversion in V 1 [10],6, 18, which he closely compares with its remaining in
itself (µE:vovi:rn;; EKELVOV EV i:&J aui:&J fl9n) in v 3 [49],12,33-34 (Porphyre et
Victorinus, 1:320-321, note 4). This interpretation suggests that Plotinus'
identification of the One's V€Ucrtc;; npoc; aui:6v and µovi\ EV aui:&J in 16,24-25 is
firmly based on his systematic doctrine.
12Buchner compares EVEpyEt.a µE:vovcra with Intellect's EVEpyEt.a
€cri:wcra in II 9 [33], 1,30 (Plotins Moglichkeitslehre, p. 102, note 10). Unlike the
One's rest, however, Intellect's rest goes with movement (see VI 9 [9],5, 14-15
TlUVXOV Kat ai:pEµf1 Kl\/llUtV).
13Jn the apparatus of H-S2, i:aui:a in 16,25 is taken to refer to EnEKELVa
oucrt.ac; Kat VOU Kat ~wf1c; €µ~povoc;. But to take the referent of i:aui:a as
Eypf}yopcrtc; Kat unEpVOflUl<; in 16,32 makes the argument in the present passage
more intelligible as follows:
(1) The One's activity is awaking and hyper-intellection (16,31-33).
(2) The awaking is beyond Intellect and life (16,33-34 ).
(3) The awaking and hyper-intellection are the One itself (16,35).
(4) Therefore (apa) the One itself is an activity beyond Intellect and life
(16,35-36).
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The proposed reading has another advantage. The undifferentiatedness
of awaking and hyper-intellection from the One itself can be taken with that of selfdirected activity from the One itself (i:ofrto OE EV Kcxl cxui:&;;, 16,28-29) and with that
of waking from the awakener (16,31-32).
14p. Henry, Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 59-60, 386-387. For the equivalence
of vnEpVof'\crt.c; to Kcxi:cxv6f'\crt.c;, see also J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p.
49; J. Bussanich,Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):182.
15Plotinus applies to intellectual activity the words aunvrn;; (I 4 [46],9,22;
VI 2 [43],8,7) and aypunvrn;; (II 5 [25],3,36).
16See also Bussanich's comment on the present passage: "It is in fact
perplexing why Plotinus persists in employing noetic terminology, albeit literally
hyper-noetic, to describe the Good (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus,
p. 218, (Italics mine.)). In terms of the general tendency in the middle treatises,
however, Plotinus does not persist in employing noetic terminology.
17J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 218.
The One is elsewhere referred to as o'tov vo\Jc;; €v €vi (18,21; 18,27).
18See also 15, 19-21 O:ycx8ou €vEpyE~ Kcxl µEi~ovrn;; Ti Km:a vo\Jv, ouK
ETICXK1:0V 1:0 un€p 'tO VOEtV EXOUO'f'\<;.
19Rist comments on the present passage as follows: "Plotinus then really
did envisage some kind of VOf'\O't.c; as appropriate to the first principle" (Plotinus: The
Road to Reality, p. 45). The One's vnEpVof'\crtc;;, insofar as it is beyond Intellect, is
not any kind of intellection. In terms of Plotinus' formal doctrine in his middle
treatises, it would be only some kind of €ntl)oA.fl that is truly appropriate to the One.
Even in V 4 [7],2, 17-19, Plotinus would think that any kind of intellection is not
appropriate to the One. Rist seems to be unnecessarily swayed by Plotinus' noetic
terminology.
Beierwaltes accurately points out the interplay of negativity and positivity
in the notion of the One's vnEpV6f'\crt.c;:
"So umfasst der Begriff vnEpVof'\crtc;; apophatische und kataphatische
Aussage als Einheit, indem er dem Einen die Weise des intentionalen
Denkens, des vo\Jc;; abspricht, ihm aber eine andere, nicht naher
beschriebene Weise des Denkens zuspricht. Gerade durch die im vm~:p
angezeigte Negativitat des Begriffes vnE:pV6f'\crtc;; wird die alles Seidende
und Denkende iibersteigende Positivitat des Einen offenkundig" ("Die
Metaphysik des Lichtes in der Philosophie Plotins," Zeitschrift far
Philosophische Forschung 15 (1961):349).
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Beierwaltes' observation would be most apparently embodied by €v€pyE1.CX "1t€p
voOv (16,35). The phrase consists of the kataphatic €v€pyE1.CX and the apophatic
un€p voOv. We shall see later what sort of all-transcending positivity is attributed to
the One's activity. But we should like to make two critical comments on
Beierwaltes' view of the One's knowledge. First, Beierwaltes regards the term
\JnEpvoriau; as viable in Plotinus' system. In the present passage, however, Plotinus
does not give a formal account of the One's knowledge. The use of the term would
certainly deviate from his general terminological tendency in the middle treatises.
Dodds' attitude towards unEpv6riau; is similar to Beierwaltes': ''The nearest he [i.e.
Plotinus] can get to describing it [i.e. the One's consciousness] is to call it
iJnEpvoriau;" (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 50). Beierwaltes' observation is fully
compatible with our claim that the positive and the negative descriptions are
coherent with one another in Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge. But the
word unEpv6riau; at best implies that the One's cognitive activity is beyond Intellect
and so does not have any sufficiently positive meaning. It would rather be the One's
€ntl3oA.ft that really comprises apophatic and kataphatic statements; for the One's
€nt130A.ft not only is the positive specification of the One's internal activity, but also
is sharply contrasted with intellection by virtue of the absence of otherness from it.
Second, Beierwaltes associates self-reversion (€mai:po~ft €~ €o:vi:6v) solely with
intellection and dissociates it from the One's knowledge (Zeitschrift filr
Philosophische Forschung 15 (1961):348). As repeatedly remarked in light of V 1
[10],6,18, however, the One's knowledge must be inseparably linked with its selfrevers10n.
20See V 6 [24],6,9-13, 6,24-27, and VI 7 [38],37,10-14.
210n the necessary connection between intellectual €v€pyE1.CX and ouaicx,
see J. Moreau, Plotin ou la Gloire de la Philosophie Antique, pp. 85-86.
220n the status of the One as such, see J. Bussanich, The One and Its
Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 69, 213; idem, Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):178; J.
Moreau, Plotin ou la Gloire de la Philosophie Antique, pp. 86-87; V. Schubert, Plotin:
Einfilhrung in sein Philosophieren (Freiburg, Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 1973), p.
58; K. Kremer, "Zur ontologischen Differenz: Plotin und Heidegger," Zeitschrift far
Philosophische Forschung 43 (1989):683-684. Arnou also holds that the One is the
activity (Le Desir de Dieu dans la Philosophie de Plotin, 2nd ed. (Rome: Presses de
l'Universite Gregorienne, 1967), p. 141. See also Deck's comment on VI 8 [39],20,915 in "The One, or God, is not Properly 'Hypostais': A Reply to Professor John P.
Anton," in The Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic Approach, ed. R. B. Harris (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1982), p. 38:
"The act (which is the One) is a quasi hypostasis because it does not have a
subject or substratum in which it inheres, but is, as it were, its own subject
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or substratum--or, better yet, 'gets by' without a substratum."
From the same passage, Anton draws the diametrically opposite view:
"What makes the concept of hypostasis intelligible and actual is the original activity
of the One, which is presupposed by its ousia" ("Some Logical Aspects of the
Concept of Hypostasis in Plotinus," in The Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic
Approach, ed. R. B. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), p.
33). We here do not fully consider the dispute between Anton and Deck around the
problem whether the One can be a hypostasis. But Deck seems to be on the right
track at least as regards the interpretation of 20,9-15. We are totally reluctant to
accept Anton's claim that the One is a hypostasis with an €v€pyEta.
Can we regard the One as the hypostasis-less activity? Deck writes: "The
One is above hypostasis and is best described, when the word 'hypostasis' is used at
all, as quasi-hypostasis" (The Structure of Being, p. 39). His expression "quasihypostasis" is based on i:i\v otov ui:6ai:aatv in 20, 10-11. But Buchner observes that
the sense of the term un6ai:aau;; in 20,lOff. is restricted to being (Plotins
Moglichkeitslehre, p. 102, note 10). Buchner's observation proves to be correct as
soon as we become aware of the contrast between €v€pyEtaV i:f\v npwi:flV avEv
ouaiex<; (20,9-10) and un6ai:acrtv CXVEV EVEpyEio:<; (20, 11 ). The One can be called
the activity without hypostasis at least within the context of 20,9-15. By appealing to
Buchner's point, Deck could push further his thesis that the One is not properly a
hypostasis.
23Schwyzer closely relates the npWl:fl €v€pyEta CXVEV ouaio:<; in VI 8
[39],20,9 to the npwi:fl €v€pyEta in V 6 [24],6,6 in "Plotinos," in Paulys RealEncyclopiidie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft, vol. 21, (Stuttgart: Alfred
Druckenmiiller, 1951), p. 561.
Wallis, referring to VI 7 [38],37, 15-16 and VI 9 [9],6,50-55, holds that "we
may describe the One ... as being a pure Intellectual Act prior to the emergence of
subject and object in Neoplatonism, p. 59. It is indeed true that the argument for the
absence of intellection from the One in VI 7 [38],37, 10-16 is very proximate to that
in V 6 [24],6,3-9. In the former argument, Plotinus attacks the Peripatetic claim that
the first principle must think because it is activity (lines 10-11 ). This claim allows
two disjunctive possibilities, respectively marked by µ€v (line 11) and 0€ (line 15),
that the first principle is a real being always thinking (lines 11-12) and that it is itself
an intellectual activity (line 15). Notice that the subject of A.€yovatv in line 15 is ol
... VOflO'lV aui:Q OOVl:E<; i:Q A.6yQ in line 1, namely the Peripatetics. It is not
Plotinus himself who identifies the Good as the pure intellectual activity in this
passage. Therefore this passage can be a textual evidence for Plotinus' view, as
stated also in V 6 [24],6,3-5, that any pure activity itself, conceptually differentiated
from the activity or actualization of being, does not think, but not for his own
identification of the One as the activity without any substantiality.
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24See R. Harder, "Eine neue Schrift Plotins," Hermes 71 (1936):1-10.
250n several occasions Plotinus denied any activity to the One (I 7
[54],1,17-20; III 9 [13],9,8-10; V 3 [49],12,23-24; VI 7 [38],40,29-30). In these
sections, however, he either defines intellection as the primary activity or speaks of
the general activity towards the Good. Hence this denial is not inconsistent with the
identification of the One as activity without being. Bussanich states that the claims
that the One is beyond activity "are usually made in contexts where the generation
of Intellect is the primary focus" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p.
213).
The identification of the Good as the primary activity means that the
Good is the activity, but not that it has the activity. Since the One is itself activity, it
does not have another activity (V 6 [24],6,4-5). Therefore we are told that the One
has nothing to which to direct its activity (V 3 [49], 10, 16-17) and that it has no
€pyov (VI 7 [38],37,28-29).
260n the close connection between the One's status as the primary activity
and the double-activity theory, see J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect
in Plotinus, pp. 31, 213. The description of the One as €v€pyEta µ€voucra in VI 8
[39], 16, 15 seems to be based on the self-abiding of the primary activity in the
double-activity theory (V 4 [7],2, 13 €<J>' E:aui:ou µ€vov; 2,33-34 µ€vovi:rn; aui:ou €v
1:~ oiKE~ fl8Et).
27We must also examine the claim that the One is not described as
€v€pyEtcx in the treatises except for VI 8 [39]. Buchner, overlooking V 6 [24 ],6,3-9,
writes as follows:
"Die Verwirklichung bringt eine Aufspaltung in Subjekt und Objekt mit
sich (wobei das Objekt das eigene Innere ist), schlieBt also eine
vollkommene Einheitlichkeit des Wesens aus. Zudem bedeutet sie
Abhangigkeit vom Erzeuger; denn nur durch das Betrachten des Oberen
hat das Sein Bestand. Das Eine kann deswegen nicht Energeia sein.
Denn nicht es wirkt auf Anderes, sondern dieses betatigt sich vielmehr in
Richtung auf Es" (Plotins Moglichkeitslehre, p. 99 (Italics mine.)).
We should like to make two critical remarks on Buchner's claim. First, it
would be true that the notion of actualization excludes the complete simplicity, since
the actualization is always the actualization of something. But the One's €v€pyEtcx is
not the actualization of anything. Buchner confuses activity and actualization.
Second, it is indeed correct to say that the One does not work upon anything else.
But that the One does not work does not necessarily mean that it is not an activity.
The One's not working is rather based on its being the pure activity (V 6 [24],6,4-5).
Buchner also confuses being-activity and having-activity.
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28See note 19 in Chapter II of Part I.
29See note 41 in Chapter II of Part I.
30See note 1 in the first chapter.
310n this identification, see E. R. Dodds, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 19; P.
Hadot, Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 143, 149; G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of
Unity, p. 241, note 8.
32Intellection is for Numenius the distinctive activity of the Second God or
intellect contemplating. The First God can be said to have no intellection, insofar
as his doctrine of np6cr)(pflOt<; is not concerned (see E. R. Dodds, Les Sources de
Plotin, p. 14). See also H. -C. Puech, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 51: "11 [i.e. le premier
vo\k;] est purement intelligence, c'est un VOfll:OV et non un voEp6v." The doctrine
of np6cr)(pflOt<; allows the transition of intellect at rest from non-thinking state to
thinking state, so that intellect at rest can be said to have intellection in potentiality.
In II 9 [33],1,23-25, Plotinus mentions the absurdity of multiplying natures by
distinguishing actuality and potentiality in the realm without matter. He would here
reject the Numenian-Gnostic doctrine as infringing upon the complete actuality and
immutability of the intelligible world.
Needless to say, the idea of np6cr)(pflcrtc; is totally incompatible with the
Plotinian thesis that the One neither sees its products nor inclines to them. Wallis'
observation is very instructive that "though Numenius anticipates Plotinus' doctrine
of 'undiminished giving,' ... he does not use it, unlike Plotinus, to exempt the gods
from attention to their products" (Neoplatonism, p. 34 ).
The cognitive state of Numenius' First God itself remains a real enigma.
Dodds maintains that the First God's "distinctive activity (or passivity) must be
something other than VOflcrtc; proper" (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 14). But it cannot be
the absolutized €v€pyEta like the inner activity of the Plotinian One. See E. R.
Dodds, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 50: "... if he [i.e. First God] is a pure intelligence
without object, how can he be nEpl i:a VOfli:a?" Here arises another problem. The
First God of Numenius is "intellect at rest" which is nEpl i:a VOfll:a. So we wonder
why his distinctive activity, as Dodds claims, is something other than intellection.
Dodds takes the pronoun nEpi as exactly meaning "in relation to" (Les Sources de
Plotin, p. 50). The relation of the static intellect to the intelligible objects can
naturally be called VOflau;. The real problem is how it is possible to reconcile the
First God's being intellect at rest and its relation to the intelligible objects with the
nature of intellection as the distinctive activity of the Second God only.
The highest deity's knowledge is real difficulty in the systems of both
Plotinus and Numenius. But the fundamental nature of the problem differs in both
thinkers. In Numenius, on the one hand, the First God's knowledge is the cognitive
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relation of intellect at rest to the plural vorrt6:. In Plotinus, on the other, the One's
knowledge is the specification of the unity of the One's cognitive activity and the
One itself.

33This point is echoed in Plotinus' attack on the Gnostic bifurcation of
intellect: "What would be the inactivity (apyl.cx) (of intellect at rest), and what the
work (€pyov) of the other intellect?" (II 9 [33],1,28-29).
34Whereas First God is said to be ai.11:o6v (Fr. 26, Leemans) and nE'pl 'ta
von'ta (Fr. 24, Leemans), it is prior to Being and Form (Fr. 25, Leemans). Dodds is
annoyed by this contradiction (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 12). Wallis gives a solution
to this problem: "The solution may be that Numenius, like some late Neoplatonists,
regards the Forms as pre-existing in unmanifested form in the First Hypostasis,
whence they are brought forth by Intelligence" (Neoplatonism, p. 34 ).
35A. E. Taylor also theistically interprets the Platonic Form of the Good
as what is means in Christian philosophy by ens realissimum in Plato: The Man and
His Work (London: Methuen, 1926; reprint ed., Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1956),
p. 289. He claims that Plato's conception of the Idea of the Good involves "the
tension between the affirmative and the negative moments" (ibid., p. 288). But
Taylor's characterization less fully embodies this tension than Plotinus' notion of the
oval.ex-less activity does.
36Moreau observes that Plotinus' descriptions of the One's knowledge, as
Ka'tav6nau;;, €nlf3oA.ft, and unEpv6nat<;;, are the characterizations of its primitive
activity without being (Plotin ou la Gloire de la Philosophie Antique, p. 88).

CHAPTER VII

TIIE DENIAL OF INTELLECilON AND CONSOOUSNESS TO 1HE ONE IN
VI 7 [38] AND V 3 [49]

Introduction

As explicated in the last two chapters, Plotinus' affirmation about the

One's knowledge, which is based on its ontological status as the self-directed activity
unaccompanied with being, is systematically coherent with its having no intellection.
As viewed in the fourth chapter, he denies intellection to the One mainly because of

its simplicity and self-sufficiency. This is also the case in the middle and the late
treatises. As Armstrong notes, 1 nevertheless, Plotinus' intensely active and critical
mind makes him not easily satisfied with his own earlier formulations. While he has
already painstakingly considered the problem concerning the absence of intellection
from the One in V 6 [24 ], Plotinus tirelessly deals with the problem again in VI 7
[38] and V 3 [49]. In this chapter, we shall analyze his arguments in these treatises
to trace the chronological development in his defense of the thesis that the One
does not think.
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1. The Denial of Intellection to the One in VI 7 [38].37-39

In the final parts ( chs. 37-42) of VI 7 [38], Plotinus gives a detailed
account of the One's cognitive state. The substantial portion of these chapters,
however, is devoted to the thoroughgoing arguments for the absence of intellection
from the One, and the One's knowledge, as seen in the fifth chapter, is very briefly
described in 39,1-4.
Plotinus begins his extensive discussion with the critique of the Peripatetic
ascription of intellection to the first principle. He first attacks the thesis that the
first principle has honor by virtue of its possessing intellection (37,3-7).2 This thesis
robs the Good of the intrinsic value (37,8). If the first principle has the value from
itself, on the contrary, it must be complete before intellection (37,9-10). This
argument seems to appeal tacitly to the self-sufficiency of the Good.
In the immediately ensuing passage (37, 10-16), Plotinus criticizes the
Aristotelian claim that the first principle must think because it is €v€pyEta. The
statement that the first principle is the activity allows two disjuncts. The first
disjunct that the first principle is the ouaia VOOUUCX, namely EVEpyEta accompanied
with ouaia, infringes upon the simplicity of the first principle (37,11-14).3 The
second disjunct that the first principle is itself pure activity and intellection entails
its not thinking because intellection itself does not think (37, 15-16).4 The
Aristotelian claim is thus refuted.
This passage cannot be a textual warrant for Plotinus' own identification
of the One as the activity without being.5 Nevertheless this argument instructs us
that Plotinus really entertains two notion of €v€pyEta; (i) the activity accompanied
with being or the actualization of being, and (ii) the pure activity without or
abstracted from being. These two notions are distinguished also in V 6 [24],6,5-8; (i)
corresponds to the activity directed to something else, the activity to which we can
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attribute something, and (ii) corresponds to the pure activity as conceived without
its substrate or the primary activity on which all other activities depend and to which
nothing must be added. Intellection is denied to the Good which is categorized as
the latter sort of activity. Also in this section, it is stressed that the activity itself in
general does not have another activity (lines 4-5). In VI 8 [39],20,9-15, as seen in
the last chapter, Plotinus remarks that the €v€py€lcx without oucri.cx is consistent with
the absolute simplicity, but that hypostasis with €v€pyE:tcx is not. Hence the present
argument follows the line of the argument in V 6 [24 ],6,3-9 as regards the distinction
of two notions of €v€pyE:tcx and the thesis that the activity itself does not have
another activity.
But Plotinus admits that he himself places oucri.cx and €v€pyE:tcx in the
intelligible world and contrasts their multiplicity and difference with the simplicity
of the Good (37,17-19). This passage includes an implicit argument for the One's
having no intellection from the contrast between the One's unity and the vouc;v6ricru;; duality. In the ensuing lines (37,19-24), Plotinus mentions the derivative
nature of intellection and concludes to the transcendence of the One, as the cause of
intellection, over Intellect. Also in VI 9 [9],6,53-55, as already seen in the second
chapter, intellection is denied to the cause of intellection which is the One, on the
basis of the Neoplatonic principle that the cause necessarily transcends its effect.
Also in the present treatise, Plotinus is fully aware that his persistent
denial of intellection to the One would cause some pejorative conception of it:
For un-thinking Intellect, on the one hand, is unintelligent (av6ri-roc;);
because for that which has intellection as its nature, if it does not execute
intellection, it is unintelligent (av6ri-rov). For that which has no work
(€pyov), what kind of work will someone bring to it and accuse it of the
privation of work when it does not execute the work? It is as if someone
says that it is not a physician (37,24-28).
Plotinus grounds the One's non-thinking on its self-sufficiency (37,28-31 ).
The One's having no intellection surely means its having no work.6 The absence of
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intellection from the One is prone to invite the accusation of its laziness. Plotinus
dismisses this illicit accusation by appealing to the One's self-sufficiency and saying
that the One has no need to think. In a word, the thesis that the One does not think
is satisfactorily defended when it is developed into the thesis that the One has no
need to think.7 According to the reasoning in the above passage, moreover, we

cannot jump from the view that the One does not think to the conclusion that it
must be 6:v6rrrov. The One has no nature of thinking; it transcends intellection not
from outside (ouK €ncxKi:ov) (VI 8 [39],15,20-21), that is, in its own nature. For that
which does not have intellection as its nature, its non-thinking does not mean its
being O:v6rrrov. Hence two disjunctive possibilities, about the characterization of
the originative source oflntellect, mentioned in III 8 [30],9, 14-15, either voouv or
aVO'f11:0V, are essentially inapplicable to the One.

The argument in 38, 10-25 is a reduction from the tentative suggestion that
the content of the Good's self-intellection may be "I am the Good."8 This
supposition allows two possibilities. In the first possibility, in which intellection is
itself the Good, intellection need not have the One as its object, so that the One is
no longer the Good (38,18-20). In the second possibility, in which intellection
directed to the Good is different from the Good itself, the Good is already prior to
intellection and self-sufficient, so that it need not think itself (38,21-24). The
supposition of the Good's self-intellection thus entails the absence of selfintellection from the Good.
In 39, 1-4, as already seen, Plotinus elucidates the One's €nij3oA.T,. After his
laconic affirmation about the One's intuition, Plotinus argues for the One's having
no intellection from its simplicity. lntellection always involves otherness (39,5-6).
Otherness has two roles, difference which distinguishes the thinking subject and the
intelligible object (39,6-7) and difference which causes all things to come to be by
differentiating intelligible objects from one another (39,7-9).9 But otherness is

328

absent from the One (39,2-3), so that self-intellection is incompatible with the One's
simplicity (39, 11-16). Again, each intellection, insofar as it concerns the multiplicity
of objects and so is manifold, is incompatible with the simple wholeness (i:o cxvi:o

ncxv) of the One (39,16-20).
We further need to scrutinize Plotinus' denial of self-intellection to the
One. He writes as follows:
But we said that there is no intellection concerning him [i.e. the Good],10
even if he wishes to see himself as different. But if he himself thinks, he
becomes many: intelligible object, knower, mover, and whatever other
things belong to Intellect (39,13-16).
The One's being unknown by intellection has the double meaning: (i) the
One cannot be known by another's intellection, and (ii) intellection is not a kind of
knowledge that the One may have of itself. The second sense can be explicated such
that the One is not the object of intellection to itse!f.11 On the close connection
between intellection and otherness, if the One is the object of its intellection, it will
be dual, consisting of subject and object, and multiple, consisting of all the
intelligible objects. In this connection, likewise, the One cannot be the subject of
self-intellection; for in this case the One will be dual as having all the noetic objects
in manifested form within itself. The conflict between the absence of otherness
from the One and the involvement of otherness in intellection thus entails not only
that the One cannot be the subject of intellection but that it cannot be the object of
self-intellection. The latter point is not fully established in V 6 [24], where Plotinus
elaborately argues for the One's having no intellection. The present argument
confirms the absence of self-intellection from the One by establishing not only that
the One does not think itself but that the One is not thought by itself.
The above investigation tells us that Plotinus in VI 7 [38] argues for the
One's having no intellection from more diverse perspectives than in earlier treatises,
though he grounds the absence of intellection from the One basically on its
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simplicity and self-sufficiency.12 In the present treatise, as already mentioned in the
fifth chapter, (i) the One's intuition, (ii) the absence of intellection from the One,
and (iii) the possibility of (ii) as inviting some pejorative conception of the One
enter into a single scope. The possible pejorative conception of the One is
dismissed by the positive description of its cognitive state and its self-sufficiency.
Such systematization of the doctrine of the One's knowledge would surely indicate
the development in Plotinus' philosophy.
It must be further noticed that Plotinus also denies intellection to the soul
united to the One in VI 7 [38]:
Therefore the soul does not move, then, because that Good does not
move. She is, then, not even soul, because That does not live, but is
beyond life. Nor is she even Intellect, because That does not think; for
she must be made like that Good. It does not even think that Good,
because That does not think (35,42-45, tr. J. Bussanich, adapted by A.
Sumi).13
In the second chapter, it was seen that Plotinus attributes

VOEtV

and the

€v€pyna vou to the soul united with the One in VI 9 [9],9,14-17.14 In the present
passage, on the contrary, we are explicitly told that the soul united with the One is
i:nade like the One as regards their both having no intellection. Since intellection is
a kind of movement (VI 7 [38],35, 1-4 ), the One and the soul united with it, being
both free from intellection, do not move. As seen in the fifth chapter, the
expression a€µvov '(a1:aa9cxt is appropriate to the One's knowledge (39,28-34).
Therefore the likeness of the soul in the mystic union with the One must be
understood as stating that there is no intellection and complete immobility.15 As
repeatedly mentioned, Plotinus speaks of the likeness of Intellect's hyper-noetic

€nt130A.il to the One's in III 8 [30],9,22-23. In the fifth chapter, we pointed out that
the parallel is noticed among the One's

k~owledge,

the hyper-noetic activity of

Intellect, and the soul's apprehension of the One with regard to their being
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described as either bn/3oA.ft or npoo'{3oA.ft. The parallel also holds among them with
regard to their being free from intellection. Since the €m/3oA.ft or npocrf3oA.ft in the
former parallel is precisely hyper-noetic, the former kataphatic parallel is exactly
coherent with the latter apophatic parallel.16
The corollary of the absence of intellection from the soul united with the
One is the impossibility of apprehending the One by intellection. Plotinus thus
remarks that no intellection concerns the One (VI 7 [38],39,13-14). In the present
treatise, the meaning of VOEtV is confined to the seeing of the Forms within
Intellect (35,31-32). The thesis that intellection concerns the multiplicity of the
intelligible objects and so is manifold justifies both the unknowability of the One by
intellection and the absence of intellection from the One. The One's being not the
subject of intellection and its being not the object of intellection, whether to itself or
to others, are thus systematically related to one another by the nature of intellection
as always directed to the multiple wholeness.
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2. The "Persuasive Argument" in VI 7 [38].40-41

After concluding his demonstrative arguments for the absence of
intellection from the One, Plotinus finds it necessary to make sure that the One does
not think and attempts to add some "encouragement (napaµv0i.cx)" and to mix
"persuasion (nEt0w)" with the logical necessity of the demonstrative arguments
(42,2-5).17 In VI 7 [38],40-41, the absence of intellection from the One is not
established through a demonstrative argument.
In 40,5-18, Plotinus distinguishes two kinds of intellection, the fully actual
intellection as the actualization of the intelligible entity and the pre-noetic
intellection as the power of generating being. His references to the latter as i\
VOTJO'LC; (40, 10-11) certainly deviates not only from his earlier definition of VOELV as
the seeing of the intelligible objects (35,22) but from his general terminological
tendency in the middle and the late treatises. The pre-noetic intellection is defined
as the primary activity and the image of the Good (40,18-22). From the definition of
the pre-noetic intellection as the primary activity and the primary intellection, it is
concluded that neither intellection nor activity is present in the Good prior to the
pre-noetic activity of Intellect (40,23-32).
In the second persuasive argument (40,32-43 ), Plotinus appeals to the
inferiority of intellection concerning the Good to the Good itself. He also here
deviates from his formal formulation in tentatively admitting the knowability of the
Good by intellection (40,34-35).18
In the third persuasive argument (40,43-56), it is stressed that two sorts of
intellection mentioned in the first persuasive argument, the fully actual and the prenoetic intellections, are caused by that which is prior to them. Any intellection must
therefore be absent from the highest, uncaused One.
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In 41,1-9, finally, Plotinus compares intellection to the eye and light given
to inferior entities. The One as light itself needs no intellection, just as light does
not seek light.
In 41,9-22, Plotinus ruminates that the absence of self-intellection and
self-consciousness (crvvEcrtv afrrou, 41,20) from the One is due to its absolute
simplicity and self-sufficiency. Intellect must always possess self-consciousness in
order to be one with intellection (41,19-21). But the One does not seek itself and
thereby is self-sufficient to be greater than yv@au;, v611cru;, and cruvaicr0flcru;
(41,25-27). Plotinus here repeats the argument in V 6 [24],5,1-5, where Intellect's

O'\JVaicr0flcru; of itself is linked with its seeking after itself and is thus denied to the
One. In VI 7 [38], cruvaicr0flcru; is employed for describing Intellect's consciousness
of its being filled with all the Forms (16,19-20; 35,31-32) and clearly implies a
multiplicity. It is hence evidently inappropriate to the One.19
Plotinus concludes his long consideration of the cognitive state of the One
by alluding to Pann. 142a3-4; neither A.6yoc; nor afo0flcrtc; nor E:mcri:i\µ.11 is present
in the One (41,37-38). The allusion adumbrates the connection of the absence of
intellection from the One with the One's ineffability. This connection, as we shall
see in the next section, becomes explicit in V 3 [49], 13.

333

3. The Denial of Intellection and Consciousness to the One in V 3 [49]

The treatise "On the Knowing Hypostases and That Which Is Beyond" (V
3 [49]) was written towards the end of the life of Plotinus. The treatise is roughly
divided into two parts. In the first part (chs. 1-9), Plotinus deals with the true
definition of self-knowledge; as seen in Chapter III of Part I, he, in the fifth chapter,
elaborately argues for the possibility of self-intellection in terms of the intellectintelligible identity and places true self-knowledge on the level of Intellect. The
second part ( chs. 10-17) is concerned with the need to go beyond Intellect to find
the first principle as the soul's true end.
The absence of intellection from the One is thematically discussed in the
thirteenth chapter. Before his extensive discussion, Plotinus briefly mentions the
One's having no intellection in two places. In 10,46-50, the absolutely simple One is
said to have no need to seek itself, so that yv@at<;;, which is a kind of longing (n69<><;;
i:u;;) for the absent, is not present in the One. In 11,25-30, again, we are told that
since Intellect is many, the One must be beyond Intellect. 20 In both passage,
Plotinus appeals to the absolute simplicity of the One as he usually does elsewhere.
In V 3 [49], 13, we come across the difficult passage to which several critics
usually refer in treating the One's knowledge:
But when we raise the difficulty "Then it [i.e. the One] has no perception
of itself (avcxia9T)i:ov ... E:cxui:ou) and is not even conscious of itself (ouo€
ncxpo:KoA.ou9ouv €cxu1:4>) and does not even know itself (ouo€ oIBEv o:u1:6),"
we should consider that by saying this we are turning ourselves round and
going in the opposite direction (13,6-9, tr. A. H. Armstrong).
What is Plotinus saying here? Rist comments on this passage as follows:
What this appears to mean is that one must not jump from the view that
the One has no auvcxia9T)at<;; of itself to the conclusion that it must be
avcxicr9f11:0V or from the view that it has no VOT)Ut<;; to the conclusion that
it is aVOf11:0V. If this is the sense of the passage, however, Plotinus has
obscured his meaning in the rest of the chapter by insisting that the One

334

has no cruvatcr0T)crl<; or VOflO'l<; but not examining the related question of
whether it is therefore avatcr0T)'tOV or CxVOT)'tOV.21
Is Rist's interpretation convincing enough? It is indeed true that Plotinus
denies intellection to the One also in 13,16-19 and 13,34-36. Since intellection is
defined in terms of cruvatcr0T)cru:; in 13, 12-13, it is natural to think that cruvatcr0T)crl<;
is also denied to the One. In fact, Plotinus elsewhere rejects the move from the
One's having no intellection to the conclusion that it is surrounded by &.yvma (VI 9

[9],6,46-50) and to the conclusion that it is av6T)i:ov (VI 7 [38],37,24-28). In the
present passage, however, the word aVOfl'tOV does not occur. To call the One
avatcr0T)i:ov is to conceive it as inactive, so that Plotinus definitely remarks that the
One is not avatcr0T)'tOV (V 4 [7],2, 15). But the sections OUOE napaKOAou0ouv

€aui:~

and ouo€ oIBEv aui:6 in the present passage can hardly be regarded as a pejorative
conception of the One; for Plotinus holds that the One has no consciousness, ouo'
aui:i\ [sc. napaKOAOU0T)O'l<;] EO''tat, in III 9 [13],9, 16, and that it does not know itself,
µi\ oIBEv €aui:6v, in V 6 [24 ],6,31. The meaning of the present passage does not
seem to be as straightforward as Rist takes it.

In order to take the exact sense of the passage in question, we must pay
attention to the context. In the opening part of V 3 [49], 13, Plotinus speaks of the
One's ineffability:
It [i.e. the One] is, therefore, truly ineffable: for whatever you say about it,
you will always be speaking of "something." But "beyond all things and
beyond the supreme majesty of Intellect" is the only one of all the ways of
speaking of it which is true; it is not its name, but says that it is not one of
all things and "has no name," because we can say nothing of it: we only try,
as far as possible, to make signs to ourselves about it (13,1-6, tr. A.H.
Armstrong).22
From this passage, it becomes clear that ouv in 13,7 marks the response to
the expression of the One as f:n€Knva nctvi:wv Kat f:n€Knva i:ov crEµvoi:ai:ou vov

(13,2-3). Hence the passage in question would be better taken to mean that we are
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prone to be perplexed by the absence of self-knowledge and self-consciousness from
the One, which necessarily results from the One's transcendence, over Intellect,
representing its ineffability.
We must further read the passage immediately ensuing 13,6-9:
For (yap) we are making it [i.e. the One] many when we make it object of
knowledge (yvwai:ov) and knowledge (yv@aiv), and attributing
intellection (vodv) to it we make it need intellection: even if intellection
is with it, intellection will be superfluous to it (13,9-12, tr. A.H.
Armstrong).
In light of yap in 13,9, the section €o:ui:ouc; nEpti:p€noµEv €nl. i:O:vo:vi:io:
(13,9-9) means noA.u ... o:\rro notouµEv (13,9) and OE'icr9o:t i:ou voE1v notouµEv
(13,10-11). To make the absolutely simple and self-sufficient One many and
deficient precisely indicates to turn ourselves towards the opposite direction, namely
the wrong direction.23 The embarrassment that "the One has no perception of itself
and is not even conscious of itself and does not even know itself' arises from the
uncritical, tacit assumption that it must possess self-knowledge and selfconsciousness. This assumption, based on the misunderstanding of the true nature
of the One, unmistakably leads us to "the opposite direction" by ascribing yv@atc;;,
v6ricrtc;, and cruvo:icr9ricrtc; to the One.
In conclusion, the meaning of the passage in 13,6-9 is that we need not be
perplexed by the absence of intellection, intellectual knowledge, and consciousness
from the One, which is the necessary consequence of the description of the One,
coherent with its ineffability, as beyond all things and Intellect. The reason why we
need not be annoyed, as signaled by yap in 13,12, is explained in 13,12-21; the
definition of intellection as the cruvo:icr9ricrtc; i:ou oA.ou points to the inner
multiplicity oflntellect (13,12-16), so that the altogether simple and self-sufficient
One does not need intellection (13,16-21). In the present passage, as in VI 7

[38),41,37-38, the absence of intellection and consciousness from the One is closely
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connected with the One's ineffability. This connection is not fully developed in
earlier treatises. Therefore, although Plotinus elsewhere dismisses the move from
the One's having no intellection to its being 6:v6rrrov or being surrounded by
ayvma, the similar kind of reasoning is not mentioned in the present passage.24
The examination of the problem whether the One is 6:vata0rrrov or 6:v6rrrov is not
the theme in V 3 [49],13. Rist's observation that "Plotinus has obscured his meaning
in the rest of the chapter" is inaccurate. On the contrary, Plotinus clarifies his
meaning in the rest of the chapter by explaining the reason why we need not be
perplexed by the absence of intellectual knowledge and consciousness from the One.
The definition of intellection as the auvata0riau; i:ou oA.ou leads not only
to the One's having no intellection but to its being unknown by intellection (oui:'
ouv avi:o VOElV oui:' €ai:t voriau; aui:ou, 13,36).25 Inv 3 [49], the connection

between intellection and multiplicity is repeatedly stressed, so that the sense of
voriau; is confined solely to the contemplation of the Forms as is in VI 7 [38].

Hence voriau; no longer refers to the inchoate Intellect as it does in the early
treatises:
Therefore the thinker must apprehend one thing different from another
and the object of thought in being thought must contain variety; or there
will not be an intellection of it [i.e. the One], but only a touch and a sort of
contact without speech and intellection (01.~u; Kat otov €na~ii µ6vov
apprii:oc,; Kal 6:v6rii:oc,;), pre-thinking (npovoouao:) because Intellect has
not yet come into being and that which touches does not think (10,40-44,
tr. A.H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).26
The pre-noetic apprehension is characterized as €J3A.EnEv 6:v6rii:wc,; in VI 7
[38], 16, 14. The unknowability of the One by intellection at the same time means
that v6riau; cannot be ascribed to the eternally pre-noetic phase of Intellect. In
other words, voE'iv is no longer an apt description of Intellect's relation to the One
in VI 7 [38] and V 3 [49],27 so that there is no room in these treatises for the
expression of the One as i:o vorii:6v. The disappearance of the references to the
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One as 'tO VOT}'tOV and to the inchoate Intellect as

v6T}au;;

in later treatises seems to

be due to the full development of the connection between intellection and
multiplicity in these treatises.28 Therefore the conception of intellection as multiple
proves to play an important role in Plotinus' doctrine of the One's cognitive state; it
not only insures the absence of intellection from the One but makes it impossible to

-ro VOT}'tOV.

describe the One as
voT}'tOV,
VOT}'tOV

If the One can no more be referred to as

-ro

Plotinus has no need to put a proviso that it is not necessary for every
to have intellection as he actually does in V 6 [24],2,4-5. The disappearance

of the reference to the One as such, to this extent, really confirms the One's having
no intellection. With regard to this disappearance, in addition to the variety of the
viewpoints of arguments, Plotinus' denial of intellection to the One surely develops
in his later treatises.
As pointed out in Chapter I of Part I, moreover, the question of whether
the Idea of the Good can be known by VOT}at<;; is left unanswered in Plato's Republic.
Plotinus' description of the inchoate Intellect and the eternal activity of Intellect
towards the One as

VOT}au;;

in V 6 [24] and earlier treatises would not enable him to

give a definite answer to this question. With the univocal sense of intellection as
necessarily concerning the multiplicity in VI 7 [38] and V 3 [49], Plotinus can now
answer to the question; his answer must be definitely negative.
In his last treatise, Plotinus associates the One's self-remaining with its
transcendence over Intellect and intellection (I 7 [54],1, 19-20). The thesis that the
One does not think, the thesis which may determine the fundamental structure of
the philosophy of Plotinus, has been consistently maintained to the end.
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NOIBS

lA. H. Armstrong, P/otinus, l:vii.
2Tuis is Aristotle's own claim in Met. 1074b20-21 (oU:X yap -rov vodv -ro
i;(µtov aui;~ VTtcXpXEl).
3In contradiction to Plotinus, Ravaisson regards the intellect-intelligible
identity of the Aristotelian God as the absolute unity in Essai sur la Metaphysique
d'Aristote, 2 vols. (Paris: L'Imprimerie Royale, Joubert, 1837-1846; reprint ed.,
Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), 1:580.
4See also VI 9 [9],6,53-54 voriau;;

OE OU VOEl

5See note 23 in the sixth chapter.
6In the present passage, Plotinus does not reject the One's being an
€v€pyEta, but its having any work. As repeatedly remarked, the One's having
neither activity nor work is sufficiently compatible with its being itself the activity.
7In VI 9 [9],6,46-50, as seen in the second chapter, Plotinus attempts to
dismiss the move from the One's having no intellection to its being ignorant by
appealing to the One's unity. The thesis that the One does not need self-intellection
is here founded on the One's simplicity (lines 49-50).
8Since this argument has already been considered in the fifth chapter, we
shall review it only briefly in the present chapter.
90n these two roles of difference, see also V 1 [10],4,37-40.
lOSince €A.€yoµEv in 39,13 refers back to 38,21-24, 'l:OU'l:ou in 39,14, in
light of 1:~ vof\aEwc; "!:Tl<; nEpl av'l:ov in 38,24, is the objective genitive. See also
39,12 'l:flV voriatv 'l:flV nEpt aU'l:OV.
11Tuis point is briefly mentioned in V 6 [24],2,9. In this treatise, however,
the sense of intellection is not restricted to the contemplation of the Forms as in VI
7 [38].
12Aiso in III 8 [30],11,13-16, Plotinus argues for the One's having no
intellection from its self-sufficiency.
13With Bussanich and Cilento, we regard the subject of voEt in 35,45 as
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the One. Theiler deletes 0-tt 000€ VOEt (35,44-45) on the ground that it is a variant
of 0-tt µr,BE: VOEt in 35,44 (see Plotins Schriften, 3b:510-511). But Plotinus here
stresses that the soul must be like the Good in her union with it (35,44 ). Hence the
statement that soul does not think the Good since it does not think reveals her
likeness to the Good with respect to the absence of intellection and thereby is not
redundant.
The sentence VOEt 0€ ooo' €KEtVo, O'tl 000€ voEt (35,44-45) is variously
interpreted. The translation in H-S, followed by Armstrong, reads: "anima ne illud
quidem cogitat se ne cogitare quidem." Preller emends voEt in 35,45 to VOEt'tcxt,
adopted by Brehier and MacKenna. These interpretations, however, do not
sufficiently explicate the soul's likeness to the Good.
14Nevertheless VOf'\atc; is denied to the soul united with the One in VI 9
[9],11,11.
15See also J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p.
185: "It [i.e. the soul] is also like the One in that it transcends KtVf'\crtc; and VOf'\crtc;."
For the immobility of the soul united with the One, see also VI 9 [9], 11, 13-14 iicruxn
€v €pilµcp KCXt KCX'tcxcri:6:cr€l YEYEVf'\1:CXl cX1:pEµEt and 11, 15-16 E:cri:W<;; naV'tT\ KCXt OloV
cri:6:crtc; y€voµEvrn;.
16In the fifth chapter, we distinguished the vehemently dynamic €m/3oAit
of the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect from the static €nt/3oAit of the One. But this
point does not denote the inconsistency of these parallels. The dynamicity is
associated with the €nt/3oAft and its cognates attributed to Intellect, when they occur
in the passages dealing with the transformative moment from the normal state to
the mystic union (III 8 [30],9,21-22; V 5 [32],10,7-8; VI 7 [38],35,21). In the passage
dealing with the soul's mystic union, on the contrary, her npocrj3oAft is related to
avcxncxuEcr9cxt (III 8 [30], 10,32-34 ). The hyper-noetic €nt/3oAft oflntellect and the
soul as the cognitive activity during the mystic union transcends movement. As
regards the cognitive activities of the One, Intellect, and the soul in the mystic
union, therefore, the kataphatic parallel is coherent with the apophatic parallel in
respect of their transcending not only intellection but movement.
17For the juxtaposition between ncxpcxµu91.a and nn9w, see also VI 5
[23],11,6-7. They are contrasted with the A6yoc; (line 3) and an6oEt(tc; (lines 4-5).
For the contrast between avayKT\ and nEt9w, see V 3 [49],6, 10-11 and VI 4 [22],4,4-

6.
18Intellection concerning the Good (ti VOf'\Ol<; ... aycx9ou, 40,32) in the
present persuasive argument is the pre-noetic intellection in the previous persuasive
argument. Compare 40,37 6µou ti VOT\Ol<; Ecr1:CXl KO'.t ti oval.a with 40, 15 crUVEcrLl KCXt
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EV i:n OUO'~ and 40,47-48 CXAAO\J unoKEtµ€vou ... cruvun6cri:cxcrt<;.
19In the middle and the late treatises, Plotinus does not use cruvaicr0flcrt<;
to describe the One's awareness. We agree with Bussanich's view that great
importance must not be attached to this fact (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in
Plotinus, p. 25). Nevertheless the attribution of a sort of cruvaicr0flcrt<; to the One
does not seem to be viable in the middle and the late treatises. As pointed out in
the fifth chapter, Plotinus' application €nt130Xi\ and its cognates to the One, the
hyper-noetic phase of Intellect and the inchoate Intellect in the middle and the late
treatises represents his intentions of stressing the likeness of the hyper-noetic phase
of Intellect to the One and of distinguishing their cognitive activities from
intellection proper. For achieving the former intention, it is necessary to apply the
same terminology to the One and the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect. Plotinus
ascribes otov cruvaicr0flcrt<; to the One in V 4 [7],2, 18. As remarked in the first
chapter, the implication of the term as the concentration into the self-unity comes to
the fore when it is applied to the One. In this respect, otov cruvcxicr0flcrt<; of the One
seems to be compatible with its €m'3oXi\ in VI 7 [38],39,1-4. Although Plotinus
nowhere applies cruvcxicr0flcrt<; to the hyper-noetic activity of Intellect, the word
cruvEcrt<;, which is synonymous with cruvcxia0flcrt<;, is used of the hyper-noetic
apprehension of the One (VI 9 [9],4,2; VI 7 [38],31,33; 33,27; see also III 8 [30],10,34
auvt€vm). In addition to the kinship between the One's otov cruvcxicr0flcrt<; and the
hyper-intellective cruvEcrt<; directed to the One, the One's Kcxi:av6flcrtc; (V 4 [7]2, 17)
and the comparison of the soul's union with the One to the relationship of i:o voo\Jv
to i:o Kai:avoouµEvov (VI 9 [9],8,26) would perhaps suggest that Plotinus has
already entertained the terminological affinity between the :ne and the hypernoetic activity of Intellect and the soul in his early treatises. But, insofar as
cruvaicr0flcrt<; is proper to self-intellection, the application of the word to the One
and to the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect is definitely against Plotinus' intention of
distinguishing their cognitive activities from intellection proper. In VI 7 [38],
nevertheless, cruvEcrtc; is employed to describe not only self-intellection (41,20) but
the soul's apprehension of the One (31,33; 33,27). But their modes are clearly
distinct in that the former is self-reflexive and the latter is self-transcending.
Moreover, cruvEcrtc; is not to be attributed to "Intellect in love"; the sober
implication of the word would certainly be repugnant to that Intellect's being Ci~pwv
(35,24 ). Plotinus, in the present treatise, seems to be persistently conscious of his
intention to distinguish the cognitive activities of the One and the hyper-noetic
phase of Intellect terminologically from intellection proper.
20Armstrong translates nXfl0U€l (11,27) "which makes it many." He
confuses nXfl0U€lV and nXfl0UVEtv; the latter occurs in 11,3 and 11,5. While the
codices of the group x have 0u€l in 11,27, no codex has nA.fl0uv€l there.
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21J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 41. Bussanich accepts Rist's
interpretation (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 93).
220n the One's ineffability, see also V 5 [32],6,1-15 and VI 9 [9],4,11-12.
23Tue sense of €nl i:avcxvri.a in the present text is proximate to the phrase
in VI 5 [23],12,28 and is well contrasted with that in V 1 [10],1,24.
24Tue section avcxia8rii:ov ouv ... 000€ OWEV cxui:6 (13,6-8) expresses the
content of our perplexity (anop@µEv, 13,6), but not Plotinus' own position.
Therefore this section does not warrant that Plotinus employs avcxicr8rii:ov for the
One and so is not inconsistent with the description of the One as ouK otov
avcxia8rii:ov in v 4 [7],2, 15.
250n the unknowability of the One by intellection, see also 13,32-33 fi
€priµov Kcxl µ6vov €av €8EATt<J1l<; A.cxl3E1v, ou vof\an<;;.
26Deck observes that Plotinus talks about the One's self-contact in this
passage (Nature, Contemplation, and the One: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus,
p. 18). We cannot see how such an interpretation is possible.
As Theiler and Beutler point out (Plotins Schriften, 5b:381), Plotinus
implies npo vou by npovoE'iv in 13,43. In ascribing npovoE'iv to the henads, Proclus
also invokes the same implication of the verb (Elementatio Theologica, prop. 120,
demonstration). The anonymous commentator on the Pannenides, whom Hadot
identifies as Porphyry, follows the same line and attributes npo€vvotcx to the One
(Fr. 2,20, Hadot). But the One's np6votcx, briefly mentioned in VI 7 [38],39,26-27,
would not be credited with such implication.
27Schwyzer maintains as follows: "Allerdings darf man diese Beziehung
nicht mehr als ein voE'iv bezeichnen, sondern nur noch als ein €<P6'.ni:Ecr8cxt, ein
Styyavnv" (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 419).
28The description of the pre-noetic activity as il v6riat<; in VI 7 [38],40,1011, as already mentioned, is an exception justifiable by the fact that the context is
the ncxpcxµu8tcx and the nEt8w.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

Introduction

As proclaimed in the introduction to Part II, the passages relevant to the

problem of the One's knowledge have been analyzed from two points of view,
systematic and chronological. As for the systematic structure of and the
chronological development in Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge, therefore,
we must summarize our inquiry. Moreover, we shall see the exact locus of the
doctrine in the history of Greek philosophy by summarizing our inquiry in Part I and
Part II together.
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1. The Systematic Structure of Plotinus' Doctrine of the One's Knowledge

Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge, consistently in earlier and later
treatises, consists of three basic theses. First, the One's knowledge and
consciousness are totally, even conceptually, indistinguishable from the One itself in
virtue of its absolute simplicity or the absence of otherness from it (V 4 [7],2,17; VI

7 [38],39,2-4; VI 8 [39],16,31-32; 16,35). Second, the One's knowledge is always in
rest (V 4 [7],2, 18; VI 7 [38],39,28; VI 8 [39], 16,25). Finally, the One's knowledge is
the specification of its reversion towards itself (V 1 [10],6, 18; VI 8 [39], 16,24), so
that the One may have the consciousness of its ouvcxµtc;;, which is in no way related
to its external effects. The ontological status of the One as the primary €v€pyncx
without ovai.cx (VI 8 [39],20,9-10) serves as the foundation for the affirmations about
the One's knowledge and consciousness. The aforementioned theses are based on
this ontological status; the first and the third theses are based on the E:v€pyEtc:x npOc;;
cxfrr6v which is entirely identified with the One itself (16,28-29), and the second
thesis on the E:v€pyEtc:x µ€vouacx (16,15). The ontological status of the One as the
primary activity without being also serves as the ground for the account of the
genesis of Intellect in terms of the double-activity theory, hence as the pivot in
Plotinus' doctrine of procession.
Both the undifferentiatedness of the One's knowledge from the One itself
and its ontological status as the hyper-ontic activity are fully consistent with the
absolute simplicity of the One, which is the fundamental thesis in the philosophy of
Plotinus. In V 4 [7],2, 15-19, Plotinus ascribes knowledge and consciousness to the
One by reason of its self-sufficiency. The self-sufficiency of the One is based on its
absolute unity (VI 9 [9],6,16-26). His attribution of cognitive activity to the One is
hence ultimately rooted in the One's simplicity. Intellection, sharply contrasted with
the One's knowledge, is not purely simple, since it presupposes the duality of
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thinking subject and object thought and always is directed to the multiplicity of the
intelligible objects. In arguing for the absence of intellection from the One, Plotinus
normally appeals to the One's simplicity and self-sufficiency. The ascription of some
hyper-noetic activity and the denial of intellection to the One systematically cohere
with one another in virtue of the mediation by its simplicity and self-sufficiency.
The ontological status of the One as the primary activity without being is
also coherent with the absence of intellection from the One. Intellection is always
the activity with being or the actualization of being. Intellect's activity is dual,
directed both to itself and to the One. Even the eternally pre-noetic activity of
Intellect, directed to the One, is in and with being (VI 7 [38],40,15). Hence
intellectual activity cannot be purely one. Furthermore, the self-directed
intellectual activity is a movement which has the Form as its limit (VI 2 [43],8,23-24)
and the eternally pre-noetic activity is movement towards the Good (V 6 [24 ],5,8-9),
whereas the One's knowledge is eternally in rest. Finally, the pre-noetic activity is
the reversion towards the originative principle of Intellect (VI 9 [9],2,35-36) and
thereby said to be directed to something else (El<; M.Ao, V 6 [24 ],6,5), whereas the
One always turns inward to nothing else than itself. The One's activity, thus
distinguished from noetic activity, cannot be called intellection. Again, no pure
activity has another activity. The ontological status of the One as the hyper-ontic,
primary activity, consistent with the One's simplicity, therefore serves as the ground
not only for the ascription of the hyper-noetic knowledge to the One but for the
denial of intellection to it. The ascription and the denial are coherently mediated
also by the ontological status of the One as such.
In addition to the systematic consistency between the ascription of the
hyper-noetic activity and the denial of intellection to the One, Plotinus always
employs careful qualifications or technical terms in attributing the hyper-noetic
activity to the One. In V 4 [7],2, 17-19, he qualifies the One's Ko:i:o:v6rpt.c; by the
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phrase E'tEp<.i>c;; fi KCX'ta 'tftV vou VOflatv and adds otov to its auvata9flau;;. In VI 7
[38],39,1-4, he applies to the One the word €mJ3oA.f}, which has no etymological
bearing on voflau;;, instead of employing noetic terminology with some qualification.
Plotinus' frequent denial of intellection to the One is very prone to invite
some misinterpretation of his doctrine of the One. I He is himself aware of this
possibility. Plotinus is hence forced to undermine the illicit move from the claim
that the One has neither VOflau;; nor auvata9flau;; to the conclusion that it must be
aVOfl'tOV and 6:vata9fl'tOV. He dismisses this sort of reasoning by noting that the

notion of ayvma is totally inapplicable to that which is entirely simple (VI 9
[9],6,46-50) and that the word aVOfl'tO<; is irrelevant to that which has no intellection
in its nature (VI 7 [38],37,24-28). The One's self-sufficiency, which is the
quintessential mark of the ultimate Good, enables one to say that the One not only
does not think but also does not need intellection, and the inner plenitude of the
One, which represents its self-sufficiency, really denotes that it is not 6:vata9fl'tOV
(V 4 [7],2, 15). The positive description of the One's cognitive state, all the more,
can readily dismiss the misconstruction that the One must be CxVOfl'tOV or

6:vata9fl'tOV.2 Again, the ontological status of the One as the primary activity
without being really eliminates any conception of it as inactive, the conception
which may compromise the role of the One as the productive power of all things in
the doctrine of procession. Therefore the systematic consistency between the
ascription of the hyper-noetic activity and the denial of intellection and intellectual
consciousness to the One must be understood in such a way that the former not only
is logically and descriptively coherent with the latter but also satisfactorily
undermines any pejorative conception of the One that the extreme negativity of the
language used in the latter is prone to cause.
Finally, the doctrine of the One's knowledge is inseparably connected not
only with the doctrine of procession but with the doctrines of Intellect's relation to
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the One and of Intellect's self-thinking. For the notion of self-intellection to be
complete, the intelligible objects, identical with the noetic agent, must be conceived
as living and thinking. Intellect thinks within itself those objects which it receives
from the One through its eternal reversion to it. Therefore the notion of selfintellection necessarily demands the conception of the originative source, of the
intelligible objects, as living and being active.3 In Plotinus, the self-thinking
principle cannot be the highest, but rather necessitates something which makes selfintellection possible by giving the active and living intelligible objects from itself,
insofar as it thinks the multiplicity of those objects. The thesis that the multiplicity
of the intelligible objects must be referred back to the simple origin, of course, is
based on the Plotinian principle of the ontological priority of one to many.
The observation has traditionally been dominant that Plotinus' talk of the
One's knowledge and consciousness in V 4 [7],2,15-19 represents his early uncritical
attitude possibly influenced by Numenius. But our inquiry shows that his
description in this text, however not highly technical in terminology, is fully coherent
with his denial of intellection to the One and with his other doctrines. The view that
Plotinus' positive description of the One's knowledge reflects his uncritical attitude
or is at best an insignificant appendix seems to arise from the preconception that his
doctrine of the One is characterized exclusively as negative theology.
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2. The Chronological Development in Plotinus' Doctrine of the One's Knowledge

As a matter of fact, Plotinus positively and formally describes the One's
cognitive state in only two places, V 4 [7],2,15-19 and VI 7 [38],39,1-4. Whereas the
One's knowledge is associated with its self-sufficiency in the former context, the
affirmation about the One's knowledge, the denial of intellection to the One, and
the possibility of the denial's causing some misconception about the One enter into
a single scope in the latter context. Such a difference in degree of systematization,
however, would not be exhausted by the difference in their contexts. The terms
describing the One's knowledge differ in both passages; Plotinus employs
Kcx'tcxV6'f'\au;; and VO'f'\au; with the qualification E'tEpWc;; ft KCX'ta 'tflV vou VO'f'\atv in the
former, and €nt130A.fl and €nt/3illnv in the latter. The description of the One's
knowledge by noetic terminology does not seem to be fully viable in the midst of the
argument for the absence of intellection from the One.4
The chronological shift from noetic terminology to €nt/3oA.fl and its
cognates occurs also for the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect, the inchoate Intellect,
and the soul united with the One. In earlier treatises, on the one hand, Plotinus
describes Intellect's relation to the One as voE'iv (V 6 [24 ],5 passim), refers to the
inchoate Intellect as v6T\atc; (V 4 [7],2,4; V 1 [10],7,11), and ascribes VOELV or
KCX'tCXVOELV to the soul united with the One (VI 9 [9],8,26-27; 9,14-15). In later
treatises, on the other hand, he attributes €nt/3oA.n to the hyper-noetic phase of
Intellect (VI 7 [38],35,21 ), €nt/3illnv to the inchoate Intellect (V 3 [49], 11,2;
11,13), employs €nt/3oA.n (III 8 [30],9,21-22), npoal3oA.fl (III 8 [30],10,33; V 5 [32],7,8)

and npoal3illnv (V 5 [32],10,7-8; V 3 [49],10,31) in the general contexts dealing
with the apprehension of the One by Intellect or the soul. In later treatises,
moreover, earlier terminology proves to be no longer viable when we consider the
fact that the pre-noetic vision concerning the One and the hyper-noetic contact with
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it are expressed as av6rrcoc; (VI 7 [38],16,14; V 3 [49],10,43). In III 8 [30],9,22-23,
Plotinus remarks about the affinity of Intellect's €ml3oA.i\ to the One's. The above
mentioned fact would suggest that he entertains terminological similarity between
the One's knowledge and the hyper-noetic cognition of Intellect and the soul already
in earlier treatises. The terminological shift in the One's knowledge synchronizes
with those in the pre-noetic and the hyper-noetic relation of Intellect to the One and
in the cognition of the soul's apprehension of the One. This synchronization
certainly implies that the terminology for the One's cognitive activity is not
arbitrarily chosen, but always has a systematic bearing upon the terminology for the
hyper-noetic and the pre-noetic cognitions of Intellect and the soul.
Why has the terminological change happened? There seem to be two
reasons. One reason is due to the characteristics of the word €nt130A.f\ and its
cognates themselves. Since the term €nt130A.f\ is based on its root meaning of
"throwing on" and so has some proximity to the word

€mai:po~f\

which originally

means "turning towards," the One's anA.T) i:tc; €nt130A.T\ npCx;; o:ui:ov (VI 7 [38],39,1-2)
can cognitively specify its eternal reversion towards itself (€mai:po:~E:vi:oc; aEt

EKEivou npCx;; o:ui:o, V 1 [10],6, 18), which represents its €vE:pyEux npCx;; o:ui:6v (VI 8
[39], 16,28) and is informally and untechnically rendered as

nVEucrtc; npoc; o:ui:ov

(16,24). The application of the term to the One thus enables us to describe the
incomprehensible interiority and depth of the One (16, 12; 18,3). Second, as shown
in the fifth chapter, €nt130A.f\ and its cognates well describe the traits of the
apprehension of the One by Intellect and the soul. Finally, since €nt130A.f\ and its
cognates have no etymological bearing on VOf\alc;, the attribution of the word to the
One goes well with the absence of intellection from it. Moreover, the ascription of
these words to the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect and the inchoate Intellect clearly
demarcates their activities from intellection proper.
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Another reason is the chronological change in Plotinus' use of the word
v6ncru:;. The One is described as i:o voni:6v to Intellect in earlier treatises (V 4
[7],2,4ff.; V 6 [24],2,4ff.), but no longer in later treatises. The early reference to the
inchoate Intellect as v6ncru:; (V 4 [7],2,4; V 1 [10],7,11) also disappears in later
treatises. Their disappearances exactly synchronize with one another. In later
treatises, Plotinus no longer employs v6ncru:; or VOE'iv to describe Intellect's relation
to the One and stresses the necessary connection between intellection and
multiplicity or otherness to restrict the sense of v6ncru:; solely to the contemplation
of the intelligible objects. Such restriction of the meaning of intellection does not
allow for the expression of the One as i:o voni:6v. As already mentioned, Intellect's
hyper-noetic apprehension of the One is the likeness to the One's cognitive activity.
If the word v6ncru:; ceases to refer to the eternally pre-noetic activity of Intellect, the

One's knowledge is no longer described by noetic terminology. Consequently, the
shift in the use of the term v6ncrt<; at the same time causes the disappearance of the
description of the One as i:o voni:6v and the shift in the terminology for the One's
knowledge. This major shift from the usage of earlier treatises to that of later
treatises seems to have occurred during the period before V 6 [24] was written and
after III 8 [30] was written. Moreover, the thesis that intellection is the pluralized
vision concerning the Forms not only completes the absence of intellection from the
One in such a way that the One cannot be the object of self-intellection nor even its
subject, but also implies that intellection cannot apprehend the absolutely simple
One in its simplicity. In later treatises, hence, the absence of intellection from the
One and the unknowability of the One by intellection tend to be systematically
related to one another through the univocal notion of intellection as always
concerning multiplicity.
We will understand the significance of the disappearance of the reference
to the One as i:o voni:6v as soon as we see its philosophical advantages. First the
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equivocalness of "to VOfl"tOV can be avoided when it solely refers to the complex of
the Forms. At the same time, the equivocalness of vDT)au; can be avoided since it
comes to mean solely self-intellection or the contemplation of the intelligible
objects. Second, the unknowability of the One by intellection can be established
without the slightest confusion. Although the One as "to VOfl"tOV is precisely
correlative to the hyper-noetic or eternally pre-noetic v6ricru;, the description of the
One as such is very prone to imply its knowability by intellection proper. In earlier
treatises, however, Plotinus explicitly maintains the unknowability of the One by
intellection proper (VI 9 [9],4,2-3; 11,11). Hence the expression of the One as "tO
VOfl"tOV

is very likely to be felt contradictory with the insistence on its unknowability

by intellection proper in earlier treatises. Finally, "tO vorii:6v, which is beyond
Intellect and has no intellectual agent within itself, is somehow prone to be
conceived as inactive and lifeless.5 If i:o vorii:6v ceases to mean the One, there
remains no room for the conception of it as the inactive vorii:6v. In other words, the
disappearance of the reference to the One as such also contributes to the dismissing
of the pejorative conception of the One.
Plotinus does not abruptly begin the technical use of €11t130A.fl and its
cognates in III 8 [30]. He already employs €11l/30A.fl in the context dealing with the
soul's contemplation of the intelligible world in IV 4 [28], 1, 19-20 and 2, 12-14. A
more prominent bud of the terminological shift would be the reference to the One
as i:o E:nl/3illov in relation to Intellect at V 6 [24],2,10. The verb E:nl/3illELv is,
however, non-technically used for the description of the contemplation of the
ultimate Beauty in the very early treatise (I 6 [1],9,29-30). In earlier treatises, these
terms have been dormantly awaiting their technical employment in later treatises.6
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3. The Plotinian One and Greek Philosophy

In the historical background of Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge,
there are two problems left unresolved in Plato's dialogues, the Republic and the
Sophist. One problem is what kind of relation between intellect and the Form

satisfies the fundamental theses of the theory of Forms, the Forms' immutability and
complete intelligibility. Plotinus replies to this problem by the intellect-intelligible
unity. He pushes the identity further and conceives the intelligible objects as
themselves thinking and living. Such a conception of the Forms brings the notion of
self-intellection to completion and dismisses the Middle Platonic view, of the Forms
as divine voiyJ.a'tcx, which Plato himself would not admit. Another problem is then
how we must characterize, positively and negatively, the Form of the Good from
which the Forms thus conceived are derived. The Idea of the Good is laden not
only with the role of cause of the Forms' knowability but with the role of cause of
their substantiality. If the Forms were to be living and thinking, their originative
principle should be neither inactive nor lifeless. Envisioning the Platonic Idea of
the Good in this direction, Plotinus positively characterizes the One as the primary
activity without being. The One's knowledge is nothing else than the cognitive
specification of its ontological status as such. The Form of the Good is already in
Plato said to transcend ouaicx (Rep. 509b9-10). The proposed conception of the
Good must thus also involve the extremely negative language which denies of it all
the perfection attached to being. Plotinus' persistent denial of intellection to the
One represents the negative aspect of the Good's transcendence over being, and his
affirmation about the One's knowledge the positive aspect.
Plotinus' endeavor to solve the aforementioned problems does not remain
within the bounds of a simply interpretive attempt to resolve the problems of Plato's
dialogues. The defense of the fundamental theses of the theory of Forms is
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necessary for the safeguarding of the very possibility of philosophy and other
significant discourse (Pann. 135b5-c3). Moreover, the account for the Idea of the
Good in the metaphor of the Sun in the Republic, however metaphorical, embodies
Plato's identification of the true cause as the good in the Phaedo (98el-99b6).
Hence the general quest of the true cause, which is one of the fundamental
problems of philosophy, underlies the second problem.7 The two problems, which
constitutes the background of Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge, are thus
precisely the fundamental problems of philosophy.8
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NOTES

lJn his epistle to Porphyry, Amelius reports that the people from Greece
attack Plotinus by saying that his fundamental principles are the meanest of real
beings (Vita Plotini 17,22-24). Armstrong regards this accusation as "the result of a
misunderstanding ... of the extreme negativity of the language which he sometimes
uses about the One or Good" (Plotinus, 1:47, note 2).
2As seen in the first chapter, the explanation of the One's being ovK owv
O:vcxlo-0rri:ov by its having owv cruvcxtcr011crtc; in V 4 [7],2,15-19 is not intended to
undermine the illegitimate move from the denial of intellection and consciousness
to the One. Nevertheless, an affirmation about the One's unique knowledge and
consciousness would satisfactorily undercut the illicit jump of this sort.
3In earlier treatises like V 4 [7] and V 6 [24 ], the One is described as i:o
vo11i:6v in relation to Intellect. The transcendent vo11i:6v has no thinking principle
within itself (V 6 [24],2,4-5) and stands outside Intellect. In one of his arguments for
the intellect-intelligible identity, Plotinus critically represents intelligible objects
outside Intellect as O:vcxtcr011i:cx KCXt aµotpcx (.wf\c; KCXt VOU (V 5 [32], 1,32-33) or
O:v611i:cx Kcxl aVE\J (.wf\c; (1,37-38). The reference to the One as i:o vo11i:6v is hence
also prone to lead to the conception of the One as inactive and senseless. The claim
that self-intellection rather demands the active, transcendent vo11i:6v would
eliminate such misconception of the One.
4See J. N. Deck, Nature, Contemplation, and the One: A Study in the
Philosophy of Plotinus, p. 18, note 25: "If E:ntJ3oA.ft has this meaning [i.e. thrust], we
have an indication of cognition by the One in the midst of a long development
(VI,7,37-41) of the argument that the One does not know."
5See note 3.
6Tue shift from noetic terminology to "epibolic" terminology happens at
the time of Plotinus' confrontation with Gnosticism. But we cannot fully see how
this confrontation provokes, if any, an external motive to the terminological shift.
Nevertheless it would be quite certain, from III 8 [30],9-11, that the controversy
between Plotinus and the Gnostics may turn on his doctrine of Intellect's relation to
the One. It is not difficult to imagine that such circumstance may have forced him
to reconsider his doctrine.
7Turee causal theories are presented and left unsystematized in Plato's
philosophy. First, the causal theory of the Good is claimed in the Phaedo and
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metaphorically explicated in the Republic. Second, the causal theory of intellect is
expected by Socrates in the Phaedo in Anaxagoras' account of nature and is
completed by Plato himself in the Timaeus and the Philebus. Third, the causal
theory of the Forms, as the OE\.rtEp<><; nA.ov<; in quest of the cause (Phd. 99c9-dl), is
formulated in the hypothesis argument of the Phaedo. Plotinus seems to feel the
systematization of these theories as his philosophical task. His doctrine of the
intellect-intelligible identity unifies the causal theories of intellect and of the Forms.
The intellect-intelligible unity, as already shown, not only coheres with the Forms'
immutability and insures their complete intelligibility, but makes Intellect free from
any falsehood and discursivity to confirm its goodness and truthfulness which is
stressed in the Timaeus. Intellect and the Forms are then subordinated to the
causality of the One in the doctrine of Intellect's relation to the One. In this way,
Plotinus endeavors to systematize Plato's unsystematized theories of causality.
8We are surely maintaining that Plotinus' detailed account of the
transcendent Good is consistent with his defense of the Forms' unchangeability and
complete intelligibility. But his negative theology of the One is prone to entail the
diametrically opposite consequences, which are clearly envisioned by Trouillard and
Armstrong. Trouillard ("Le Neoplatonisme," in Encyclopedie de la Pleiade: Histoire
de la Philosophie I (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), p. 896) draws the consequence of
Plotinus' negative theology for our own thinking as follows:
"Si tout sujet pensant part necessairement de l'Un en de~a de sa vie
pensante, aucun n'est prisonnier de !'evidence et chacun, au contraire, se
trouve foncierement affranchi de l'ordre noetique entier."
Let us abstain from questioning whether this reasoning is valid or not. Trouillard
explicates this consequence to the soul's radical freedom:
·
"L'anteriorite mystique aboutit done a faire de l'esprit une liberte radicale
et a le rendre capable d'une critique que rien ne pourra limiter" (loc. cit.).
Armstrong ("The Escape of the One: An Investigation of Some
Possibilities of Apophatic Theology Imperfectly Realised in the West," Studia
Patristica13 (1975):84) calls such denoument "the abolition of K6aµo<; vo11"t6<;" or
"the end of two-world thinking," which he describes as follows:
"The only kosmos noetos which will survive in this way of thinking is a
Heraclitean one, the ever-changing succession of created thoughts about
the ever-changing created world, in which we may hope and believe that
we receive lights from the Good sufficient for our personal needs in our
particular time and place, but not of a kind which we can appropriate and
fix and demand that others should accept as unchanging universal truths."
Plotinus' doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity seems to prevent his
philosophical system from being developed in this direction. The doctrine claims
that all the Forms are not successively apprehended by Intellect, but are immutably
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present in it, and establishes the infallibility of Intellect to evade a relativist theory
of truth. As already noticed, that doctrine demands the conception of the One as
active, the very conception that is to be embodied by the affirmation about the
One's knowledge. In turn, we can say that Plotinus' negative theology of the One
necessarily invokes the doctrine of the intellect-intelligible unity in order to avoid
the mutable conception or the abolition of the intelligible world and some relativist
theory of truth. In this sense, Plotinus' doctrines of the One and of Intellect
necessitate one another.

EPILOGUE

As mentioned in the introduction to Part II, three distinct positions are

discernible regarding Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge. The most widelyheld position is that Plotinus is very careful in making his affirmation about the
One's cognitive activity, to avoid contradicting his frequent denial of intellection to
the One. As Bussanich estimates, this position usually
rests on a minimalist view of the many statements, both early and late, of
the One's inner activities. Here I detect an excessive zeal to protect the
absolute transcendence and unknowability of the One. The phrase "as it
were," which occurs in so many accounts of the One's inner life, is too
often used by some scholars to bracket what Plotinus says. However, the
challenge, it seems to me, is not simply to maintain the full force of the
negative theology and the absolute transcendence of the One, but to
explore whether it is possible to fit these essential Plotinian doctrines into
a more comprehensive theory of the One that also includes its selfdirected activities. I
Instead of such a minimalist view, Bussanich himself claims the maximum
for Plotinus' statements:
... as he intensifies his meditations to the One, Plotinus expands the range
of activities he thinks must be attributed to the absolute, broadening the
focus on the One's quasi-intellection and self-consciousness in the earlier
treatises to include eros, self-vision, self-will, and so on in later treatises.2

It is apparent that Bussanich's view heavily relies on Plotinus' statements
in VI 8 [39). At Chapter VI of Part II, however, we did not take literally his
statements in that treatise, but explored the systematic structure of his formal
doctrine of the One's knowledge by comparing carefully those positive and revealing
statements with the relevant passages from other treatises. Our inquiry resulted in
showing that Plotinus' doctrine of the One is so comprehensive as to allow the
coherence of the One's self-directed activity with its absolute transcendence and
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unknowability by intellection. We did not admit the One's self-love, self-vision, and
self-will, but its self-intuition and self-directed reversion. Our position,
characterized by the serious, if not excessive, zeal to protect the One's absolute
transcendence and unknowability by intellection, can perhaps be called a moderate
view placed between the minimalist and the maximalist views. The moderateness of
our position directly indicates the extent to which the positive descriptions of the
One's self-directed activity can go well with the negative theology and the absolute
transcendence of the One.3
In the above, we have treated collectively the negative theology and the
absolute transcendence of the One and contrasted them with the positive
description of the One's inner life. But it would be necessary for us to distinguish
them from one another. The absolute transcendence of the One, which goes back to
the metaphor of the sun in Plato's Republic, is not exclusively characterized by
negativity. The transcendence indeed presupposes the separateness or otherness
which is expressed in negative statements; the One is not those which are
transcended by it. As for the absolute transcendence of the Platonic Good and the
Plotinian One, however, that which transcends and those which are transcended are
tied by the cause-effect and the archetype-image relations. The transcendence of
the One must be primarily understood as that of the cause beyond the effects. To
say that the One is the cause, however, does not describe what it is in itself. Plotinus
writes:
For to say that the One is the cause is not to predicate some sort of
attribute to it, but to us (ou ... afrr4>, ill' -iiµtv),4 because we have
something from it while the One is in itself (VI 9 (9],3,49-51).
The negative theology of the One aims at revealing what the One is not in
itself and thereby is distinct from the absolute transcendence of the One, which
indicates not only what it is not in itself but what it is to its effects. Different from
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them, what we call the positive description of the One's inner life is an affirmation
about what the One is in itself. The One, on the one hand, is the hyper-ontic, selfdirected ev€pyEux in itself. It, on the other, is the ouvcxµtc; nav-rwv to others. We
must notice that the ontological status of the One as the self-directed and selfabiding activity is essentially viable in the causal theory of double-activity; the One
is such activity not only in itself but to the activity from it.5 The ontological status of
the One as such thus represents the systematic link between what the One is in itself
and what it is to others. Since the ouvcxµtc; always implies the relation to its effects,
it does not describe what the One is in itself. Instead, the €v€pyEux does not have
such implication and so is suitable for the description of what the One is in itself.
We can perhaps say that the One's self-directed €v€pyEux, when it is seen in terms
of its effects, is rendered as the ouvaµtc; nav-rwv. In Chapter VI of Part II, we
maintained that if the One is not regarded as the primary activity, the doubleactivity theory loses its foundation. This claim may be understood to mean that the
description of what the One is to others cannot do without that of what it is in itself.
The One's Kai:cxv6flatc; or €nt130A.f\ is nothing other than the cognitive specification
of what it is in itself.
As a historical fact, the apophatic theology of Plotinus and the later

Neoplatonists has not been accepted in the West. According to Armstrong, the
aspect of this theology which is most difficult for Christian theologians, ancient or
modern, to accept, is that the One neither is apprehended by intellection nor itself
has intellection.6 On the other hand, Plotinus' doctrine of the One's hyper-noetic
knowledge was polytheistically developed by Proclus in his view of the henads'
hyper-intellective np6voto: (Elementatio Theologica, props. 120-124, 134, 141). But
the Christian theologians of the West, who have not accepted the Neoplatonic
negative theology, have not been in need of exploring any hyper-noetic mode of
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divine knowledge. In spite of such a historical fact, Armstrong holds that the
Neoplatonic negative theology
may have something very positive to contribute to theology in the
intellectual climate of our own period. It should not be necessary to say
much about the relativism and pluralism forced upon us by experience and
history which has made it impossible for most people who think seriously
in our world to believe that there are any incorrigible or infallible
propositions or statements, established by philosophical reason or
allegedly divine authority, which are in some way exempt from or
unchangeable by that "criticism without limits" of which Trouillard
speaks.7
Armstrong believes that the negative theology
may be able to do something towards repairing the appalling harm that
the maintenance of an absolutist and exclusive dogmatism, based on the
concept of God as Intelligible Being, has done to our religion, especially in
the last two centuries.8
The equal and equitable presence of the unthinkable and unspeakable
Good, continues Armstrong, not only stimulates and eludes our minds as we discuss
endlessly, but also eliminates some dishonest and arrogant devaluing to second-class
status of the values shown in the heterodox or non-Christians.9 Armstrong
summarizes the basic picture of the faith of this sort:
... the endless discussion which is our intellectual life, with the continual
intuitions of value which cannot be organized into a fixed, unchanging
universal system, can be seen as the everlasting dance of our minds in
their splendid and uncircumscribable diversity, through the ever-changing
glories of the creation, around the uncircumscribable Good.10
In a word, it is "the end of the claim to attain at any point to incorrigible
intellectual certainty, philosophical or theological" that the negative theology may
eventually bring forth.11
Armstrong's view, as he himself admits, is basically stimulated by the idea
of Trouillard, who directly draws the abolition of absolute truth from the negative
theology of the One:
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On aboutit ainsi a une disjonction entre l'ordre noetique et l'absolu. Le
Principe n'est pas Verite, comme le croira saint Augustin. 11 n'y pas de
verite absolue, puisque toute intelligibilite est derivee et frappee de
relativite.12
Trouillard further describes the consequence of the abolition of the
absolute truth for our thinking; a thinking subject which departs from the One is not
a "prisoner of the evidence," but entirely free from the noetic order, so that
"criticism without limits" is justifiably made possible for our thinking.13
In Plotinus, indeed, truth properly belongs to the intelligible world so that
the One is not the truth itself but the king of truth (V 5 [32],3, 18). But we wonder
why the abolition of the absolute truth can be concluded from the thesis that the
Absolute is not truth. Trouillard seems to understand the truth as the intelligibility
of the One. Plotinus, however, does not entertain the notion of truth as the
intelligibility of the One, but as the complete intelligibility of the Forms. Moreover,
what would Trouillard mean by the "relativity" of truth? The alleged relativity of
truth cannot be sufficiently explained solely by the discontinuity between the One
and the noetic order. Even if Trouillard's statement is spelled out such that "every
. intelligibility of the One is derivative and stamped by relativity because of the
discontinuity between the One and the noetic order," the statement cannot be a
convincing reason for the claim that "there is no absolute truth."
Let us yield an inch to Trouillard and admit that a kind of relativity is
imposed on the intelligibility of the One. As for the sense of the relativity of the
intelligibility of the One, we have the only way to think that each intellectual agent
contemplates the One from its own point of view. If so, we cannot see why the
relativity leads to the view that our thinking is free from the noetic order so that we
are not the "prisoner of the evidence." In addition to a leap noticed in his reasoning,
,.

we cannot understand why the relative intelligibility is more deserving of being
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called truth than is the evidence, which is the most prominent character of the
intellect-intelligible identity.
Even if it is admitted that every truth realized in the noetic realm is
relative, the relativity of truth does not necessarily mean its changeability. If one
wishes to conclude from the negative theology of the One "the end of the claim to
attain any point to incorrigible intellectual certainty," he must completely neglect
the Plotinian doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity and the Platonic theory of
Forms. To Plotinus' philosophy belongs not only the thesis that the One is not
known by intellection but also the thesis that Being is completely and transparently
knowable to us. If we, with Armstrong and Trouillard, wish to listen to the message
from Plotinus' negative theology to our own era, we, nolens volens, are forced to
sacrifice the very important aspect of his philosophy that represents his own reply to
the fundamental problem of philosophy, that is, the problem regarding the relation
between knowing subject and object known. With the immutable Forms abdicated
and the noetic cosmos abolished, a Plotinus so invoked in our age would be at best
Plotinus dimidiatus. l 4

It is certain that a negative theology is explicitly noticed in Plotinus'
doctrine of the One. But he does not purport to establish the total unknowability of
the One by means of the negative theology of his own. Plotinus mentions the
apophatic way as follows:
The knowledge of or contact with the Good (Ti ·rov aya9ov E'ti:E yv@au;;
E'iLE €na~i)) is the greatest thing, and Plato calls it "the greatest study,"
meaning by study not the vision of the Good, but learning something
about it beforehand. What teaches (ot06:aKouat) us, then, are analogies
(avaA.oyl.m) and negations (a~atp€attc;;) and knowledge of those which
derive from it and specific degrees of the ascent (aval3aaµol. i:tvEc;;), but
what advances (nopE\'.JOuat) us towards it are purifications and virtues and
adornments and securing footholds in the intelligible world and
establishing ourselves in it and feasting on it (VI 7 [38),36,3-10, tr. J.
Bussanich, adapted by A. Sumi).
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Plotinus would surely mean via analogiae, via negationis and via

eminentiae, which are formulated by the Middle Platonists, respectively by
exv<XAoy1.cxt, ex<j>cxtpE:crEtc; and CxV<X/3acrµot.15 To study about the Good is distinguished
actually from seeing it. Negations "teach" us about the Good and lead us to "the
knowledge of the Good." The via negationis neither makes us silent about the Good
nor thrusts the Good beyond the reach of our comprehension, but is .devoted to
nothing else than our "knowledge of the Good."16 For instance, the negation of
intelligibility to the Good is to constitute our "knowledge" that the Good is
something which is not apprehended by intellection. Although the Good is not
known by intellection, it is possible for us to know about it. "The knowledge of the
Good" may consist of the statements about what it is in itself, what it is not in itself,
and what it is to others. Each statement, insofar as it belongs to "the knowledge of
the Good," has a definite truth-value. Incidentally, Armstrong quotes a brief remark
from a paper which a student at Manhattanville College wrote in the 1960's:
Plotinus really did help me. My favorite thing about him is that he did not
organize his Good.17
According to our inquiry, on the contrary, Plotinus did organize his Good
in highly systematic fashion. He does work out ( E~Epy6:l:Ecr8at) the One. If the
traditional conception of God as Intelligible Being is called a dogma, Plotinus' view
that the One is the hyper-antic activity and cannot be known by intellection will be
at most another dogma. The apophatic theology ala Plotinus would not so nicely fit
the intellectual climate of our period colored by relativism and pluralism.
As Armstrong notices, to be sure, the awareness that we do not know
much about the Absolute makes our attitude towards other religions and cultures
more open-minded, tolerant, honest and modest. Absolutism and dogmatism do not
arise from the claims that there are unchanging, universal truths and that we can
attain to incorrigible intellectual certainty, but from the perverse absolutization and

363

fixation of our relative viewpoint and the violent universalization of some parochial
truths. Stubbornness and obstinacy in absolutism and dogmatism seem to be due to
the lack of effort to understand thoroughly the complete fact in favor of narrowminded adherence to the already established dogmae and the parochial truths. In
order to overcome such absolutism and dogmatism, it is necessary not merely to
make absolutists and dogmatists notice that their positions are simply relative but to
exhort them to make an effort to understand the complete fact more thoroughly.
But negative theology is not able to wake them up towards the further endeavor to
understand, because unknowable God can by no means be understood. The urge to
understand thoroughly must rather postulate the very possibility of understanding
universal truths entirely in incorrigible intellectual certainty, in a word, complete
intelligibility. We are urged to elevate our viewpoint strenuously, precisely because
the goal of our intellectual quest is marked by complete intelligibility. Plato's theory
of Forms and Plotinus' theory of the intellect-intelligible identity really open up the
perspective of our intellectual and ethical quest rather than bind us with some
stubborn dogmae. These philosophers are perennially sending not only to our own
age but to all the eras the message that the perspective of our intellectual and
ethical inquiry should not be closed. This message would be nothing but their

np01:pEm: tK6<;; A.6yo<;;.
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NOTES

lJ. Bussanich, "Plotinus on the Inner Life of the One," Ancient Philosophy
7 (1987):182-183.

2J. Bussanich,AncientPhi/osophy 7 (1987):182.
3Bussanich regards Plotinus' positive descriptions of the One's inner life
and negative theology of the One as complementary. But there are a couple of
assailable points in his view. Bussanich points out an aspect which is often forgotten
in discussion of the negative theology of the One:
"It is, quite simply, that negation can become a mental crutch if it leads to
an intellectual rigidity that sets limits on what the One can be. In other
words, the infinity, and even the unity, of the One is ultimately
compromised if we maintain that there is something the One is not.
Plotinus speaks of the One's omnipresence in part to eliminate this
tendency" (Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):183).
This observation is not convincing enough. Plotinus himself neither entertains the
view of the One's infinity as the unlimitedness in what it can be nor associates
omnipresence with its infinity. The negative theology must be considered to lead to
the liberation of the One from the limits imposed on lower entities; the statement
that the One is not such and such must mean that the One is free from or transcends
being-such-and-such rather than that it may be limited with respect to its not being
such and such. In Plotinus, negation exactly functions as the dissociating of the
factors, which imply multiplicity and finitude, from the One to insure its absolute
unity and transcendence. If the One is limited by the limits denied to it, its
transcendence will be totally meaningless. Moreover, Bussanich attempts to
reconcile the negative theology with his maximalist view of the One's inner life by
claiming as follows:
"To refer to what the One is in itself and how the soul might experience its
reality Plotinus seems to employ, particularly in vi 8 [39], a method that is
analogous to what the later Neoplatonists much more explicitly defined as
the negatio negationis" (Zoe. cit.).
Bussani ch presents the same view also in his comment on VI 8 [39), 16,3339, in The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, a Commentary on Selected
Texts, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), p. 220. We cannot see how Plotinus' positive and
revealing descriptions of the One's inner activity in VI 8 [39) are the cause of his
implicit practice of the negatio negationis. Armstrong rightly points out that the
negatio negationis, though clearly stated in VI 8 [39),9,39-41, is not often explicit in
Plotinus, in "The Negative Theology of Nous in Later Neoplatonism," in Platonismus
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und Christentum: Festschrift filr Heinrich Dorrie, ed. H. -D. Blume and F. Mann
(Munster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1983), p. 32, note 4. In sum,
Bussanich does not fully succeed in showing the complementary nature of the
positive and the negative descriptions of the One's knowledge. Instead we explored
the logical connections among various descriptions of the One's nature and activity
to ascertain the systematic consistency of the descriptions of two sorts. In other
words, the systematic consistency is fully acknowledged only when we maintain the
moderate view, whose advantages consist not only in its not compromising the
absolute unity and transcendence of the One, but also in its being based on more
careful and reasonable reading of the relevant texts.

4We take o:ui:4> and iiµt:v in line 50 as the dativus judicantis.
5Tue One is described as ouvo:µu;; mxvi:wv in the passages dealing with the
double-activity theory (V 4 [7],1,36; 2,38).
6A. H. Armstrong, "The Escape of the One: An Investigation of Some
Possibilities of Apophatic Theology Imperfectly Realised in the West," Studia
Patristica 13 (1975):79.
7A. H. Armstrong, Studia Patristica 13 (1975):87.
BA. H. Armstrong, Studia Patristica 13 (1975):88.
9A.H.

Armstrong, Studia Patristica 13 (1975):88.

lOA. H. Armstrong, Studia Patristica 13 (1975):89.
llA. H. Armstrong, Studia Patristica 13 (1975):88. Armstrong reiterates
the similar observation about the viability of negative theology in other articles. See
A.H. Armstrong, "Negative Theology, Myth and Incarnation," in Neoplatonism and
Christian Thought, ed. D. O'Meara (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1982), pp. 213-222; "Platonic Mirrors," Eranos 55 (1988):172-173; "On Not Knowing
too much about God," Philosophy, supplement 25 (1989):129-145.
12J. Trouillard, "Le Neoplatonisme," in Encyclopedie de la Pleiade: Histoire
de la Philosophie I, (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), p. 895.
13See note 8 in Chapter VIII of Part II.
14When the absolute transcendence of the One is considered in terms of
the metaphysics of light, the view diametrically opposed to Trouillard's comes out.
Blumenberg comments on Plato's metaphor of the sun as follows:
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"Licht wird nur an dem gesehen, was es sichtbar werden laBt; gerade das
macht die 'Natiirlichkeit' des Lichts aus, daB es erst mit der Sichtbarkeit
der Dinge seinem Sinn nach 'aufgeht,' selbst also nicht von der Art dessen
ist, was es hervorruft. Aber diese Differenz spielt schon bei Plato in
Transzendenz hiniiber; in Lichtmetapher ist die Lichtmetaphysik angelegt.
Die Aussageweise fiir die Natiirlichkeit der Wahrheit schlagt in ihr
Gegenteil um: Wahrheit wird in der Transzendenz 'lokalisiert'" ("Licht als
Metapher der Wahrheit: Im Vorfeld der philosophischen Begriffsbildung,"
Studium Generale 10 (1957):434).
As already mentioned, the absolute transcendence of the One indicates what it is
not in itself and what it is to others. As Trouillard holds, indeed, the One would not
be truth in itself. This view is nevertheless compatible with the view that the One is
the transcendent ground for the absolute truth to us. Therefore the conclusion that
there is not absolute truth to us is not necessarily drawn from the thesis that the One
is not the absolute truth in itself.
15See Plotins Schriften, iibersetzt von R. Harder, Neubearbeitung mit
griechischem Lesetext und Ammerkungen fortgefiihrt van R. Beutler und W.
Theiler, 6 vols. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1960-1967), 3b:511; and H. Dorrie, "Die
Frage nach dem Transzendenten im Mittelplatonismus," in Les Sources de Plotin,
(Geneva, Vandoevres: Fondation Hardt, 1957), p. 213. For more details about
three ways, see J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp.
194-195. Especially on the way of negation, see J. Bussanich, op. cit., pp. 113-115;
and P. Hadot, "Neoplatonist Spirituality: Plotinus and Porphyry," in Classical
Medite"anean Spirituality, ed. A. H. Armstrong (New York: Crossroad, 1986), p.
247.
Mosse-Bastide thinks that three ways are consistently employed in the
doctrine of the One's knowledge. She regards the One's Ka't'aV6f1crtc; and €nt130A.fl,
respectively in V 4 [7],2,15-19 and VI 7 [38],39,1-2, as somehow akin to intellection
and observes that Plotinus thereby completes the method of negations by that of
analogies (La Pensee Philosophique de Plotin (Paris: Bordas, 1972), p. 134). She
then concludes that the One's unEpV6f1crtc; in VI 8 [39],16,32 is based on the method
of ascending gradations, which is to complete that of analogies (op. cit., p. 135).
16Hadot characterizes negative theology in Plotinus as "only a rational
method of knowing" (Classical Medite"anean Spirituality, p. 247). Moreover, the
following remark by Macquarrie would be accurate: " ... but as happens in all
negative theology, Plotinus allows himself to say a good deal more about the
Absolute than the strict application of his own praise of silence would seem to
admit," In Search of Deity: An Essay in Dialectical Theism (New York: Crossroad,
1985), p. 66.
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17A.H.

Armstrong, Studia Patristica 13 (1975):88.
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